minicode-ai 0.9.26
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +935 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +200 -0
- package/cli/args.ts +195 -0
- package/cli/auto-update.ts +108 -0
- package/cli/commands/auth.ts +166 -0
- package/cli/commands/config.ts +382 -0
- package/cli/commands/doctor.ts +128 -0
- package/cli/commands/exec.ts +179 -0
- package/cli/commands/mcp.ts +35 -0
- package/cli/commands/memory.ts +107 -0
- package/cli/commands/pricing.ts +100 -0
- package/cli/commands/providers.ts +162 -0
- package/cli/commands/sessions.ts +128 -0
- package/cli/commands/skills.ts +61 -0
- package/cli/commands/stats.ts +82 -0
- package/cli/commands.ts +317 -0
- package/cli/index.ts +539 -0
- package/cli/model-manager.ts +112 -0
- package/cli/provider-manager.ts +111 -0
- package/cli/repl.ts +734 -0
- package/cli/router.ts +124 -0
- package/cli/setup.ts +780 -0
- package/cli/wizard.ts +21 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.html +1222 -0
- package/docs/README.md +109 -0
- package/docs/architecture.md +44 -0
- package/docs/changelog.md +3 -0
- package/package.json +91 -0
- package/src/agents/pool.ts +43 -0
- package/src/app/mentions.ts +50 -0
- package/src/app/provider-layer.ts +118 -0
- package/src/app/rag-layer.ts +105 -0
- package/src/app/session.ts +154 -0
- package/src/app/tool-layer.ts +56 -0
- package/src/config.ts +372 -0
- package/src/constants.ts +119 -0
- package/src/hooks/run.ts +89 -0
- package/src/lib/atomic-write.ts +88 -0
- package/src/lib/db-path.ts +36 -0
- package/src/lib/git-hardening.ts +91 -0
- package/src/lib/ignore.ts +58 -0
- package/src/lib/keystore.ts +202 -0
- package/src/lib/net.ts +70 -0
- package/src/lib/safe-open.ts +138 -0
- package/src/lib/session-id.ts +23 -0
- package/src/lib/trash.ts +38 -0
- package/src/lib/trusted-exec.ts +81 -0
- package/src/lsp/client.ts +395 -0
- package/src/mcp/client.ts +400 -0
- package/src/mcp/http-transport.ts +344 -0
- package/src/mcp/server.ts +538 -0
- package/src/mcp/transport.ts +150 -0
- package/src/memory/files.ts +159 -0
- package/src/memory/vector.ts +775 -0
- package/src/policy/allowlist.ts +67 -0
- package/src/policy/bash-guard.ts +465 -0
- package/src/policy/compaction.ts +271 -0
- package/src/policy/context.ts +161 -0
- package/src/policy/executor.ts +199 -0
- package/src/policy/jail.ts +127 -0
- package/src/policy/permission.ts +517 -0
- package/src/policy/pricing.ts +336 -0
- package/src/policy/ratelimit.ts +54 -0
- package/src/policy/sandbox-policy.ts +157 -0
- package/src/policy/scrub.ts +138 -0
- package/src/policy/update-check.ts +200 -0
- package/src/policy/usage.ts +292 -0
- package/src/policy/verifier.ts +181 -0
- package/src/providers/anthropic.ts +401 -0
- package/src/providers/auth-store.ts +139 -0
- package/src/providers/build.ts +136 -0
- package/src/providers/detect.ts +126 -0
- package/src/providers/effort.ts +165 -0
- package/src/providers/guards.ts +107 -0
- package/src/providers/oauth.ts +326 -0
- package/src/providers/presets.ts +122 -0
- package/src/providers/provision.ts +298 -0
- package/src/providers/responses.ts +371 -0
- package/src/providers/router.ts +247 -0
- package/src/repo/repomap.ts +470 -0
- package/src/sandbox/docker.ts +129 -0
- package/src/sandbox/os.ts +193 -0
- package/src/session/checkpoint.ts +543 -0
- package/src/session/journal.ts +1347 -0
- package/src/session/persistence.ts +446 -0
- package/src/session/shadow-git.ts +351 -0
- package/src/session/turn-marker.ts +118 -0
- package/src/skills/loader.ts +117 -0
- package/src/telemetry/trace.ts +283 -0
- package/src/tools/ask_user.ts +54 -0
- package/src/tools/bash.ts +400 -0
- package/src/tools/code_run.ts +96 -0
- package/src/tools/delete_file.ts +31 -0
- package/src/tools/edit.ts +204 -0
- package/src/tools/git.ts +301 -0
- package/src/tools/glob.ts +90 -0
- package/src/tools/grep.ts +281 -0
- package/src/tools/hashline.ts +66 -0
- package/src/tools/index.ts +103 -0
- package/src/tools/lsp.ts +346 -0
- package/src/tools/mcp_call.ts +163 -0
- package/src/tools/memory.ts +144 -0
- package/src/tools/move_file.ts +47 -0
- package/src/tools/patch.ts +86 -0
- package/src/tools/read_file.ts +130 -0
- package/src/tools/read_image.ts +80 -0
- package/src/tools/submit_result.ts +49 -0
- package/src/tools/task.ts +346 -0
- package/src/tools/todo.ts +201 -0
- package/src/tools/web_fetch.ts +161 -0
- package/src/tools/web_search.ts +156 -0
- package/src/tools/write_file.ts +42 -0
- package/src/ui/approval/prompt.ts +76 -0
- package/src/ui/assistant/simple.ts +568 -0
- package/src/ui/assistant/turn-status.ts +303 -0
- package/src/ui/contract.ts +55 -0
- package/src/ui/footer.ts +105 -0
- package/src/ui/input/input.ts +805 -0
- package/src/ui/input/prompt-engine.ts +606 -0
- package/src/ui/render/collapse.ts +84 -0
- package/src/ui/render/detail.ts +24 -0
- package/src/ui/render/diff.ts +181 -0
- package/src/ui/render/errors.ts +239 -0
- package/src/ui/render/format.ts +54 -0
- package/src/ui/render/highlight.ts +294 -0
- package/src/ui/render/markdown.ts +120 -0
- package/src/ui/render/money.ts +12 -0
- package/src/ui/render/reasoning.ts +20 -0
- package/src/ui/render/sanitize.ts +80 -0
- package/src/ui/render/table.ts +88 -0
- package/src/ui/render/theme.ts +339 -0
- package/src/ui/render/width.ts +256 -0
- package/src/ui/render/wrap.ts +120 -0
- package/src/ui/runtime/bus-debug.ts +83 -0
- package/src/ui/runtime/chrome.ts +301 -0
- package/src/ui/runtime/spinner.ts +77 -0
- package/src/ui/runtime/statusline.ts +227 -0
- package/src/ui/screens/model-manager.ts +434 -0
- package/src/ui/screens/overlay.ts +61 -0
- package/src/ui/screens/picker.ts +307 -0
- package/src/ui/screens/provider-manager.ts +450 -0
