lastlight 0.1.15 → 0.2.1

package/dist/sandbox/egress-firewall-config.js

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST, mergeAllowlist } from "./egress-allowlist.js";
+/**
+ * Egress firewall config generation for the docker sandbox backend.
+ *
+ * Architecture (replaces the earlier tinyproxy CONNECT-proxy):
+ *
+ *   sandbox-egress (internal: true, subnet 172.30.0.0/24)
+ *     ├─ sandbox containers              (docker run --dns <coredns-ip>)
+ *     ├─ coredns-strict   172.30.0.10    → returns nginx-strict IP for allowlist hosts, NXDOMAIN otherwise
+ *     ├─ coredns-open     172.30.0.11    → returns nginx-open IP for ANY hostname (except hard-deny SSRF magnets)
+ *     ├─ nginx-egress-strict 172.30.0.20 → ssl_preread, SNI must match allowlist; tunnel upstream via proxy-egress
+ *     └─ nginx-egress-open   172.30.0.21 → tunnel any SNI; client DNS already gated through coredns-open
+ *
+ * Why this instead of a forward proxy (tinyproxy/smokescreen): clients
+ * inside the sandbox (especially the OpenAI/Anthropic SDKs that build
+ * their own undici dispatchers) don't honour HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY.
+ * Forcing them to cooperate is a losing battle. By spoofing DNS and
+ * peeking SNI at the network layer, the sandbox sees no proxy at all —
+ * it dials `api.openai.com:443` directly. The firewall intercepts the
+ * connection by virtue of being the only thing the spoofed DNS pointed
+ * at.
+ *
+ * Inspired by Vercel Sandbox's egress firewall (SNI peeking, no env
+ * vars). Their implementation also handles TLS termination for
+ * credentials brokering and Postgres STARTTLS — we don't (yet).
+ *
+ * ## Wildcards
+ *
+ * Entries in egress-allowlist.ts with a leading dot (`".github.com"`)
+ * match the apex plus every subdomain. nginx's `map` directive supports
+ * this syntax natively. CoreDNS uses the `template` plugin with an
+ * anchored regex to do the same.
+ */
+/** Fixed IPs assigned in docker-compose.yml so `--dns` and nginx upstreams can reference them. */
+export const COREDNS_STRICT_IP = "172.30.0.10";
+export const COREDNS_OPEN_IP = "172.30.0.11";
+export const NGINX_STRICT_IP = "172.30.0.20";
+export const NGINX_OPEN_IP = "172.30.0.21";
+/**
+ * Static IP of the in-network OTEL collector (docker backend). Sandboxes
+ * dial it directly by IP — it lives on `sandbox-egress` alongside the
+ * firewalls, so no DNS lookup (and therefore no coredns allowlist entry)
+ * is involved. The collector is the ONLY OTLP endpoint a sandbox ever
+ * sees: it terminates the sandbox's telemetry and re-exports to the real
+ * backend over `proxy-egress` using credentials that stay host-side. This
+ * is why the strict SNI firewall no longer needs to know about collector
+ * hosts or non-443 ports — that hop happens on the trusted outbound leg,
+ * not through `ssl_preread`.
+ */
+export const OTEL_COLLECTOR_IP = "172.30.0.30";
+/** OTLP/HTTP + OTLP/gRPC receiver ports the in-network collector listens on. */
+export const OTEL_COLLECTOR_OTLP_HTTP_PORT = 4318;
+export const OTEL_COLLECTOR_OTLP_GRPC_PORT = 4317;
+/** Endpoint a docker sandbox is told to export OTLP to (HTTP/protobuf). */
+export const OTEL_COLLECTOR_SANDBOX_ENDPOINT = `http://${OTEL_COLLECTOR_IP}:${OTEL_COLLECTOR_OTLP_HTTP_PORT}`;
+/**
+ * UID the `otel/opentelemetry-collector` image runs as (its Dockerfile
+ * `USER`). The collector reads the OTLP config (which can hold backend auth
+ * headers) as this non-root user. To let it read a mode-0600 file from the
+ * shared volume WITHOUT running as root or making the secret world-readable,
+ * the harness's own `lastlight` user is pinned to this same UID (see the
+ * Dockerfile `useradd -u`), so the collector reads files it wrote as their
+ * owner. The Dockerfile and the collector image tag in docker-compose.yml
+ * must move together if a future image bumps the UID — enforced by a test in
+ * docker-compose.test.ts.
