minicode-ai 0.9.26

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Files changed (162) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +935 -0
  2. package/LICENSE +21 -0
  3. package/README.md +200 -0
  4. package/cli/args.ts +195 -0
  5. package/cli/auto-update.ts +108 -0
  6. package/cli/commands/auth.ts +166 -0
  7. package/cli/commands/config.ts +382 -0
  8. package/cli/commands/doctor.ts +128 -0
  9. package/cli/commands/exec.ts +179 -0
  10. package/cli/commands/mcp.ts +35 -0
  11. package/cli/commands/memory.ts +107 -0
  12. package/cli/commands/pricing.ts +100 -0
  13. package/cli/commands/providers.ts +162 -0
  14. package/cli/commands/sessions.ts +128 -0
  15. package/cli/commands/skills.ts +61 -0
  16. package/cli/commands/stats.ts +82 -0
  17. package/cli/commands.ts +317 -0
  18. package/cli/index.ts +539 -0
  19. package/cli/model-manager.ts +112 -0
  20. package/cli/provider-manager.ts +111 -0
  21. package/cli/repl.ts +734 -0
  22. package/cli/router.ts +124 -0
  23. package/cli/setup.ts +780 -0
  24. package/cli/wizard.ts +21 -0
  25. package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.html +1222 -0
  26. package/docs/README.md +109 -0
  27. package/docs/architecture.md +44 -0
  28. package/docs/changelog.md +3 -0
  29. package/package.json +91 -0
  30. package/src/agents/pool.ts +43 -0
  31. package/src/app/mentions.ts +50 -0
  32. package/src/app/provider-layer.ts +118 -0
  33. package/src/app/rag-layer.ts +105 -0
  34. package/src/app/session.ts +154 -0
  35. package/src/app/tool-layer.ts +56 -0
  36. package/src/config.ts +372 -0
  37. package/src/constants.ts +119 -0
  38. package/src/hooks/run.ts +89 -0
  39. package/src/lib/atomic-write.ts +88 -0
  40. package/src/lib/db-path.ts +36 -0
  41. package/src/lib/git-hardening.ts +91 -0
  42. package/src/lib/ignore.ts +58 -0
  43. package/src/lib/keystore.ts +202 -0
  44. package/src/lib/net.ts +70 -0
  45. package/src/lib/safe-open.ts +138 -0
  46. package/src/lib/session-id.ts +23 -0
  47. package/src/lib/trash.ts +38 -0
  48. package/src/lib/trusted-exec.ts +81 -0
  49. package/src/lsp/client.ts +395 -0
  50. package/src/mcp/client.ts +400 -0
  51. package/src/mcp/http-transport.ts +344 -0
  52. package/src/mcp/server.ts +538 -0
  53. package/src/mcp/transport.ts +150 -0
  54. package/src/memory/files.ts +159 -0
  55. package/src/memory/vector.ts +775 -0
  56. package/src/policy/allowlist.ts +67 -0
  57. package/src/policy/bash-guard.ts +465 -0
  58. package/src/policy/compaction.ts +271 -0
  59. package/src/policy/context.ts +161 -0
  60. package/src/policy/executor.ts +199 -0
  61. package/src/policy/jail.ts +127 -0
  62. package/src/policy/permission.ts +517 -0
  63. package/src/policy/pricing.ts +336 -0
  64. package/src/policy/ratelimit.ts +54 -0
  65. package/src/policy/sandbox-policy.ts +157 -0
  66. package/src/policy/scrub.ts +138 -0
  67. package/src/policy/update-check.ts +200 -0
  68. package/src/policy/usage.ts +292 -0
  69. package/src/policy/verifier.ts +181 -0
  70. package/src/providers/anthropic.ts +401 -0
  71. package/src/providers/auth-store.ts +139 -0
  72. package/src/providers/build.ts +136 -0
  73. package/src/providers/detect.ts +126 -0
  74. package/src/providers/effort.ts +165 -0
  75. package/src/providers/guards.ts +107 -0
  76. package/src/providers/oauth.ts +326 -0
  77. package/src/providers/presets.ts +122 -0
  78. package/src/providers/provision.ts +298 -0
  79. package/src/providers/responses.ts +371 -0
  80. package/src/providers/router.ts +247 -0
  81. package/src/repo/repomap.ts +470 -0
  82. package/src/sandbox/docker.ts +129 -0
  83. package/src/sandbox/os.ts +193 -0
  84. package/src/session/checkpoint.ts +543 -0
  85. package/src/session/journal.ts +1347 -0
  86. package/src/session/persistence.ts +446 -0
  87. package/src/session/shadow-git.ts +351 -0
  88. package/src/session/turn-marker.ts +118 -0
  89. package/src/skills/loader.ts +117 -0
  90. package/src/telemetry/trace.ts +283 -0
  91. package/src/tools/ask_user.ts +54 -0
  92. package/src/tools/bash.ts +400 -0
  93. package/src/tools/code_run.ts +96 -0
  94. package/src/tools/delete_file.ts +31 -0
  95. package/src/tools/edit.ts +204 -0
  96. package/src/tools/git.ts +301 -0
  97. package/src/tools/glob.ts +90 -0
  98. package/src/tools/grep.ts +281 -0
  99. package/src/tools/hashline.ts +66 -0
  100. package/src/tools/index.ts +103 -0
  101. package/src/tools/lsp.ts +346 -0
  102. package/src/tools/mcp_call.ts +163 -0
  103. package/src/tools/memory.ts +144 -0
  104. package/src/tools/move_file.ts +47 -0
  105. package/src/tools/patch.ts +86 -0
  106. package/src/tools/read_file.ts +130 -0
  107. package/src/tools/read_image.ts +80 -0
  108. package/src/tools/submit_result.ts +49 -0
  109. package/src/tools/task.ts +346 -0
  110. package/src/tools/todo.ts +201 -0
  111. package/src/tools/web_fetch.ts +161 -0
  112. package/src/tools/web_search.ts +156 -0
  113. package/src/tools/write_file.ts +42 -0
