evolcore 0.0.17 → 0.0.18

package/dist/core/command/menu-catalog.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 import { groupInfo, groupMembers } from '../../aun/msg/group.js';
 import { formatPeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
 import { authorizeAccess, authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
+import { authorizationDenialData, formatAuthorizationDenial } from '../auth/authorization-denial.js';
 import { ConfigTarget, read as readConfig } from '../../config/config-manager.js';
 import { readRolesConfig } from '../../config/roles.js';
 import { normalizeMenuError } from './menu-protocol.js';
@@ -106,8 +107,13 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
         throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'control catalog context requires a control subject' };
     }
     if (requested === 'process') {
-        if (input.channelScope !== 'control' || !subject.fromControlChannel || !subject.isDaemonOwner)
-            throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'process context requires a daemon owner control subject' };
+        if (input.channelScope !== 'control' || !subject.fromControlChannel || !subject.isDaemonOwner) {
+            throw {
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Process context requires a DaemonOwner control subject.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            };
+        }
         return makeContext(input, requested, subject, input.channelId);
     }
     if (requested === 'agent') {
@@ -139,9 +145,18 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
             chatType: 'private',
             conversationId: subject.actorId,
             fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
-            identity: subject.isDaemonOwner ? subject.identity : undefined,
         });
-        const bound = { ...rebuilt, channel: subject.channel, channelId: subject.actorId, peerKey: formatPeerKey('aun', subject.actorId), isDaemonOwner: subject.isDaemonOwner || rebuilt.isDaemonOwner, fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel };
+        const processRole = subject.processRole ?? (subject.isDaemonOwner ? 'daemon-owner' : 'none');
+        const bound = {
+            ...rebuilt,
+            channel: subject.channel,
+            channelId: subject.actorId,
+            peerKey: formatPeerKey('aun', subject.actorId),
+            processRole,
+            isDaemonOwner: processRole === 'daemon-owner',
+            fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
+            allowAccess: processRole !== 'none' || rebuilt.allowAccess,
+        };
         const access = authorizeAccess(bound);
         if (!access.allow)
             throw { code: access.code, message: access.reason };
@@ -201,9 +216,19 @@ export async function resolveMenuCatalogContext(input) {
         chatType: 'group',
         conversationId: canonicalGroupId,
         fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
-        identity: subject.isDaemonOwner ? subject.identity : undefined,
     });
-    const bound = { ...rebuilt, channel: subject.channel, channelId: canonicalGroupId, conversationId: canonicalGroupId, peerKey, isDaemonOwner: subject.isDaemonOwner || rebuilt.isDaemonOwner, fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel };
+    const processRole = subject.processRole ?? (subject.isDaemonOwner ? 'daemon-owner' : 'none');
+    const bound = {
+        ...rebuilt,
+        channel: subject.channel,
+        channelId: canonicalGroupId,
+        conversationId: canonicalGroupId,
+        peerKey,
+        processRole,
+        isDaemonOwner: processRole === 'daemon-owner',
+        fromControlChannel: subject.fromControlChannel,
+        allowAccess: processRole !== 'none' || rebuilt.allowAccess,
+    };
     const access = authorizeAccess(bound);
     if (!access.allow)
         throw { code: access.code, message: access.reason };
@@ -278,7 +303,7 @@ async function operationView(binding, context) {
         return undefined;
     if (binding.supported === false)
         return { supported: false, allowed: false, reason: { code: 'NOT_SUPPORTED', message: 'operation is not supported' } };
-    if (binding.operation === 'group.rulespolicy.update' && context.subject.role !== 'owner' && !context.subject.isDaemonOwner) {
+    if (binding.operation === 'group.rulespolicy.update' && context.subject.role !== 'owner') {
         return { supported: true, allowed: false, reason: { code: 'PERMISSION_DENIED', message: 'rulesPolicy can only be changed by an Agent owner' } };
     }
     const decision = authorizeOperation({ source: 'menu', intent: intentFor(binding, context), subject: context.subject, audit: false });

package/dist/core/command/menu-handler.js

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import { isCapabilityType, listCapabilityOptions, queryCapabilityTypes, resolveC
 import { normalizeCliArgv, parseCliIntent, parseLegacyCliCommand, validateCliArgv, withDefaultRelationContext } from './cli-intent-parser.js';
 import { auditCommandAuthorization, hashArgv } from '../auth/authorization-audit.js';
 import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