+ */
+export const OTEL_COLLECTOR_UID = 10001;
+/** Subnet for sandbox-egress. Compose declares this CIDR so the IPs above are valid. */
+export const SANDBOX_EGRESS_SUBNET = "172.30.0.0/24";
+/**
+ * Hostnames the open coredns explicitly NXDOMAINs even in unrestricted
+ * mode — known SSRF magnets. nginx's `ssl_preread` SNI inspection alone
+ * can't catch hostnames that resolve to private IPs (the DNS server
+ * we control gets the first say), so this is the right layer to enforce
+ * "no cloud metadata, no internal services" even with `unrestricted_egress`.
+ */
+const OPEN_MODE_HARD_DENY = [
+    "metadata.google.internal",
+    "169.254.169.254", // GCP / AWS / Azure metadata service IP literal
+];
+/**
+ * Convert one allowlist entry to its nginx `map` line.
+ *
+ *   "openai.com" → '.openai.com  $ssl_preread_server_name:443;'
+ *
+ * Every entry is treated as apex+subdomain (see egress-allowlist.ts).
+ * The generated line uses nginx's `.foo.com` leading-dot syntax,
+ * which is its built-in "match this domain and all subdomains" form.
+ * Upstream is whatever SNI the client sent — we don't know which
+ * subdomain they're targeting at config-gen time.
+ */
+function nginxMapLine(entry) {
+    return `        .${entry} $ssl_preread_server_name:443;`;
+}
+/**
+ * Build one CoreDNS `match` regex per allowlist entry. All entries
+ * share a SINGLE `template` block (see renderCorefileStrict) because
+ * CoreDNS only honours one `template` per zone — multiple blocks
+ * silently shadow each other.
+ *
+ * The `(^|\.)` prefix matches the apex (`openai.com.`) or any subdomain
+ * (`api.openai.com.`) — same semantics as nginx's leading-dot form.
+ */
+function corednsMatchLineForEntry(entry) {
+    const escapedHost = entry.replaceAll(".", "\\.");
+    return `        match (^|\\.)${escapedHost}\\.$`;
+}
+/** Build the strict nginx.conf — ssl_preread + map on SNI allowlist. */
+export function renderNginxStrictConf() {
+    const mapLines = mergeAllowlist(DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST).map(nginxMapLine).join("\n");
+    return `# Generated by lastlight at harness boot. DO NOT EDIT BY HAND —
+# source of truth is src/sandbox/egress-allowlist.ts.
+
+error_log /dev/stderr warn;
+pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
+
+events { worker_connections 1024; }
+
+# Streams (TCP/UDP). \`ssl_preread\` reads the TLS ClientHello without
+# terminating the session, exposing the SNI hostname as
+# \`$ssl_preread_server_name\`. We \`map\` that to an upstream — anything
+# unmatched is sunk to 127.0.0.1:1 (no listener, instant reset).
+stream {
+  log_format basic '$remote_addr -> $ssl_preread_server_name -> $upstream_addr status=$status';
+  access_log /dev/stdout basic;
+
+  # Runtime resolver for upstream hostnames (docker's embedded DNS).
+  resolver 127.0.0.11 valid=30s ipv6=off;
+
+  # Allowlist. The \`hostnames\` directive enables nginx's wildcard
+  # hostname match: a key like ".github.com" matches "github.com" AND
+  # any subdomain. WITHOUT \`hostnames\`, map does exact string match
+  # only and ".github.com" never matches anything real (we hit this
+  # exact bug in prod — every allowlisted host fell through to the
+  # black hole).
+  map $ssl_preread_server_name $upstream_target {
+    hostnames;
+${mapLines}
+    # Anything else → black hole. The connection resets immediately;
+    # no data ever leaves the sandbox-egress network.
+    default 127.0.0.1:1;
+  }
+
+  server {
+    listen 443;
+    ssl_preread on;
+    proxy_pass $upstream_target;
+    proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
+    proxy_timeout 60s;
+  }
+}
+`;
+}
+/** Build the open nginx.conf — no SNI allowlist, just tunnel whatever DNS pointed at. */
+export function renderNginxOpenConf() {
+    return `# Generated by lastlight at harness boot. DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+# This nginx is used only by phases that declared \`unrestricted_egress: true\`.
