minicode-ai 0.9.26

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Files changed (162) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +935 -0
  2. package/LICENSE +21 -0
  3. package/README.md +200 -0
  4. package/cli/args.ts +195 -0
  5. package/cli/auto-update.ts +108 -0
  6. package/cli/commands/auth.ts +166 -0
  7. package/cli/commands/config.ts +382 -0
  8. package/cli/commands/doctor.ts +128 -0
  9. package/cli/commands/exec.ts +179 -0
  10. package/cli/commands/mcp.ts +35 -0
  11. package/cli/commands/memory.ts +107 -0
  12. package/cli/commands/pricing.ts +100 -0
  13. package/cli/commands/providers.ts +162 -0
  14. package/cli/commands/sessions.ts +128 -0
  15. package/cli/commands/skills.ts +61 -0
  16. package/cli/commands/stats.ts +82 -0
  17. package/cli/commands.ts +317 -0
  18. package/cli/index.ts +539 -0
  19. package/cli/model-manager.ts +112 -0
  20. package/cli/provider-manager.ts +111 -0
  21. package/cli/repl.ts +734 -0
  22. package/cli/router.ts +124 -0
  23. package/cli/setup.ts +780 -0
  24. package/cli/wizard.ts +21 -0
  25. package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.html +1222 -0
  26. package/docs/README.md +109 -0
  27. package/docs/architecture.md +44 -0
  28. package/docs/changelog.md +3 -0
  29. package/package.json +91 -0
  30. package/src/agents/pool.ts +43 -0
  31. package/src/app/mentions.ts +50 -0
  32. package/src/app/provider-layer.ts +118 -0
  33. package/src/app/rag-layer.ts +105 -0
  34. package/src/app/session.ts +154 -0
  35. package/src/app/tool-layer.ts +56 -0
  36. package/src/config.ts +372 -0
  37. package/src/constants.ts +119 -0
  38. package/src/hooks/run.ts +89 -0
  39. package/src/lib/atomic-write.ts +88 -0
  40. package/src/lib/db-path.ts +36 -0
  41. package/src/lib/git-hardening.ts +91 -0
  42. package/src/lib/ignore.ts +58 -0
  43. package/src/lib/keystore.ts +202 -0
  44. package/src/lib/net.ts +70 -0
  45. package/src/lib/safe-open.ts +138 -0
  46. package/src/lib/session-id.ts +23 -0
  47. package/src/lib/trash.ts +38 -0
  48. package/src/lib/trusted-exec.ts +81 -0
  49. package/src/lsp/client.ts +395 -0
  50. package/src/mcp/client.ts +400 -0
  51. package/src/mcp/http-transport.ts +344 -0
  52. package/src/mcp/server.ts +538 -0
  53. package/src/mcp/transport.ts +150 -0
  54. package/src/memory/files.ts +159 -0
  55. package/src/memory/vector.ts +775 -0
  56. package/src/policy/allowlist.ts +67 -0
  57. package/src/policy/bash-guard.ts +465 -0
  58. package/src/policy/compaction.ts +271 -0
  59. package/src/policy/context.ts +161 -0
  60. package/src/policy/executor.ts +199 -0
  61. package/src/policy/jail.ts +127 -0
  62. package/src/policy/permission.ts +517 -0
  63. package/src/policy/pricing.ts +336 -0
  64. package/src/policy/ratelimit.ts +54 -0
  65. package/src/policy/sandbox-policy.ts +157 -0
  66. package/src/policy/scrub.ts +138 -0
  67. package/src/policy/update-check.ts +200 -0
  68. package/src/policy/usage.ts +292 -0
  69. package/src/policy/verifier.ts +181 -0
  70. package/src/providers/anthropic.ts +401 -0
  71. package/src/providers/auth-store.ts +139 -0
  72. package/src/providers/build.ts +136 -0
  73. package/src/providers/detect.ts +126 -0
  74. package/src/providers/effort.ts +165 -0
  75. package/src/providers/guards.ts +107 -0
  76. package/src/providers/oauth.ts +326 -0
  77. package/src/providers/presets.ts +122 -0
  78. package/src/providers/provision.ts +298 -0
  79. package/src/providers/responses.ts +371 -0
  80. package/src/providers/router.ts +247 -0
  81. package/src/repo/repomap.ts +470 -0
  82. package/src/sandbox/docker.ts +129 -0
  83. package/src/sandbox/os.ts +193 -0
  84. package/src/session/checkpoint.ts +543 -0
  85. package/src/session/journal.ts +1347 -0
  86. package/src/session/persistence.ts +446 -0
  87. package/src/session/shadow-git.ts +351 -0
  88. package/src/session/turn-marker.ts +118 -0
  89. package/src/skills/loader.ts +117 -0
  90. package/src/telemetry/trace.ts +283 -0
  91. package/src/tools/ask_user.ts +54 -0
  92. package/src/tools/bash.ts +400 -0
  93. package/src/tools/code_run.ts +96 -0
  94. package/src/tools/delete_file.ts +31 -0
  95. package/src/tools/edit.ts +204 -0
  96. package/src/tools/git.ts +301 -0
  97. package/src/tools/glob.ts +90 -0
  98. package/src/tools/grep.ts +281 -0
  99. package/src/tools/hashline.ts +66 -0
  100. package/src/tools/index.ts +103 -0
  101. package/src/tools/lsp.ts +346 -0
  102. package/src/tools/mcp_call.ts +163 -0
  103. package/src/tools/memory.ts +144 -0
  104. package/src/tools/move_file.ts +47 -0
  105. package/src/tools/patch.ts +86 -0
  106. package/src/tools/read_file.ts +130 -0
  107. package/src/tools/read_image.ts +80 -0
  108. package/src/tools/submit_result.ts +49 -0
  109. package/src/tools/task.ts +346 -0
  110. package/src/tools/todo.ts +201 -0
  111. package/src/tools/web_fetch.ts +161 -0
  112. package/src/tools/web_search.ts +156 -0
  113. package/src/tools/write_file.ts +42 -0
  114. package/src/ui/approval/prompt.ts +76 -0
  115. package/src/ui/assistant/simple.ts +568 -0
  116. package/src/ui/assistant/turn-status.ts +303 -0
  117. package/src/ui/contract.ts +55 -0
  118. package/src/ui/footer.ts +105 -0
  119. package/src/ui/input/input.ts +805 -0
  120. package/src/ui/input/prompt-engine.ts +606 -0
  121. package/src/ui/render/collapse.ts +84 -0