- package/src/ui/screens/wizard.ts +132 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/VENDOR.md +29 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/package.json +21 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/budget.ts +26 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/compact.ts +76 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/errors.ts +60 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/events.ts +74 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/executor.ts +139 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/history.ts +32 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/index.ts +42 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/loop.ts +344 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/permission.ts +24 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/provider.ts +39 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/recovery.ts +34 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/session.ts +327 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/snapshot.ts +142 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tokens.ts +111 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tool.ts +118 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/core/types.ts +50 -0
- package/vendor/minicore/src/providers/openai-compat.ts +366 -0
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import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"
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import { isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep } from "node:path"
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// Satu sumber untuk aturan sandbox path — dipakai permission layer + setiap tool
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// (defense-in-depth). File kredensial / direktori toolchain dianggap sensitif.
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//
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// Semua alternatif ter-anchor ke batas segmen (awal string atau setelah / \)
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// dan bila relevan akhir path. Ini menutup bug operator-precedence lama di mana
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// `node_modules` dan ekstensi `.pem/.key/.p12` match di mana saja tanpa anchor.
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export const SENSITIVE_RE =
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/(?:^|[/\\])(?:\.env(?:\.[a-z0-9_.-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.git[/\\](?:config|credentials)(?:[/\\]|$)|\.git-credentials$|\.npmrc(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.netrc(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)?(?:[/\\]|$)|\.ssh(?:[/\\]|$)|\.aws(?:[/\\]|$)|\.kube(?:[/\\]|$)|\.docker[/\\]config\.json$|id_(?:rsa|ecdsa|ed25519|dsa)(?:\.(?:pub|ppk))?$|credentials\.json$|\.minicode[/\\]auth\.json$|secrets?\.(?:yaml|yml|json)$|terraform(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)*\.tfvars$|node_modules(?:[/\\]|$)|system32[/\\]config[/\\](?:sam|system|security|software|default)(?:[/\\]|$)|ntds\.dit$)|\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore)$/i
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export function isSensitive(p: string): boolean {
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return SENSITIVE_RE.test(p)
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}
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// State milik minicode sendiri (temuan audit #04, dikeraskan audit #13):
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// sesi/DB/jejak/checkpoint/jurnal/todo/rencana/allowlist/config yang dikelola
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// tool khusus (bukan file tools). File tool (write/edit/patch/delete/move)
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// DILARANG menyentuh apa pun di bawah `.minicode/` — daftar-nama terbukti
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// rapuh (kasus nyata: `write_file .minicode/test-write.txt` lolos karena
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// namanya tak terdaftar). Kalau tidak, sub-agen (atau prompt-injected call)
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// bisa menanam file eksport-mimikri, menimpa todos/rencana, allowlist
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// ("always" palsu!), config (server MCP jahat!), atau membutakan recovery.
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// BACA tetap boleh (observability/debug). Pola di-anchor ke segmen
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// `.minicode/` agar file user bernama mirip di tempat lain tak kena.
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// Pengecualian: skrip hooks milik user (.minicode/hooks/, lihat HOOKS_RE)
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// dan restore dari `.minicode/.trash/` (ditangani di permission.ts, bukan
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// di sini, agar arahnya eksplisit).
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const OWNED_STATE_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode(?:[/\\]|$)/i
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// Skrip hooks milik user (.minicode/hooks/): BUKAN state runtime — alur
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// legit "buatkan hook" menulis lewat tool (dikunci test delegate-audit).
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// Registrasi eksekusi tetap dikunci (allowlist.json owned), jadi file
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// titipan tak jalan sendiri. skills//steering/MEMORY tetap terkunci:
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// isinya ikut ke konteks (persistensi prompt-injection), user kelola via shell.
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const HOOKS_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode[/\\]hooks(?:[/\\]|$)/i
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export function isOwnedState(p: string): boolean {
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return OWNED_STATE_RE.test(p) && !HOOKS_RE.test(p)
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}
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/**
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* Restore sah dari soft-delete: sumber di `.minicode/.trash/`, tujuan di
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* luar `.minicode/` (workspace). Satu-satunya arah gerak file tool yang
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* boleh menyentuh state minicode — dipakai carve-out move_file di
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* permission.ts. Tanpa ini kunci penuh mematahkan restore (atau sebaliknya
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* celah bila arahnya dibalik: menanam ke trash = menulis state).
