gnss-js 2.10.1 → 2.12.0

package/dist/osnma.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/**
+ * OSNMA Merkle tree (SIS ICD v1.1 §6.2): the trust anchor that public
+ * keys — broadcast in DSM-PKR or loaded from the GSC — are checked
+ * against. N = 16 leaves, SHA-256, root x(4,0).
+ */
+/**
+ * Root of the OSNMA Merkle tree in force since 2025-12-10 (GSC file
+ * OSNMA_MerkleTree_20251209100000_newPKID_2.xml, UID MT-D7A51E17…).
+ * Per the ICD a tree is renewed "very rarely, typically after more
+ * than 10 years", announced 2 years ahead; pass `merkleRoot` to
+ * {@link OsnmaReceiver} to use another one.
+ */
+declare const OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
+/** A public key with the Merkle path that proves it against a root. */
+interface OsnmaPublicKeyRecord {
+    /** Public key ID (PKID). */
+    pkid: number;
+    /** Key type (NPKT): 1 = ECDSA P-256, 3 = ECDSA P-521. */
+    npkt: number;
+    /** SEC1-compressed public key. */
+    key: Uint8Array;
+    /** Leaf index i of m_i in the tree (MID). */
+    mid: number;
+    /** Intermediate nodes x(0,·), x(1,·), x(2,·), x(3,·) along the path. */
+    path: Uint8Array[];
+}
+/**
+ * The public key in force at the time of writing, PKID 2, as published
+ * by the GSC with its Merkle path (leaf m1). It is checked against the
+ * root before use, like a broadcast DSM-PKR, so a wrong constant here
+ * fails closed.
+ */
+declare const OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS: readonly OsnmaPublicKeyRecord[];
+/**
+ * Check a Merkle leaf m_i = (NPKT ‖ NPKID ‖ NPK) against `root` through
+ * the four intermediate nodes of its path (ICD Eq. 12-13, Table 4).
+ */
+declare function merkleLeafOk(leaf: Uint8Array, mid: number, path: readonly Uint8Array[], root: Uint8Array): boolean;
+
+/**
+ * Galileo OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication)
+ * receiver, after the OSNMA SIS ICD v1.1 (October 2023) and the
+ * Receiver Guidelines v1.3.
+ *
+ * Feed it Galileo E1-B I/NAV nominal page pairs; it reassembles the
+ * 40-bit OSNMA field of each page into the per-subframe HKROOT (DSM
+ * blocks) and MACK (tags + TESLA key) messages and runs the whole
+ * chain of trust:
+ *
+ *   Merkle root ─▶ public key (DSM-PKR, or a known key + its path)
+ *     ─▶ ECDSA-signed TESLA root key (DSM-KROOT)
+ *     ─▶ TESLA chain keys (one per subframe, delayed disclosure)
+ *     ─▶ MAC tags over the satellites' navigation data
+ *
+ * A tag that verifies proves the satellite's ephemeris/clock (ADKD 0,
+ * 12) or GST-UTC/GPS timing parameters (ADKD 4) are the ones Galileo
+ * signed. A tag that does not verify against an authenticated key means
+ * the navigation data differ from what was signed — a spoofing or
+ * replay symptom. Supported: SHA-256 chains, HMAC-SHA-256 tags and
+ * ECDSA P-256 keys — the configuration Galileo has used since the
+ * service started; other choices are reported as unsupported.