  122. package/src/ui/render/detail.ts +24 -0
  123. package/src/ui/render/diff.ts +181 -0
  124. package/src/ui/render/errors.ts +239 -0
  125. package/src/ui/render/format.ts +54 -0
  126. package/src/ui/render/highlight.ts +294 -0
  127. package/src/ui/render/markdown.ts +120 -0
  128. package/src/ui/render/money.ts +12 -0
  129. package/src/ui/render/reasoning.ts +20 -0
  130. package/src/ui/render/sanitize.ts +80 -0
  131. package/src/ui/render/table.ts +88 -0
  132. package/src/ui/render/theme.ts +339 -0
  133. package/src/ui/render/width.ts +256 -0
  134. package/src/ui/render/wrap.ts +120 -0
  135. package/src/ui/runtime/bus-debug.ts +83 -0
  136. package/src/ui/runtime/chrome.ts +301 -0
  137. package/src/ui/runtime/spinner.ts +77 -0
  138. package/src/ui/runtime/statusline.ts +227 -0
  139. package/src/ui/screens/model-manager.ts +434 -0
  140. package/src/ui/screens/overlay.ts +61 -0
  141. package/src/ui/screens/picker.ts +307 -0
  142. package/src/ui/screens/provider-manager.ts +450 -0
  143. package/src/ui/screens/wizard.ts +132 -0
  144. package/vendor/minicore/VENDOR.md +29 -0
  145. package/vendor/minicore/package.json +21 -0
  146. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/budget.ts +26 -0
  147. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/compact.ts +76 -0
  148. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/errors.ts +60 -0
  149. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/events.ts +74 -0
  150. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/executor.ts +139 -0
  151. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/history.ts +32 -0
  152. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/index.ts +42 -0
  153. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/loop.ts +344 -0
  154. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/permission.ts +24 -0
  155. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/provider.ts +39 -0
  156. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/recovery.ts +34 -0
  157. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/session.ts +327 -0
  158. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/snapshot.ts +142 -0
  159. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tokens.ts +111 -0
  160. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/tool.ts +118 -0
  161. package/vendor/minicore/src/core/types.ts +50 -0
  162. package/vendor/minicore/src/providers/openai-compat.ts +366 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
1
+ import { mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises"
2
+ import { homedir } from "node:os"
3
+ import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"
4
+ import type { ToolCall } from "#minicore/core/types.ts"
5
+ import { atomicWriteText } from "../lib/atomic-write.ts"
6
+
7
+ export interface Allowlist {
8
+ allowed: string[] // entries like "bash:echo hi" or "write_file:.tmp/*"
9
+ }
10
+
11
+ const GLOBAL_ALLOW = join(homedir(), ".minicode", "allowlist.json")
12
+ const LOCAL_ALLOW = ".minicode/allowlist.json"
13
+
14
+ export async function loadAllowlist(
15
+ cwd?: string,
16
+ opts: { allowLocal?: boolean } = {},
17
+ ): Promise<Allowlist> {
18
+ let globalList: Allowlist = { allowed: [] }
19
+ let localList: Allowlist = { allowed: [] }
20
+ try {
21
+ const txt = await readFile(GLOBAL_ALLOW, "utf8")
22
+ const parsed = JSON.parse(txt) as Allowlist
23
+ if (Array.isArray(parsed.allowed)) globalList = parsed
24
+ } catch {}
25
+ // Sama seperti config (audit #07 P0): allowlist lokal adalah input repo —
26
+ // repo yang memberi dirinya sendiri "always" = persetujuan palsu. Hanya
27
+ // dibaca bila operator opt-in; default = global saja.
28
+ if (opts.allowLocal) {
29
+ try {
30
+ const path = resolve(cwd ?? process.cwd(), LOCAL_ALLOW)
31
+ const txt = await readFile(path, "utf8")
32
+ const parsed = JSON.parse(txt) as Allowlist
33
+ if (Array.isArray(parsed.allowed)) localList = parsed
34
+ } catch {}
35
+ }
36
+ // merge global+local, dedup
37
+ const merged = new Set<string>([...globalList.allowed, ...localList.allowed])
38
+ return { allowed: [...merged] }
39
+ }
40
+
41
+ export async function saveAllowlist(entry: string, cwd?: string, opts: { global?: boolean } = {}) {
42
+ const path = opts.global ? GLOBAL_ALLOW : resolve(cwd ?? process.cwd(), LOCAL_ALLOW)
43
+ await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true }).catch(() => {})
44
+ let list: Allowlist = { allowed: [] }
45
+ try {
46
+ const parsed = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, "utf8")) as Allowlist
47
+ if (Array.isArray(parsed.allowed)) list = parsed
48
+ } catch {}
49
+ if (!list.allowed.includes(entry)) list.allowed.push(entry)
50
+ await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true }).catch(() => {})
51
+ await atomicWriteText(path, JSON.stringify(list, null, 2))
52
+ }
53
+
54
+ export function matchAllowlist(call: ToolCall, allowlist: string[]): boolean {
55
+ // Tanpa pemotongan: kunci = nama + JSON ARG PENUH. Versi lama memakai
56
+ // `.slice(0, 200)` sehingga dua panggilan dengan 200-char prefix sama
57
+ // berbagi kunci — entri "always" untuk perintah jinak panjang otomatis
58
+ // me-allow perintah jahat dengan prefix sama (temuan audit #07, reproducer:
59
+ // prefix 'A'x195 + tail jinak vs tail jahat → kunci terpotong identik).