  114. package/src/ui/approval/prompt.ts +76 -0
  115. package/src/ui/assistant/simple.ts +568 -0
  116. package/src/ui/assistant/turn-status.ts +303 -0
  117. package/src/ui/contract.ts +55 -0
  118. package/src/ui/footer.ts +105 -0
  119. package/src/ui/input/input.ts +805 -0
  120. package/src/ui/input/prompt-engine.ts +606 -0
  121. package/src/ui/render/collapse.ts +84 -0
  122. package/src/ui/render/detail.ts +24 -0
  123. package/src/ui/render/diff.ts +181 -0
  124. package/src/ui/render/errors.ts +239 -0
  125. package/src/ui/render/format.ts +54 -0
  126. package/src/ui/render/highlight.ts +294 -0
  127. package/src/ui/render/markdown.ts +120 -0
  128. package/src/ui/render/money.ts +12 -0
  129. package/src/ui/render/reasoning.ts +20 -0
  130. package/src/ui/render/sanitize.ts +80 -0
  131. package/src/ui/render/table.ts +88 -0
  132. package/src/ui/render/theme.ts +339 -0
  133. package/src/ui/render/width.ts +256 -0
  134. package/src/ui/render/wrap.ts +120 -0
  135. package/src/ui/runtime/bus-debug.ts +83 -0
  136. package/src/ui/runtime/chrome.ts +301 -0
  137. package/src/ui/runtime/spinner.ts +77 -0
  138. package/src/ui/runtime/statusline.ts +227 -0
  139. package/src/ui/screens/model-manager.ts +434 -0
  140. package/src/ui/screens/overlay.ts +61 -0
  141. package/src/ui/screens/picker.ts +307 -0
  142. package/src/ui/screens/provider-manager.ts +450 -0
  143. package/src/ui/screens/wizard.ts +132 -0
  144. package/vendor/minicore/VENDOR.md +29 -0
  145. package/vendor/minicore/package.json +21 -0
  146. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/budget.ts +26 -0
  147. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/compact.ts +76 -0
  148. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/errors.ts +60 -0
  149. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/events.ts +74 -0
  150. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/executor.ts +139 -0
  151. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/history.ts +32 -0
  152. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/index.ts +42 -0
  153. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/loop.ts +344 -0
  154. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/permission.ts +24 -0
  155. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/provider.ts +39 -0
  156. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/recovery.ts +34 -0
  157. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/session.ts +327 -0
  158. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/snapshot.ts +142 -0
  159. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tokens.ts +111 -0
  160. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tool.ts +118 -0
  161. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/types.ts +50 -0
  162. package/vendor/minicore/src/providers/openai-compat.ts +366 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
1
+ import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"
2
+ import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep } from "node:path"
3
+
4
+ // Satu sumber untuk aturan sandbox path — dipakai permission layer + setiap tool
5
+ // (defense-in-depth). File kredensial / direktori toolchain dianggap sensitif.
6
+ //
7
+ // Semua alternatif ter-anchor ke batas segmen (awal string atau setelah / \)
8
+ // dan bila relevan akhir path. Ini menutup bug operator-precedence lama di mana
9
+ // `node_modules` dan ekstensi `.pem/.key/.p12` match di mana saja tanpa anchor.
10
+ export const SENSITIVE_RE =
11
+ /(?:^|[/\\])(?:\.env(?:\.[a-z0-9_.-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.git[/\\](?:config|credentials)(?:[/\\]|$)|\.git-credentials$|\.npmrc(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.netrc(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.ssh(?:[/\\]|$)|\.aws(?:[/\\]|$)|\.kube(?:[/\\]|$)|\.docker[/\\]config\.json$|id_(?:rsa|ecdsa|ed25519|dsa)(?:\.(?:pub|ppk))?$|credentials\.json$|\.minicode[/\\]auth\.json$|secrets?\.(?:yaml|yml|json)$|terraform(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)*\.tfvars$|node_modules(?:[/\\]|$)|system32[/\\]config[/\\](?:sam|system|security|software|default)(?:[/\\]|$)|ntds\.dit$)|\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$/i
12
+
13
+ export function isSensitive(p: string): boolean {
14
+ return SENSITIVE_RE.test(p)
15
+ }
16
+
17
+ // State milik minicode sendiri (temuan audit #04, dikeraskan audit #13):
18
+ // sesi/DB/jejak/checkpoint/jurnal/todo/rencana/allowlist/config yang dikelola
19
+ // tool khusus (bukan file tools). File tool (write/edit/patch/delete/move)
20
+ // DILARANG menyentuh apa pun di bawah `.minicode/` — daftar-nama terbukti
21
+ // rapuh (kasus nyata: `write_file .minicode/test-write.txt` lolos karena
22
+ // namanya tak terdaftar). Kalau tidak, sub-agen (atau prompt-injected call)
23
+ // bisa menanam file eksport-mimikri, menimpa todos/rencana, allowlist
24
+ // ("always" palsu!), config (server MCP jahat!), atau membutakan recovery.