+ */
+
+type OsnmaNmaStatus = 'reserved' | 'test' | 'operational' | 'dont-use';
+type OsnmaCpks = 'reserved' | 'nominal' | 'end-of-chain' | 'chain-revoked' | 'new-public-key' | 'public-key-revoked' | 'new-merkle-tree' | 'alert-message';
+/** GST as Galileo week + time of week (s). */
+interface Gst {
+    wn: number;
+    tow: number;
+}
+/** A TESLA chain whose root key verified against a public key. */
+interface OsnmaChain {
+    /** Chain ID (CIDKR). */
+    cid: number;
+    /** PKID of the public key that verified the DSM-KROOT. */
+    pkid: number;
+    /** Hash function: 'SHA-256' | 'SHA3-256'. */
+    hashFunction: string;
+    /** MAC function: 'HMAC-SHA-256' | 'CMAC-AES'. */
+    macFunction: string;
+    keyBits: number;
+    tagBits: number;
+    /** MAC look-up table entry (ANNEX C). */
+    maclt: number;
+    /** Time of applicability GST0 of the KROOT. */
+    gst0: Gst;
+    /** Whether this library can verify tags of this chain. */
+    supported: boolean;
+}
+interface OsnmaTagStats {
+    /** Tags whose MAC verified. */
+    ok: number;
+    /** Tags whose MAC did not verify against an authenticated key. */
+    failed: number;
+}
+/** Per-satellite authentication state. */
+interface OsnmaSatellite {
+    /** 'E05'… */
+    prn: string;
+    /** This satellite transmits OSNMA data (non-zero OSNMA field). */
+    transmitsOsnma: boolean;
+    /** Ephemeris, clock and status (ADKD 0 + slow-MAC ADKD 12). */
+    ced: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        /** IODnav of the latest authenticated data set (≥ 80 tag bits). */
+        authenticatedIodNav: number | null;
+        /** GST subframe of the latest tag that completed authentication. */
+        lastAuthenticated: Gst | null;
+    };
+    /** GST-UTC / GST-GPS conversion parameters (ADKD 4). */
+    timing: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        lastAuthenticated: Gst | null;
+    };
+}
+interface OsnmaEvent {
+    gst: Gst;
+    kind: 'public-key-verified' | 'public-key-rejected' | 'kroot-verified' | 'kroot-rejected' | 'key-rejected' | 'tag-failed' | 'macseq-failed' | 'alert-message' | 'unsupported';
+    message: string;
+    prn?: string;
+}
+interface OsnmaStatus {
+    /** Latest NMA header seen (null before any OSNMA page). */
+    nmaStatus: OsnmaNmaStatus | null;
+    cid: number | null;
+    cpks: OsnmaCpks | null;
+    /** Public keys proven against the Merkle root. */
+    publicKeys: {
+        pkid: number;
+        source: 'known' | 'broadcast';
+    }[];
+    /** TESLA chains with a verified root key. */
+    chains: OsnmaChain[];
+    /** Chain keys (one per subframe) verified back to a KROOT. */
+    keysVerified: number;
+    /** Keys that did not hash back to the root (a forged or broken chain). */
+    keysRejected: number;
+    /** GST of the latest verified TESLA key. */
+    lastKey: Gst | null;
+    tags: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        /** Tags whose key, data or chain is not available yet / any more. */
+        unverifiable: number;
+        /** Dummy tags (COP = 0) verified. */
+        dummy: number;
+    };
+    satellites: OsnmaSatellite[];
+    /** Notable events, oldest first (capped). */
+    events: OsnmaEvent[];
+    /** OSNMA pages fed (E1-B pages with a non-zero OSNMA field). */
+    osnmaPages: number;
+    /** MACK messages left unused because the NMA status was "don't use". */
+    dontUseMacks: number;
+    /** An authenticated OSNMA Alert Message was received: OSNMA stopped. */
+    alert: boolean;
+}
+interface OsnmaReceiverOptions {
+    /**
+     * Merkle tree root(s) (32 bytes each); default {@link OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT}.
+     * During a Merkle tree renewal pass both the old and the new root.
+     */
+    merkleRoot?: Uint8Array | readonly Uint8Array[];
+    /**
+     * Public keys known in advance (each checked against the root);
+     * default {@link OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS}. Pass [] to rely only on
+     * keys broadcast in DSM-PKR.
+     */
+    publicKeys?: readonly OsnmaPublicKeyRecord[];
+}
+declare class OsnmaReceiver {
+    private readonly roots;
+    /** An authenticated OSNMA Alert Message stopped all processing. */
+    private alerted;
+    /** Revoked public keys and chains (hex), never to be used again. */
+    private readonly revoked;
+    private readonly pubKeys;
+    private readonly collect;
+    private readonly dsms;
+    private readonly chains;
+    private readonly macks;
+    private readonly words;
+    private readonly sats;
+    private readonly events;
+    private nmaHeader;
+    private keysVerified;
+    private keysRejected;
+    private lastKey;
+    private tags;
+    private osnmaPages;
+    private dontUseMacks;
+    private latestSf;
+    /** Keys already rejected, as `sf:hex` (one event each). */
+    private readonly rejectedKeys;
+    constructor(opts?: OsnmaReceiverOptions);
+    /**
+     * Feed one E1-B I/NAV nominal page pair: `page` holds the 114-bit even
+     * part (tail removed) followed by the 120-bit odd part, MSB first, as
+     * Septentrio's GALRawINAV carries it (CRC already checked by the
+     * caller). `wn`/`tow` give the GST of the page's first symbol.