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*/
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const TRASH_RE = /(?:^|[/\\])\.minicode[/\\]\.trash(?:[/\\]|$)/i
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export function isTrashRestore(from: string, to: string): boolean {
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return TRASH_RE.test(from) && !isOwnedState(to)
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}
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export function isPathOutsideRoot(p: string, root: string): boolean {
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const abs = isAbsolute(p) ? resolve(p) : resolve(root, p)
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const rel = relative(root, abs)
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if (!rel) return false // same directory
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if (isAbsolute(rel)) return true // different drive on Windows
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return (
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rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) || rel.startsWith("../") || rel.startsWith("..\\")
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)
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}
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/**
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* Cek jail berbasis REALPATH — symlink yang menunjuk keluar workspace
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* terdeteksi di sini, bukan hanya di dalam tiap tool (defense-in-depth tetap).
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* Bila path belum ada (ENOENT — mis. write_file file baru), fallback ke cek
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* logis agar kasus penulisan file baru tetap diizinkan.
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*/
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export function isRealPathOutsideRoot(p: string, root: string): boolean {
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if (!p) return false
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const abs = isAbsolute(p) ? resolve(p) : resolve(root, p)
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// Symlink/hardlink di Windows lolos realpath pre-check TOCTOU — tolak langsung.
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try {
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const realRoot = realpathSync(resolve(root))
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} catch {
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return isPathOutsideRoot(p, root)
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}
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}
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export function isCwdOutsideRoot(cwd: string, root: string): boolean {
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try {
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const realCwd = realpathSync(resolve(root, cwd))
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return isPathOutsideRoot(realCwd, realRoot)
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} catch {
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// if realpath fails (ENOENT), fallback to logical check (treated as outside to be safe if non-existent)
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return isPathOutsideRoot(cwd, root)
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}
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}
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// P0-3: Windows tidak punya O_NOFOLLOW — TOCTOU symlink di Windows hanya
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// bisa ditahan via lstat pre-check. Hardlink (nlink>1) juga berbahaya karena
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// realpath tak melihatnya (hardlink = nama lain file yang sama).
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export function isSymlink(p: string): boolean {
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try {
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export function isHardlink(p: string): boolean {
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try {
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// Direktori punya nlink >= 2 di POSIX (entri `.` + tiap subdir) — itu
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// BUKAN hardlink (hardlink direktori tak bisa dibuat user). Tanpa
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// pengecualian ini tiap argumen cwd direktori yang sah ditolak
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// isRealPathOutsideRoot di Linux/macOS, sementara Windows (nlink dir
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return ((s as unknown as { nlink?: number }).nlink ?? 1) > 1
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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export function isDangerousLink(p: string): boolean {
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}
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import { resolve } from "node:path"
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import { cwd } from "node:process"
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import type { PermissionHandler, ToolCall } from "#minicore"
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import { loadAllowlist, matchAllowlist, saveAllowlist } from "./allowlist.ts"
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import { inspectBashCommand } from "./bash-guard.ts"
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import {
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isCwdOutsideRoot,
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isOwnedState,
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isRealPathOutsideRoot,
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isSensitive,
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isTrashRestore,
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} from "./jail.ts"
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export type PermissionMode = "auto" | "readonly" | "plan" | "allow-all" | "ask" | "allowlist"
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/**
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* View persetujuan yang di-inject dari composition root (cli/setup.ts memakai
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* src/ui/approval/prompt.ts). Policy layer tidak pernah mengimpor UI langsung;
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* tanpa injeksi jawabannya selalu deny (headless), sama dengan perilaku
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* non-TTY sebelumnya.
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*/
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export type PermissionAsk = (call: {
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name: string
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args?: unknown
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}) => Promise<"allow" | "deny" | "always">
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const READONLY_TOOLS = new Set([
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"read_file",
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"glob",
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"grep",
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"git_status",
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"git_diff",
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"git_log",
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"web_fetch",
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"web_search",
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"read_memory",
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"todo_read",
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"mcp_list",
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"lsp_diagnostics",
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"lsp_definition",
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"lsp_references",
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"lsp_hover",
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"lsp_symbols",
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"lsp_workspace_symbols",
|
|
45
|
+
"read_image",
|
|
46
|
+
])
|
|
47
|
+
// Tool yang menulis state internal minicode (bukan file workspace) — aman
|
|
48
|
+
// di semua mode kecuali readonly/plan. `bash_kill` menghentikan proses yang
|
|
49
|
+
// dimulai agent sendiri, jadi tidak menambah permukaan serangan.
|
|
50
|
+
const INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS = new Set([
|
|
51
|
+
"write_memory",
|
|
52
|
+
"forget_memory",
|
|
53
|
+
"todo_write",
|
|
54
|
+
"submit_result",
|
|
55
|
+
"bash_output",
|
|
56
|
+
"bash_kill",
|
|
57
|
+
])
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
const FILE_WRITE_TOOLS = new Set(["write_file", "edit", "apply_patch", "move_file", "delete_file"])
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
// Subset INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS yang juga tidak perlu prompt di mode `ask`.
|
|
62
|
+
// `write_memory`/`forget_memory` TIDAK termasuk: itu menulis MEMORY.md yang
|
|
63
|
+
// persisten lintas sesi, jadi user berhak menyetujuinya. `submit_result`
|
|
64
|
+
// termasuk: ia hanya menyerahkan jawaban akhir, tanpa efek samping.
|
|
65
|
+
const NO_PROMPT_TOOLS = new Set(["todo_write", "submit_result", "bash_output", "bash_kill"])
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
// Tool yang memperbesar serangan / menembus dunia luar: tidak auto-allowed.
|
|
68
|
+
//
|
|
69
|
+
// `git_commit` ada di sini karena commit mengubah riwayat yang dibagikan —
|
|
70
|
+
// bukan sekadar file kerja. Di mode `auto` ia meminta persetujuan sekali
|
|
71
|
+
// (jawab `[a] Always` untuk persist), dan ditolak di readonly/plan/allowlist.