25
+ // BACA tetap boleh (observability/debug). Pola di-anchor ke segmen
26
+ // `.minicode/` agar file user bernama mirip di tempat lain tak kena.
27
+ // Pengecualian: skrip hooks milik user (.minicode/hooks/, lihat HOOKS_RE)
28
+ // dan restore dari `.minicode/.trash/` (ditangani di permission.ts, bukan
29
+ // di sini, agar arahnya eksplisit).
30
+ const OWNED_STATE_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode(?:[/\\]|$)/i
31
+
32
+ // Skrip hooks milik user (.minicode/hooks/): BUKAN state runtime — alur
33
+ // legit "buatkan hook" menulis lewat tool (dikunci test delegate-audit).
34
+ // Registrasi eksekusi tetap dikunci (allowlist.json owned), jadi file
35
+ // titipan tak jalan sendiri. skills//steering/MEMORY tetap terkunci:
36
+ // isinya ikut ke konteks (persistensi prompt-injection), user kelola via shell.
37
+ const HOOKS_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode[/\\]hooks(?:[/\\]|$)/i
38
+
39
+ export function isOwnedState(p: string): boolean {
40
+ return OWNED_STATE_RE.test(p) && !HOOKS_RE.test(p)
41
+ }
42
+
43
+ /**
44
+ * Restore sah dari soft-delete: sumber di `.minicode/.trash/`, tujuan di
45
+ * luar `.minicode/` (workspace). Satu-satunya arah gerak file tool yang
46
+ * boleh menyentuh state minicode — dipakai carve-out move_file di
47
+ * permission.ts. Tanpa ini kunci penuh mematahkan restore (atau sebaliknya
48
+ * celah bila arahnya dibalik: menanam ke trash = menulis state).
49
+ */
50
+ const TRASH_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode[/\\]\.trash(?:[/\\]|$)/i
51
+
52
+ export function isTrashRestore(from: string, to: string): boolean {
53
+ if (!from || !to) return false
54
+ return TRASH_RE.test(from) && !isOwnedState(to)
55
+ }
56
+
57
+ export function isPathOutsideRoot(p: string, root: string): boolean {
58
+ if (!p) return false
59
+ const abs = isAbsolute(p) ? resolve(p) : resolve(root, p)
60
+ const rel = relative(root, abs)
61
+ if (!rel) return false // same directory
62
+ if (isAbsolute(rel)) return true // different drive on Windows
63
+ return (
64
+ rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) || rel.startsWith("../") || rel.startsWith("..\\")
65
+ )
66
+ }
67
+
68
+ /**
69
+ * Cek jail berbasis REALPATH — symlink yang menunjuk keluar workspace
70
+ * terdeteksi di sini, bukan hanya di dalam tiap tool (defense-in-depth tetap).
71
+ * Bila path belum ada (ENOENT — mis. write_file file baru), fallback ke cek
72
+ * logis agar kasus penulisan file baru tetap diizinkan.
73
+ */
74
+ export function isRealPathOutsideRoot(p: string, root: string): boolean {
75
+ if (!p) return false
76
+ const abs = isAbsolute(p) ? resolve(p) : resolve(root, p)
77
+ // Symlink/hardlink di Windows lolos realpath pre-check TOCTOU — tolak langsung.
78
+ if (isDangerousLink(abs)) return true
79
+ try {
80
+ const real = realpathSync(abs)
81
+ const realRoot = realpathSync(resolve(root))
82
+ return isPathOutsideRoot(real, realRoot)
83
+ } catch {
84
+ return isPathOutsideRoot(p, root)
85
+ }
86
+ }
87
+
88
+ export function isCwdOutsideRoot(cwd: string, root: string): boolean {
89
+ try {
90
+ const realCwd = realpathSync(resolve(root, cwd))
91
+ const realRoot = realpathSync(resolve(root))
92
+ return isPathOutsideRoot(realCwd, realRoot)
93
+ } catch {
94
+ // if realpath fails (ENOENT), fallback to logical check (treated as outside to be safe if non-existent)
95
+ return isPathOutsideRoot(cwd, root)
96
+ }
97
+ }
98
+
99
+ // P0-3: Windows tidak punya O_NOFOLLOW — TOCTOU symlink di Windows hanya
100
+ // bisa ditahan via lstat pre-check. Hardlink (nlink>1) juga berbahaya karena
101
+ // realpath tak melihatnya (hardlink = nama lain file yang sama).
102
+ export function isSymlink(p: string): boolean {
103
+ try {
104
+ return lstatSync(p).isSymbolicLink()
105
+ } catch {
106
+ return false
107
+ }
108
+ }
109
+
110
+ export function isHardlink(p: string): boolean {
111
+ try {
112
+ const s = lstatSync(p)
113
+ // Direktori punya nlink >= 2 di POSIX (entri `.` + tiap subdir) — itu
114
+ // BUKAN hardlink (hardlink direktori tak bisa dibuat user). Tanpa
115
+ // pengecualian ini tiap argumen cwd direktori yang sah ditolak
116
+ // isRealPathOutsideRoot di Linux/macOS, sementara Windows (nlink dir
117
+ // biasanya 1) lolos — bug hanya terlihat di POSIX.
