forge-workflow 0.0.9 → 0.1.0-beta.2

package/lib/commands/serve.js

@@ -0,0 +1,581 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * `forge serve [--port N] [--open]`
+ *
+ * A minimal LOCAL loopback companion that turns the static dashboard
+ * (web/dashboard/) into an interactive one. It is a DUMB RELAY: the browser
+ * never mutates the kernel directly — it fires the SAME `forge` verbs the CLI
+ * and agents use, in-process, through the existing command dispatch. ALL
+ * validation lives in the verb/broker handlers; this server adds no parallel
+ * validator.
+ *
+ * Endpoints:
+ *   GET  /health        — capability probe (app.js flips SNAPSHOT -> LIVE).
+ *   GET  /data.json     — current snapshot (regenerated on demand, debounced).
+ *   POST /api/mutation  — the write path. Body { token, verb, args }.
+ *   GET  /* (static)    — the dashboard assets.
+ *
+ * Security model (see docs/work/2026-07-13-forge-serve/design.md):
+ *   - Binds 127.0.0.1 ONLY (never a public interface).
+ *   - Per-run random token, minted at startup, injected into the served page
+ *     URL fragment (#token=…), REQUIRED on every POST (constant-time compare).
+ *   - POST also rejects any non-loopback Host / foreign Origin (CSRF fence).
+ *   - No accounts, no cloud, no daemon; the token dies with the process.
+ *   - Zero agent/token cost: reads SQLite/kernel + writes via the broker; it
+ *     NEVER spawns an agent.
+ */
+
+const http = require('node:http');
+const fs = require('node:fs');
+const path = require('node:path');
+const crypto = require('node:crypto');
+const { spawn } = require('node:child_process');
+
+// Shared-machine hardening (single-instance lock, owner-only perms + audit,
+// hash-chained mutation journal). No dependency on serve.js, so a top-level
+// require is safe (unlike _registry — see the lazy-require note below).
+const security = require('./_serve-security');
+
+// NOTE: `_registry` / `_resolve-command-opts` are require()d LAZILY at call time
+// (inside routeMutation / registry), never destructured at module top. serve.js
+// is listed in the static command manifest, so `_manifest` require()s serve.js
+// while serve.js is itself mid-load requiring `_registry` — a top-level
+// destructure would capture `_registry`'s not-yet-assigned exports (undefined).
+// A lazy require resolves the fully-initialized module every time.
+
+const COMMANDS_DIR = __dirname;
+const DEFAULT_PORT = 8730;
+const MAX_BODY = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MB — issue/comment bodies are user data.
+const SNAPSHOT_TTL_MS = 3000; // debounce background regeneration.
+const GEN_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000;
+
+// verb -> forge command. Every verb is an EXISTING handler; issue verbs append
+// --json so the handler returns the machine envelope. No shell is ever invoked,
+// so issue/comment bodies are inert user data (the broker stores them).
+const VERB_MAP = {
+  'issue.create': { command: 'create', json: true },
+  'issue.update': { command: 'update', json: true },
+  'issue.close': { command: 'close', json: true },
+  'issue.comment': { command: 'comment', json: true },
+  gate: { command: 'gate', json: false },
+  role: { command: 'role', json: false },
+};
+
+const MIME = {
+  '.html': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
+  '.js': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+  '.mjs': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+  '.css': 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
+  '.json': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+  '.svg': 'image/svg+xml',
+  '.map': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+};
+
+// Generated bundles that index.html <script>-loads. When absent (a fresh
+// worktree gitignores them), return an empty 200 so the page cleanly falls to
+// the live /data.json path with no console error.