+     */
+    pushPage(svid: number, wn: number, tow: number, page: Uint8Array): void;
+    /** Process anything still buffered (end of a file). */
+    flush(): void;
+    status(): OsnmaStatus;
+    private sat;
+    private event;
+    private storeWord;
+    private prune;
+    private closeSubframe;
+    private leafOk;
+    /**
+     * "Don't use" headers announcing a revocation (ICD §5.4.1, §5.5.3):
+     * drop the revoked chain or public key and never accept it again.
+     */
+    private applyRevocations;
+    private onDsmBlock;
+    private onPkr;
+    private onKroot;
+    /** F(K) for the key of subframe `sf`: the key of subframe sf − 30. */
+    private oneWay;
+    private chainFor;
+    /** Verify the TESLA key carried in a MACK against the chain. */
+    private onKeyFrom;
+    private rejectKey;
+    private processMacks;
+    private verifyTags;
+    private onTag;
+    /** Latest word of `wt` from `svid` in subframes [sf − 30·cop, sf − 30]. */
+    private wordIn;
+    /** ADKD 0/12 data: WT1-5 of one IODnav (Annex B.1). */
+    private cedData;
+    /** ADKD 4 data: WT6 ‖ WT10 timing parameters (Annex B.2). */
+    private timingData;
+}
+
+/**
+ * OSNMA from Septentrio SBF: GALRawINAV (4023) blocks on E1-B carry the
+ * nominal I/NAV page pair with its 40-bit OSNMA field.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Feed one SBF block at offset `b` to `rx` when it is an E1-B
+ * GALRawINAV page with a valid CRC. Returns true if a page was fed.
+ */
+declare function feedSbfOsnmaBlock(data: Uint8Array, view: DataView, b: number, id: number, len: number, rx: OsnmaReceiver): boolean;
+/** Run OSNMA verification over every GALRawINAV E1-B page of an SBF stream. */
+declare function verifySbfOsnma(data: Uint8Array, opts?: OsnmaReceiverOptions): OsnmaStatus;
+
+/**
+ * Synchronous SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4) and HMAC-SHA-256 (FIPS 198-1).
+ *
+ * OSNMA verification runs a TESLA chain of up to a few thousand hashes
+ * per key and an HMAC per tag, page by page on a live stream; WebCrypto
+ * is asynchronous only, so the library carries its own small, sync
+ * implementation (checked against the NIST vectors in the tests).
+ */
+/** SHA-256 of the concatenation of `parts`. */
+declare function sha256(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array;
+/** HMAC-SHA-256 of `msg` under `key`. */
+declare function hmacSha256(key: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
+/** SHA-512 of the concatenation of `parts`. */
+declare function sha512(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array;
+
+/**
+ * Verify an ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 signature `sig` (r ‖ s, 64 bytes) of
+ * `msg` under the SEC1-encoded public key `pubKey`.
+ */
+declare const p256Verify: (pubKey: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array) => boolean;
+/**
+ * Verify an ECDSA P-521/SHA-512 signature `sig` (r ‖ s, 66 bytes each)
+ * of `msg` under the SEC1-encoded public key `pubKey` (67 bytes
+ * compressed).
+ */
+declare const p521Verify: (pubKey: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array) => boolean;
+
+export { type Gst, OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS, OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT, type OsnmaChain, type OsnmaCpks, type OsnmaEvent, type OsnmaNmaStatus, type OsnmaPublicKeyRecord, OsnmaReceiver, type OsnmaReceiverOptions, type OsnmaSatellite, type OsnmaStatus, type OsnmaTagStats, feedSbfOsnmaBlock, hmacSha256, merkleLeafOk, p256Verify, p521Verify, sha256, sha512, verifySbfOsnma };

package/dist/osnma.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/**
+ * OSNMA Merkle tree (SIS ICD v1.1 §6.2): the trust anchor that public
+ * keys — broadcast in DSM-PKR or loaded from the GSC — are checked
+ * against. N = 16 leaves, SHA-256, root x(4,0).