|
|
72
|
+
//
|
|
73
|
+
// `mcp_read`/`mcp_prompt` juga di-gate meski read-only: keduanya menarik konten
|
|
74
|
+
// dari server pihak ketiga langsung ke konteks model, yang merupakan jalur
|
|
75
|
+
// prompt-injection. `mcp_list` TIDAK di-gate karena hanya melaporkan metadata
|
|
76
|
+
// server yang sudah user daftarkan sendiri.
|
|
77
|
+
//
|
|
78
|
+
// `ask_user` di-gate: model yang bisa bertanya tanpa batas bisa membanjiri
|
|
79
|
+
// user (atau memancing jawaban kredensial) — persetujuan sekali per sesi
|
|
80
|
+
// via `[a] Always` tetap tersedia.
|
|
81
|
+
const GATED_TOOLS = new Set([
|
|
82
|
+
"delegate_task",
|
|
83
|
+
"mcp_call",
|
|
84
|
+
"mcp_read",
|
|
85
|
+
"mcp_prompt",
|
|
86
|
+
"git_commit",
|
|
87
|
+
"ask_user",
|
|
88
|
+
])
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
// Denylist bash kini di src/policy/bash-guard.ts — pemeriksaan dilakukan pada
|
|
91
|
+
// bentuk TERNORMALISASI (quote dibuang, variabel sederhana disubstitusi), bukan
|
|
92
|
+
// string mentah. Regex-atas-string-mentah yang lama trivially dilewati oleh
|
|
93
|
+
// `cat .e""nv`, `X=.env; cat $X`, `p=python3; $p -c 1`, dan `node --eval`.
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
// Perintah yang dianggap aman di mode `allowlist` — mode paling ketat, dipakai
|
|
96
|
+
// saat menjalankan task tak terpercaya. Isinya sengaja **read-only + build**:
|
|
97
|
+
// operasi tulis (`rm`, `mv`, `cp`, `mkdir`) TIDAK di sini, karena tujuan mode
|
|
98
|
+
// ini memang menahan efek samping. Agent yang butuh menulis file punya
|
|
99
|
+
// `write_file`/`edit` yang ter-jail, bukan shell.
|
|
100
|
+
//
|
|
101
|
+
// Perhatikan: allowlist diperiksa SETELAH bash-guard, jadi `cat *` di sini
|
|
102
|
+
// tidak berarti `cat .env` lolos — guard menolaknya lebih dulu. Pola di sini
|
|
103
|
+
// soal "bentuk perintah apa yang boleh", bukan "target apa yang boleh".
|
|
104
|
+
const DEFAULT_BASH_ALLOWLIST = [
|
|
105
|
+
"git status*",
|
|
106
|
+
"git diff*",
|
|
107
|
+
"git log*",
|
|
108
|
+
"git branch*",
|
|
109
|
+
"git show*",
|
|
110
|
+
"bun test*",
|
|
111
|
+
"bun x tsc*",
|
|
112
|
+
"bun run *",
|
|
113
|
+
"npm run *",
|
|
114
|
+
"npm exec *",
|
|
115
|
+
"npx *",
|
|
116
|
+
"echo *",
|
|
117
|
+
"ls*",
|
|
118
|
+
"dir*",
|
|
119
|
+
"pwd",
|
|
120
|
+
"cat *",
|
|
121
|
+
// `type` = padanan `cat` di cmd.exe Windows (deskripsi tool bash menyuruh
|
|
122
|
+
// model memakainya) — tanpanya tiap baca berkas via shell di Windows
|
|
123
|
+
// gagal allowlist walau guard sudah menganggapnya reader aman.
|
|
124
|
+
"type *",
|
|
125
|
+
"head *",
|
|
126
|
+
"tail *",
|
|
127
|
+
"wc *",
|
|
128
|
+
"grep *",
|
|
129
|
+
"rg *",
|
|
130
|
+
"find *",
|
|
131
|
+
"which *",
|
|
132
|
+
"node --version",
|
|
133
|
+
"bun --version",
|
|
134
|
+
]
|
|
135
|
+
|
|
136
|
+
// 6.4 — npm exec / npx hanya di-allow bila arg "known-good": tak ada
|
|
137
|
+
// ekspansi shell ($/backtick) atau redirection (< >). Chaining ;|& sudah
|
|
138
|
+
// diblokir oleh matchBashAllowlist (pattern tak mengandungnya).
|
|
139
|
+
// Berlaku juga untuk `bun run`/`bun x`: keduanya menjalankan script/paket
|
|
140
|
+
// arbitrer dari package.json repo — tanpa cek ini `bun run test` di repo
|
|
141
|
+
// jahat lolos dengan ekspansi shell di argumennya.
|
|
142
|
+
function npmNpxSafe(cmd: string): boolean {
|
|
143
|
+
return !/[`$<>]/.test(cmd)
|
|
144
|
+
}
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
function matchBashAllowlist(cmd: string, pattern: string): boolean {
|
|
147
|
+
// prevent shell chaining bypass: if cmd contains ; & | and pattern does not explicitly allow them, deny.
|
|
148
|
+
// F-20: newline adalah chaining juga (`echo hi\nenv`) — pola allowlist tak
|
|
149
|
+
// pernah mengandung newline sehingga multiline selalu deny di mode ini
|
|
150
|
+
// (fail-closed untuk mode paling ketat; skrip multiline sah milik auto).