118
+ if (s.isDirectory()) return false
119
+ return ((s as unknown as { nlink?: number }).nlink ?? 1) > 1
120
+ } catch {
121
+ return false
122
+ }
123
+ }
124
+
125
+ export function isDangerousLink(p: string): boolean {
126
+ return isSymlink(p) || isHardlink(p)
127
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
1
+ import { resolve } from "node:path"
2
+ import { cwd } from "node:process"
3
+ import type { PermissionHandler, ToolCall } from "#minicore"
4
+ import { loadAllowlist, matchAllowlist, saveAllowlist } from "./allowlist.ts"
5
+ import { inspectBashCommand } from "./bash-guard.ts"
6
+ import {
7
+ isCwdOutsideRoot,
8
+ isOwnedState,
9
+ isRealPathOutsideRoot,
10
+ isSensitive,
11
+ isTrashRestore,
12
+ } from "./jail.ts"
13
+
14
+ export type PermissionMode = "auto" | "readonly" | "plan" | "allow-all" | "ask" | "allowlist"
15
+
16
+ /**
17
+ * View persetujuan yang di-inject dari composition root (cli/setup.ts memakai
18
+ * src/ui/approval/prompt.ts). Policy layer tidak pernah mengimpor UI langsung;
19
+ * tanpa injeksi jawabannya selalu deny (headless), sama dengan perilaku
20
+ * non-TTY sebelumnya.
21
+ */
22
+ export type PermissionAsk = (call: {
23
+ name: string
24
+ args?: unknown
25
+ }) => Promise<"allow" | "deny" | "always">
26
+
27
+ const READONLY_TOOLS = new Set([
28
+ "read_file",
29
+ "glob",
30
+ "grep",
31
+ "git_status",
32
+ "git_diff",
33
+ "git_log",
34
+ "web_fetch",
35
+ "web_search",
36
+ "read_memory",
37
+ "todo_read",
38
+ "mcp_list",
39
+ "lsp_diagnostics",
40
+ "lsp_definition",
41
+ "lsp_references",
42
+ "lsp_hover",
43
+ "lsp_symbols",
44
+ "lsp_workspace_symbols",
45
+ "read_image",
46
+ ])
47
+ // Tool yang menulis state internal minicode (bukan file workspace) — aman
48
+ // di semua mode kecuali readonly/plan. `bash_kill` menghentikan proses yang
49
+ // dimulai agent sendiri, jadi tidak menambah permukaan serangan.
50
+ const INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS = new Set([
51
+ "write_memory",
52
+ "forget_memory",
53
+ "todo_write",
54
+ "submit_result",
55
+ "bash_output",
56
+ "bash_kill",
57
+ ])
58
+
59
+ const FILE_WRITE_TOOLS = new Set(["write_file", "edit", "apply_patch", "move_file", "delete_file"])
60
+
61
+ // Subset INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS yang juga tidak perlu prompt di mode `ask`.
62
+ // `write_memory`/`forget_memory` TIDAK termasuk: itu menulis MEMORY.md yang
63
+ // persisten lintas sesi, jadi user berhak menyetujuinya. `submit_result`
64
+ // termasuk: ia hanya menyerahkan jawaban akhir, tanpa efek samping.
65
+ const NO_PROMPT_TOOLS = new Set(["todo_write", "submit_result", "bash_output", "bash_kill"])
66
+
67
+ // Tool yang memperbesar serangan / menembus dunia luar: tidak auto-allowed.
68
+ //
69
+ // `git_commit` ada di sini karena commit mengubah riwayat yang dibagikan —
70
+ // bukan sekadar file kerja. Di mode `auto` ia meminta persetujuan sekali
71
+ // (jawab `[a] Always` untuk persist), dan ditolak di readonly/plan/allowlist.
72
+ //
73
+ // `mcp_read`/`mcp_prompt` juga di-gate meski read-only: keduanya menarik konten
74
+ // dari server pihak ketiga langsung ke konteks model, yang merupakan jalur
75
+ // prompt-injection. `mcp_list` TIDAK di-gate karena hanya melaporkan metadata
76
+ // server yang sudah user daftarkan sendiri.
77
+ //
78
+ // `ask_user` di-gate: model yang bisa bertanya tanpa batas bisa membanjiri
79
+ // user (atau memancing jawaban kredensial) — persetujuan sekali per sesi
80
+ // via `[a] Always` tetap tersedia.
81
+ const GATED_TOOLS = new Set([
82
+ "delegate_task",
83
+ "mcp_call",
84
+ "mcp_read",
85
+ "mcp_prompt",
86
+ "git_commit",
87
+ "ask_user",
88
+ ])
89
+
90
+ // Denylist bash kini di src/policy/bash-guard.ts — pemeriksaan dilakukan pada
91
+ // bentuk TERNORMALISASI (quote dibuang, variabel sederhana disubstitusi), bukan
92
+ // string mentah. Regex-atas-string-mentah yang lama trivially dilewati oleh
93
+ // `cat .e""nv`, `X=.env; cat $X`, `p=python3; $p -c 1`, dan `node --eval`.