+ */
+/**
+ * Root of the OSNMA Merkle tree in force since 2025-12-10 (GSC file
+ * OSNMA_MerkleTree_20251209100000_newPKID_2.xml, UID MT-D7A51E17…).
+ * Per the ICD a tree is renewed "very rarely, typically after more
+ * than 10 years", announced 2 years ahead; pass `merkleRoot` to
+ * {@link OsnmaReceiver} to use another one.
+ */
+declare const OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
+/** A public key with the Merkle path that proves it against a root. */
+interface OsnmaPublicKeyRecord {
+    /** Public key ID (PKID). */
+    pkid: number;
+    /** Key type (NPKT): 1 = ECDSA P-256, 3 = ECDSA P-521. */
+    npkt: number;
+    /** SEC1-compressed public key. */
+    key: Uint8Array;
+    /** Leaf index i of m_i in the tree (MID). */
+    mid: number;
+    /** Intermediate nodes x(0,·), x(1,·), x(2,·), x(3,·) along the path. */
+    path: Uint8Array[];
+}
+/**
+ * The public key in force at the time of writing, PKID 2, as published
+ * by the GSC with its Merkle path (leaf m1). It is checked against the
+ * root before use, like a broadcast DSM-PKR, so a wrong constant here
+ * fails closed.
+ */
+declare const OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS: readonly OsnmaPublicKeyRecord[];
+/**
+ * Check a Merkle leaf m_i = (NPKT ‖ NPKID ‖ NPK) against `root` through
+ * the four intermediate nodes of its path (ICD Eq. 12-13, Table 4).
+ */
+declare function merkleLeafOk(leaf: Uint8Array, mid: number, path: readonly Uint8Array[], root: Uint8Array): boolean;
+
+/**
+ * Galileo OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication)
+ * receiver, after the OSNMA SIS ICD v1.1 (October 2023) and the
+ * Receiver Guidelines v1.3.
+ *
+ * Feed it Galileo E1-B I/NAV nominal page pairs; it reassembles the
+ * 40-bit OSNMA field of each page into the per-subframe HKROOT (DSM
+ * blocks) and MACK (tags + TESLA key) messages and runs the whole
+ * chain of trust:
+ *
+ *   Merkle root ─▶ public key (DSM-PKR, or a known key + its path)
+ *     ─▶ ECDSA-signed TESLA root key (DSM-KROOT)
+ *     ─▶ TESLA chain keys (one per subframe, delayed disclosure)
+ *     ─▶ MAC tags over the satellites' navigation data
+ *
+ * A tag that verifies proves the satellite's ephemeris/clock (ADKD 0,
+ * 12) or GST-UTC/GPS timing parameters (ADKD 4) are the ones Galileo
+ * signed. A tag that does not verify against an authenticated key means
+ * the navigation data differ from what was signed — a spoofing or
+ * replay symptom. Supported: SHA-256 chains, HMAC-SHA-256 tags and
+ * ECDSA P-256 keys — the configuration Galileo has used since the
+ * service started; other choices are reported as unsupported.