|
|
151
|
+
const trimmed = cmd.trim()
|
|
152
|
+
if (/[;&|\n]/.test(trimmed) && !/[;&|]/.test(pattern)) return false
|
|
153
|
+
const re = new RegExp(
|
|
154
|
+
`^${pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*")}$`,
|
|
155
|
+
"i",
|
|
156
|
+
)
|
|
157
|
+
return re.test(trimmed)
|
|
158
|
+
}
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
161
|
+
opts: {
|
|
162
|
+
mode?: PermissionMode
|
|
163
|
+
root?: string
|
|
164
|
+
ask?: PermissionAsk
|
|
165
|
+
/** Teruskan flag --allow-local-config: allowlist lokal hanya dibaca bila
|
|
166
|
+
* operator opt-in (default deny — repo tak bisa memberi dirinya always). */
|
|
167
|
+
allowLocalConfig?: boolean
|
|
168
|
+
} = {},
|
|
169
|
+
): PermissionHandler {
|
|
170
|
+
const state = { mode: (opts.mode ?? "auto") as PermissionMode }
|
|
171
|
+
const root = resolve(opts.root ?? cwd())
|
|
172
|
+
const askUser = opts.ask
|
|
173
|
+
const allowLocal = opts.allowLocalConfig === true
|
|
174
|
+
let allowlistCache: string[] | null = null
|
|
175
|
+
// Persetujuan "always" sesi ini — in-memory, bukan dari disk. Tanpa ini,
|
|
176
|
+
// jawaban always yang baru disimpan ke berkas lokal tak terlihat saat local
|
|
177
|
+
// config nonaktif, dan user ditanya berulang untuk call yang sama.
|
|
178
|
+
const sessionGrants: string[] = []
|
|
179
|
+
// bash allowlist di-cache sekali (bukan baca env tiap panggilan)
|
|
180
|
+
const envRaw = process.env.MINICODE_BASH_ALLOWLIST
|
|
181
|
+
const bashAllowlist = envRaw
|
|
182
|
+
? envRaw
|
|
183
|
+
.split(",")
|
|
184
|
+
.map((s) => s.trim())
|
|
185
|
+
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
186
|
+
: DEFAULT_BASH_ALLOWLIST
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
188
|
+
async function getAllowlist(): Promise<string[]> {
|
|
189
|
+
if (allowlistCache) return allowlistCache
|
|
190
|
+
try {
|
|
191
|
+
const l = await loadAllowlist(root, { allowLocal: allowLocal })
|
|
192
|
+
allowlistCache = [...l.allowed, ...sessionGrants]
|
|
193
|
+
return allowlistCache
|
|
194
|
+
} catch {
|
|
195
|
+
return [...sessionGrants]
|
|
196
|
+
}
|
|
197
|
+
}
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
function isGated(name: string): boolean {
|
|
200
|
+
// Semua tool bertitik (MCP — terdaftar maupun tidak) = gated. Server jahat
|
|
201
|
+
// tidak boleh mendapat auto-allow hanya karena namanya terdaftar.
|
|
202
|
+
return GATED_TOOLS.has(name) || name.includes(".")
|
|
203
|
+
}
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
// Alasan deny per-call untuk seam kernel describeDenial (audit #14):
|
|
206
|
+
// check() TETAP mengembalikan "deny" polos (kontrak Decision + semua
|
|
207
|
+
// assertion tak berubah); alasannya dibaca kernel tepat setelah deny via
|
|
208
|
+
// describeDenial(call) sehingga observasi model menjadi actionable
|
|
209
|
+
// ("permission denied: bash-guard: destructive rm") alih-alih retry buta.
|
|
210
|
+
// Map dibatasi + hapus-saat-baca agar abort di tengah tak bocor memori.
|
|
211
|
+
const denyReasons = new Map<string, string>()
|
|
212
|
+
function noteDeny(call: ToolCall, reason: string): void {
|
|
213
|
+
try {
|
|
214
|
+
const id = (call as { id?: string } | null)?.id
|
|
215
|
+
if (!id) return
|
|
216
|
+
if (denyReasons.size > 500) denyReasons.delete(denyReasons.keys().next().value as string)
|
|
217
|
+
denyReasons.set(id, reason.slice(0, 160))
|
|
218
|
+
} catch {}
|
|
219
|
+
}
|
|
220
|
+
function deny(call: ToolCall, reason: string): "deny" {
|
|
221
|
+
noteDeny(call, reason)
|
|
222
|
+
return "deny"
|
|
223
|
+
}
|
|
224
|
+
function takeDenyReason(call: ToolCall): string | undefined {
|
|
225
|
+
try {
|
|
226
|
+
const id = (call as { id?: string } | null)?.id
|
|
227
|
+
if (!id) return undefined
|
|
228
|
+
const r = denyReasons.get(id)
|
|
229
|
+
denyReasons.delete(id)
|
|
230
|
+
return r
|
|
231
|
+
} catch {
|
|
232
|
+
return undefined
|
|
233
|
+
}
|
|
234
|
+
}
|
|
235
|
+
function bashDenyReason(cmd: string): string | null {
|
|
236
|
+
if (!cmd.trim()) return "empty command"
|
|
237
|
+
try {
|
|
238
|
+
const v = inspectBashCommand(cmd, root)
|
|
239
|
+
return v.denied ? (v.reason ?? "blocked command") : null
|
|
240
|
+
} catch {
|
|
241
|
+
return null
|
|
242
|
+
}
|
|
243
|
+
}
|
|
244
|
+
|
|
245
|
+
function saveAlways(call: ToolCall): Promise<void> {
|
|
246
|
+
// Simpan kunci PENUH (tanpa slice) agar simetris dengan matchAllowlist.
|
|
247
|
+
// Arg raksasa (>2KB JSON, mis. write_file 1MB) tidak disimpan sama sekali
|
|
248
|
+
// (fail-closed, minta persetujuan tiap kali) — kalau tidak allowlist.json
|
|
249
|
+
// membengkak dan "always" menjadi blanket-allow untuk konten apa pun.