+import { authorizationDenialData, formatAuthorizationDenial } from '../auth/authorization-denial.js';
 import { evaluateRoleOperationCapability } from '../auth/operation-authorizer.js';
 import { splitConfigBatchGetArgv } from '../../cli/cli-argv.js';
 import { chatmodeFieldForPeer, resolveChatModeForField } from '../message/peer-mode.js';
@@ -854,13 +855,21 @@ function gateControlScope(opts) {
     if (fromControlChannel)
         return null;
     if (isProcessLevelAction(cmdBase, action)) {
-        return { error: '此操作仅允许通过控制 AID channel 执行', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation is not available from an Agent channel.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        };
     }
     const targetAid = args?.aid;
     if (targetAid) {
         const currentAgentAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (targetAid !== currentAgentAid) {
-            return { error: '跨 agent 操作仅允许通过控制 AID channel 执行', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+            return {
+                error: formatAuthorizationDenial('An Agent channel may only target its current Agent.', 'TARGET_SELF_ONLY'),
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                data: authorizationDenialData('TARGET_SELF_ONLY'),
+            };
         }
     }
     return null;
@@ -983,8 +992,12 @@ function buildMenuIntent(verb, cmdBase, args, action, value, fromControlChannel
                 return intent('agent.reload', fromControlChannel ? 'control' : 'agent', { action });
             if (action === 'create')
                 return intent('agent.create', 'control', { action });
-            if (action === 'delete' || action === 'disable')
+            if (action === 'delete')
                 return intent('agent.delete', 'control', { action });
+            if (action === 'enable')
+                return intent('agent.enable', 'control', { action });
+            if (action === 'disable')
+                return intent('agent.disable', 'control', { action });
         }
         if (cmdBase === '/trigger') {
             if (action === 'create' || action === 'set')
@@ -1088,7 +1101,12 @@ async function authorizeMenuIntent(params) {
                 },
             };
         }
-        return { error: decision.reason, code: decision.code };
+        const reasonCode = decision.command?.reasonCode;
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial(decision.reason, reasonCode),
+            code: decision.code,
+            ...(reasonCode ? { data: authorizationDenialData(reasonCode) } : {}),
+        };
     }
     return null;
 }
@@ -1136,8 +1154,6 @@ function buildRoleMenuContext(owner, channel, subject) {
             },
         } : {}),
         availableBaseagents: Array.from(new Set([
-            ...Object.keys(owningAgent?.config?.baseagents ?? {}),
-            ...(owningAgent?.baseagent ? [owningAgent.baseagent] : []),
             ...(owningAgent?.name ? (owner.getAvailableBaseagentsForOwner?.(owningAgent.name) ?? []) : []),
         ])),
         listModels: async (baseagent) => {
@@ -1187,9 +1203,6 @@ async function executeGroupMenu(owner, params) {
         return menuResultFailure(error);
     }
     const authorizationArgs = groupMenuAuthorizationArgs(params.args, params.subject.selfAid, menuIntent.scope === 'relation' ? params.subject.peerKey : undefined);
-    const authorizationSubject = params.subject.isDaemonOwner && params.subject.role !== 'owner'
-        ? { ...params.subject, role: 'owner' }
-        : params.subject;
     const denied = await authorizeMenuIntent.call(owner, {
         intent: {
             operation: menuIntent.operation,
@@ -1198,7 +1211,7 @@ async function executeGroupMenu(owner, params) {
             args: authorizationArgs,
         },
         identity: params.identity,
-        subject: authorizationSubject,
+        subject: params.subject,
         session: params.session,
         explicitChatType: params.explicitChatType,
         channel: params.channel,
@@ -1541,16 +1554,15 @@ export async function getSubMenuItems(cmd, channel, channelId, userId, args, ove
                 throw { code: res.code, message: res.error };
             return res.data.agents.map(ag => ({ value: ag.aid, label: ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }));
         }
-        // agent channel：作用域绑定自身，仅返回自身单条
+        // agent channel：直接读取自身，避免先枚举全部 Agent 再过滤。
         const selfAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (!selfAid)
             throw { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: '当前 channel 无绑定 agent' };
-        const res = await execAgentOptions(args);
+        const res = await execAgentQuery({ aid: selfAid });
         if ('error' in res)
             throw { code: res.code, message: res.error };
-        return res.data.agents
-            .filter(ag => ag.aid === selfAid)
-            .map(ag => ({ value: ag.aid, label: ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }));
+        const ag = res.data;
+        return [{ value: ag.aid, label: ag.identity?.name || ag.name || ag.aid, desc: ag.status }];
     }
     if (cmd === '/capability') {
         const type = args?.type;
@@ -1890,7 +1902,7 @@ export async function execMenuQuery(cmd, channel, channelId, userId, args, expli