+# No SNI allowlist — every host is tunnelled. The corresponding coredns-open
+# refuses to resolve the cloud-metadata hostnames so SSRF to them is blocked
+# even in this mode.
+
+error_log /dev/stderr warn;
+pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
+
+events { worker_connections 1024; }
+
+stream {
+  log_format basic '$remote_addr -> $ssl_preread_server_name -> $upstream_addr status=$status';
+  access_log /dev/stdout basic;
+  resolver 127.0.0.11 valid=30s ipv6=off;
+
+  server {
+    listen 443;
+    ssl_preread on;
+    # $ssl_preread_server_name is whatever SNI the client sent. Tunnel
+    # to that hostname on :443. No allowlist check.
+    proxy_pass $ssl_preread_server_name:443;
+    proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
+    proxy_timeout 60s;
+  }
+}
+`;
+}
+/** Build the Corefile that returns the strict nginx IP for allowlist hosts. */
+export function renderCorefileStrict() {
+    // ALL allowlist entries share a SINGLE template block. CoreDNS only
+    // honours one `template` per (class, type, zone), so multiple blocks
+    // silently overwrite each other — we learned this in prod when only
+    // the first host in the list resolved.
+    const matchLines = mergeAllowlist(DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST).map(corednsMatchLineForEntry).join("\n");
+    return `# Generated by lastlight from src/sandbox/egress-allowlist.ts.
+# All allowlist hosts live in a single \`template IN A\` block (multiple
+# template blocks per zone are NOT additive — they shadow each other).
+# Queries that don't match any \`match\` regex fall through to the
+# catch-all NXDOMAIN at the end.
+.:53 {
+    template IN A {
+${matchLines}
+        answer "{{ .Name }} 60 IN A ${NGINX_STRICT_IP}"
+    }
+    # Catch-all: NXDOMAIN for everything else (including AAAA queries,
+    # since nginx-egress only binds 443 on IPv4).
+    template IN ANY {
+        rcode NXDOMAIN
+    }
+    errors
+    log
+}
+`;
+}
+/** Build the Corefile that returns the open nginx IP for ANY hostname (except hard-denies). */
+export function renderCorefileOpen() {
+    // Hard-deny hosts each get their OWN zone block. CoreDNS routes queries
+    // to the longest-suffix-matching zone, so `metadata.google.internal:53`
+    // catches both the apex and every subdomain before the catch-all `.`
+    // zone ever sees them. We do NOT use a multi-`template` layout inside
+    // the catch-all zone because CoreDNS only honours one template per
+    // (class, type) and prior templates with non-matching `match` clauses
+    // silently drop the query — leaving sandboxes with no DNS answer at
+    // all (which is exactly what failed in prod the first time explore
+    // ran on the open path).
+    const hardDenyZones = OPEN_MODE_HARD_DENY.map((host) => `# Hard-deny zone for ${host} (SSRF floor — NXDOMAIN even in unrestricted mode).
+${host}:53 {
+    template IN ANY {
+        rcode NXDOMAIN
+    }
+    errors
+    log
+}
+`).join("\n");
+    return `# Generated by lastlight. Used by sandbox phases with unrestricted_egress: true.
+# Returns nginx-egress-open's IP for every hostname EXCEPT the SSRF hard-denies
+# (cloud metadata literals etc).
+.:53 {
+    # Everything → nginx-egress-open IP. Hard-deny names are intercepted
+    # by the per-host zones declared below (longest-suffix zone match).
+    template IN A {
+        answer "{{ .Name }} 60 IN A ${NGINX_OPEN_IP}"
+    }
+    # AAAA returns empty (we route only via IPv4).
+    template IN AAAA {
+        rcode NOERROR
+    }
+    errors
+    log
+}
+
+${hardDenyZones}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Write the four config files under $STATE_DIR/proxy/. Idempotent.
+ * Returns the directory path. Compose bind-mounts this dir into the
+ * coredns + nginx containers read-only.