60
+ const key = `${call.name}:${JSON.stringify(call.args)}`
61
+ return allowlist.some((pat) => {
62
+ const safe = pat.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*")
63
+ const re = new RegExp(`^${safe}$`)
64
+ if (pat.includes(":")) return re.test(key)
65
+ return re.test(call.name) || re.test(key)
66
+ })
67
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
1
+ // Analisis perintah shell untuk keputusan permission.
2
+ //
3
+ // Kenapa modul terpisah? Denylist regex lama diterapkan ke string MENTAH,
4
+ // sehingga trivially dilewati oleh hal-hal yang shell anggap setara:
5
+ //
6
+ // cat .e""nv → shell membaca .env, regex melihat `.e""nv`
7
+ // X=.env; cat $X → shell membaca .env, regex tak pernah melihat ".env"
8
+ // p=python3; $p -c 1 → interpreter jalan, regex tak melihat "python3 -c"
9
+ // node --eval "1" → sama dengan -e, tapi hanya `-e` yang di-regex
10
+ //
11
+ // Pendekatan di sini: NORMALISASI dulu (buang quote pemisah kata, substitusi
12
+ // assignment variabel sederhana), lalu periksa. Ini menutup seluruh kelas
13
+ // bypass, bukan satu-satu polanya.
14
+ //
15
+ // Batasan yang harus jujur: ini tetap analisis statis atas bahasa yang
16
+ // Turing-complete. Command substitution dinamis (`$(curl ...)`), aritmetika,
17
+ // dan indirection berlapis tak bisa diselesaikan tanpa mengeksekusi. Untuk
18
+ // isolasi sungguhan tetap perlu sandbox OS/container — modul ini menaikkan
19
+ // biaya serangan, bukan menghilangkannya.
20
+
21
+ import { isAbsolute, resolve } from "node:path"
22
+ import { isOwnedState, isRealPathOutsideRoot, isSensitive } from "./jail.ts"
23
+
24
+ export interface BashVerdict {
25
+ /** true = tolak */
26
+ denied: boolean
27
+ /** alasan singkat untuk pesan ke model/user */
28
+ reason?: string
29
+ }
30
+
31
+ // ── Normalisasi ──
32
+
33
+ /**
34
+ * Buang quote yang dipakai untuk memecah kata tanpa mengubah arti bagi shell.
35
+ * `.e""nv` → `.env`, `pyt"h"on3` → `python3`, `'.env'` → `.env`.
36
+ *
37
+ * Kita tidak mencoba meniru quoting shell sepenuhnya; tujuannya membuat
38
+ * bentuk-terpecah dan bentuk-utuh menghasilkan string pemeriksaan yang sama.
39
+ * Diekspor untuk test.
40
+ */
41
+ export function stripQuotes(cmd: string): string {
42
+ return cmd.replace(/["']/g, "")
43
+ }
44
+
45
+ /**
46
+ * Substitusi assignment variabel sederhana dalam satu perintah.
47
+ * `X=.env; cat $X` → `X=.env; cat .env`
48
+ * `p=python3 && $p -c 1` → `p=python3 && python3 -c 1`
49
+ *
50
+ * Hanya nilai literal tanpa spasi/ekspansi yang disubstitusi — cukup untuk
51
+ * menutup indirection yang dipakai untuk lolos filter, tanpa berpura-pura
52
+ * mengevaluasi shell. Assignment di-scan ulang tiap lintasan agar rantai
53
+ * (`a=.env; b=$a; cat $b`) juga terselesaikan. Diekspor untuk test.
54
+ */
55
+ export function inlineSimpleVars(cmd: string): string {
56
+ const ASSIGN = /(?:^|[;&|]\s*|\s)([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=([^\s;&|"'`$()]+)/g
57
+ let out = cmd
58
+ for (let pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
59
+ // scan ulang: substitusi lintasan sebelumnya bisa memunculkan
60
+ // assignment literal baru (b=$a → b=.env)
61
+ const vars = new Map<string, string>()
62
+ ASSIGN.lastIndex = 0
63
+ let m: RegExpExecArray | null = ASSIGN.exec(out)
64
+ while (m !== null) {
65
+ vars.set(m[1]!, m[2]!)
66
+ m = ASSIGN.exec(out)
67
+ }
68
+ if (vars.size === 0) break
69
+ let changed = false
70
+ for (const [name, value] of vars) {
71
+ const ref = new RegExp(`\\$\\{${name}\\}|\\$${name}\\b`, "g")
72
+ const next = out.replace(ref, value)
73
+ if (next !== out) {
74
+ out = next
75
+ changed = true
76
+ }
77
+ }
78
+ if (!changed) break
79
+ }
80
+ return out
81
+ }
82
+
83
+ /**
84
+ * Buang wrapper perintah yang tidak mengubah apa yang dijalankan.