     // 授权由 agent.list/agent.show operation 决定；channel 闸门只负责目标范围。
     if (cmdBase === '/agent') {
         if (fromControlChannel) {
-            return await execAgentQuery(args);
+            return args?.aid ? await execAgentQuery(args) : await execAgentOptions(args);
         }
         const selfAid = this.getOwningAgent?.(channel)?.aid;
         if (!selfAid)
@@ -2727,7 +2739,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
         subject: authSubject,
     });
     if (cmdBase === '/system' && fromControlChannel && !subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-        return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+        return {
+            error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        };
     }
     if (cmdBase === '/role') {
         const authorized = await authorizeRoleMenu(this, {
@@ -2808,7 +2824,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
     if (cmdBase === '/agent') {
         if (fromControlChannel) {
             if (!subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-                return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+                return {
+                    error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This Agent lifecycle operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                    code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                    data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                };
             }
         }
         else {
@@ -3323,7 +3343,11 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
     if (cmdBase === '/system') {
         // D1 迁移：进程级鉴权统一查 daemon.json owners，替代各 action 内联的 identity.role 判断
         if (!subject.isDaemonOwner) {
-            return { error: '操作需要 owner 权限', code: 'FORBIDDEN' };
+            return {
+                error: formatAuthorizationDenial('This daemon-level operation requires DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+                code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            };
         }
         if (action === 'restart') {
             const suppressRealRestart = shouldSuppressRealRestart();
@@ -3475,6 +3499,7 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
                     requestId, sessionId: subject.sessionId, agentAid: subject.selfAid,
                     permissionMode: subject.permissionMode,
                     channel, channelId, role: identity.role, decision: 'deny', code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+                    executed: false, executionState: 'blocked',
                     reason: 'Unrecognized CLI command', taskId: requestId, argvHash: hashArgv(intentArgv),
                     name: 'cli', action: 'exec', args: { argv: [...requestedArgv] },
                 });
@@ -3534,6 +3559,8 @@ export async function execMenuAction(cmd, action, args, channel, channelId, user
                 permissionMode: subject.permissionMode,
                 channel, channelId, role: identity.role, isDaemonOwner,
                 fromControlChannel: fromControlChannel ?? false, decision: 'allow',
+                executed: true,
+                executionState: executionData?.exitCode === undefined || executionData.exitCode === 0 ? 'completed' : 'failed',
                 matchedRule: decision.command?.matchedRule, taskId: requestId, argvHash: hashArgv(argv),
                 name: 'cli', action: 'exec',
                 args: { argv: [...requestedArgv] },
@@ -3665,7 +3692,6 @@ async function execMenuForSystemControl(payload, context) {
         channelId: context.actorAid || SYSTEM_CONTROL_CHANNEL,
         chatType: 'private',
         conversationId: context.actorAid || SYSTEM_CONTROL_CHANNEL,
-        identity: context.localDirect ? { role: 'owner', mode: 'interactive' } : undefined,
         processOwners: context.owners,
         fromControlChannel: true,
     });
@@ -3788,7 +3814,11 @@ export async function execMenuForEcweb(payload, trusted) {
     const isProcessLevel = isProcessLevelMenu(name, payload?.cmd) || isProcessContextMenu(payload);
     const owners = loadDaemonConfig().owners ?? [];
     if (isProcessLevel && owners.length === 0) {
-        return { type: 'menu.response', id, name, error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: '请在 daemon.json 配置 owners 后使用进程级操作' } };
+        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Configure daemon.json.owners before using process-level operations.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        });
     }
     if (!trusted || (!trusted.localDirect && !trusted.actorAid)) {
         return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
@@ -3797,7 +3827,9 @@ export async function execMenuForEcweb(payload, trusted) {
             data: { $schema_version: 1, kind: 'role_permission_denied', self: payload?.args?.self ?? null },
         });
     }
-    const userId = trusted.actorAid ?? (trusted.localDirect ? (isProcessLevel ? owners[0] : 'local-direct') : undefined);
+    // A verified local ECWeb connection acts through the configured human
+    // DaemonOwner identity; it is not an anonymous daemon service principal.