+const OPTIONAL_BUNDLES = new Set(['/snapshot.js', '/docs.js']);
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Arg parsing
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function parseServeArgs(args = [], flags = {}) {
+  let port = Number(flags.port) || DEFAULT_PORT;
+  let open = Boolean(flags.open);
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i += 1) {
+    const token = args[i];
+    if (token === '--open') open = true;
+    else if (token === '--port') { port = Number(args[i + 1]) || port; i += 1; }
+    else if (typeof token === 'string' && token.startsWith('--port=')) {
+      port = Number(token.slice('--port='.length)) || port;
+    }
+  }
+  return { port, open };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Security helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function mintToken() {
+  return crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+}
+
+function verifyToken(provided, expected) {
+  if (typeof provided !== 'string' || provided.length !== expected.length) return false;
+  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(provided), Buffer.from(expected));
+}
+
+function hostname(hostHeader) {
+  if (typeof hostHeader !== 'string') return '';
+  // Strip the :port; handle bare IPv6 defensively.
+  const lastColon = hostHeader.lastIndexOf(':');
+  const host = lastColon > hostHeader.indexOf(']') ? hostHeader.slice(0, lastColon) : hostHeader;
+  return host.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '').toLowerCase();
+}
+
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1']);
+
+function isLoopbackRequest(req) {
+  if (!LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(hostname(req.headers.host))) return false;
+  const origin = req.headers.origin;
+  if (typeof origin === 'string' && origin.length > 0) {
+    try {
+      if (!LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(new URL(origin).hostname.toLowerCase())) return false;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Extract the per-run token from a GET request: prefer the `X-Forge-Token`
+// header, fall back to a `?token=` query param. The served page holds the token
+// in its URL fragment and attaches it on the data fetch. Mirrors the POST path,
+// which reads the token from the JSON body.
+function readRequestToken(req) {
+  const header = req.headers['x-forge-token'];
+  if (typeof header === 'string' && header.length > 0) return header;
+  try {
+    return new URL(req.url || '/', 'http://127.0.0.1').searchParams.get('token') || '';
+  } catch {
+    return '';
+  }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Response helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function sendJson(res, status, payload) {
+  const body = JSON.stringify(payload);
+  res.writeHead(status, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8', 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' });
+  res.end(body);
+}
+
+function sendText(res, status, text, contentType = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8') {
+  res.writeHead(status, { 'Content-Type': contentType });
+  res.end(text);
+}
+
+function readBody(req, limit = MAX_BODY) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let size = 0;
+    const chunks = [];
+    req.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      size += chunk.length;
+      if (size > limit) {
+        reject(new Error('request body too large'));
+        req.destroy();
+        return;
+      }
+      chunks.push(chunk);
+    });
+    req.on('end', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')));
+    req.on('error', reject);
+  });
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mutation relay — reuse the CLI's own dispatch, never a parallel validator.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let SHARED_REGISTRY = null;
+function registry(deps = {}) {
+  if (deps?.registry) return deps.registry;
+  const loadCommands = deps.loadCommands || require('./_registry').loadCommands;
+  if (!SHARED_REGISTRY) SHARED_REGISTRY = loadCommands(COMMANDS_DIR);
+  return SHARED_REGISTRY;
+}
+
+function validateVerbArgs(verb, args) {
+  const spec = VERB_MAP[verb];
+  if (!spec) {
+    return { error: `Unknown verb '${verb}'. Allowed: ${Object.keys(VERB_MAP).join(', ')}` };
+  }
+  if (!Array.isArray(args) || !args.every((a) => typeof a === 'string')) {
+    return { error: 'args must be an array of strings' };
+  }
+  return { spec };
+}
+
+// Route a { verb, args } envelope to the EXISTING forge command handler,
+// in-process. Returns { ok, output, error } — the handler's own success/
+// rejection is surfaced verbatim (unknown gate, locked gate, invalid role, an
+// issue-command-contract validation error).