85
+ *
86
+ * `command env`, `nice env`, `time env`, `exec env` semuanya menjalankan `env`,
87
+ * tapi wrapper-nya menggeser posisi kata sehingga pola yang ter-anchor ke awal
88
+ * perintah (mis. deteksi env-dump) tidak lagi cocok. Ditemukan oleh
89
+ * experiments/extreme-bash-fuzz.ts: `command env` lolos sementara `env` ditolak.
90
+ *
91
+ * Wrapper dibuang berulang karena bisa berlapis (`time nice env`).
92
+ * Diekspor untuk test.
93
+ */
94
+ export function stripCommandWrappers(cmd: string): string {
95
+ const WRAPPER =
96
+ /(^|[;&|]\s*)(?:command|exec|builtin|eval|nice(?:\s+-n\s*-?\d+)?|nohup|time|timeout\s+[\d.]+[smhd]?|stdbuf(?:\s+-\S+)*|env(?=\s+[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=)|setsid|ionice(?:\s+-\S+)*|xargs(?:\s+-\S+)*|sudo(?:\s+-\S+)*|doas)\s+/gi
97
+ // Wrapper privilese/konteks (audit 2026-09-16 B2): `su -c 'env'`,
98
+ // `runuser -u x -- printenv`, `cmd /c set` menyembunyikan perintah
99
+ // sebenarnya dari aturan konten yang ter-anchor ke awal (ENV_DUMP dkk).
100
+ // Dibuang BESERTA flag/argumen konteksnya (user/host/path, introducer
101
+ // -c/--//c) sehingga perintah DALAM dievaluasi aturan biasa — `su -c
102
+ // 'cat /etc/shadow'` tetap kena SENSITIVE_TARGET. Jangkar awal mencegah
103
+ // strip di tengah perintah (`echo su -c env` tak tersentuh).
104
+ const WRAPPER_SHELL =
105
+ /(^|[;&|]\s*)(?:(?:su|runuser|gosu|chroot|nsenter)(?:\s+(?:-[^\s;|]+|--[^\s;|]*|\/[^\s;|]*|[^-;\s|/][^;\s|]*))*\s+|cmd(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+\/[a-zA-Z]+)*\s+\/c\s+)/gi
106
+ let out = cmd
107
+ for (let pass = 0; pass < 4; pass++) {
108
+ const next = out.replace(WRAPPER, "$1").replace(WRAPPER_SHELL, "$1")
109
+ if (next === out) break
110
+ out = next
111
+ }
112
+ return out
113
+ }
114
+
115
+ /** Bentuk kanonik untuk pemeriksaan: quote dibuang + variabel disubstitusi. */
116
+ export function normalizeCommand(cmd: string): string {
117
+ return stripCommandWrappers(inlineSimpleVars(stripQuotes(cmd)))
118
+ }
119
+
120
+ // ── Aturan ──
121
+
122
+ /** Path/berkas kredensial, dicek pada bentuk ternormalisasi. */
123
+ const SENSITIVE_TARGET =
124
+ /(?:^|[\s/\\=@"'([:])(?:\.env(?:\.[\w.-]+)?|\.git-credentials|\.npmrc|\.netrc|id_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)|credentials(?:\.json)?|\.pem|\.p12|\.pfx|shadow|master\.key|config[/\\](?:sam|system|security|software|default)(?=[/\\]|$|[\s;"'&|])|ntds\.dit\b|hklm[/\\](?:sam|system|security)(?=[/\\]|$|[\s;"'&|]))\b/i
125
+
126
+ /** Direktori kredensial: ~/.ssh, $HOME/.aws, /etc/shadow, dst. */
127
+ const SENSITIVE_DIR = /(?:~|\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|\/etc|\/root|\/proc\/self)[/\\](?:\.?[\w.-]+)/i
128
+
129
+ /** Export registry hive / salin shadow-copy — satu-satunya pemakaian di
130
+ * konteks agen adalah eksfiltrasi hive terkunci (SAM butuh SYSTEM/VSS).
131
+ * `reg query` diagnostik TIDAK kena (butuh kata kerja save|export). */
132
+ const REG_HIVE_EXPORT = /\breg(?:\.exe)?\s+(?:save|export)\b/i
133
+
134
+ /** Path hive dalam bentuk apa pun (file maupun key registry). Jaga sinkron
135
+ * dengan cabang config[/\\]…|ntds|hklm di SENSITIVE_TARGET di atas. */
136
+ const HIVE_PATH =
137
+ /config[/\\](?:sam|system|security|software|default)(?=[/\\]|$|[\s;"'&|])|ntds\.dit\b|hklm[/\\](?:sam|system|security)(?=[/\\]|$|[\s;"'&|])/i
138
+
139
+ /** Pembuatan/mount shadow copy + utilitas DS — di tangan agen hanya untuk
140
+ * membaca hive terkunci (kasus nyata: `type ...\system32\config\sam`).