94
+
95
+ // Perintah yang dianggap aman di mode `allowlist` — mode paling ketat, dipakai
96
+ // saat menjalankan task tak terpercaya. Isinya sengaja **read-only + build**:
97
+ // operasi tulis (`rm`, `mv`, `cp`, `mkdir`) TIDAK di sini, karena tujuan mode
98
+ // ini memang menahan efek samping. Agent yang butuh menulis file punya
99
+ // `write_file`/`edit` yang ter-jail, bukan shell.
100
+ //
101
+ // Perhatikan: allowlist diperiksa SETELAH bash-guard, jadi `cat *` di sini
102
+ // tidak berarti `cat .env` lolos — guard menolaknya lebih dulu. Pola di sini
103
+ // soal "bentuk perintah apa yang boleh", bukan "target apa yang boleh".
104
+ const DEFAULT_BASH_ALLOWLIST = [
105
+ "git status*",
106
+ "git diff*",
107
+ "git log*",
108
+ "git branch*",
109
+ "git show*",
110
+ "bun test*",
111
+ "bun x tsc*",
112
+ "bun run *",
113
+ "npm run *",
114
+ "npm exec *",
115
+ "npx *",
116
+ "echo *",
117
+ "ls*",
118
+ "dir*",
119
+ "pwd",
120
+ "cat *",
121
+ // `type` = padanan `cat` di cmd.exe Windows (deskripsi tool bash menyuruh
122
+ // model memakainya) — tanpanya tiap baca berkas via shell di Windows
123
+ // gagal allowlist walau guard sudah menganggapnya reader aman.
124
+ "type *",
125
+ "head *",
126
+ "tail *",
127
+ "wc *",
128
+ "grep *",
129
+ "rg *",
130
+ "find *",
131
+ "which *",
132
+ "node --version",
133
+ "bun --version",
134
+ ]
135
+
136
+ // 6.4 — npm exec / npx hanya di-allow bila arg "known-good": tak ada
137
+ // ekspansi shell ($/backtick) atau redirection (< >). Chaining ;|& sudah
138
+ // diblokir oleh matchBashAllowlist (pattern tak mengandungnya).
139
+ // Berlaku juga untuk `bun run`/`bun x`: keduanya menjalankan script/paket
140
+ // arbitrer dari package.json repo — tanpa cek ini `bun run test` di repo
141
+ // jahat lolos dengan ekspansi shell di argumennya.
142
+ function npmNpxSafe(cmd: string): boolean {
143
+ return !/[`$<>]/.test(cmd)
144
+ }
145
+
146
+ function matchBashAllowlist(cmd: string, pattern: string): boolean {
147
+ // prevent shell chaining bypass: if cmd contains ; & | and pattern does not explicitly allow them, deny.
148
+ // F-20: newline adalah chaining juga (`echo hi\nenv`) — pola allowlist tak
149
+ // pernah mengandung newline sehingga multiline selalu deny di mode ini
150
+ // (fail-closed untuk mode paling ketat; skrip multiline sah milik auto).
151
+ const trimmed = cmd.trim()
152
+ if (/[;&|\n]/.test(trimmed) && !/[;&|]/.test(pattern)) return false
153
+ const re = new RegExp(
154
+ `^${pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*")}$`,
155
+ "i",
156
+ )
157
+ return re.test(trimmed)
158
+ }
159
+
160
+ export function createPermissionHandler(
161
+ opts: {
162
+ mode?: PermissionMode
163
+ root?: string
164
+ ask?: PermissionAsk
165
+ /** Teruskan flag --allow-local-config: allowlist lokal hanya dibaca bila
166
+ * operator opt-in (default deny — repo tak bisa memberi dirinya always). */
167
+ allowLocalConfig?: boolean
168
+ } = {},
169
+ ): PermissionHandler {
170
+ const state = { mode: (opts.mode ?? "auto") as PermissionMode }
171
+ const root = resolve(opts.root ?? cwd())
172
+ const askUser = opts.ask
173
+ const allowLocal = opts.allowLocalConfig === true
174
+ let allowlistCache: string[] | null = null
175
+ // Persetujuan "always" sesi ini — in-memory, bukan dari disk. Tanpa ini,
176
+ // jawaban always yang baru disimpan ke berkas lokal tak terlihat saat local
177
+ // config nonaktif, dan user ditanya berulang untuk call yang sama.
178
+ const sessionGrants: string[] = []
179
+ // bash allowlist di-cache sekali (bukan baca env tiap panggilan)
180
+ const envRaw = process.env.MINICODE_BASH_ALLOWLIST
181
+ const bashAllowlist = envRaw
182
+ ? envRaw
183
+ .split(",")
184
+ .map((s) => s.trim())
185
+ .filter(Boolean)
186
+ : DEFAULT_BASH_ALLOWLIST
187
+
188
+ async function getAllowlist(): Promise<string[]> {
189
+ if (allowlistCache) return allowlistCache
190
+ try {
191
+ const l = await loadAllowlist(root, { allowLocal: allowLocal })
192
+ allowlistCache = [...l.allowed, ...sessionGrants]
193
+ return allowlistCache
194
+ } catch {
195
+ return [...sessionGrants]
196
+ }
197
+ }
198
+
199
+ function isGated(name: string): boolean {
200
+ // Semua tool bertitik (MCP — terdaftar maupun tidak) = gated. Server jahat
201
+ // tidak boleh mendapat auto-allow hanya karena namanya terdaftar.