+async function routeMutation(verb, args, projectRoot, deps = {}) {
+  const { spec, error } = validateVerbArgs(verb, args);
+  if (error) return { ok: false, error };
+
+  const argv = spec.json && !args.includes('--json') ? [...args, '--json'] : args;
+  const resolveOpts = deps.resolveCommandOpts || require('./_resolve-command-opts').resolveCommandOpts;
+  const exec = deps.executeCommand || require('./_registry').executeCommand;
+
+  const { commandOpts, args: dispatchArgs } = await resolveOpts(
+    spec.command,
+    argv,
+    { env: process.env, projectRoot },
+  );
+  const result = await exec(
+    registry(deps).commands,
+    spec.command,
+    dispatchArgs,
+    {},
+    projectRoot,
+    { commandOpts },
+  );
+  return {
+    ok: result && result.success !== false,
+    output: result && typeof result.output === 'string' ? result.output : undefined,
+    error: result ? (result.error || undefined) : 'no result',
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Snapshot (GET /data.json) — regenerate on demand, debounced.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function defaultGenerate(projectRoot, dashboardDir) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const script = path.join(dashboardDir, 'generate-snapshot.mjs');
+    const child = spawn(process.execPath, [script], { cwd: projectRoot, stdio: 'ignore' });
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => { child.kill(); reject(new Error('snapshot generation timed out')); }, GEN_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    child.on('error', (err) => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(err); });
+    child.on('exit', (code) => {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      if (code === 0) resolve();
+      else reject(new Error(`snapshot generator exited ${code}`));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function readBakedSnapshot(dashboardDir) {
+  const dataPath = path.join(dashboardDir, 'data.json');
+  if (fs.existsSync(dataPath)) return fs.readFileSync(dataPath);
+  return Buffer.from('{}');
+}
+
+// Regenerate the snapshot (bounded, single-flight). Best-effort: a generator
+// failure keeps the last baked data.json rather than surfacing an error.
+function regenerate(ctx) {
+  const cache = ctx.snapshot;
+  if (cache.inFlight) return cache.inFlight;
+  cache.inFlight = (async () => {
+    try { await cache.generate(ctx.projectRoot, ctx.dashboardDir); } catch { /* keep baked */ }
+    cache.buffer = readBakedSnapshot(ctx.dashboardDir);
+    cache.lastGen = Date.now();
+  })().finally(() => { cache.inFlight = null; });
+  return cache.inFlight;
+}
+
+// Reads NEVER block on the heavy generator (it shells forge/git/gh): serve the
+// baked snapshot immediately and refresh in the BACKGROUND when stale. Only a
+// cold start with nothing baked does one bounded synchronous generation, so the
+// first paint isn't empty. Mutations call regenerate() directly (see
+// handleMutation) so a post-write refetch is fresh.
+async function getSnapshot(ctx) {
+  const cache = ctx.snapshot;
+  const hasBaked = cache.buffer || fs.existsSync(path.join(ctx.dashboardDir, 'data.json'));
+  if (!hasBaked) {
+    await regenerate(ctx);
+    return cache.buffer;
+  }
+  if (!cache.buffer) cache.buffer = readBakedSnapshot(ctx.dashboardDir);
+  if (Date.now() - cache.lastGen > SNAPSHOT_TTL_MS && !cache.inFlight) regenerate(ctx);
+  return cache.buffer;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Static host
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Map a raw request URL to a SAFE absolute path inside `dashboardDir`, or null
+// if it would escape (path traversal) or is malformed. This is the ONLY place a
+// user-controlled URL is turned into a filesystem path — every fs access must go
+// through the value it returns. The pattern (decode -> strip query/hash -> reject
+// null bytes -> resolve a GUARANTEED-RELATIVE `'.' + path` under a pre-resolved
+// root -> containment check on that same resolved value) is what breaks the taint
+// flow both for real attackers and for static analysis (CodeQL).
+function resolveStaticPath(dashboardDir, urlPath) {
+  let clean;
+  try {
+    // Drop query (?) and fragment (#), then percent-decode. A malformed escape
+    // (e.g. a lone '%') throws — treat that as "not found".