141
+ * `vssadmin list` diagnostik tetap lolos (hanya create/delete yang ditahan). */
142
+ const VSS_SHADOW = /\bvssadmin\b[^\n]*\b(?:create\s+shadow|delete\s+shadows?)\b/i
143
+ const NTDSUTIL = /\bntdsutil\b/i
144
+
145
+ /** Perintah yang membaca/menyalin isi berkas. Daftar ini + ekstraktor argumen
146
+ * di inspectBashCommand WAJIB sinkron (audit 2026-09-16 B4: certutil/tac/
147
+ * findstr lolos karena hanya ada di satu sisi). Denylist takkan pernah
148
+ * komplet (residual arsitektural, lihat kepala berkas) — tiap entri di sini
149
+ * adalah kasus konkret terverifikasi, bukan tebakan. */
150
+ const READERS =
151
+ /\b(?:cat|bat|less|more|head|tail|nl|od|xxd|strings|type|Get-Content|certutil|tac|findstr|fc|comp|cp|copy|mv|move|scp|rsync|tar|zip|gzip|base64|openssl|awk|sed|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|cut|sort|uniq|tee|dd|install)\b/i
152
+
153
+ /** Dump environment — `printenv` sudah lama diblok, sisanya belum. */
154
+ const ENV_DUMP =
155
+ // F-20: `\n` adalah pemisah perintah setara `;` — tanpa ini `echo hi\nenv`
156
+ // lolos (anchor lama hanya [;&|]). Berlaku untuk semua aturan ber-anchor
157
+ // awal-perintah di berkas ini.
158
+ /(?:^|[;&|\n]\s*)(?:printenv|env|set|export\s+-p|declare\s+-[xp]|compgen\s+-v)\s*(?:$|[;&|\n]|\|)/i
159
+
160
+ /** Referensi eksplisit ke variabel env yang berbau kredensial. */
161
+ const ENV_SECRET_REF =
162
+ /\$\{?[A-Z_]*(?:API_?KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_?KEY|ACCESS_?KEY)[A-Z_]*\}?/
163
+
164
+ /** Flag upload berkas pada klien HTTP — jalur exfiltrasi paling langsung. */
165
+ const UPLOAD_FLAG =
166
+ /\b(?:curl|wget|http|httpie|nc|ncat|socat)\b[^\n]*(?:-F\s*\S*=@|--form\s*\S*=@|-d\s*@|--data(?:-binary|-raw)?\s*@|-T\s+|--upload-file|--post-file=|-b\s*@)/i
167
+
168
+ /** Interpreter dijalankan dengan kode inline (semua bentuk flag). */
169
+ const INLINE_INTERPRETER =
170
+ /\b(?:pyw?|python[\d.]*|pypy[\d.]*|sh|bash|dash|zsh|ksh|node|deno|bun|perl|ruby|php|Rscript)(?:\.exe)?\b\s+(?:-\w*\s+)*(?:-c|-e|-E|--eval|--print|-p|--command|-r|--execute)\b/i
171
+ // Residual jujur (audit 2026-09-16 B3): eksekusi via stdin/redirect TANPA
172
+ // flag inline (`bash -s < skrip`, `python3 < prog`, `... | python3 -`) tidak
173
+ // ditahan — menahan `| python3 -` mematahkan pipeline sah, dan `bash berkas`
174
+ // telanjang memang diizinkan (skrip workspace dieksekusi setara user
175
+ // menjalankannya; penanaman skrip dijaga permission write). Isolasi penuh
176
+ // tetap tugas sandbox OS/docker, bukan analisis statis.
177
+
178
+ /** Process substitution / here-string yang memasukkan output perintah lain. */
179
+ const PROCESS_SUB = /<\s*\(|>\s*\(|<<<|\bsource\s+<|\.\s+<\(/
180
+
181
+ /** Pipe ke shell/interpreter — bentuk apa pun sumbernya. */
182
+ const PIPE_TO_SHELL =
183
+ /\|\s*(?:sudo\s+)?(?:sh|bash|dash|zsh|ksh|python|python2|python3|pyw?|node|deno|bun|perl|ruby|php|iex|Invoke-Expression)(?:\.exe)?\b/i
184
+
185
+ /** Unduh ke berkas lalu jalankan berkas itu dalam satu baris. */
186
+ const DOWNLOAD_THEN_RUN =
187
+ /\b(?:curl|wget|Invoke-WebRequest|iwr)\b[^\n]*?(?:-o|-O|--output|-OutFile)\s*(\S+)[^\n]*[;&|][^\n]*\b(?:sh|bash|dash|zsh|node|pyw?|python3?|perl|ruby|php|\.\/)(?:\.exe)?\b/i
188
+
189
+ /** Container escape: mount host root / privileged. */
190
+ const CONTAINER_ESCAPE =
191
+ /\b(?:docker|podman|nerdctl)\b[^\n]*(?:--privileged|--pid[= ]host|--net(?:work)?[= ]host|-v\s*\/:|--volume\s*\/:|-v\s*\/etc|--cap-add[= ](?:ALL|SYS_ADMIN))/i
192
+
193
+ /**
194
+ * Target redirect shell (`>`, `>>`, `<`) di luar quote. Heredoc `<<`/`<<-`
195
+ * dilewati (kata berikutnya delimiter, bukan path); target fd (`>&2`, `&-`)
196
+ * dilewati (bukan path). Diekspor untuk test.
197
+ *
198
+ * Kenapa scan RAW quote-aware, bukan bentuk ternormalisasi: stripQuotes
199
+ * membuat `echo "a > b"` (aman — shell tak me-redirect isi quote) terlihat
200
+ * persis seperti `echo a > b` (redirect nyata).
201
+ */
202
+ export function findRedirectTargets(rawCmd: string): string[] {
203
+ const out: string[] = []
204
+ let sq = false
205
+ let dq = false
206
+ let i = 0
207
+ const n = rawCmd.length
208
+ const isTerm = (c: string): boolean => /[\s;|&<>()]/.test(c)
209
+ while (i < n) {
210
+ const c = rawCmd[i]!