202
+ return GATED_TOOLS.has(name) || name.includes(".")
203
+ }
204
+
205
+ // Alasan deny per-call untuk seam kernel describeDenial (audit #14):
206
+ // check() TETAP mengembalikan "deny" polos (kontrak Decision + semua
207
+ // assertion tak berubah); alasannya dibaca kernel tepat setelah deny via
208
+ // describeDenial(call) sehingga observasi model menjadi actionable
209
+ // ("permission denied: bash-guard: destructive rm") alih-alih retry buta.
210
+ // Map dibatasi + hapus-saat-baca agar abort di tengah tak bocor memori.
211
+ const denyReasons = new Map<string, string>()
212
+ function noteDeny(call: ToolCall, reason: string): void {
213
+ try {
214
+ const id = (call as { id?: string } | null)?.id
215
+ if (!id) return
216
+ if (denyReasons.size > 500) denyReasons.delete(denyReasons.keys().next().value as string)
217
+ denyReasons.set(id, reason.slice(0, 160))
218
+ } catch {}
219
+ }
220
+ function deny(call: ToolCall, reason: string): "deny" {
221
+ noteDeny(call, reason)
222
+ return "deny"
223
+ }
224
+ function takeDenyReason(call: ToolCall): string | undefined {
225
+ try {
226
+ const id = (call as { id?: string } | null)?.id
227
+ if (!id) return undefined
228
+ const r = denyReasons.get(id)
229
+ denyReasons.delete(id)
230
+ return r
231
+ } catch {
232
+ return undefined
233
+ }
234
+ }
235
+ function bashDenyReason(cmd: string): string | null {
236
+ if (!cmd.trim()) return "empty command"
237
+ try {
238
+ const v = inspectBashCommand(cmd, root)
239
+ return v.denied ? (v.reason ?? "blocked command") : null
240
+ } catch {
241
+ return null
242
+ }
243
+ }
244
+
245
+ function saveAlways(call: ToolCall): Promise<void> {
246
+ // Simpan kunci PENUH (tanpa slice) agar simetris dengan matchAllowlist.
247
+ // Arg raksasa (>2KB JSON, mis. write_file 1MB) tidak disimpan sama sekali
248
+ // (fail-closed, minta persetujuan tiap kali) — kalau tidak allowlist.json
249
+ // membengkak dan "always" menjadi blanket-allow untuk konten apa pun.
250
+ const argsJson = JSON.stringify(call.args)
251
+ if (argsJson.length > 2000) return Promise.resolve()
252
+ const key = `${call.name}:${argsJson}`
253
+ if (!sessionGrants.includes(key)) sessionGrants.push(key)
254
+ allowlistCache = null
255
+ return saveAllowlist(key, root).catch(() => {})
256
+ }
257
+
258
+ // data-driven: tiap mode = satu fungsi keputusan (tanpa cabang saling tumpang tindih).
259
+ // Param ketiga = signal turn (opsional): prompt yang belum terjawab saat
260
+ // sesi dibatalkan harus kalah oleh abort (deny), bukan menunggu jawaban.
261
+ const handlers: Record<
262
+ PermissionMode,
263
+ (
264
+ call: ToolCall,
265
+ args: Record<string, unknown> | null,
266
+ signal?: AbortSignal,
267
+ ) => Promise<"allow" | "deny">
268
+ > = {
269
+ "allow-all": async () => "allow",
270
+ readonly: async (call) =>
271
+ READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ? "allow" : deny(call, "read-only mode"),
272
+ // Plan = readonly + tiga perkecualian aman: todo_write (artefak rencana
273
+ // .minicode/plans, bukan file workspace), delegate_task (penelahan
274
+ // rencana, bukan eksekusi — dipaksa explore/read-only di task.ts bila
275
+ // parent plan/readonly, permission hanya membuka gerbangnya), dan
276
+ // submit_result (singleton memori-proses untuk exec --json, tanpa tulis
277
+ // file/state sesi; terlihat di PLAN_EXTRA tool-layer jadi harus boleh).
278
+ plan: async (call) =>
279
+ READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ||
280
+ call.name === "todo_write" ||
281
+ call.name === "delegate_task" ||
282
+ call.name === "submit_result"
283
+ ? "allow"
284
+ : deny(call, "plan mode"),
285
+ allowlist: async (call, args) => {
286
+ if (call.name === "bash") {
287
+ const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
288
+ const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
289
+ if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
290
+ const matched = bashAllowlist.filter((pat) => matchBashAllowlist(cmd, pat))
291
+ // Alasan actionable (keluhan eval: "no matching pattern" tanpa jalan
292
+ // keluar membuat model retry buta): tulis/baca file = pakai tool file
293
+ // terjail; shell penuh = operator pilih --allow-all/--sandbox docker.