|
|
250
|
+
const argsJson = JSON.stringify(call.args)
|
|
251
|
+
if (argsJson.length > 2000) return Promise.resolve()
|
|
252
|
+
const key = `${call.name}:${argsJson}`
|
|
253
|
+
if (!sessionGrants.includes(key)) sessionGrants.push(key)
|
|
254
|
+
allowlistCache = null
|
|
255
|
+
return saveAllowlist(key, root).catch(() => {})
|
|
256
|
+
}
|
|
257
|
+
|
|
258
|
+
// data-driven: tiap mode = satu fungsi keputusan (tanpa cabang saling tumpang tindih).
|
|
259
|
+
// Param ketiga = signal turn (opsional): prompt yang belum terjawab saat
|
|
260
|
+
// sesi dibatalkan harus kalah oleh abort (deny), bukan menunggu jawaban.
|
|
261
|
+
const handlers: Record<
|
|
262
|
+
PermissionMode,
|
|
263
|
+
(
|
|
264
|
+
call: ToolCall,
|
|
265
|
+
args: Record<string, unknown> | null,
|
|
266
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
267
|
+
) => Promise<"allow" | "deny">
|
|
268
|
+
> = {
|
|
269
|
+
"allow-all": async () => "allow",
|
|
270
|
+
readonly: async (call) =>
|
|
271
|
+
READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ? "allow" : deny(call, "read-only mode"),
|
|
272
|
+
// Plan = readonly + tiga perkecualian aman: todo_write (artefak rencana
|
|
273
|
+
// .minicode/plans, bukan file workspace), delegate_task (penelahan
|
|
274
|
+
// rencana, bukan eksekusi — dipaksa explore/read-only di task.ts bila
|
|
275
|
+
// parent plan/readonly, permission hanya membuka gerbangnya), dan
|
|
276
|
+
// submit_result (singleton memori-proses untuk exec --json, tanpa tulis
|
|
277
|
+
// file/state sesi; terlihat di PLAN_EXTRA tool-layer jadi harus boleh).
|
|
278
|
+
plan: async (call) =>
|
|
279
|
+
READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ||
|
|
280
|
+
call.name === "todo_write" ||
|
|
281
|
+
call.name === "delegate_task" ||
|
|
282
|
+
call.name === "submit_result"
|
|
283
|
+
? "allow"
|
|
284
|
+
: deny(call, "plan mode"),
|
|
285
|
+
allowlist: async (call, args) => {
|
|
286
|
+
if (call.name === "bash") {
|
|
287
|
+
const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
|
|
288
|
+
const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
|
|
289
|
+
if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
|
|
290
|
+
const matched = bashAllowlist.filter((pat) => matchBashAllowlist(cmd, pat))
|
|
291
|
+
// Alasan actionable (keluhan eval: "no matching pattern" tanpa jalan
|
|
292
|
+
// keluar membuat model retry buta): tulis/baca file = pakai tool file
|
|
293
|
+
// terjail; shell penuh = operator pilih --allow-all/--sandbox docker.
|
|
294
|
+
if (matched.length === 0)
|
|
295
|
+
return deny(
|
|
296
|
+
call,
|
|
297
|
+
`allowlist: no matching pattern for "${cmd.slice(0, 80)}" — file work: use read_file/write_file/edit; full shell: rerun with --allow-all / --sandbox docker / MINICODE_BASH_ALLOWLIST`,
|
|
298
|
+
)
|
|
299
|
+
if (matched.some((p) => /^(npx|npm exec|bun x|bun run)\b/i.test(p)) && !npmNpxSafe(cmd))
|
|
300
|
+
return deny(call, "allowlist: npm/npx unsafe")
|
|
301
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
302
|
+
}
|
|
303
|
+
if (isGated(call.name)) return deny(call, "allowlist: gated tool")
|
|
304
|
+
if (FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
305
|
+
if (INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
306
|
+
return READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ? "allow" : deny(call, "allowlist: not allowed here")
|
|
307
|
+
},
|
|
308
|
+
ask: async (call, args, signal) => {
|
|
309
|
+
if (READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
310
|
+
// Bookkeeping internal tidak menyentuh workspace: todo list dan kontrol
|
|
311
|
+
// job yang izinnya sudah diberikan saat `bash` dijalankan. Meminta
|
|
312
|
+
// konfirmasi untuk ini hanya melelahkan tanpa menambah keamanan.
|
|
313
|
+
if (NO_PROMPT_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
314
|
+
const list = await getAllowlist()
|
|
315
|
+
if (matchAllowlist(call, list)) return "allow"
|
|
316
|
+
if (call.name === "bash") {
|
|
317
|
+
const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
|
|
318
|
+
const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
|
|
319
|
+
if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
|
|
320
|
+
} else if (isGated(call.name)) {
|
|
321
|
+
return await promptAskOr(call, () => deny(call, "gated approval unavailable"), signal)
|
|
322
|
+
}
|
|
323
|
+
const ans = askUser ? await raceAbort(askUser(call), signal) : "deny"
|
|
324
|
+
if (ans === "always") {
|
|
325
|
+
await saveAlways(call)
|
|
326
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
327
|
+
}
|
|
328
|
+
return ans === "allow" ? "allow" : "deny"
|
|
329
|
+
},
|
|
330
|
+
auto: async (call, args, signal) => {
|
|
331
|
+
if (READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
332
|
+
if (isGated(call.name))
|
|
333
|
+
return await promptAskOr(call, () => deny(call, "gated approval unavailable"), signal)
|
|
334
|
+
if (FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
335
|
+
if (INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
336
|
+
if (call.name === "code_run") {
|
|
337
|
+
const sb = process.env.MINICODE_SANDBOX ?? ""
|
|
338
|
+
if (sb !== "os" && sb !== "docker" && sb !== "bwrap" && sb !== "seatbelt")
|
|
339
|
+
return deny(call, "code_run needs sandbox (os|docker)")
|
|
340
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
341
|
+
}
|
|
342
|
+
if (call.name === "bash") {
|
|
343
|
+
const cmd = (args?.cmd as string) ?? ""
|
|
344
|
+
const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
|
|
345
|
+
if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
|
|
346
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
347
|
+
}
|
|
348
|
+
return "deny"
|
|
349
|
+
},
|
|
350
|
+
}
|
|
351
|
+
|
|
352
|
+
const returned = {
|
|
353
|
+
async check(call: ToolCall, _deps?: unknown): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
|
|
354
|
+
const earlyArgs = call.args as Record<string, unknown> | null
|
|
355
|
+
// Cancellation sebelum eksekusi mengalahkan segalanya: approval yang
|
|
356
|
+
// datang terlambat (atau sesi yang sudah detach) tidak boleh membuka
|
|
357
|
+
// gerbang. Kernel meneruskan signal turn di deps (executor kernel).
