mindforge-cc 9.0.0 → 10.0.1

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,4 +1,110 @@
 # Security Policy
 
-Please see `docs/security/SECURITY.md` for the full security policy,
-reporting process, and supported versions.
+## Supported Versions
+
+| Version | Status | Support Level |
+|---------|--------|---------------|
+| 10.x | **Current** | Full security and feature updates |
+| 9.x | Maintenance | Critical security patches only (until 2026-08-31) |
+| 8.x | End of Life | No further updates |
+| 7.x and below | End of Life | No further updates |
+
+We recommend all users upgrade to the latest 10.x release. Security patches for 9.x will be provided for critical vulnerabilities only, on a best-effort basis, until August 2026.
+
+---
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+If you discover a security vulnerability in MindForge, please report it responsibly.
+
+**Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
+
+### How to Report
+
+1. **Email**: Send a detailed report to the repository maintainer via the email listed in their GitHub profile.
+2. **GitHub Security Advisories**: Use the "Report a vulnerability" button on the repository's Security tab (preferred).
+
+### What to Include
+
+- Description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
+- Steps to reproduce (minimal test case preferred)
+- Affected version(s)
+- Any suggested fix or mitigation
+
+### Response Timeline
+
+| Stage | Target |
+|-------|--------|
+| Acknowledgment | Within 48 hours |
+| Severity assessment | Within 5 business days |
+| Patch development | Within 14 days for Critical/High |
+| Public disclosure | After patch is released, coordinated with reporter |
+
+We follow responsible disclosure practices. We will credit reporters in the release notes unless they prefer anonymity.
+
+---
+
+## Security Features (v10.0.0)
+
+### Authentication & Authorization
+
+- **Bearer token auth on dashboard** — All mutating endpoints (`/api/steering`, `/api/approve`, SSE control) require `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Token is sourced from `MINDFORGE_DASHBOARD_TOKEN` environment variable.
+- **Browser daemon authentication** — The `/evaluate` endpoint requires auth before executing code in the Playwright context.
+- **ZTAI Trust Tiers** — 4-tier authorization model (Tier 0-3) controls which agents can perform which actions. Tier 3 (catastrophic-risk) operations require explicit human approval.
+
+### Audit & Integrity
+
+- **Merkle-chain audit log** — Every entry in `AUDIT.jsonl` includes a SHA-256 hash of the previous entry. Tampering with any historical entry breaks the chain, making modifications detectable.
+- **AuditWriter with buffered writes** — Atomic append operations prevent partial writes from corrupting the log.
+- **npm provenance** — Published packages include SLSA Build Level 2 attestation via `--provenance`, proving the package was built from the stated source commit in CI.
+
+### Input Validation & Injection Prevention
+
+- **Parameterized SQL queries** — All VectorHub queries use bound parameters. No string concatenation of user input into SQL.
+- **Path traversal prevention** — The temporal API validates `auditId` against `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]` and verifies resolved paths remain within the expected directory.
+- **No shell interpretation** — Commands that invoke external processes use argument arrays, never shell string interpolation.
+- **Structured action allowlist** — Autonomous actions are validated against an explicit permit list (replaces the previous regex blocklist that was prone to bypass).
+
+### Governance & Policy
+
+- **Fail-closed ZK verification** — `verifyZKProof()` throws on invalid or missing proofs. The system denies by default.
+- **Non-overridable parameters** — Security-critical MINDFORGE.md settings cannot be overridden by project-level or session-level configuration.
+- **CSP headers on dashboard** — Content Security Policy headers prevent XSS in the dashboard UI.
+- **Localhost-only binding** — The dashboard server binds to `127.0.0.1` only. It is not accessible from the network.
+
+### Supply Chain
+
+- **Zero native dependencies** — The removal of `better-sqlite3` eliminates the entire native compilation toolchain (node-gyp, Python, C++ compiler) from the install process, reducing the attack surface.
+- **Dependabot enabled** — Automated weekly scans for vulnerable npm dependencies and monthly GitHub Actions version updates.
+- **CODEOWNERS enforcement** — Changes to `bin/governance/`, `bin/engine/`, and the SDK require review from designated security owners.
+- **.npmignore** — Prevents accidental publication of secrets, test fixtures, planning state, and intelligence logs.
+
+---
+
+## Security Hardening Checklist (for Contributors)
+
+Before submitting code that touches security-sensitive paths:
+
+- [ ] No hardcoded secrets, tokens, or API keys in code or config
+- [ ] All user inputs validated before processing
+- [ ] SQL queries use bound parameters (never string concatenation)
+- [ ] File path inputs validated and contained within expected directories
+- [ ] External process invocations use argument arrays (no shell)
+- [ ] Authentication checks present on all mutating endpoints
+- [ ] Error messages do not leak internal paths or stack traces to clients
+- [ ] Audit log entries include the action for traceability
+- [ ] Tests cover the security-relevant behavior (positive and negative cases)
+
+---
+
+## Known Mitigations & Limitations
+
+- **ZK-proofs are simulated** — The Dilithium-5 / ZK-proof layer uses cryptographic simulation, not hardware-backed TEEs. It provides logical governance enforcement, not hardware-grade isolation.
+- **Dashboard is localhost-only** — The dashboard is designed for local development. Do not expose it to the public internet, even behind a reverse proxy, without adding additional authentication.
+- **ZTAI keys are file-based** — Agent identity keys are stored on disk. In production deployments requiring hardware-bound keys, integrate with your organization's HSM or secure enclave.
+
+---
+
+## Contact
+
+For security questions that are not vulnerability reports, open a GitHub Discussion with the "security" label.