294
+ if (matched.length === 0)
295
+ return deny(
296
+ call,
297
+ `allowlist: no matching pattern for "${cmd.slice(0, 80)}" — file work: use read_file/write_file/edit; full shell: rerun with --allow-all / --sandbox docker / MINICODE_BASH_ALLOWLIST`,
298
+ )
299
+ if (matched.some((p) => /^(npx|npm exec|bun x|bun run)\b/i.test(p)) && !npmNpxSafe(cmd))
300
+ return deny(call, "allowlist: npm/npx unsafe")
301
+ return "allow"
302
+ }
303
+ if (isGated(call.name)) return deny(call, "allowlist: gated tool")
304
+ if (FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
305
+ if (INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
306
+ return READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ? "allow" : deny(call, "allowlist: not allowed here")
307
+ },
308
+ ask: async (call, args, signal) => {
309
+ if (READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
310
+ // Bookkeeping internal tidak menyentuh workspace: todo list dan kontrol
311
+ // job yang izinnya sudah diberikan saat `bash` dijalankan. Meminta
312
+ // konfirmasi untuk ini hanya melelahkan tanpa menambah keamanan.
313
+ if (NO_PROMPT_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
314
+ const list = await getAllowlist()
315
+ if (matchAllowlist(call, list)) return "allow"
316
+ if (call.name === "bash") {
317
+ const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
318
+ const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
319
+ if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
320
+ } else if (isGated(call.name)) {
321
+ return await promptAskOr(call, () => deny(call, "gated approval unavailable"), signal)
322
+ }
323
+ const ans = askUser ? await raceAbort(askUser(call), signal) : "deny"
324
+ if (ans === "always") {
325
+ await saveAlways(call)
326
+ return "allow"
327
+ }
328
+ return ans === "allow" ? "allow" : "deny"
329
+ },
330
+ auto: async (call, args, signal) => {
331
+ if (READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
332
+ if (isGated(call.name))
333
+ return await promptAskOr(call, () => deny(call, "gated approval unavailable"), signal)
334
+ if (FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
335
+ if (INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
336
+ if (call.name === "code_run") {
337
+ const sb = process.env.MINICODE_SANDBOX ?? ""
338
+ if (sb !== "os" && sb !== "docker" && sb !== "bwrap" && sb !== "seatbelt")
339
+ return deny(call, "code_run needs sandbox (os|docker)")
340
+ return "allow"
341
+ }
342
+ if (call.name === "bash") {
343
+ const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
344
+ const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
345
+ if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
346
+ return "allow"
347
+ }
348
+ return "deny"
349
+ },
350
+ }
351
+
352
+ const returned = {
353
+ async check(call: ToolCall, _deps?: unknown): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
354
+ const earlyArgs = call.args as Record<string, unknown> | null
355
+ // Cancellation sebelum eksekusi mengalahkan segalanya: approval yang
356
+ // datang terlambat (atau sesi yang sudah detach) tidak boleh membuka
357
+ // gerbang. Kernel meneruskan signal turn di deps (executor kernel).
358
+ const signal = (_deps as { signal?: AbortSignal } | null | undefined)?.signal
359
+ if (signal?.aborted) return "deny"
360
+
361
+ // universal file-path jail — harus sebelum allow-all (defense-in-depth)
362
+ // realpath-based: symlink keluar workspace tetap tertangkap walau --allow-all
363
+ if (
364
+ call.name === "write_file" ||
365
+ call.name === "edit" ||
366
+ call.name === "apply_patch" ||
367
+ call.name === "read_file" ||
368
+ call.name === "delete_file"
369
+ ) {
370
+ const p = (earlyArgs?.path as string) ?? ""
371
+ if (!p) return "deny"
372
+ if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(p, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
373
+ if (isSensitive(p)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
374
+ }
375
+ // move_file punya dua ujung (from+to): keduanya dijail. `to` yang belum
376
+ // ada jatuh ke cek logis di isRealPathOutsideRoot (fallback ENOENT).
377
+ if (call.name === "move_file") {
378
+ const f = (earlyArgs?.from as string) ?? ""
379
+ const t = (earlyArgs?.to as string) ?? ""
380
+ if (!f || !t) return "deny"
381
+ if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(f, root) || isRealPathOutsideRoot(t, root))
382
+ return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
383
+ if (isSensitive(f) || isSensitive(t)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
384
+ }
385
+ if (call.name.startsWith("lsp_")) {
386
+ const f = (earlyArgs?.file as string) ?? ""
387
+ if (f && isRealPathOutsideRoot(f, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
388
+ if (f && isSensitive(f)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
389
+ }
390
+ const cwdArg = (earlyArgs?.cwd as string) ?? ""
391
+ if (
392
+ cwdArg &&
393
+ (call.name === "bash" ||
394
+ call.name === "glob" ||
395
+ call.name === "grep" ||
396
+ call.name.startsWith("git_"))
397
+ ) {
398
+ if (isCwdOutsideRoot(cwdArg, root) || isRealPathOutsideRoot(cwdArg, root))
399
+ return deny(call, "jail: cwd outside workspace")
400
+ }
401
+ // git_commit: path yang di-stage juga dijail, bukan hanya cwd.
402
+ if (call.name === "git_commit" && Array.isArray(earlyArgs?.paths)) {
403
+ for (const p of earlyArgs.paths as unknown[]) {
404
+ if (typeof p !== "string") continue
405
+ if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(p, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
406
+ if (isSensitive(p)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
407
+ }
408
+ }
409
+ // State milik minicode (temuan audit #04, dikeraskan audit #13):
410
+ // tool TULIS file dilarang menyentuh apa pun di bawah `.minicode/`
411
+ // (dulu daftar-nama: `test-write.txt` lolos). Tanpa ini sub-agen (atau
412
+ // call ter-injeksi) bisa menanam file, menimpa todos/rencana,
413
+ // menanam allowlist "always", mendaftarkan server MCP via config,
414
+ // atau membutakan recovery (jurnal/checkpoint) lewat jalur jinak.
