iterate-plugin 3.5.7 → 3.6.0

package/dist/config-loader.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { existsSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { existsSync, readFileSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
+import { basename, dirname, join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
 import yaml from 'js-yaml';
 /**
  * Load and parse iterate.config.yaml from the project root.
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ export function mergeConfig(base, override) {
  * of the built-in defaults ("Master + Overrides"). Never returns null — a
  * project without a config file simply runs on the defaults (with an empty
  * validation command set, so nothing untrusted can ever execute).
+ *
+ * The merged result is FIELD-COERCED (see {@link coerceKnownFields}): YAML has
+ * no schema, so a hand-edited `max_rounds: "ten"` falls back to the default
+ * per field instead of flowing into the review loop as garbage.
  */
 export function loadEffectiveConfig(projectRoot) {
     const override = loadConfig(projectRoot);
@@ -111,8 +115,110 @@ export function loadEffectiveConfig(projectRoot) {
         return { config: defaultConfig(), source: 'defaults', override: null };
     }
     const merged = mergeConfig(defaultConfig(), override);
+    coerceKnownFields(merged);
     return { config: merged, source: 'override', override };
 }
+/** True for a plain object (not null, not an array). */
+function isPlainObject(v) {
+    return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+/** A positive integer (rounds, line budgets, chunk sizes). */
+function isPositiveInt(v) {
+    return typeof v === 'number' && Number.isInteger(v) && v > 0;
+}
+/** A non-negative integer (thresholds where 0 means "no limit"). */
+function isNonNegativeInt(v) {
+    return typeof v === 'number' && Number.isInteger(v) && v >= 0;
+}
+/** An array of strings; `nonEmptyItems` also rejects blank entries. */
+function isStringArray(v, nonEmptyItems = false) {
+    return (Array.isArray(v) &&
+        v.every((x) => typeof x === 'string' && (!nonEmptyItems || x.trim().length > 0)));
+}
+/**
+ * Coerce the KNOWN config fields back to their documented types, falling back
+ * to the built-in default PER FIELD when the on-disk value is garbage.
+ *
+ * YAML has no schema: `max_rounds: "ten"` used to flow straight into the
+ * review loop (which then silently ran zero rounds), `dimensions: "all"`
+ * replaced the dimension list with a string, and a garbage
+ * `observatory.approval` reached the approval gate unchecked. Free-form
+ * sections (`onboarding`, `personalization`) and unknown project keys are NOT
+ * touched beyond requiring them to be objects. Mutates `raw` in place — only
+ * safe on freshly-merged objects (see {@link loadEffectiveConfig}).
+ */
+function coerceKnownFields(raw) {
+    const d = defaultConfig();
+    if (typeof raw.goal !== 'string' || raw.goal.trim().length === 0)
+        raw.goal = d.goal;
+    if (!isPositiveInt(raw.max_rounds))
+        raw.max_rounds = d.max_rounds;
+    if (raw.language !== 'zh' && raw.language !== 'en')
+        raw.language = d.language;
+    if (!isStringArray(raw.dimensions, true))
+        raw.dimensions = d.dimensions;
+    // `reasoning_effort` is optional (absent → provider default). Present but
+    // invalid → drop back to absent rather than inventing a value.
+    if ('reasoning_effort' in raw &&
+        raw.reasoning_effort !== 'low' && raw.reasoning_effort !== 'medium' && raw.reasoning_effort !== 'high') {
+        delete raw.reasoning_effort;
+    }
+    // A scalar/null value wholesale-replaces its default section during the
+    // merge — restore a full default section, then coerce its members.