+ */
+export function writeEgressFirewallConfigs(stateDir) {
+    const dir = join(stateDir, "proxy");
+    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "nginx-strict.conf"), renderNginxStrictConf());
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "nginx-open.conf"), renderNginxOpenConf());
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "Corefile.strict"), renderCorefileStrict());
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "Corefile.open"), renderCorefileOpen());
+    return dir;
+}
+/**
+ * Parse an OTLP headers string (`key1=val1,key2=val2`, the OTEL spec format
+ * used by `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS`) into an ordered list of pairs.
+ * Malformed segments (no `=`, empty key) are dropped. Values keep any inner
+ * `=` so bearer tokens survive intact.
+ */
+function parseOtlpHeaders(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return [];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const segment of raw.split(",")) {
+        const eq = segment.indexOf("=");
+        if (eq <= 0)
+            continue;
+        const key = segment.slice(0, eq).trim();
+        const value = segment.slice(eq + 1).trim();
+        // Reject CR/LF in either part: a real newline in an HTTP header value is
+        // header injection on the collector→backend leg, and would also break the
+        // YAML scalar. A header carrying a newline is corruption/injection, not a
+        // valid OTLP config — drop the pair rather than emit something dangerous.
+        if (!key || /[\r\n]/.test(key) || /[\r\n]/.test(value))
+            continue;
+        out.push([key, value]);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * YAML double-quoted-scalar escape. Backslash and quote are the cases that
+ * appear in tokens/URLs; CR/LF/TAB are escaped too as a hard guarantee that
+ * we NEVER emit a syntactically invalid collector config regardless of input
+ * (header values are already CR/LF-filtered in parseOtlpHeaders, but a stray
+ * control char in any other field must not be able to break the file).
+ */
+function yamlQuote(s) {
+    return `"${s
+        .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
+        .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
+        .replace(/\n/g, "\\n")
+        .replace(/\r/g, "\\r")
+        .replace(/\t/g, "\\t")}"`;
+}
+/** OTLP signals the collector pipelines cover, in stable output order. */
+const OTLP_SIGNALS = ["traces", "metrics", "logs"];
+/**
+ * Resolve one signal's backend per the OTEL env precedence: a
+ * signal-specific endpoint/headers var wins, otherwise the generic one.
+ * Returns null when neither is set — that signal's pipeline then drops to
+ * the `debug` exporter instead of being misrouted to another signal's URL.
+ */
+function resolveSignalBackend(env, signal) {
+    const SIG = signal.toUpperCase();
+    const specificEndpoint = (env[`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_${SIG}_ENDPOINT`] || "").trim();
+    const genericEndpoint = (env.OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT || "").trim();
+    if (!specificEndpoint && !genericEndpoint)
+        return null;
+    const specificHeaders = (env[`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_${SIG}_HEADERS`] || "").trim();
+    const genericHeaders = env.OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS;
+    return specificEndpoint
+        ? { endpointField: `${signal}_endpoint`, endpoint: specificEndpoint, headers: parseOtlpHeaders(specificHeaders || genericHeaders) }
+        : { endpointField: "endpoint", endpoint: genericEndpoint, headers: parseOtlpHeaders(specificHeaders || genericHeaders) };
+}
+/**
+ * Render the in-network OTEL collector config (docker backend).
+ *
+ * `opts.active` gates whether the collector forwards anywhere. It MUST track
+ * the harness's effective `otel.enabled && otel.forwardToSandbox` — when
+ * false, every pipeline is wired to a `debug` exporter (drops data) and NO
+ * backend endpoint or credential is emitted, even if `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*`
+ * env vars are present. This is the security floor: the collector listens on
+ * a static IP that sandboxes can reach, so if forwarding weren't gated, a
+ * sandbox could POST directly to it and exfil to the real backend regardless
+ * of the documented `LASTLIGHT_OTEL_ENABLED` / `FORWARD_TO_SANDBOX` opt-outs.
+ *
+ * When active, the collector re-exports to the REAL backend — the standard
+ * `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` / `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS` plus their
+ * per-signal `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_<SIGNAL>_ENDPOINT` / `_HEADERS` overrides,
+ * resolved with the spec's precedence. Each signal gets its own exporter so
+ * a split traces/metrics/logs setup is routed correctly rather than all
+ * collapsing onto whichever endpoint won a fallback chain. Those credentials
+ * live here, in a file on the host mounted read-only into the collector, and
+ * are NEVER forwarded into an untrusted sandbox. The sandbox can only
+ * influence span *content* sent to the harness's own fixed backend — it
+ * cannot redirect where the collector exports, so this adds no SSRF/exfil
+ * surface.