415
+ // Berlaku di SEMUA mode termasuk allow-all (jail mendahului mode).
416
+ // BACA tetap boleh; tool khusus (todo/memory/config/undo) tak lewat
417
+ // gerbang ini sehingga alur legit tetap jalan. Pengecualian:
418
+ // restore `.minicode/.trash/` → workspace (isTrashRestore) dan skrip
419
+ // hooks `.minicode/hooks/` (HOOKS_RE di jail.ts — registrasi eksekusi
420
+ // tetap dikunci via allowlist.json yang owned).
421
+ if (
422
+ call.name === "write_file" ||
423
+ call.name === "edit" ||
424
+ call.name === "apply_patch" ||
425
+ call.name === "delete_file" ||
426
+ call.name === "move_file"
427
+ ) {
428
+ // Restore dari trash (.minicode/.trash/ → workspace) adalah satu-
429
+ // satunya gerak sah menyentuh state — selain itu dua arah deny.
430
+ if (call.name === "move_file") {
431
+ const f = (earlyArgs?.from as string) ?? ""
432
+ const t = (earlyArgs?.to as string) ?? ""
433
+ if (isTrashRestore(f, t)) {
434
+ // lanjut ke mode check di bawah (ask/auto tetap berlaku)
435
+ } else if ((f !== "" && isOwnedState(f)) || (t !== "" && isOwnedState(t))) {
436
+ return deny(call, "jail: owned state")
437
+ }
438
+ } else {
439
+ const p = (earlyArgs?.path as string) ?? ""
440
+ if (p !== "" && isOwnedState(p)) return deny(call, "jail: owned state")
441
+ }
442
+ }
443
+
444
+ const mode = state.mode
445
+ if (mode === "allow-all") {
446
+ // allow-all tetap menolak bash berbahaya — izin penuh bukan berarti
447
+ // mengizinkan `rm -rf /` atau fork bomb. Yang dicek di sini FULL
448
+ // inspectBashCommand (bukan sebagian), sama seperti mode lain.
449
+ if (call.name === "bash") {
450
+ const cmd = (earlyArgs?.cmd as string) ?? ""
451
+ // allow-all + cmd kosong = allow (perilaku lama dipertahankan).
452
+ if (cmd.trim()) {
453
+ const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
454
+ if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
455
+ }
456
+ }
457
+ return "allow"
458
+ }
459
+
460
+ return handlers[state.mode](call, earlyArgs, signal)
461
+ },
462
+ // Kontrol mode saat runtime (Shift+Tab di TUI). Sebelumnya kedua method ini
463
+ // hanya ada di type-cast tanpa implementasi, sehingga pemanggilnya no-op /
464
+ // TypeError dan mode permission tidak pernah benar-benar berubah.
465
+ __setMode(m: PermissionMode): void {
466
+ state.mode = m
467
+ allowlistCache = null
468
+ },
469
+ __getMode(): PermissionMode {
470
+ return state.mode
471
+ },
472
+ // Seam kernel describeDenial: alasan deny terakhir call ini (dicatat
473
+ // check() via deny()). Hapus-saat-baca; tak ada catatan = undefined =
474
+ // pesan deny polos seperti dulu.
475
+ describeDenial(call: ToolCall): string | undefined {
476
+ return takeDenyReason(call)
477
+ },
478
+ }
479
+ return returned as unknown as PermissionHandler & {
480
+ __setMode(m: PermissionMode): void
481
+ __getMode(): PermissionMode
482
+ describeDenial(call: ToolCall): string | undefined
483
+ }
484
+
485
+ // Balapan prompt melawan abort: jawaban yang tiba SETELAH sesi dibatalkan
486
+ // tidak boleh membuka gerbang (late approval = deny). Tanpa ini, user yang
487
+ // menekan [y] sepersekian detik setelah Ctrl+C tetap mengeksekusi tool.
488
+ function raceAbort<T>(p: Promise<T>, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<T | "aborted"> {
489
+ if (!signal) return p
490
+ if (signal.aborted) return Promise.resolve("aborted")
491
+ return Promise.race([
492
+ p,
493
+ new Promise<"aborted">((res) =>
494
+ signal.addEventListener("abort", () => res("aborted"), { once: true }),
495
+ ),
496
+ ])
497
+ }
498
+
499
+ async function promptAskOr(
500
+ call: ToolCall,
501
+ noTty: () => "deny",
502
+ signal?: AbortSignal,
503
+ ): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
504
+ if (signal?.aborted) return noTty()
505
+ if (!askUser) return noTty()
506
+ if (!process.stdin.isTTY) return noTty()
507
+ const list = await getAllowlist()
508
+ if (matchAllowlist(call, list)) return "allow"
509
+ const ans = await raceAbort(askUser(call), signal)
510
+ if (ans === "aborted") return "deny"
511
+ if (ans === "always") {
512
+ await saveAlways(call)
513
+ return "allow"
514
+ }
515
+ return ans === "allow" ? "allow" : deny(call, "declined by user")
516
+ }
517
+ }