+    const userId = trusted.actorAid ?? (trusted.localDirect ? (owners[0] || 'local-direct') : undefined);
     return execMenuForSystemControl.call(this, payload, {
         source: 'ecweb',
         actorAid: userId || 'local-direct',
@@ -3819,7 +3851,11 @@ export async function execMenuForControl(payload, peerId) {
     const isRoleRequest = name === 'role' || compatCmd === '/role';
     const isConnectRequest = name === 'connect' || compatCmd === '/connect';
     if (!isRoleRequest && !isConnectRequest && !isProcessLevelOwner(peerId, owners)) {
-        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, { code: 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED', message: '控制 channel 操作需要 owner 权限' });
+        return menuFailure({ id, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }, {
+            code: 'NOT_ALLOWED',
+            message: formatAuthorizationDenial('Control-channel process operations require DaemonOwner.', 'DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+            data: authorizationDenialData('DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED'),
+        });
     }
     return execMenuForSystemControl.call(this, payload, {
         source: 'control',

package/dist/core/command/menu-protocol.js

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks';
 import { loadDaemonConfig } from '../../config-store.js';
 import { readInstalledEvolcoreVersion } from '../../utils/evolcore-version.js';
 import { compareStableSemver, parseStableSemver } from '../../utils/stable-semver.js';
+import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
 export const MENU_REQUEST_TYPES = new Set([
     'menu.token.request',
     'menu.list',
@@ -40,6 +42,51 @@ export function menuCommandForName(name) {
         return undefined;
     return MENU_NAME_COMMANDS[name];
 }
+/**
+ * Preserve a valid adapter receive mark, or capture a local monotonic fallback
+ * at the earliest boundary available to the caller.
+ */
+export function normalizeMenuResponseTiming(timing, clock = {}) {
+    const receivedAtMono = typeof timing.receivedAtMono === 'number' && Number.isFinite(timing.receivedAtMono)
+        ? timing.receivedAtMono
+        : undefined;
+    const receivedAt = typeof timing.receivedAt === 'number' && Number.isFinite(timing.receivedAt)
+        ? timing.receivedAt
+        : undefined;
+    if (receivedAtMono !== undefined) {
+        return { ...(receivedAt !== undefined ? { receivedAt } : {}), receivedAtMono };
+    }
+    if (receivedAt !== undefined)
+        return { receivedAt };
+    return {
+        receivedAt: clock.wallNow ?? Date.now(),
+        receivedAtMono: clock.monotonicNow ?? performance.now(),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Finalize a Menu response at an external transport boundary.
+ *
+ * Keeping this outside menuSuccess/menuFailure is intentional: dedupe caches
+ * response drafts, while every inbound request (including a replay) must get
+ * its own inbound-to-outbound processing time.