+    const section = (key) => {
+        if (!isPlainObject(raw[key]))
+            raw[key] = { ...d[key] };
+        return raw[key];
+    };
+    const review = section('review');
+    if (review.scope !== 'full' && review.scope !== 'changed-only') {
+        review.scope = d.review.scope;
+    }
+    const atomic = section('atomic');
+    if (!isPositiveInt(atomic.max_lines))
+        atomic.max_lines = d.atomic.max_lines;
+    if (!isNonNegativeInt(atomic.max_adjacent_methods)) {
+        atomic.max_adjacent_methods = d.atomic.max_adjacent_methods;
+    }
+    const git = section('git');
+    if (typeof git.target_branch !== 'string' || git.target_branch.length === 0) {
+        git.target_branch = d.git.target_branch;
+    }
+    for (const key of ['use_worktree', 'push_per_round', 'auto_merge']) {
+        if (typeof git[key] !== 'boolean')
+            git[key] = d.git[key];
+    }
+    const validation = section('validation');
+    if (!isStringArray(validation.command_whitelist)) {
+        validation.command_whitelist = d.validation.command_whitelist;
+    }
+    // `commands` is an allow-list (module → command[]): a malformed entry must
+    // fall back to the default (empty) so an invalid shape can never smuggle a
+    // command into the runtime allow-list.
+    if (!isPlainObject(validation.commands) || !Object.values(validation.commands).every((v) => isStringArray(v))) {
+        validation.commands = d.validation.commands;
+    }
+    const reviewer = section('reviewer');
+    const dReviewer = d.reviewer;
+    for (const key of ['output_schema_validation', 'evidence_validation', 'coverage_validation']) {
+        if (typeof reviewer[key] !== 'boolean')
+            reviewer[key] = dReviewer[key];
+    }
+    if (!isPositiveInt(reviewer.scope_chunk_size))
+        reviewer.scope_chunk_size = dReviewer.scope_chunk_size;
+    const observatory = section('observatory');
+    const dObs = d.observatory;
+    if (typeof observatory.capture !== 'boolean')
+        observatory.capture = dObs.capture;
+    if (observatory.approval !== 'ask' && observatory.approval !== 'deny' && observatory.approval !== 'allow') {
+        observatory.approval = dObs.approval;
+    }
+    // Free-form sections must be objects (consumers treat them as maps).
+    for (const key of ['onboarding', 'personalization']) {
+        if (key in raw && !isPlainObject(raw[key]))
+            delete raw[key];
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Check whether a command is in the predefined commands list.
  * A command is allowed if it is EXACTLY (after trim) listed in any
@@ -139,8 +245,66 @@ export function flattenCommands(commands) {
     return out;
 }
 /**
- * Validate that the config has all required fields.
- * Returns an array of missing field paths.
+ * Every top-level key `IterateConfig` defines. Anything else in the file is
+ * an unknown key: a typo (`maxRounds`) or a hallucinated section that nothing
+ * ever reads. Single source of truth for BOTH validation paths —
+ * {@link validateConfig} (read/merge) and `validateConfigUpdates` (write).
+ *
+ * Keep in sync with `IterateConfig` (src/types.ts).
+ */
+export const SUPPORTED_CONFIG_KEYS = [
+    'goal',
+    'language',
+    'dimensions',
+    'max_rounds',
+    'reasoning_effort',
+    'review',
+    'reviewer',
+    'atomic',
+    'git',
+    'validation',
+    'observatory',
+    'personalization',
+    'onboarding',
+];
+/** Upper bound on configurable iteration rounds (config bomb guard). */
+export const MAX_MAX_ROUNDS = 100;
+/** Upper bound on `atomic.max_lines` (a single fix never needs more). */
+export const MAX_ATOMIC_MAX_LINES = 10_000;
+/** Upper bound on `atomic.max_adjacent_methods`. */
+export const MAX_MAX_ADJACENT_METHODS = 200;
+/** Upper bound on `reviewer.scope_chunk_size` (files per reviewer task batch). */
+export const MAX_SCOPE_CHUNK_SIZE = 1000;
+/** `review.scope` enum. */
+const REVIEW_SCOPES = ['full', 'changed-only'];
+/** `reasoning_effort` enum (absent → provider default). */
+const REASONING_EFFORTS = ['low', 'medium', 'high'];
+/** `observatory.approval` enum (the human-consent policy). */
+const APPROVAL_POLICIES = ['ask', 'deny', 'allow'];
+/** True when `v` is one of the allowed enum members. */
+function isEnum(v, allowed) {
+    return typeof v === 'string' && allowed.includes(v);
+}
+/**
+ * Validate the config's shape, ranges, and enums.