+ */
+
+type OsnmaNmaStatus = 'reserved' | 'test' | 'operational' | 'dont-use';
+type OsnmaCpks = 'reserved' | 'nominal' | 'end-of-chain' | 'chain-revoked' | 'new-public-key' | 'public-key-revoked' | 'new-merkle-tree' | 'alert-message';
+/** GST as Galileo week + time of week (s). */
+interface Gst {
+    wn: number;
+    tow: number;
+}
+/** A TESLA chain whose root key verified against a public key. */
+interface OsnmaChain {
+    /** Chain ID (CIDKR). */
+    cid: number;
+    /** PKID of the public key that verified the DSM-KROOT. */
+    pkid: number;
+    /** Hash function: 'SHA-256' | 'SHA3-256'. */
+    hashFunction: string;
+    /** MAC function: 'HMAC-SHA-256' | 'CMAC-AES'. */
+    macFunction: string;
+    keyBits: number;
+    tagBits: number;
+    /** MAC look-up table entry (ANNEX C). */
+    maclt: number;
+    /** Time of applicability GST0 of the KROOT. */
+    gst0: Gst;
+    /** Whether this library can verify tags of this chain. */
+    supported: boolean;
+}
+interface OsnmaTagStats {
+    /** Tags whose MAC verified. */
+    ok: number;
+    /** Tags whose MAC did not verify against an authenticated key. */
+    failed: number;
+}
+/** Per-satellite authentication state. */
+interface OsnmaSatellite {
+    /** 'E05'… */
+    prn: string;
+    /** This satellite transmits OSNMA data (non-zero OSNMA field). */
+    transmitsOsnma: boolean;
+    /** Ephemeris, clock and status (ADKD 0 + slow-MAC ADKD 12). */
+    ced: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        /** IODnav of the latest authenticated data set (≥ 80 tag bits). */
+        authenticatedIodNav: number | null;
+        /** GST subframe of the latest tag that completed authentication. */
+        lastAuthenticated: Gst | null;
+    };
+    /** GST-UTC / GST-GPS conversion parameters (ADKD 4). */
+    timing: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        lastAuthenticated: Gst | null;
+    };
+}
+interface OsnmaEvent {
+    gst: Gst;
+    kind: 'public-key-verified' | 'public-key-rejected' | 'kroot-verified' | 'kroot-rejected' | 'key-rejected' | 'tag-failed' | 'macseq-failed' | 'alert-message' | 'unsupported';
+    message: string;
+    prn?: string;
+}
+interface OsnmaStatus {
+    /** Latest NMA header seen (null before any OSNMA page). */
+    nmaStatus: OsnmaNmaStatus | null;
+    cid: number | null;
+    cpks: OsnmaCpks | null;
+    /** Public keys proven against the Merkle root. */
+    publicKeys: {
+        pkid: number;
+        source: 'known' | 'broadcast';
+    }[];
+    /** TESLA chains with a verified root key. */
+    chains: OsnmaChain[];
+    /** Chain keys (one per subframe) verified back to a KROOT. */
+    keysVerified: number;
+    /** Keys that did not hash back to the root (a forged or broken chain). */
+    keysRejected: number;
+    /** GST of the latest verified TESLA key. */
+    lastKey: Gst | null;
+    tags: OsnmaTagStats & {
+        /** Tags whose key, data or chain is not available yet / any more. */
+        unverifiable: number;
+        /** Dummy tags (COP = 0) verified. */
+        dummy: number;
+    };
+    satellites: OsnmaSatellite[];
+    /** Notable events, oldest first (capped). */
+    events: OsnmaEvent[];
+    /** OSNMA pages fed (E1-B pages with a non-zero OSNMA field). */
+    osnmaPages: number;
+    /** MACK messages left unused because the NMA status was "don't use". */
+    dontUseMacks: number;
+    /** An authenticated OSNMA Alert Message was received: OSNMA stopped. */
+    alert: boolean;
+}
+interface OsnmaReceiverOptions {
+    /**
+     * Merkle tree root(s) (32 bytes each); default {@link OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT}.
+     * During a Merkle tree renewal pass both the old and the new root.
+     */
+    merkleRoot?: Uint8Array | readonly Uint8Array[];
+    /**
+     * Public keys known in advance (each checked against the root);
+     * default {@link OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS}. Pass [] to rely only on
+     * keys broadcast in DSM-PKR.
+     */
+    publicKeys?: readonly OsnmaPublicKeyRecord[];
+}
+declare class OsnmaReceiver {
+    private readonly roots;
+    /** An authenticated OSNMA Alert Message stopped all processing. */
+    private alerted;
+    /** Revoked public keys and chains (hex), never to be used again. */
+    private readonly revoked;
+    private readonly pubKeys;
+    private readonly collect;
+    private readonly dsms;
+    private readonly chains;
+    private readonly macks;
+    private readonly words;
+    private readonly sats;
+    private readonly events;
+    private nmaHeader;
+    private keysVerified;
+    private keysRejected;
+    private lastKey;
+    private tags;
+    private osnmaPages;
+    private dontUseMacks;
+    private latestSf;
+    /** Keys already rejected, as `sf:hex` (one event each). */
+    private readonly rejectedKeys;
+    constructor(opts?: OsnmaReceiverOptions);
+    /**
+     * Feed one E1-B I/NAV nominal page pair: `page` holds the 114-bit even
+     * part (tail removed) followed by the 120-bit odd part, MSB first, as
+     * Septentrio's GALRawINAV carries it (CRC already checked by the
+     * caller). `wn`/`tow` give the GST of the page's first symbol.