+    clean = decodeURIComponent(String(urlPath).split('?')[0].split('#')[0]);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  // Reject NUL bytes outright (can truncate paths at the syscall boundary).
+  if (clean.indexOf('\0') !== -1) return null;
+  // Normalize to a single leading slash so the join below is always relative.
+  const normalized = '/' + clean.replace(/^\/+/, '');
+  const rel = normalized === '/' ? '/index.html' : normalized;
+  // Resolve the root FIRST, then join a guaranteed-relative path ('.' + rel).
+  // Prefixing with '.' means path.resolve can never treat `rel` as absolute and
+  // discard the root, so the result is always rooted at `root`.
+  const root = path.resolve(dashboardDir);
+  const resolved = path.resolve(root, '.' + rel);
+  // Containment check on the EXACT value that will reach the fs calls. If it does
+  // not stay within root, refuse (path traversal).
+  if (resolved !== root && !resolved.startsWith(root + path.sep)) return null;
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+function serveStatic(res, dashboardDir, urlPath) {
+  const abs = resolveStaticPath(dashboardDir, urlPath);
+  if (!abs) return sendText(res, 403, 'forbidden');
+  if (!fs.existsSync(abs) || fs.statSync(abs).isDirectory()) {
+    // Absent optional bundle -> empty 200 so live mode has no console noise.
+    if (OPTIONAL_BUNDLES.has(urlPath.split('?')[0])) {
+      return sendText(res, 200, '// forge serve: live mode (bundle not baked)\n', MIME['.js']);
+    }
+    return sendText(res, 404, 'not found');
+  }
+  const type = MIME[path.extname(abs).toLowerCase()] || 'application/octet-stream';
+  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': type, 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' });
+  return res.end(fs.readFileSync(abs));
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Request router
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async function handleMutation(req, res, ctx) {
+  if (req.method !== 'POST') return sendJson(res, 405, { ok: false, error: 'method not allowed' });
+  if (!isLoopbackRequest(req)) return sendJson(res, 403, { ok: false, error: 'forbidden: non-loopback request' });
+
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(await readBody(req));
+  } catch {
+    return sendJson(res, 400, { ok: false, error: 'invalid JSON body' });
+  }
+  if (!parsed || !verifyToken(parsed.token, ctx.token)) {
+    return sendJson(res, 403, { ok: false, error: 'invalid or missing token' });
+  }
+  const result = await routeMutation(parsed.verb, parsed.args || [], ctx.projectRoot, ctx.deps);
+  // Tamper-evident audit trail: record EVERY mutation attempt (accepted or
+  // rejected) into the hash-chained journal. The `actor`/`origin` are advisory
+  // coordination metadata only — loopback requests are not authenticated beyond
+  // the per-run token, so this records WHAT the server did, not a proven WHO.
+  // Best-effort: a journal write must never break the response.
+  try {
+    security.appendJournal(ctx.projectRoot, {
+      verb: typeof parsed.verb === 'string' ? parsed.verb : null,
+      ok: Boolean(result.ok),
+      actor: 'local',
+      origin: typeof req.headers.origin === 'string' ? req.headers.origin : null,
+    });
+  } catch { /* journal is best-effort; never fail the mutation on it */ }
+  // On a successful write, refresh the baked snapshot BEFORE responding so the
+  // client's follow-up /data.json refetch reflects the change. Best-effort.
+  if (result.ok) { try { await regenerate(ctx); } catch { /* keep baked */ } }
+  return sendJson(res, result.ok ? 200 : 422, result);
+}
+
+async function handleRequest(req, res, ctx) {
+  const urlPath = (req.url || '/').split('?')[0];
+  if (urlPath === '/health') {
+    return sendJson(res, 200, { ok: true, forge_serve: true, version: 1 });
+  }
+  if (urlPath === '/api/mutation') {
+    return handleMutation(req, res, ctx);
+  }
+  if (urlPath === '/data.json') {
+    // The snapshot carries the FULL issue/message data, so an unauthenticated
+    // read by any other local user/process is a real disclosure. Gate it with
+    // the SAME fence as POST /api/mutation: loopback-only + valid per-run token
+    // (constant-time compare). /health stays token-free (capability probe only).