package/bin/autonomous/audit-writer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/**
+ * MindForge — Audit Writer (Async Buffered)
+ * Extracted from auto-runner.js — handles all JSONL audit append operations.
+ * Buffers entries and flushes every 100ms or when buffer reaches 10 entries.
+ */
+'use strict';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+const FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS = 100;
+const FLUSH_THRESHOLD = 10;
+
+/**
+ * Creates a buffered async audit writer.
+ * @param {string} auditPath — Path to the AUDIT.jsonl file
+ * @returns {{ write: (entry: object) => void, flush: () => Promise<void>, close: () => Promise<void> }}
+ */
+function createAuditWriter(auditPath) {
+  let buffer = [];
+  let flushTimer = null;
+  let isClosed = false;
+
+  function scheduleFlush() {
+    if (flushTimer !== null) return;
+    flushTimer = setTimeout(async () => {
+      flushTimer = null;
+      await flush();
+    }, FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Adds an entry to the buffer. Triggers flush if threshold reached.
+   * Stamps entry with id and timestamp if missing (immutable — creates new object).
+   */
+  function write(entry) {
+    if (isClosed) {
+      throw new Error('AuditWriter is closed — cannot write after close()');
+    }
+
+    const stamped = Object.assign(Object.create(null), entry, {
+      id: entry.id || crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex'),
+      timestamp: entry.timestamp || new Date().toISOString(),
+    });
+
+    buffer = [...buffer, stamped];
+
+    if (buffer.length >= FLUSH_THRESHOLD) {
+      // Immediate flush — don't wait for timer
+      if (flushTimer !== null) {
+        clearTimeout(flushTimer);
+        flushTimer = null;
+      }
+      flush();
+    } else {
+      scheduleFlush();
+    }
+
+    return stamped;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Flushes the buffer to disk using async appendFile.
+   */
+  async function flush() {
+    if (buffer.length === 0) return;
+
+    const toWrite = buffer;
+    buffer = [];
+
+    const payload = toWrite.map(e => JSON.stringify(e)).join('\n') + '\n';
+    await fs.promises.appendFile(auditPath, payload);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Flushes remaining entries and stops the timer. After close(), write() will throw.
+   */
+  async function close() {
+    isClosed = true;
+    if (flushTimer !== null) {
+      clearTimeout(flushTimer);
+      flushTimer = null;
+    }
+    await flush();
+  }
+
+  return Object.freeze({ write, flush, close });
+}
+
+module.exports = { createAuditWriter };