evolcore 0.0.17 → 0.0.18

package/dist/cli/daemon-commands.js

@@ -64,6 +64,23 @@ async function probeDaemon(socketPath, timeoutMs = 1000) {
         return null;
     return response;
 }
+/** Ask the daemon to run its own graceful shutdown lifecycle. */
+export async function requestDaemonShutdown(socketPath, timeoutMs = 3_000, reason = 'cli', expectedPids) {
+    const daemon = await probeDaemon(socketPath, Math.min(timeoutMs, 1_000));
+    if (!daemon || (expectedPids && !expectedPids.has(daemon.pid)))
+        return null;
+    const response = await ipcQuery(socketPath, {
+        type: 'shutdown',
+        reason,
+        expectedPid: daemon.pid,
+    }, timeoutMs);
+    if (response?.ok !== true || response.accepted !== true
+        || !Number.isInteger(response.pid) || response.pid <= 0
+        || response.pid !== daemon.pid) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return response.pid;
+}
 function hasVisibleDaemonPid(status, ping) {
     return status.mains.some(entry => entry.alive && entry.record.pid === ping.pid);
 }
@@ -562,10 +579,11 @@ export async function cmdStart(opts = {}) {
     };
     setTimeout(checkReady, 1000);
 }
-async function stopPid(pid) {
+async function stopPid(pid, gracefulRequested = false) {
     console.log(`🛑 Stopping EvolCore (PID: ${pid})...`);
-    platform.killProcess(pid);
-    if (await platform.waitForProcessExit(pid, 10_000)) {
+    if (!gracefulRequested)
+        platform.killProcess(pid);
+    if (await platform.waitForProcessExit(pid, gracefulRequested ? 30_000 : 10_000)) {
         console.log('✓ EvolCore stopped');
         return true;
     }
@@ -608,7 +626,10 @@ export async function cmdStop() {
     if (runtimeOrphans.length > 0) {
         console.log(`⚠ 检测到未登记的 EvolCore 进程，将一并停止: ${runtimeOrphans.map(orphan => orphan.pid).join(', ')}`);
     }
-    const stopped = await Promise.all([...pids].map(pid => stopPid(pid)));
+    const gracefulPid = ping && pids.has(ping.pid)
+        ? await requestDaemonShutdown(p.socket, 3_000, 'ec stop', pids)
+        : null;
+    const stopped = await Promise.all([...pids].map(pid => stopPid(pid, pid === gracefulPid)));
     if (stopped.some(result => !result)) {
         process.exitCode = 1;
         return;
@@ -675,7 +696,12 @@ export async function cmdRestart(opts = {}) {
         if (aliveMains.length > 1) {
             console.log(`⚠ 检测到 ${aliveMains.length} 个 main 实例，将一并停止: ${aliveMains.map(m => m.record.pid).join(', ')}`);
         }
-        const stopped = await Promise.all(aliveMains.map(m => stopPid(m.record.pid)));
+        const mainPids = new Set(aliveMains.map(entry => entry.record.pid));
+        const currentPing = await probeDaemon(socketPath);
+        const gracefulPid = currentPing && mainPids.has(currentPing.pid)
+            ? await requestDaemonShutdown(socketPath, 3_000, 'ec restart', mainPids)
+            : null;
+        const stopped = await Promise.all(aliveMains.map(m => stopPid(m.record.pid, m.record.pid === gracefulPid)));
         if (stopped.some(result => !result)) {
             console.error('❌ Restart aborted because an existing EvolCore process could not be stopped');
             process.exitCode = 1;
@@ -703,7 +729,12 @@ export async function cmdRestart(opts = {}) {
         const runtimeOrphans = findOrphanProcesses().filter(o => isRuntimeOrphan(o));
         if (runtimeOrphans.length > 0) {
             console.log(`⚠ 检测到未登记的 EvolCore 进程，将一并停止: ${runtimeOrphans.map(o => o.pid).join(', ')}`);
-            const stopped = await Promise.all(runtimeOrphans.map(o => stopPid(o.pid)));
+            const orphanPids = new Set(runtimeOrphans.map(orphan => orphan.pid));
+            const currentPing = await probeDaemon(socketPath);
+            const gracefulPid = currentPing && orphanPids.has(currentPing.pid)
+                ? await requestDaemonShutdown(socketPath, 3_000, 'ec restart', orphanPids)
+                : null;
+            const stopped = await Promise.all(runtimeOrphans.map(o => stopPid(o.pid, o.pid === gracefulPid)));
             if (stopped.some(result => !result)) {
                 console.error('❌ Restart aborted because an unregistered EvolCore process could not be stopped');
                 process.exitCode = 1;
@@ -1359,7 +1390,7 @@ export function cmdLogs(args) {
 // ==================== Watch ====================
 let watchUseColor = false;
 const WATCH_BRACKET_TS_RE = /^\[(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}[T ]\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d+)?Z?)\]/;
-const WATCH_JSON_TS_RE = /"ts"\s*:\s*"(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d+)?Z?)"/;
+const WATCH_JSON_TS_RE = /"(?:ts|timestamp|startedAt|firedAt|finishedAt)"\s*:\s*(?:"(\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(?:\.\d+)?Z?)"|(\d+(?:\.\d+)?))/;
 function parseWatchTs(s) {
     const m = s.match(/^(\d{4})-(\d{2})-(\d{2})[T ](\d{2}):(\d{2}):(\d{2})(?:\.(\d+))?(Z)?$/);
     if (!m)
@@ -1371,10 +1402,21 @@ function parseWatchTs(s) {
     return new Date(+y, +mo - 1, +d, +h, +mi, +se, msNum).getTime();
 }
 function extractWatchTs(line) {
-    const m = line.match(WATCH_BRACKET_TS_RE) || line.match(WATCH_JSON_TS_RE);
-    if (!m)
+    const bracket = line.match(WATCH_BRACKET_TS_RE);
+    if (bracket) {
+        const t = parseWatchTs(bracket[1]);
+        return isNaN(t) ? null : t;
+    }
+    const json = line.match(WATCH_JSON_TS_RE);
+    if (!json)
         return null;
-    const t = parseWatchTs(m[1]);
+    if (json[2] !== undefined) {
+        const numeric = Number(json[2]);
+        if (!Number.isFinite(numeric) || numeric <= 0)
+            return null;
+        return numeric < 100_000_000_000 ? numeric * 1000 : numeric;
+    }
+    const t = parseWatchTs(json[1]);
     return isNaN(t) ? null : t;
 }
 function toLocalTimeStr(epoch) {
@@ -1791,8 +1833,7 @@ function cmdWatch(filterTypes) {
         const all = fs.readdirSync(p.logs).filter(f => f.endsWith('.log')).map(f => path.join(p.logs, f));
         return filterLogFiles(all, filterTypes);
     };
-    // Strip rotation suffix (e.g., "daemon-20260518-21" → "daemon")
-    const shortName = (f) => path.basename(f, '.log').replace(/-\d{8}-\d{2}$/, '');
+    const shortName = shortLogNameLocal;
     // 计算最长文件名用于对齐
     let maxNameLen = 0;
     const updateMaxName = () => {