+    if (!isLoopbackRequest(req) || !verifyToken(readRequestToken(req), ctx.token)) {
+      return sendJson(res, 403, { ok: false, error: 'forbidden: invalid or missing token' });
+    }
+    const buf = await getSnapshot(ctx);
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': MIME['.json'], 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' });
+    return res.end(buf);
+  }
+  if (req.method !== 'GET') return sendText(res, 405, 'method not allowed');
+  return serveStatic(res, ctx.dashboardDir, req.url || '/');
+}
+
+function buildContext(projectRoot, dashboardDir, token, deps = {}) {
+  return {
+    projectRoot,
+    dashboardDir,
+    token,
+    deps,
+    snapshot: {
+      buffer: null,
+      lastGen: 0,
+      inFlight: null,
+      generate: deps.generate || defaultGenerate,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function createServeServer(ctx) {
+  return http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    handleRequest(req, res, ctx).catch((err) => {
+      if (!res.headersSent) sendJson(res, 500, { ok: false, error: err.message });
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Startup
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Resolve the OS "open a URL" helper to an ABSOLUTE path — never a bare command
+// name resolved through $PATH. A writable PATH entry could otherwise shadow the
+// executable (S4036); an absolute path in a fixed system directory forecloses it.
+function browserOpener() {
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    const root = process.env.SystemRoot || 'C:\\Windows';
+    return { file: path.join(root, 'System32', 'cmd.exe'), args: ['/c', 'start', ''] };
+  }
+  if (process.platform === 'darwin') return { file: '/usr/bin/open', args: [] };
+  return { file: '/usr/bin/xdg-open', args: [] };
+}
+
+function openBrowser(url) {
+  try {
+    const { file, args } = browserOpener();
+    const child = spawn(file, [...args, url], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' });
+    // spawn() failures (e.g. the opener binary is missing) surface ASYNChronously
+    // as an 'error' event, NOT via the try/catch — an unhandled one would crash
+    // `forge serve`. Opening a browser is best-effort; swallow it (URL is printed).
+    child.on('error', () => { /* best-effort; the URL is always printed */ });
+    child.unref();
+  } catch {
+    // Opening a browser is best-effort; the URL is always printed.
+  }
+}
+
+// Register signal handlers that release the single-instance lock, close the
+// server, and resolve the handler's promise, so `forge serve` exits cleanly on
+// Ctrl-C without leaving a stale lock behind. `onClose` releases the lock.
+function installServeShutdown(server, resolve, onClose = () => {}) {
+  let done = false;
+  const shutdown = () => {
+    if (done) return; // SIGINT then SIGTERM must not double-release/close.
+    done = true;
+    try { onClose(); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+    server.close(() => resolve({ success: true, output: 'forge serve stopped.' }));
+  };
+  process.once('SIGINT', shutdown);
+  process.once('SIGTERM', shutdown);
+  // Last-ditch release if the process exits some other way (uncaught, exit()).
+  process.once('exit', () => { try { onClose(); } catch { /* best effort */ } });
+}
+
+// Print the loopback URL (token in the fragment), optionally open a browser, and
+// wire shutdown. Extracted so startListening's listen-callback stays shallow.
+function announceServe(server, token, options, resolve) {
+  const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/#token=${token}`;
+  process.stdout.write(
+    `\nforge serve — interactive dashboard (loopback only)\n  ${url}\n`
+    + '  Token dies with this process. Press Ctrl-C to stop.\n\n',
+  );
+  if (options.open) openBrowser(url);
+  installServeShutdown(server, resolve, options.onClose);
+}
+
+function startListening(server, port, token, options = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.on('error', reject);
+    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => announceServe(server, token, options, resolve));
+  });
+}
+
+// Startup path audit: warn LOUDLY if the serve state dir / lock / journal are
+// group- or other-readable on a shared box (POSIX). On Windows the mode bits do
+// not reflect ACLs, so we print an honest one-line caveat instead of a false
+// alarm. Never blocks startup — hardening is advisory, not a gate.