211
+ if (c === "\\" && i + 1 < n) {
212
+ i += 2
213
+ continue
214
+ }
215
+ if (c === "'" && !dq) {
216
+ sq = !sq
217
+ i++
218
+ continue
219
+ }
220
+ if (c === '"' && !sq) {
221
+ dq = !dq
222
+ i++
223
+ continue
224
+ }
225
+ if (sq || dq || (c !== ">" && c !== "<")) {
226
+ i++
227
+ continue
228
+ }
229
+ // Operator: serakah makan [<>|] (>, >>, >|, <>, <). `<<` = heredoc.
230
+ let j = i
231
+ let heredoc = false
232
+ while (j < n && (rawCmd[j] === ">" || rawCmd[j] === "<" || rawCmd[j] === "|")) {
233
+ j++
234
+ if (j - i > 3) break
235
+ }
236
+ const op = rawCmd.slice(i, j)
237
+ if (op.includes("<<")) heredoc = true
238
+ // Lewati spasi, baca satu kata target.
239
+ let k = j
240
+ while (k < n && /\s/.test(rawCmd[k]!)) k++
241
+ if (heredoc || (k < n && rawCmd[k] === "&")) {
242
+ // Delimiter heredoc / target fd (`>&2`, `&-`): bukan path.
243
+ while (k < n && !isTerm(rawCmd[k]!)) k++
244
+ i = k
245
+ continue
246
+ }
247
+ let e = k
248
+ while (e < n && !isTerm(rawCmd[e]!)) e++
249
+ if (e > k) out.push(rawCmd.slice(k, e))
250
+ i = e
251
+ }
252
+ return out
253
+ }
254
+
255
+ /** Null sink lintas-OS — redirect ke sini selalu aman, jangan dihitung. */
256
+ function isNullSink(t: string): boolean {
257
+ return t === "/dev/null" || t.toUpperCase() === "NUL"
258
+ }
259
+
260
+ /** Pencarian rekursif dari root filesystem. */
261
+ const ROOT_SCAN = /\b(?:find|fd|ls|dir|du|tree|grep|rg)\b[^\n]*\s\/(?:\s|$)/i
262
+
263
+ /**
264
+ * `rm` rekursif dengan target berbahaya.
265
+ *
266
+ * Dipisah dari denylist lama yang menganggap SETIAP `/` berbahaya — itu
267
+ * memblokir `rm -rf node_modules/.cache` yang sah. Yang berbahaya: target root,
268
+ * home, parent traversal, atau wildcard telanjang.
269
+ *
270
+ * Bentuk flag panjang (`--recursive`) ikut dikenali: fuzz menemukan
271
+ * `rm --recursive --force /` lolos karena pola lama hanya mencari `-[a-z]*r`.
272
+ *
273
+ * Traversal dicek di mana pun dalam argumen, bukan hanya di awal kata: target
274
+ * bisa dibungkus command substitution (`rm -rf $(pwd)/../..`) yang tidak bisa
275
+ * kita evaluasi, tapi `..` yang menaik tetap terlihat.
276
+ *
277
+ * Target `//` dan `/.X` ikut berbahaya (audit 2026-09-16 B5): slash ganda
278
+ * collapse ke root di POSIX (`rm -rf //` ≡ `rm -rf /`), dan `/.[!.]*` dengan
279
+ * -r menghapus isi dotfile root.
280
+ */
281
+ const RM_RECURSIVE = /\brm\b[^\n]*(?:\s-[a-z]*[rR]|\s--recursive\b|\s--dir\b)/i
282
+ const RM_DANGEROUS_TARGET =
283
+ /(?:\s\/(?:\s|$|\*|;|&|\/|\.)|\s~(?:[/\\]\s*)?(?:\s|$|;|&)|\$\{?HOME\}?|\.\.(?:[/\\]|\s|$|;|&)|\s\*\s*(?:$|;|&)|--no-preserve-root)/
284
+
285
+ const STATIC_DENY: [RegExp, string][] = [
286
+ // Fork bomb: definisi fungsi rekursif yang memanggil dirinya lewat pipe.
287
+ // Pola longgar (bukan hanya `:(){ :|:& };:` literal) karena nama fungsi bisa
288
+ // apa saja dan spasi bebas — fuzz menemukan varian yang terpecah oleh
289
+ // substitusi variabel masih lolos bentuk ketat. `\}` opsional karena
290
+ // normalisasi bisa menghilangkan bagian setelah pipe.
291
+ [/(?:^|[;&|=\n]\s*)[\w:]+\s*\(\)\s*\{[^}]*\|[^}]*&/, "fork bomb"],
292
+ [/\bmkfs\b/i, "format filesystem"],
293
+ [/\bdd\s+if=/i, "raw disk write"],
294
+ [/\bchmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\b/i, "permission 777"],
295
+ [/\bshred\b/i, "secure delete"],
296
+ [/\btruncate\b/i, "truncate file"],
297
+ [/\bmv\s+[^;|]*\s+\/(?:etc|boot|usr|lib)\b/i, "overwrite system dir"],
298
+ [/\bsudo\b[^\n]*\brm\b/i, "sudo rm"],
299
+ // `pwsh`/`pwsh.exe` = nama biner PowerShell modern lintas-OS (audit
300
+ // 2026-09-16: varian encoded lolos karena aturan hanya kenal `powershell`).
301
+ [/\b(?:powershell|pwsh)\b[^\n]*-EncodedCommand/i, "encoded powershell"],
302
+ // Bentuk pendek -enc/-enco/... + blob base64 panjang. Aturan penuh di atas
303
+ // tak menangkap prefix; pola ini mensyaratkan blob (60+ byte, hitung padding
304
+ // `==`) sehingga -Encoding milik cmdlet dalam (-Command "... -Encoding
305
+ // utf8 ...") lolos: -enc* + blob panjang praktis hanya payload terenkode.