+ */
+export function withMenuProcessingTime(response, timing, clock = {}) {
+    const receivedAtMono = typeof timing.receivedAtMono === 'number' && Number.isFinite(timing.receivedAtMono)
+        ? timing.receivedAtMono
+        : undefined;
+    const receivedAt = typeof timing.receivedAt === 'number' && Number.isFinite(timing.receivedAt)
+        ? timing.receivedAt
+        : undefined;
+    const elapsed = receivedAtMono !== undefined
+        ? (clock.monotonicNow ?? performance.now()) - receivedAtMono
+        : receivedAt !== undefined
+            ? (clock.wallNow ?? Date.now()) - receivedAt
+            : 0;
+    return {
+        ...response,
+        processing_ms: Math.max(0, Math.round(Number.isFinite(elapsed) ? elapsed : 0)),
+    };
+}
 export function evaluateEvolMenuVersionGate(input) {
     const minimum = loadDaemonConfig().aun?.minEvolVersion;
     if (!minimum)
@@ -346,3 +393,152 @@ export class MenuDiagnosticLimiter {
         return { log: false, suppressed: previous.suppressed };
     }
 }
+const MAX_LOG_DEPTH = 8;
+const MAX_LOG_KEYS = 100;
+const MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS = 100;
+const MAX_LOG_STRING_LENGTH = 4096;
+const SENSITIVE_LOG_KEY = /(?:^|[_-])(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|menu[_-]?token|token|secret(?:[_-]?key)?|password|passwd|credentials?|authorization|cookie|private[_-]?key|seed)(?:$|[_-])/i;
+const SENSITIVE_LOG_ARG = /(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|menu[_-]?token|token|secret|password|passwd|credential|authorization|cookie|private[_-]?key|seed)/i;
+function isSensitiveLogKey(key) {
+    const normalized = key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, '$1_$2');
+    return SENSITIVE_LOG_KEY.test(normalized);
+}
+function sanitizeInlineLogSecrets(value) {
+    return value
+        .replace(/\b(authorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+)[^\s"',;]+/gi, '$1[REDACTED]')
+        .replace(/\bBearer\s+[^\s,;]+/gi, 'Bearer [REDACTED]')
+        .replace(/\b(api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|menu[_-]?token|token|password|passwd|secret|credential|authorization|cookie)\s*([=:])\s*(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+)/gi, '$1$2[REDACTED]')
+        .replace(/(--(?:api-key|access-token|refresh-token|menu-token|token|password|secret|credential))(?:=|\s+)(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+)/gi, '$1 [REDACTED]');
+}
+function sanitizeLogString(value) {
+    let sanitized = value;
+    const trimmed = value.trim();
+    if ((trimmed.startsWith('{') || trimmed.startsWith('[')) && trimmed.length <= 64 * 1024) {
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed);
+            if (parsed && typeof parsed === 'object')
+                sanitized = JSON.stringify(sanitizeMenuLogValue(parsed));
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Ordinary strings may start with JSON punctuation; keep their original shape.
+        }
+    }
+    sanitized = sanitizeInlineLogSecrets(sanitized);
+    if (sanitized.length <= MAX_LOG_STRING_LENGTH)
+        return sanitized;
+    return `${sanitized.slice(0, MAX_LOG_STRING_LENGTH)}...[TRUNCATED ${sanitized.length - MAX_LOG_STRING_LENGTH} chars]`;
+}
+function sanitizeLogArgv(value, depth, seen) {
+    const output = [];
+    let redactNext = false;
+    for (const item of value.slice(0, MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS)) {
+        if (typeof item !== 'string') {
+            output.push(sanitizeMenuLogValue(item, '', depth + 1, seen));
+            redactNext = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (redactNext) {
+            output.push('[REDACTED]');
+            redactNext = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        const sanitized = sanitizeLogString(item);
+        output.push(sanitized);
+        const token = item.replace(/^--?/, '').replace(/=.*$/, '');
+        redactNext = SENSITIVE_LOG_ARG.test(token) && !item.includes('=');
+    }
+    if (value.length > MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS)
+        output.push(`[TRUNCATED ${value.length - MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS} items]`);
+    return output;
+}