+ *
+ * Returns an array of error strings (empty when valid). Three tiers:
+ *   - `root` — the whole document is not an object (return immediately).
+ *   - the three PRESENCE-required fields (`goal`, `dimensions`, `validation`)
+ *     — reported by their bare path so existing callers keep matching them;
+ *   - STRICT checks on every field that IS present: bounded integers
+ *     (`max_rounds ≤ 100`, `atomic.max_lines`, `reviewer.scope_chunk_size`),
+ *     enums (`review.scope`, `reasoning_effort`, `observatory.approval`),
+ *     booleans (`git.*`, `reviewer.*`), the `validation.commands` allow-list
+ *     shape (a `Record<string, string[]>` — an ARRAY is refused, otherwise
+ *     `flattenCommands` would silently discard it and leave a whitelist that
+ *     looks configured but allows nothing), and unknown top-level keys.
+ *
+ * Absent optional fields are accepted: `loadEffectiveConfig` fills them from
+ * the built-in defaults, and hand-written partial configs are legitimate —
+ * but a present field must be RIGHT (YAML has no schema, so `max_rounds:
+ * "ten"` or `reviewer: {evidence_validation: "yes"}` used to pass the old
+ * three-presence-check validator untouched).
  */
 export function validateConfig(config) {
     const errors = [];
@@ -149,49 +313,297 @@ export function validateConfig(config) {
         return errors;
     }
     const c = config;
-    if (!c.goal)
+    // ── Required core fields (presence, bare-path identifiers) ──────────────
+    if (typeof c.goal !== 'string' || c.goal.trim().length === 0)
         errors.push('goal');
-    if (!Array.isArray(c.dimensions))
+    if (!Array.isArray(c.dimensions)) {
         errors.push('dimensions');
-    if (!c.validation || typeof c.validation !== 'object') {
-        errors.push('validation');
     }
-    else {
-        const v = c.validation;
-        if (!Array.isArray(v.command_whitelist))
+    else if (c.dimensions.length === 0 ||
+        !c.dimensions.every((d) => typeof d === 'string' && d.trim().length > 0)) {
+        // `dimensions: []` is a valid JSON type but an empty review: it passes
+        // `Array.isArray` while selecting zero dimensions to review.
+        errors.push('dimensions must be a non-empty array of non-empty strings');
+    }
+    // ── Optional scalar fields: present ⇒ must be valid ─────────────────────
+    if ('language' in c && !isEnum(c.language, ['zh', 'en'])) {
+        errors.push('language must be "zh" or "en"');
+    }
+    if ('max_rounds' in c &&
+        (typeof c.max_rounds !== 'number' ||
+            !Number.isInteger(c.max_rounds) ||
+            c.max_rounds < 1 ||
+            c.max_rounds > MAX_MAX_ROUNDS)) {
+        errors.push(`max_rounds must be an integer between 1 and ${MAX_MAX_ROUNDS}`);
+    }
+    if ('reasoning_effort' in c &&
+        c.reasoning_effort !== undefined &&
+        !isEnum(c.reasoning_effort, REASONING_EFFORTS)) {
+        errors.push('reasoning_effort must be "low", "medium", or "high"');
+    }
+    // ── Sections: absent ⇒ defaults apply; present ⇒ must be a plain object ─
+    const section = (key, required = false) => {
+        if (!(key in c)) {
+            if (required)
+                errors.push(key);
+            return null;
+        }
+        // `typeof [] === 'object'` — a YAML sequence in a section's place must not
+        // masquerade as an object (it would sail through every `key in v` check).