+     */
+    pushPage(svid: number, wn: number, tow: number, page: Uint8Array): void;
+    /** Process anything still buffered (end of a file). */
+    flush(): void;
+    status(): OsnmaStatus;
+    private sat;
+    private event;
+    private storeWord;
+    private prune;
+    private closeSubframe;
+    private leafOk;
+    /**
+     * "Don't use" headers announcing a revocation (ICD §5.4.1, §5.5.3):
+     * drop the revoked chain or public key and never accept it again.
+     */
+    private applyRevocations;
+    private onDsmBlock;
+    private onPkr;
+    private onKroot;
+    /** F(K) for the key of subframe `sf`: the key of subframe sf − 30. */
+    private oneWay;
+    private chainFor;
+    /** Verify the TESLA key carried in a MACK against the chain. */
+    private onKeyFrom;
+    private rejectKey;
+    private processMacks;
+    private verifyTags;
+    private onTag;
+    /** Latest word of `wt` from `svid` in subframes [sf − 30·cop, sf − 30]. */
+    private wordIn;
+    /** ADKD 0/12 data: WT1-5 of one IODnav (Annex B.1). */
+    private cedData;
+    /** ADKD 4 data: WT6 ‖ WT10 timing parameters (Annex B.2). */
+    private timingData;
+}
+
+/**
+ * OSNMA from Septentrio SBF: GALRawINAV (4023) blocks on E1-B carry the
+ * nominal I/NAV page pair with its 40-bit OSNMA field.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Feed one SBF block at offset `b` to `rx` when it is an E1-B
+ * GALRawINAV page with a valid CRC. Returns true if a page was fed.
+ */
+declare function feedSbfOsnmaBlock(data: Uint8Array, view: DataView, b: number, id: number, len: number, rx: OsnmaReceiver): boolean;
+/** Run OSNMA verification over every GALRawINAV E1-B page of an SBF stream. */
+declare function verifySbfOsnma(data: Uint8Array, opts?: OsnmaReceiverOptions): OsnmaStatus;
+
+/**
+ * Synchronous SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4) and HMAC-SHA-256 (FIPS 198-1).
+ *
+ * OSNMA verification runs a TESLA chain of up to a few thousand hashes
+ * per key and an HMAC per tag, page by page on a live stream; WebCrypto
+ * is asynchronous only, so the library carries its own small, sync
+ * implementation (checked against the NIST vectors in the tests).
+ */
+/** SHA-256 of the concatenation of `parts`. */
+declare function sha256(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array;
+/** HMAC-SHA-256 of `msg` under `key`. */
+declare function hmacSha256(key: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
+/** SHA-512 of the concatenation of `parts`. */
+declare function sha512(...parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array;
+
+/**
+ * Verify an ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 signature `sig` (r ‖ s, 64 bytes) of
+ * `msg` under the SEC1-encoded public key `pubKey`.
+ */
+declare const p256Verify: (pubKey: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array) => boolean;
+/**
+ * Verify an ECDSA P-521/SHA-512 signature `sig` (r ‖ s, 66 bytes each)
+ * of `msg` under the SEC1-encoded public key `pubKey` (67 bytes
+ * compressed).
+ */
+declare const p521Verify: (pubKey: Uint8Array, msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array) => boolean;
+
+export { type Gst, OSNMA_KNOWN_PUBLIC_KEYS, OSNMA_MERKLE_ROOT, type OsnmaChain, type OsnmaCpks, type OsnmaEvent, type OsnmaNmaStatus, type OsnmaPublicKeyRecord, OsnmaReceiver, type OsnmaReceiverOptions, type OsnmaSatellite, type OsnmaStatus, type OsnmaTagStats, feedSbfOsnmaBlock, hmacSha256, merkleLeafOk, p256Verify, p521Verify, sha256, sha512, verifySbfOsnma };