+ *
+ * A signal with no configured endpoint (neither specific nor generic) is
+ * likewise wired to `debug` so the collector still boots cleanly and accepts
+ * connections — sandboxes simply never send what isn't routed.
+ */
+export function renderOtelCollectorConfig(opts) {
+    const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
+    const exporterBlocks = [];
+    const pipelineBlocks = [];
+    let needsDebug = false;
+    for (const signal of OTLP_SIGNALS) {
+        // When inactive, resolve NO backend — every signal drops to debug and
+        // not a single OTEL_* value reaches the generated file.
+        const backend = opts.active ? resolveSignalBackend(env, signal) : null;
+        let exporterName;
+        if (!backend) {
+            exporterName = "debug";
+            needsDebug = true;
+        }
+        else {
+            exporterName = `otlphttp/${signal}`;
+            const headerLines = backend.headers.length
+                ? `\n    headers:\n${backend.headers.map(([k, v]) => `      ${yamlQuote(k)}: ${yamlQuote(v)}`).join("\n")}`
+                : "";
+            exporterBlocks.push(`  ${exporterName}:\n    ${backend.endpointField}: ${yamlQuote(backend.endpoint)}${headerLines}`);
+        }
+        pipelineBlocks.push(`    ${signal}:\n      receivers: [otlp]\n      processors: [batch]\n      exporters: [${exporterName}]`);
+    }
+    if (needsDebug)
+        exporterBlocks.push(`  debug:\n    verbosity: normal`);
+    const statusComment = opts.active
+        ? `# Sandboxes export OTLP to this collector (reached by its internal IP on
+# sandbox-egress); the collector re-exports to the configured backend over
+# proxy-egress. Backend credentials below stay host-side — they are never
+# forwarded into a sandbox.`
+        : `# Telemetry forwarding is DISABLED (LASTLIGHT_OTEL_ENABLED is off, or
+# LASTLIGHT_OTEL_FORWARD_TO_SANDBOX is false). The collector still listens so
+# sandboxes don't get connection errors, but every signal drops to a local
+# debug exporter — nothing is forwarded to any backend, and no OTEL_* endpoint
+# or credential is emitted here. This is the egress floor for the static
+# collector IP regardless of any OTEL_* env vars present.`;
+    return `# Generated by lastlight at harness boot. DO NOT EDIT BY HAND —
+# source of truth is src/sandbox/egress-firewall-config.ts.
+#
+${statusComment}
+receivers:
+  otlp:
+    protocols:
+      http:
+        endpoint: 0.0.0.0:${OTEL_COLLECTOR_OTLP_HTTP_PORT}
+      grpc:
+        endpoint: 0.0.0.0:${OTEL_COLLECTOR_OTLP_GRPC_PORT}
+
+processors:
+  batch: {}
+
+exporters:
+${exporterBlocks.join("\n")}
+
+service:
+  pipelines:
+${pipelineBlocks.join("\n")}
+`;
+}
+/**
+ * Write the in-network collector config to $STATE_DIR/proxy/otel-collector.yaml.
+ * Mode 0600 — it can contain backend auth headers. Called at harness boot
+ * (and by the compose `egress-init` one-shot) so the file exists before the
+ * `otel-collector` service reads it. `opts.active` gates forwarding — see
+ * `renderOtelCollectorConfig`. The harness passes its parsed
+ * `otel.enabled && otel.forwardToSandbox`; the env-only callers compute it
+ * via `otelForwardActiveFromEnv`.
+ */
+export function writeOtelCollectorConfig(stateDir, opts) {
+    const dir = join(stateDir, "proxy");
+    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    const path = join(dir, "otel-collector.yaml");
+    // Mode 0600 — it can carry backend auth headers. In the docker deployment
+    // the writer (harness/egress-init, gosu'd to `lastlight`) and the collector
+    // share UID 10001 (see OTEL_COLLECTOR_UID + the Dockerfile pin), so the
+    // collector reads this file as its owner without it being world-readable.
+    writeFileSync(path, renderOtelCollectorConfig(opts), { mode: 0o600 });
+    return path;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=egress-firewall-config.js.map

package/dist/sandbox/egress-firewall-config.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/sandbox/egress-firewall-config.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};