+        if (!isPlainObject(c[key])) {
+            errors.push(key);
+            return null;
+        }
+        return c[key];
+    };
+    const review = section('review');
+    if (review && review.scope !== undefined && !isEnum(review.scope, REVIEW_SCOPES)) {
+        errors.push('review.scope must be "full" or "changed-only"');
+    }
+    const atomic = section('atomic');
+    if (atomic) {
+        if ('max_lines' in atomic &&
+            (typeof atomic.max_lines !== 'number' ||
+                !Number.isInteger(atomic.max_lines) ||
+                atomic.max_lines < 1 ||
+                atomic.max_lines > MAX_ATOMIC_MAX_LINES)) {
+            errors.push(`atomic.max_lines must be an integer between 1 and ${MAX_ATOMIC_MAX_LINES}`);
+        }
+        if ('max_adjacent_methods' in atomic &&
+            (typeof atomic.max_adjacent_methods !== 'number' ||
+                !Number.isInteger(atomic.max_adjacent_methods) ||
+                atomic.max_adjacent_methods < 0 ||
+                atomic.max_adjacent_methods > MAX_MAX_ADJACENT_METHODS)) {
+            errors.push(`atomic.max_adjacent_methods must be an integer between 0 and ${MAX_MAX_ADJACENT_METHODS}`);
+        }
+    }
+    const git = section('git');
+    if (git) {
+        if ('target_branch' in git && (typeof git.target_branch !== 'string' || git.target_branch.length === 0)) {
+            errors.push('git.target_branch must be a non-empty string');
+        }
+        for (const key of ['use_worktree', 'push_per_round', 'auto_merge']) {
+            if (key in git && typeof git[key] !== 'boolean') {
+                errors.push(`git.${key} must be a boolean`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const reviewer = section('reviewer');
+    if (reviewer) {
+        for (const key of ['output_schema_validation', 'evidence_validation', 'coverage_validation']) {
+            if (key in reviewer && typeof reviewer[key] !== 'boolean') {
+                errors.push(`reviewer.${key} must be a boolean`);
+            }
+        }
+        if ('scope_chunk_size' in reviewer &&
+            (typeof reviewer.scope_chunk_size !== 'number' ||
+                !Number.isInteger(reviewer.scope_chunk_size) ||
+                reviewer.scope_chunk_size < 1 ||
+                reviewer.scope_chunk_size > MAX_SCOPE_CHUNK_SIZE)) {
+            errors.push(`reviewer.scope_chunk_size must be an integer between 1 and ${MAX_SCOPE_CHUNK_SIZE}`);
+        }
+    }
+    const observatory = section('observatory');
+    if (observatory) {
+        if ('capture' in observatory && typeof observatory.capture !== 'boolean') {
+            errors.push('observatory.capture must be a boolean');
+        }
+        if ('approval' in observatory && observatory.approval !== undefined && !isEnum(observatory.approval, APPROVAL_POLICIES)) {
+            errors.push('observatory.approval must be "ask", "deny", or "allow"');
+        }
+    }
+    // ── validation: the allow-list the runtime trusts to execute commands ───
+    const v = section('validation', true);
+    if (v) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(v.command_whitelist)) {
             errors.push('validation.command_whitelist');
-        if (!v.commands || typeof v.commands !== 'object')
-            errors.push('validation.commands');
+        }
+        else if (!v.command_whitelist.every((x) => typeof x === 'string')) {
+            errors.push('validation.command_whitelist must be an array of strings');
+        }
+        // `commands` is an allow-list (module → command[]): it must be a mapping
+        // whose values are string arrays. `typeof [] === 'object'` used to let
+        // `["npm t"]` through, and `flattenCommands` then dropped every
+        // non-object entry — a whitelist that read as configured while allowing
+        // nothing (fail-closed for execution, but a silent configuration lie).