|
|
358
|
+
const signal = (_deps as { signal?: AbortSignal } | null | undefined)?.signal
|
|
359
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return "deny"
|
|
360
|
+
|
|
361
|
+
// universal file-path jail — harus sebelum allow-all (defense-in-depth)
|
|
362
|
+
// realpath-based: symlink keluar workspace tetap tertangkap walau --allow-all
|
|
363
|
+
if (
|
|
364
|
+
call.name === "write_file" ||
|
|
365
|
+
call.name === "edit" ||
|
|
366
|
+
call.name === "apply_patch" ||
|
|
367
|
+
call.name === "read_file" ||
|
|
368
|
+
call.name === "delete_file"
|
|
369
|
+
) {
|
|
370
|
+
const p = (earlyArgs?.path as string) ?? ""
|
|
371
|
+
if (!p) return "deny"
|
|
372
|
+
if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(p, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
|
|
373
|
+
if (isSensitive(p)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
|
|
374
|
+
}
|
|
375
|
+
// move_file punya dua ujung (from+to): keduanya dijail. `to` yang belum
|
|
376
|
+
// ada jatuh ke cek logis di isRealPathOutsideRoot (fallback ENOENT).
|
|
377
|
+
if (call.name === "move_file") {
|
|
378
|
+
const f = (earlyArgs?.from as string) ?? ""
|
|
379
|
+
const t = (earlyArgs?.to as string) ?? ""
|
|
380
|
+
if (!f || !t) return "deny"
|
|
381
|
+
if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(f, root) || isRealPathOutsideRoot(t, root))
|
|
382
|
+
return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
|
|
383
|
+
if (isSensitive(f) || isSensitive(t)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
|
|
384
|
+
}
|
|
385
|
+
if (call.name.startsWith("lsp_")) {
|
|
386
|
+
const f = (earlyArgs?.file as string) ?? ""
|
|
387
|
+
if (f && isRealPathOutsideRoot(f, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
|
|
388
|
+
if (f && isSensitive(f)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
|
|
389
|
+
}
|
|
390
|
+
const cwdArg = (earlyArgs?.cwd as string) ?? ""
|
|
391
|
+
if (
|
|
392
|
+
cwdArg &&
|
|
393
|
+
(call.name === "bash" ||
|
|
394
|
+
call.name === "glob" ||
|
|
395
|
+
call.name === "grep" ||
|
|
396
|
+
call.name.startsWith("git_"))
|
|
397
|
+
) {
|
|
398
|
+
if (isCwdOutsideRoot(cwdArg, root) || isRealPathOutsideRoot(cwdArg, root))
|
|
399
|
+
return deny(call, "jail: cwd outside workspace")
|
|
400
|
+
}
|
|
401
|
+
// git_commit: path yang di-stage juga dijail, bukan hanya cwd.
|
|
402
|
+
if (call.name === "git_commit" && Array.isArray(earlyArgs?.paths)) {
|
|
403
|
+
for (const p of earlyArgs.paths as unknown[]) {
|
|
404
|
+
if (typeof p !== "string") continue
|
|
405
|
+
if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(p, root)) return deny(call, "jail: outside workspace")
|
|
406
|
+
if (isSensitive(p)) return deny(call, "jail: sensitive file")
|
|
407
|
+
}
|
|
408
|
+
}
|
|
409
|
+
// State milik minicode (temuan audit #04, dikeraskan audit #13):
|
|
410
|
+
// tool TULIS file dilarang menyentuh apa pun di bawah `.minicode/`
|
|
411
|
+
// (dulu daftar-nama: `test-write.txt` lolos). Tanpa ini sub-agen (atau
|
|
412
|
+
// call ter-injeksi) bisa menanam file, menimpa todos/rencana,
|
|
413
|
+
// menanam allowlist "always", mendaftarkan server MCP via config,
|
|
414
|
+
// atau membutakan recovery (jurnal/checkpoint) lewat jalur jinak.
|
|
415
|
+
// Berlaku di SEMUA mode termasuk allow-all (jail mendahului mode).
|
|
416
|
+
// BACA tetap boleh; tool khusus (todo/memory/config/undo) tak lewat
|
|
417
|
+
// gerbang ini sehingga alur legit tetap jalan. Pengecualian:
|
|
418
|
+
// restore `.minicode/.trash/` → workspace (isTrashRestore) dan skrip
|
|
419
|
+
// hooks `.minicode/hooks/` (HOOKS_RE di jail.ts — registrasi eksekusi
|
|
420
|
+
// tetap dikunci via allowlist.json yang owned).