+export function sanitizeMenuLogValue(value, key = '', depth = 0, seen = new WeakSet()) {
+    if (isSensitiveLogKey(key))
+        return '[REDACTED]';
+    if (value === null || value === undefined || typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean')
+        return value;
+    if (typeof value === 'bigint')
+        return value.toString();
+    if (typeof value === 'string')
+        return sanitizeLogString(value);
+    if (typeof value !== 'object')
+        return String(value);
+    if (depth >= MAX_LOG_DEPTH)
+        return '[MAX_DEPTH]';
+    if (seen.has(value))
+        return '[CIRCULAR]';
+    seen.add(value);
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        const items = value.slice(0, MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS).map(item => sanitizeMenuLogValue(item, '', depth + 1, seen));
+        if (value.length > MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS)
+            items.push(`[TRUNCATED ${value.length - MAX_LOG_ARRAY_ITEMS} items]`);
+        return items;
+    }
+    const output = {};
+    const entries = Object.entries(value);
+    for (const [entryKey, entryValue] of entries.slice(0, MAX_LOG_KEYS)) {
+        output[entryKey] = entryKey === 'argv' && Array.isArray(entryValue)
+            ? sanitizeLogArgv(entryValue, depth + 1, seen)
+            : sanitizeMenuLogValue(entryValue, entryKey, depth + 1, seen);
+    }
+    if (entries.length > MAX_LOG_KEYS)
+        output.$truncated_keys = entries.length - MAX_LOG_KEYS;
+    return output;
+}
+function menuRequestId(request) {
+    return typeof request.id === 'string' && request.id.trim() ? request.id : undefined;
+}
+function menuFlowBaseRecord(request, context) {
+    return {
+        source: context.source,
+        requestId: menuRequestId(request),
+        messageId: context.messageId,
+        selfAid: context.selfAid,
+    };
+}
+function menuRequestBusinessFields(request) {
+    return sanitizeMenuLogValue({
+        type: request.type,
+        name: request.name,
+        agent: request.agent,
+        action: request.action,
+        cmd: request.cmd,
+        args: request.args,
+        value: request.value,
+    });
+}
+function writeMenuFlowRecord(record) {
+    try {
+        logger.menu(record);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Observability must never affect Menu execution.
+    }
+}
+export function logMenuRequestReceived(request, context) {
+    writeMenuFlowRecord({
+        ...menuFlowBaseRecord(request, context),
+        event: 'menu.request.received',
+        request: menuRequestBusinessFields(request),
+    });
+}
+export function logMenuRequestCompleted(request, response, context, options) {
+    const error = response && 'error' in response ? response.error : undefined;
+    const transportError = options.transportError instanceof Error
+        ? { message: sanitizeLogString(options.transportError.message) }
+        : options.transportError === undefined
+            ? undefined
+            : { message: sanitizeLogString(String(options.transportError)) };
+    const processingMs = response && typeof response.processing_ms === 'number'
+        ? response.processing_ms
+        : undefined;
+    writeMenuFlowRecord({
+        ...menuFlowBaseRecord(request, context),
+        event: options.delivery === 'failed' ? 'menu.request.failed' : 'menu.request.completed',
+        delivery: options.delivery,
+        processingMs,
+        reason: options.reason,
+        result: response && 'data' in response ? sanitizeMenuLogValue(response.data) : undefined,
+        warning: response && 'warning' in response ? sanitizeMenuLogValue(response.warning) : undefined,
+        error: error ? sanitizeMenuLogValue(error) : transportError,
+    });
+}

package/dist/core/command/slash-gate.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // 支持的命令列表
-const commands = ['/new', '/pwd', '/help', '/evolhelp', '/status', '/restart', '/reload', '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/slist', '/session', '/rename', '/stop', '/compact', '/repair', '/fork', '/del', '/perm', '/file', '/check', '/rewind', '/activity', '/observable', '/chatmode', '/mentionmode', '/ask', '/resume', '/aid', '/rpc', '/storage', '/agent', '/trigger', '/upgrade'];