+        if (!('commands' in v) || !isPlainObject(v.commands)) {
+            errors.push('validation.commands must be a mapping of module → string[]');
+        }
+        else if (!Object.values(v.commands).every((arr) => Array.isArray(arr) && arr.every((x) => typeof x === 'string'))) {
+            errors.push('validation.commands must be a mapping of module → string[]');
+        }
+    }
+    // ── Unknown top-level keys: reported, never silently ignored ────────────
+    for (const key of Object.keys(c)) {
+        if (!SUPPORTED_CONFIG_KEYS.includes(key)) {
+            errors.push(`${key} is not a supported config key`);
+        }
     }
     return errors;
 }
+/**
+ * Sensitive system directories that may never become a project root in the
+ * HEADLESS tier (see {@link resolveProjectRoot} tier (b)): the directory
+ * itself and its DIRECT children are refused, checked against both the
+ * lexical path and its realpath (macOS aliases `/etc` → `/private/etc`, so a
+ * realpath'd `/etc/foo` lands under `/private/etc`). Deeper descendants and
+ * sibling trees are not swept up — that is what keeps `os.tmpdir()`
+ * (`/var/folders/…`, i.e. `/private/var/folders/…`, three levels below
+ * `/private`) and `/Users/<me>/project` working. The bare home directory is
+ * refused separately (paths INSIDE home are allowed).
+ */
+const SYSTEM_ROOTS = [
+    '/etc', '/usr', '/bin', '/sbin', '/var', '/private', '/System', '/Library',
+    '/Applications', '/dev', '/proc', '/sys', '/boot', '/run',
+];
+/** Memoized realpath (system roots, home) — `realpath` never changes for them. */
+const realpathCache = new Map();
+function cachedRealpath(path) {
+    const memo = realpathCache.get(path);
+    if (memo !== undefined)
+        return memo;
+    let real = path;
+    try {
+        const r = realpathSync(path);
+        if (r)
+            real = r;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Not present on this platform/filesystem — the literal path is all we have.
+    }
+    realpathCache.set(path, real);
+    return real;
+}
+/** True for the bare home directory itself (lexical or realpath form). */
+function isHomeDirectory(candidate) {
+    return candidate === homedir() || candidate === cachedRealpath(homedir());
+}
+/**
+ * True for a path the headless tier must refuse because it is a sensitive
+ * system root or sits DIRECTLY inside one — checked against both the lexical
+ * and the realpath form (macOS aliases `/etc` → `/private/etc`, so a
+ * realpath'd `/etc/foo` lands under `/private/etc`, whose parent is the real
+ * `/etc`). Pure path inspection — no filesystem mutation.
+ */
+function isSensitiveSystemPath(candidate) {
+    if (!candidate || candidate === sep)
+        return true;
+    const parent = dirname(candidate);
+    for (const sys of SYSTEM_ROOTS) {
+        if (candidate === sys || parent === sys)
+            return true;
+        // macOS: realpath(`/etc/foo`) = `/private/etc/foo` — compare against the
+        // real location of the sysroot or the alias slips through.
+        if (parent === cachedRealpath(sys))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve `sessionCwd` to a containment anchor: the realpath of an EXISTING
+ * directory. Returns null when the session cwd is empty, `/`, NUL-bearing, or
+ * not an existing directory — a workspace header we cannot bound the session
+ * with (stale/bogus cwd) falls back to the headless tier instead.
+ */
+function sessionAnchor(sessionCwd) {
+    if (typeof sessionCwd !== 'string')
+        return null;
+    const raw = sessionCwd.trim();
+    if (!raw || raw === sep || raw.includes('\0'))
+        return null;
+    const abs = resolve(raw);
+    if (abs === sep)
+        return null;
+    try {
+        if (!statSync(abs).isDirectory())
+            return null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null; // does not exist / unreadable — cannot anchor containment
+    }
+    try {
+        const real = realpathSync(abs);
+        if (real && real !== sep)
+            return real;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Exists but realpath is fenced — the lexical absolute path still bounds it.
+    }
+    return abs;
+}
+/**
+ * Realpath `p` for CONTAINMENT comparisons: realpath directly when it exists,
+ * otherwise realpath the deepest existing ancestor and re-append the tail.
+ * A not-yet-created target can't be realpath'd as a whole, and on macOS
+ * `/var/folders/…` (lexical) vs `/private/var/folders/…` (anchor) would never
+ * match — likewise a symlinked parent must contribute its REAL destination,
+ * or "create a new dir through this link" would escape the workspace. Falls
+ * back to the lexical path when nothing along the way can be resolved.