package/dist/cli/init.js

@@ -82,11 +82,11 @@ function ecagentUnavailableReason() {
 function buildDefaults(chosen, available, projectsDefaultPath) {
     const baseagents = {};
     for (const b of available) {
-        // ecagent is bundled but opt-in; do not declare it merely because it is available.
-        if (b === 'ecagent' && chosen !== 'ecagent')
-            continue;
         baseagents[b] = {};
     }
+    // ecagent is bundled with EvolCore, so declare it even when the caller
+    // supplies a reduced availability list (for example, a test probe).
+    baseagents.ecagent ??= {};
     return {
         $schema_version: 1,
         active_baseagent: chosen,
@@ -125,9 +125,12 @@ function applyExplicitAutostart(enabled, runtimeRoot) {
         console.log(`❌ ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录自启'}配置失败: ${result.error || '未知错误'}`);
     }
     else {
+        const backend = enabled && result.backend ? `（方式：${result.backend}）` : '';
         console.log(enabled
-            ? `✓ 已启用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启`
+            ? `✓ 已启用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启${backend}`
             : `✓ 已禁用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启`);
+        if (result.warning)
+            console.log(`⚠ ${result.warning}`);
     }
     return result.ok;
 }
@@ -508,9 +511,12 @@ export async function initTail(options = {}) {
             console.log(`  ❌ ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录自启'}配置失败: ${result.error || '未知错误'}`);
             return false;
         }
+        const backend = enabled && result.backend ? `（方式：${result.backend}）` : '';
         console.log(enabled
-            ? `  ✓ 已启用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启`
+            ? `  ✓ 已启用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启${backend}`
             : `  ✓ 已禁用 ${autostartPlatformLabel() || '登录'}自启`);
+        if (result.warning)
+            console.log(`  ⚠ ${result.warning}`);
         return true;
     }
     async function handleOwnersPrompt(rl) {
@@ -827,11 +833,19 @@ export async function cmdInitNonInteractive(opts, dependencies = {}) {
     catch (e) {
         fail('IO_ERROR', `failed to write daemon.json: ${e?.message || e}`, EXIT_RUNTIME, format);
     }
+    let autostartBackend;
+    let autostartWarning;
     if (opts.autoStart !== undefined) {
         const autostart = configureAutostart(opts.autoStart, p.root);
         if (!autostart.ok) {
             fail('AUTOSTART_CONFIG_FAILED', autostart.error || 'failed to configure login autostart', EXIT_RUNTIME, format);
         }
+        if (opts.autoStart === true && autostart.backend) {
+            // Keep the selected Windows backend visible to automation callers as
+            // well as in data/autostart-state.json.
+            autostartBackend = autostart.backend;
+        }
+        autostartWarning = autostart.warning;
     }
     // ── 10. 输出 init.result ──
     const result = {
@@ -845,6 +859,8 @@ export async function cmdInitNonInteractive(opts, dependencies = {}) {
         projectsDefaultPath: projectsDefaultPath ?? null,
         defaultsPath: p.defaultsConfig,
         daemonConfigPath: p.daemonConfig,
+        ...(autostartBackend ? { autoStartBackend: autostartBackend } : {}),
+        ...(autostartWarning ? { autoStartWarning: autostartWarning } : {}),
         ...(forced ? { forced: true, previousOwners } : {}),
     };
     emitResult(result, format);