306
+ // -Command arbitrer tetap residual jujur (butuh sandbox OS/docker).
307
+ [
308
+ /\b(?:powershell|pwsh)(\.exe)?\b[^\n]*\s-e\w*\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/]{60,}={0,2}/i,
309
+ "encoded powershell payload",
310
+ ],
311
+ [/>\s*\/dev\/(?:sda|nvme|hd[a-z])/i, "raw device write"],
312
+ [/\b(?:del|erase)\b[^\n]*\/[sfaq]/i, "windows recursive delete"],
313
+ [/\brmdir\b[^\n]*\/s/i, "windows recursive rmdir"],
314
+ [/\bRemove-Item\b[^\n]*-Recurse/i, "powershell recursive delete"],
315
+ [/\[System\.IO\.File\]::ReadAllText/i, "powershell file read"],
316
+ [/\b(?:Invoke-Expression|iex)\b/i, "powershell dynamic eval"],
317
+ [/\bawk\b[^\n]*\bsystem\s*\(/i, "awk system()"],
318
+ // git sebagai pelarian jail: `git diff --no-index A B` mencetak isi path
319
+ // filesystem ARBITRER (di luar workspace, abaikan file-jail — terkonfirmasi
320
+ // via inspectBashCommand, bukan teori); --exec-path/--upload-pack/
321
+ // --receive-pack/ext:: mengeksekusi helper eksternal. Bentuk global
322
+ // `git -c k=v <sub>` sebelum subcommand sudah gugur di allowlist (tak cocok
323
+ // pola ^git <sub>), tapi mode auto hanya dijaga guard ini. Alur sah agen
324
+ // (status/diff/log/branch/show dalam repo) tak memakai flag ini.
325
+ [/\bgit\b[^\n]*?--(?:no-index|exec-path|upload-pack|receive-pack)\b/, "git dangerous flag"],
326
+ [/\bext::/, "git ext transport"],
327
+ // Injeksi konfigurasi git via environment (`GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=x git diff`
328
+ // setara diff.external repo — repo-side adalah residual terdokumentasi, tapi
329
+ // env datang dari perintah model sendiri sehingga ditahan di sini).
330
+ [
331
+ /\bGIT_(?:EXTERNAL_DIFF|CONFIG_COUNT|CONFIG_KEY_\d+|CONFIG_VALUE_\d+)\s*=/,
332
+ "git config injection via env",
333
+ ],
334
+ [
335
+ /(?:^|[;&|\n]\s*)(?:base64|xxd)[^\n]*\|\s*(?:sh|bash|python|python3|node|perl)\b/i,
336
+ "decode|shell",
337
+ ],
338
+ // F-20: upload berkas via PowerShell — UPLOAD_FLAG hanya kenal
339
+ // curl/wget/nc. Bentuk eksfiltrasi: Invoke-WebRequest -Method POST -Body
340
+ // (Get-Content rahasia) atau -InFile <berkas>. Download polos (-OutFile)
341
+ // TETAP lolos (seperti curl tanpa -d @file): bukan upload.
342
+ [/\b(?:Invoke-WebRequest|iwr)\b[^\n]*?(?:-InFile\b|Get-Content)/i, "file upload to network"],
343
+ ]
344
+
345
+ /**
346
+ * Evaluasi satu perintah bash. Return alasan bila ditolak.
347
+ *
348
+ * Pemeriksaan dilakukan pada bentuk ternormalisasi DAN mentah: normalisasi
349
+ * menutup bypass, sementara bentuk mentah menangkap pola yang justru hilang
350
+ * saat quote dibuang (mis. `--upload-file "x"`).
351
+ */
352
+ export function inspectBashCommand(rawCmd: string, cwd?: string): BashVerdict {
353
+ const raw = rawCmd
354
+ const norm = normalizeCommand(rawCmd)
355
+ const both = (re: RegExp): boolean => re.test(norm) || re.test(raw)
356
+
357
+ for (const [re, reason] of STATIC_DENY) {
358
+ if (both(re)) return { denied: true, reason }
359
+ }
360
+ if (both(RM_RECURSIVE) && both(RM_DANGEROUS_TARGET)) {
361
+ return { denied: true, reason: "destructive rm" }
362
+ }
363
+ if (both(PROCESS_SUB)) return { denied: true, reason: "process substitution" }
364
+ if (both(PIPE_TO_SHELL)) return { denied: true, reason: "pipe to interpreter" }
365
+ if (both(DOWNLOAD_THEN_RUN)) return { denied: true, reason: "download then execute" }
366
+ if (both(INLINE_INTERPRETER)) return { denied: true, reason: "inline interpreter code" }
367
+ if (both(CONTAINER_ESCAPE)) return { denied: true, reason: "container escape" }
368
+ if (both(ENV_DUMP)) return { denied: true, reason: "environment dump" }
369
+ if (both(ENV_SECRET_REF)) return { denied: true, reason: "credential env reference" }
370
+ if (both(UPLOAD_FLAG)) return { denied: true, reason: "file upload to network" }
371
+ // Hive Windows: `reg save HKLM\SAM` / `reg export ...\config\system` —
372
+ // `reg query` diagnostik tetap lolos (tanpa kata kerja destruktif).