+const commands = ['/new', '/pwd', '/help', '/evolhelp', '/status', '/restart', '/reload', '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/slist', '/session', '/rename', '/stop', '/pause', '/compact', '/repair', '/fork', '/del', '/perm', '/file', '/check', '/rewind', '/activity', '/observable', '/chatmode', '/mentionmode', '/ask', '/resume', '/aid', '/rpc', '/storage', '/agent', '/trigger', '/upgrade'];
 const deprecatedCommands = ['/clear'];
+const exactBoundaryCommands = new Set(['/pause', '/resume', '/stop']);
 // 命令别名映射
 const aliases = {
     '/s': '/session',
@@ -9,7 +10,7 @@ const aliases = {
     '/base': '/baseagent',
 };
 // 命令快速路径前缀（所有命令都不进入消息队列）
-const quickCommandPrefixes = ['/new', '/pwd', '/help', '/evolhelp', '/status', '/restart', '/reload', '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/slist', '/session', '/rename', '/repair', '/fork', '/stop', '/clear', '/compact', '/del', '/perm', '/file', '/check', '/s ', '/name', '/rewind', '/rw', '/rw ', '/activity', '/observable', '/chatmode', '/mentionmode', '/ask', '/resume', '/base ', '/aid', '/rpc', '/storage', '/agent', '/trigger', '/upgrade'];
+const quickCommandPrefixes = ['/new', '/pwd', '/help', '/evolhelp', '/status', '/restart', '/reload', '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/slist', '/session', '/rename', '/repair', '/fork', '/stop', '/pause', '/clear', '/compact', '/del', '/perm', '/file', '/check', '/s ', '/name', '/rewind', '/rw', '/rw ', '/activity', '/observable', '/chatmode', '/mentionmode', '/ask', '/resume', '/base ', '/aid', '/rpc', '/storage', '/agent', '/trigger', '/upgrade'];
 /**
  * 计算两个字符串的 Levenshtein 距离（编辑距离）
  */
@@ -39,7 +40,9 @@ function levenshteinDistance(str1, str2) {
     return matrix[len1][len2];
 }
 export function isQuickCommand(content) {
-    return content === '/s' || quickCommandPrefixes.some(cmd => content.startsWith(cmd));
+    return content === '/s' || quickCommandPrefixes.some(cmd => exactBoundaryCommands.has(cmd)
+        ? content === cmd || content.startsWith(cmd + ' ')
+        : content.startsWith(cmd));
 }
 export function normalizeSlashContent(content) {
     for (const [alias, full] of Object.entries(aliases)) {
@@ -50,7 +53,9 @@ export function normalizeSlashContent(content) {
     return content;
 }
 export function isRecognizedSlashCommand(content) {
-    return commands.some(cmd => content.startsWith(cmd)) ||
+    return commands.some(cmd => exactBoundaryCommands.has(cmd)
+        ? content === cmd || content.startsWith(cmd + ' ')
+        : content.startsWith(cmd)) ||
         deprecatedCommands.some(cmd => content === cmd || content.startsWith(cmd + ' '));
 }
 export function guardThreadCommand(content, threadId) {
@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ export function guardRoleCommand(content, activeChatType, isAdmin) {
     // visitor/member 在群聊和私聊中均可访问的只读命令：纯查询形态（带参写操作由各 handler 内部守卫拦截）
     const userGroupCommands = [
         '/status', '/help', '/evolhelp', '/check', '/chatmode', '/mentionmode',
-        '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/perm', '/activity', '/stop',
+        '/model', '/effort', '/baseagent', '/perm', '/activity', '/stop', '/pause',
         '/resume', '/trigger', '/file',
     ];
     const userCommands = activeChatType === 'group' && !isAdmin
@@ -107,6 +112,8 @@ export async function guardIdleCommand(opts) {
         // 话题中：检查话题 session 是否在处理（不创建）
         const threadSession = await opts.sessionManager.getThreadSession(opts.channel, opts.channelId, opts.threadId);
         if (threadSession) {
+            if (opts.isSessionPaused?.(threadSession.id))
+                return undefined;
             let hasActiveStream = false;
             try {
                 hasActiveStream = opts.getAgentForSession(threadSession).hasActiveStream(threadSession.id);
@@ -123,6 +130,8 @@ export async function guardIdleCommand(opts) {
         }
     }
     else if (opts.activeSession) {
+        if (opts.isSessionPaused?.(opts.activeSession.id))
+            return undefined;
         const isBusy = (opts.activeAgent?.hasActiveStream(opts.activeSession.id) ?? false) ||
             opts.messageQueue?.isProcessing(opts.activeSession.id) ||
             (opts.messageQueue?.getQueueLength(opts.activeSession.id) ?? 0) > 0;