package/dist/cli/restart-monitor.js

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { WEB_PACKAGE_NAME } from '../product.js';
 import { shouldSuppressRealRestart } from '../utils/restart-safety.js';
 import { rotateStdoutLog } from '../utils/log-writer.js';
 import { inspectDataMigrationRequirement } from '../core/data-migration.js';
+import { requestDaemonShutdown } from './daemon-commands.js';
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 // 清理 Claude Code 环境变量，防止 SDK 认为是嵌套会话
 function cleanEnv() {
@@ -105,11 +106,14 @@ export async function cmdRestartMonitor() {
     if (runtimeOrphans.length > 0) {
         const pids = runtimeOrphans.map(o => o.pid).join(', ');
         log(`Stopping unregistered EvolCore process(es): ${pids}`);
+        const orphanPids = new Set(runtimeOrphans.map(orphan => orphan.pid));
+        const ping = await requestDaemonShutdown(p.socket, 3_000, 'restart-monitor orphan cleanup', orphanPids);
         for (const orphan of runtimeOrphans) {
-            platform.killProcess(orphan.pid, false);
+            if (orphan.pid !== ping)
+                platform.killProcess(orphan.pid, false);
         }
         const exited = await Promise.all(runtimeOrphans.map(async (orphan) => {
-            if (await platform.waitForProcessExit(orphan.pid, 10_000))
+            if (await platform.waitForProcessExit(orphan.pid, orphan.pid === ping ? 30_000 : 10_000))
                 return true;
             platform.killProcess(orphan.pid, true);
             return platform.waitForProcessExit(orphan.pid, 5_000);
@@ -130,12 +134,15 @@ export async function cmdRestartMonitor() {
     if (aliveMains.length > 0) {
         const oldPids = aliveMains.map(m => m.record.pid);
         log(`Monitoring ${oldPids.length} main process(es): ${oldPids.join(', ')}`);
-        // 先并行 SIGTERM 通知所有活 main
+        const gracefulPid = await requestDaemonShutdown(p.socket, 3_000, 'restart-monitor', new Set(oldPids));
+        // 没有收到 IPC shutdown 确认的进程才走信号兜底
         for (const pid of oldPids) {
-            try {
-                platform.killProcess(pid, false);
+            if (pid !== gracefulPid) {
+                try {
+                    platform.killProcess(pid, false);
+                }
+                catch { }
             }
-            catch { }
         }
         const exited = await Promise.all(oldPids.map(async (oldPid) => {
             if (await platform.waitForProcessExit(oldPid, 30_000)) {

package/dist/cli/watch-logs.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 import path from 'path';
-/** 去掉轮转后缀（"daemon-20260518-21.log" → "daemon"；"ts-sdk-2026-05-27.log" → "ts-sdk"）。入参可为文件名或绝对路径。 */
+/** 去掉轮转后缀（按小时、按日及旧版带连字符日期）。入参可为文件名或绝对路径。 */
 export function shortLogName(file) {
     return path.basename(file, '.log')
-        .replace(/-\d{8}-\d{2}$/, '') // -YYYYMMDD-HH（按小时轮转）
+        .replace(/-\d{8}(?:-\d{2})?$/, '') // -YYYYMMDD[-HH]（按日/小时轮转）
         .replace(/-\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/, ''); // -YYYY-MM-DD（按日轮转，如 ts-sdk）
 }
 /** 从 .log 文件名列表推导去重、字母序的类型列表。 */