373
+ if (both(REG_HIVE_EXPORT) && (HIVE_PATH.test(norm) || HIVE_PATH.test(raw)))
374
+ return { denied: true, reason: "registry hive export" }
375
+ if (both(VSS_SHADOW)) return { denied: true, reason: "shadow copy credential access" }
376
+ if (both(NTDSUTIL)) return { denied: true, reason: "directory services tool" }
377
+ if (both(ROOT_SCAN)) return { denied: true, reason: "filesystem-root scan" }
378
+
379
+ // Redirect keluar workspace (temuan audit eksternal: `echo x > ..\evil`
380
+ // lolos karena allowlist hanya menolak chaining `[;&|]` dan guard tak
381
+ // punya aturan redirect). Target di-resolve terhadap cwd pemanggil agar
382
+ // presisi (`> local.txt` dan `> /dev/null` tetap jalan); tanpa cwd,
383
+ // heuristik konservatif (`..`/absolut/sensitif) berlaku.
384
+ for (const t of findRedirectTargets(raw)) {
385
+ if (isNullSink(t)) continue
386
+ // Ekspansi %VAR% terjadi di cmd.exe SETELAH cek statis: `> "%TEMP%\x"`
387
+ // terlihat di dalam cwd secara literal lalu menulis ke luar. Target dengan
388
+ // pola %NAMA% tak bisa dipastikan aman → tolak; tulis ulang tanpa env var
389
+ // atau pakai path relatif. `%` tunggal (mis. `100%.txt`) tetap lolos
390
+ // karena bukan pola ekspansi.
391
+ if (/%[^%\s]+%/.test(t))
392
+ return { denied: true, reason: "redirect target with env expansion (%VAR%)" }
393
+ if (cwd != null) {
394
+ const abs = isAbsolute(t) ? resolve(t) : resolve(cwd, t)
395
+ // Owned-state (.minicode/config dkk) simetris dengan jail file tools:
396
+ // tulis lewat shell tak boleh lebih longgar dari write_file.
397
+ if (
398
+ isRealPathOutsideRoot(abs, cwd) ||
399
+ isSensitive(t) ||
400
+ isSensitive(abs) ||
401
+ isOwnedState(t) ||
402
+ isOwnedState(abs)
403
+ )
404
+ return { denied: true, reason: "redirect outside workspace" }
405
+ } else if (
406
+ /(^|[\\/])\.\.(?:[\\/]|$)|\b[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]|^\/(?!dev\/null$)|^~(?:[\\/]|$)/.test(t) ||
407
+ isSensitive(t) ||
408
+ isOwnedState(t)
409
+ ) {
410
+ return { denied: true, reason: "redirect outside workspace" }
411
+ }
412
+ }
413
+
414
+ // Berkas sensitif: berbahaya bila dibaca/disalin ATAU dijadikan argumen
415
+ // perintah jaringan. Menyebut `.env` dalam `echo` saja tidak diblokir.
416
+ const touchesSensitive = both(SENSITIVE_TARGET) || both(SENSITIVE_DIR)
417
+ if (touchesSensitive && (both(READERS) || /\b(?:curl|wget|nc|ncat|socat|scp)\b/i.test(norm))) {
418
+ return { denied: true, reason: "sensitive file access" }
419
+ }
420
+
421
+ // P0-2: READER tanpa filter path (cat * / type *) = bisa baca file sensitif
422
+ // atau di luar workspace walau cocok allowlist. Ekstrak argumen path untuk
423
+ // READER dan cek jail/sensitive. Wildcard `*` ditolak bila cwd tersedia
424
+ // (bisa mengembang ke .env / .minicode).
425
+ if (both(READERS)) {
426
+ const readerTargets = (() => {
427
+ const out: string[] = []
428
+ const re =
429
+ /\b(?:cat|bat|less|more|head|tail|nl|od|xxd|strings|type|Get-Content|certutil|tac|findstr|fc|comp|cp|copy|mv|move|scp|rsync|tar|zip|gzip|base64|openssl|awk|sed|grep|egrep|fgrep|rg|cut|sort|uniq|tee|dd|install)\b\s+([^\n;&|]+)/gi
430
+ for (const m of norm.matchAll(re)) {
431
+ const args = m[1]!.split(/\s+/)
432
+ for (const a of args) {
433
+ if (!a) continue
434
+ if (a.startsWith("-")) continue
435
+ const t = a.trim()
436
+ if (!t) continue
437
+ out.push(t)
438
+ }
439
+ }
440
+ return out
441
+ })()
442
+ for (const t of readerTargets) {
443
+ if (t.includes("*")) {
444
+ // Wildcard di READER bisa mengembang ke .env/.minicode — tolak bila
445
+ // cwd tersedia (butuh path eksplisit). Tanpa cwd, heuristik sensitif.
446
+ if (cwd != null) return { denied: true, reason: "reader wildcard" }
447
+ if (isSensitive(t) || isOwnedState(t)) return { denied: true, reason: "reader wildcard" }
448
+ }
449
+ if (isSensitive(t) || isSensitive(resolve(cwd ?? ".", t))) {
450
+ return { denied: true, reason: "sensitive file access" }
451
+ }
452
+ if (isOwnedState(t) || isOwnedState(resolve(cwd ?? ".", t))) {
453
+ return { denied: true, reason: "owned state access" }
454
+ }
455
+ if (cwd != null) {
456
+ const abs = isAbsolute(t) ? resolve(t) : resolve(cwd, t)
457
+ if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(abs, cwd)) return { denied: true, reason: "outside workspace" }
458
+ } else if (/^\.\.(?:[\\/]|$)|\b[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]|^\/(?!dev\/null$)|^~(?:[\\/]|$)/.test(t)) {
459
+ return { denied: true, reason: "outside workspace" }
460
+ }
461
+ }
462
+ }
463
+
464
+ return { denied: false }
465
+ }