+ */
+function realpathForContainment(p) {
+    try {
+        if (existsSync(p))
+            return realpathSync(p);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return p;
+    }
+    let cur = p;
+    const tail = [];
+    for (;;) {
+        const parent = dirname(cur);
+        if (parent === cur)
+            return p; // walked to the fs root without an ancestor
+        tail.unshift(basename(cur));
+        try {
+            if (existsSync(parent))
+                return join(realpathSync(parent), ...tail);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return p;
+        }
+        cur = parent;
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Resolve a caller-supplied project root to a safe absolute path.
  *
- * Every tool accepts a model-controlled `path` argument. Before it is used in
- * any file read/write or as a command `cwd`, it must be sanitized:
- *  - an empty/missing `path` falls back to the current working directory;
- *  - the path is resolved to an absolute path (collapsing `..` and symlinks);
- *  - the filesystem root (`/`) is refused — it would let a prompt point tools
- *    at arbitrary system directories (path-traversal escape).
+ * Every tool accepts a model-controlled `path` argument; before it is used in
+ * any file read/write or as a command `cwd`, it must be sanitized. Two-tier
+ * contract (checked AFTER the common steps below):
+ *
+ *   Resolution order for the default (no explicit `path`) case:
+ *     1. `sessionCwd` — the absolute working directory the calling DSH session
+ *        was created in (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`). Authoritative
+ *        workspace for the conversation, immune to where the process started;
+ *        an empty session cwd or `/` is refused, everything else (including
+ *        the home directory itself) is honored.
+ *     2. the process cwd, when it is a usable directory (not `/` or the home
+ *        dir — launchd/daemon-managed servers start with cwd=`/`);
+ *     3. the session workspace decoded from `DSH_SESSION_JSONL`.
+ *
+ *   Common steps: an empty/missing `path` falls back to the step above; the
+ *   path is resolved to an absolute path (collapsing `..` and symlinks —
+ *   realpath-aware so a symlinked session cwd and its target share one root);
+ *   the filesystem root `/` is always refused.
+ *
+ *   Tier (a) — a USABLE session cwd is known (an existing directory):
+ *     an EXPLICIT `path` must resolve to the session cwd or something INSIDE
+ *     it; otherwise `{ ok: false, reason }` (structured — callers
+ *     short-circuit on it). This keeps the legitimate "scope to a
+ *     subdirectory" use while blocking escapes to `/etc` or sibling trees
+ *     (the path alone could never smuggle the model out of its workspace).
+ *
+ *   Tier (b) — no usable session cwd (headless/tests):
+ *     additionally refuse the sensitive system roots and their direct children
+ *     (see {@link SYSTEM_ROOTS}) plus the bare home directory itself. Paths
+ *     INSIDE home (`/Users/me/project`) and the transient tmpdir tree remain
+ *     allowed, as does any ordinary project directory.
  *
  * Returns `{ ok: true, root }` on success, or `{ ok: false, reason }` when the
  * path is unsafe; callers must short-circuit on the failure and return a
  * structured error instead of proceeding.
  */
-/**
- * Resolve a caller-supplied project root to a safe absolute path.
- *
- * Resolution order for the default (no explicit `path`) case:
- *   1. `sessionCwd` — the absolute working directory the calling DSH session
- *      was created in (`exec.agent.session.header.cwd`). This is the
- *      authoritative workspace for the current conversation and is immune to
- *      where the web-service process happened to start.
- *   2. the process cwd, when it is a usable directory (not `/` or the home
- *      dir — launchd/daemon-managed servers start with cwd=`/`);
- *   3. the session workspace decoded from `DSH_SESSION_JSONL` (present when
- *      the DSH runtime injects per-session env into tool sub-processes).
- */
 export function resolveProjectRoot(input, sessionCwd) {
     // A non-string input (number, array, …) from a hostile tool invocation must
     // be treated as "no explicit path" instead of crashing on `.trim()`.