|
|
421
|
+
if (
|
|
422
|
+
call.name === "write_file" ||
|
|
423
|
+
call.name === "edit" ||
|
|
424
|
+
call.name === "apply_patch" ||
|
|
425
|
+
call.name === "delete_file" ||
|
|
426
|
+
call.name === "move_file"
|
|
427
|
+
) {
|
|
428
|
+
// Restore dari trash (.minicode/.trash/ → workspace) adalah satu-
|
|
429
|
+
// satunya gerak sah menyentuh state — selain itu dua arah deny.
|
|
430
|
+
if (call.name === "move_file") {
|
|
431
|
+
const f = (earlyArgs?.from as string) ?? ""
|
|
432
|
+
const t = (earlyArgs?.to as string) ?? ""
|
|
433
|
+
if (isTrashRestore(f, t)) {
|
|
434
|
+
// lanjut ke mode check di bawah (ask/auto tetap berlaku)
|
|
435
|
+
} else if ((f !== "" && isOwnedState(f)) || (t !== "" && isOwnedState(t))) {
|
|
436
|
+
return deny(call, "jail: owned state")
|
|
437
|
+
}
|
|
438
|
+
} else {
|
|
439
|
+
const p = (earlyArgs?.path as string) ?? ""
|
|
440
|
+
if (p !== "" && isOwnedState(p)) return deny(call, "jail: owned state")
|
|
441
|
+
}
|
|
442
|
+
}
|
|
443
|
+
|
|
444
|
+
const mode = state.mode
|
|
445
|
+
if (mode === "allow-all") {
|
|
446
|
+
// allow-all tetap menolak bash berbahaya — izin penuh bukan berarti
|
|
447
|
+
// mengizinkan `rm -rf /` atau fork bomb. Yang dicek di sini FULL
|
|
448
|
+
// inspectBashCommand (bukan sebagian), sama seperti mode lain.
|
|
449
|
+
if (call.name === "bash") {
|
|
450
|
+
const cmd = (earlyArgs?.cmd as string) ?? ""
|
|
451
|
+
// allow-all + cmd kosong = allow (perilaku lama dipertahankan).
|
|
452
|
+
if (cmd.trim()) {
|
|
453
|
+
const br = bashDenyReason(cmd)
|
|
454
|
+
if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
|
|
455
|
+
}
|
|
456
|
+
}
|
|
457
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
458
|
+
}
|
|
459
|
+
|
|
460
|
+
return handlers[state.mode](call, earlyArgs, signal)
|
|
461
|
+
},
|
|
462
|
+
// Kontrol mode saat runtime (Shift+Tab di TUI). Sebelumnya kedua method ini
|
|
463
|
+
// hanya ada di type-cast tanpa implementasi, sehingga pemanggilnya no-op /
|
|
464
|
+
// TypeError dan mode permission tidak pernah benar-benar berubah.
|
|
465
|
+
__setMode(m: PermissionMode): void {
|
|
466
|
+
state.mode = m
|
|
467
|
+
allowlistCache = null
|
|
468
|
+
},
|
|
469
|
+
__getMode(): PermissionMode {
|
|
470
|
+
return state.mode
|
|
471
|
+
},
|
|
472
|
+
// Seam kernel describeDenial: alasan deny terakhir call ini (dicatat
|
|
473
|
+
// check() via deny()). Hapus-saat-baca; tak ada catatan = undefined =
|
|
474
|
+
// pesan deny polos seperti dulu.
|
|
475
|
+
describeDenial(call: ToolCall): string | undefined {
|
|
476
|
+
return takeDenyReason(call)
|
|
477
|
+
},
|
|
478
|
+
}
|
|
479
|
+
return returned as unknown as PermissionHandler & {
|
|
480
|
+
__setMode(m: PermissionMode): void
|
|
481
|
+
__getMode(): PermissionMode
|
|
482
|
+
describeDenial(call: ToolCall): string | undefined
|
|
483
|
+
}
|
|
484
|
+
|
|
485
|
+
// Balapan prompt melawan abort: jawaban yang tiba SETELAH sesi dibatalkan
|
|
486
|
+
// tidak boleh membuka gerbang (late approval = deny). Tanpa ini, user yang
|
|
487
|
+
// menekan [y] sepersekian detik setelah Ctrl+C tetap mengeksekusi tool.
|
|
488
|
+
function raceAbort<T>(p: Promise<T>, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<T | "aborted"> {
|
|
489
|
+
if (!signal) return p
|
|
490
|
+
if (signal.aborted) return Promise.resolve("aborted")
|
|
491
|
+
return Promise.race([
|
|
492
|
+
p,
|
|
493
|
+
new Promise<"aborted">((res) =>
|
|
494
|
+
signal.addEventListener("abort", () => res("aborted"), { once: true }),
|
|
495
|
+
),
|
|
496
|
+
])
|
|
497
|
+
}
|
|
498
|
+
|
|
499
|
+
async function promptAskOr(
|
|
500
|
+
call: ToolCall,
|
|
501
|
+
noTty: () => "deny",
|
|
502
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
503
|
+
): Promise<"allow" | "deny"> {
|
|
504
|
+
if (signal?.aborted) return noTty()
|
|
505
|
+
if (!askUser) return noTty()
|
|
506
|
+
if (!process.stdin.isTTY) return noTty()
|
|
507
|
+
const list = await getAllowlist()
|
|
508
|
+
if (matchAllowlist(call, list)) return "allow"
|
|
509
|
+
const ans = await raceAbort(askUser(call), signal)
|
|
510
|
+
if (ans === "aborted") return "deny"
|
|
511
|
+
if (ans === "always") {
|
|
512
|
+
await saveAlways(call)
|
|
513
|
+
return "allow"
|
|
514
|
+
}
|
|
515
|
+
return ans === "allow" ? "allow" : deny(call, "declined by user")
|
|
516
|
+
}
|
|
517
|
+
}
|