+function auditServePaths(projectRoot) {
+  const audit = security.auditPaths([
+    security.serveStateDir(projectRoot),
+    security.lockPath(projectRoot),
+    security.journalPath(projectRoot),
+  ]);
+  if (!audit.ok) {
+    const paths = audit.offenders.map((o) => o.path).join(', ');
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `\n⚠  forge serve: sensitive path(s) are readable by other users: ${paths}\n`
+      + '   On a shared machine another local user could read the token/journal.\n'
+      + '   Tighten perms (chmod 700 .forge/serve) or run on a single-user box.\n\n',
+    );
+  } else if (audit.results.some((r) => r.exists && r.platformCaveat)) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      'note: forge serve stores its lock/journal under .forge/serve. On Windows,'
+      + ' file perms are enforced by NTFS ACLs, not POSIX mode bits — keep the'
+      + ' project on a single-user profile for the strongest isolation.\n',
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// Verify the hash-chained mutation journal at startup so the tamper-evident
+// control actually RUNS on every serve (not just in tests). A broken chain means
+// a past record was edited or a non-tail record removed since we last wrote it —
+// warn LOUDLY but NEVER block startup (integrity signal, not a gate). `warn` is
+// injectable for testing; production writes to stderr. Returns the verify result.
+function verifyJournalAtStartup(projectRoot, warn = (m) => process.stderr.write(m)) {
+  const result = security.verifyJournal(projectRoot);
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    warn(
+      `\n⚠  forge serve: mutation journal integrity check FAILED at record #${result.brokenAt} `
+      + `(${result.reason}).\n`
+      + `   A past entry in ${security.journalPath(projectRoot)} was edited or removed since it was written.\n`
+      + '   The tamper-evident history is compromised — investigate before trusting it.\n\n',
+    );
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+async function handler(args, flags = {}, projectRoot = process.cwd(), _opts = {}) {
+  const { port, open } = parseServeArgs(args, flags);
+  const dashboardDir = path.join(projectRoot, 'web', 'dashboard');
+  if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(dashboardDir, 'index.html'))) {
+    return { success: false, error: `Dashboard not found at ${dashboardDir}. Run from the repo root.` };
+  }
+
+  // Single-instance guard: refuse to start a rogue second server for this
+  // project (a live holder blocks; a stale lock from a dead PID is reclaimed).
+  const lock = security.acquireLock(projectRoot, { port });
+  if (!lock.ok) {
+    return {
+      success: false,
+      error: `forge serve is already running for this project (pid ${lock.held.pid}`
+        + `${lock.held.port ? `, port ${lock.held.port}` : ''}). Stop it before starting another, `
+        + 'or a second server would silently port-squat. If that process is dead, remove '
+        + `${security.lockPath(projectRoot)}.`,
+    };
+  }
+  auditServePaths(projectRoot);
+  verifyJournalAtStartup(projectRoot);
+
+  const token = mintToken();
+  const ctx = buildContext(projectRoot, dashboardDir, token);
+  const server = createServeServer(ctx);
+  return startListening(server, port, token, {
+    open,
+    onClose: () => security.releaseLock(projectRoot),
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  name: 'serve',
+  description: 'Serve the interactive dashboard over 127.0.0.1 (trigger forge verbs from the browser)',
+  usage: 'forge serve [--port N] [--open]',
+  handler,
+  // Exposed for tests + reuse (in-process, no socket).
+  routeMutation,
+  parseServeArgs,
+  buildContext,
+  createServeServer,
+  verifyToken,
+  isLoopbackRequest,
+  resolveStaticPath,
+  verifyJournalAtStartup,
+  VERB_MAP,
+};