@@ -201,7 +613,8 @@ export function resolveProjectRoot(input, sessionCwd) {
     if (raw.includes('\0')) {
         return { ok: false, reason: 'Refusing project root containing NUL bytes.' };
     }
-    const rootLexical = raw ? resolve(raw) : resolve(effectiveCwd(sessionCwd));
+    const explicit = raw.length > 0;
+    const rootLexical = explicit ? resolve(raw) : resolve(effectiveCwd(sessionCwd));
     // Collapse symlinks (documented contract: "collapsing `..` and symlinks") —
     // a path through a symlinked directory must resolve to its REAL location so
     // two aliases of the same project share one `.iterate/` state, and tools can
@@ -225,6 +638,64 @@ export function resolveProjectRoot(input, sessionCwd) {
     if (!root || root === sep) {
         return { ok: false, reason: 'Refusing filesystem root as project root.' };
     }
+    // `.iterate` must stay INSIDE the resolved root: it is the state directory
+    // every tool writes through (checkpoint, decision log, fixes, backups). When
+    // it exists and is a symlink — or is reached through one — whose REAL target
+    // escapes the REAL project root, artifacts would be created/removed outside
+    // the workspace while the tools still believe they are under the root. Only
+    // the project ROOT used to be realpath'd, so a symlinked `.iterate` quietly
+    // redirected every product out of the tree. Refuse the root (structured —
+    // callers short-circuit) instead of following the link; an `.iterate` that
+    // stays within the root (a real dir, or a link to one inside) is accepted.
+    const iterateLexical = join(root, '.iterate');
+    if (existsSync(iterateLexical)) {
+        try {
+            const realRoot = realpathForContainment(root);
+            const realIterate = realpathForContainment(iterateLexical);
+            if (realIterate !== realRoot && !realIterate.startsWith(realRoot + sep)) {
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: `Refusing project root: \`.iterate\` resolves outside the project (symlink escape): ` +
+                        `\`${realIterate}\` is not inside \`${realRoot}\`.`,
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // A realpath failure (permission fence, race) keeps the lexical
+            // behavior — the state dir itself still surfaces any real I/O problem
+            // as a structured tool error later.
+        }
+    }
+    const anchor = sessionAnchor(sessionCwd);
+    if (anchor) {
+        // Tier (a): the session workspace bounds every explicit path (realpath on
+        // both sides — including the deepest-existing-ancestor form for a
+        // not-yet-created path, so `/var/…` vs `/private/var/…` and symlinked
+        // parents agree with the anchor).
+        if (explicit) {
+            const contained = realpathForContainment(root);
+            if (contained !== anchor && !contained.startsWith(anchor + sep)) {
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: `Refusing project root outside the session workspace: \`${root}\` is not inside \`${anchor}\`.`,
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        return { ok: true, root };
+    }
+    // Tier (b): headless — no session workspace to contain the path. Refuse the
+    // bare home directory (paths INSIDE home stay allowed) and sensitive system
+    // roots — checked on both forms: `/etc/foo` only shows its `/etc` parent
+    // lexically, while its realpath shows `/private/etc`.
+    if (isHomeDirectory(root) || isHomeDirectory(rootLexical)) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: 'Refusing the home directory itself as project root — scope to a subdirectory inside it.',
+        };
+    }
+    if (isSensitiveSystemPath(rootLexical) || isSensitiveSystemPath(root)) {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'Refusing a sensitive system directory as project root.' };
+    }
     return { ok: true, root };
 }
 /**
@@ -244,7 +715,11 @@ export function resolveProjectRootForExec(exec, input) {
  * `--Volumes-Eng-Dev-iterate-skill--`).
  */
 function effectiveCwd(sessionCwd) {
-    if (sessionCwd && sessionCwd !== sep && sessionCwd !== homedir())
+    // A session legitimately rooted in the HOME directory must be honored: only
+    // an empty session cwd or the filesystem root disqualifies it. (Refusing
+    // `homedir()` here substituted the server's own cwd — tools then read/write
+    // `.iterate` in the wrong project.)
+    if (typeof sessionCwd === 'string' && sessionCwd && sessionCwd !== sep)
         return sessionCwd;
     let cwd = '';
     try {