package/dist/config/builtin-roles.js

@@ -3,11 +3,15 @@ import { expectedRoleRank } from './role-ranks.js';
 export { expectedRoleRank, ROLE_RANKS } from './role-ranks.js';
 export const BUILTIN_USER_ROLES = ['member', 'visitor'];
 export const MANAGEMENT_ROLES = ['owner', 'admin'];
+export const DAEMON_OWNER_ROLE = 'daemon-owner';
 export function isManagementRole(role) {
     return role === 'owner' || role === 'admin';
 }
+export function isDaemonOwnerRole(role) {
+    return role === DAEMON_OWNER_ROLE;
+}
 export function isReservedRoleName(role) {
-    return isManagementRole(role);
+    return isManagementRole(role) || isDaemonOwnerRole(role);
 }
 /** Built-in user policy data comes exclusively from kits/templates/roles. */
 export function getBuiltinRolesConfig() {

package/dist/config/role-ranks.js

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 export const ROLE_RANKS = Object.freeze({
+    /** Process-plane rank for display/audit only; it is never relation-assignable. */
+    'daemon-owner': 1000,
     owner: 900,
     admin: 700,
     custom: 500,
@@ -6,6 +8,8 @@ export const ROLE_RANKS = Object.freeze({
     visitor: 100,
 });
 export function expectedRoleRank(role) {
+    if (role === 'daemon-owner')
+        return ROLE_RANKS['daemon-owner'];
     if (role === 'owner')
         return ROLE_RANKS.owner;
     if (role === 'admin')

package/dist/core/audit/event-key.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+function compactPart(value) {
+    const text = String(value ?? '').trim();
+    return text || undefined;
+}
+function stableDigest(parts) {
+    const material = parts.map(part => compactPart(part) ?? '-').join('\u0000');
+    return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(material).digest('hex').slice(0, 20);
+}
+/** Stable across source/mirror records for one tool-call lifecycle. */
+export function buildToolLifecycleEventKey(input) {
+    return `tool:${stableDigest([
+        input.sessionId ?? 'unknown',
+        input.callId ?? input.correlationId ?? input.requestId ?? 'unknown',
+    ])}`;
+}
+/** Stable across repeated projections of one authorization decision. */
+export function buildAuthorizationEventKey(input) {
+    const lifecycleId = input.callId ?? input.correlationId ?? input.requestId;
+    if (lifecycleId) {
+        return `${buildToolLifecycleEventKey({
+            sessionId: input.sessionId,
+            callId: input.callId,
+            correlationId: input.correlationId,
+            requestId: input.requestId,
+        })}:authorization:${stableDigest([input.operation])}`;
+    }
+    return `authorization:${stableDigest([input.sessionId ?? 'unknown', input.operation])}`;
+}

package/dist/core/audit/log-integrity.js

@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ export function inspectStructuredLogs(logDir, options = {}) {
 }
 function structuredRecordKey(value) {
     const nested = nestedRecord(value);
+    const eventKey = firstDefined(value, nested, ['eventKey', 'event_key']);
+    const eventPhase = firstDefined(value, nested, ['eventPhase', 'event_phase']);
+    if (eventKey)
+        return `${String(eventKey)}${eventPhase ? `:${String(eventPhase)}` : ''}`;
     const correlation = firstDefined(value, nested, [
         'correlationId', 'correlation_id', 'callId', 'call_id', 'toolUseId', 'tool_use_id',
         'requestId', 'request_id', 'msgId', 'operationId',
@@ -96,17 +100,23 @@ function isCorrelatableRecord(value) {
 }
 function stableHash(value) {
     const nested = nestedRecord(value);
+    const eventKey = firstDefined(value, nested, ['eventKey', 'event_key']);
     const canonical = {
+        eventKey,
+        eventPhase: firstDefined(value, nested, ['eventPhase', 'event_phase']),
         type: canonicalEventType(value),
         toolName: firstDefined(value, nested, ['toolName', 'tool', 'name']),
-        callId: firstDefined(value, nested, ['callId', 'call_id', 'toolUseId', 'tool_use_id']),
-        correlationId: firstDefined(value, nested, ['correlationId', 'correlation_id']),
-        requestId: firstDefined(value, nested, ['requestId', 'request_id']),
+        callId: eventKey ? undefined : firstDefined(value, nested, ['callId', 'call_id', 'toolUseId', 'tool_use_id']),
+        correlationId: eventKey ? undefined : firstDefined(value, nested, ['correlationId', 'correlation_id']),
+        requestId: eventKey ? undefined : firstDefined(value, nested, ['requestId', 'request_id']),
         sessionId: firstDefined(value, nested, ['sessionId', 'session_id']),
         agentAid: firstDefined(value, nested, ['agentAid', 'agent_aid', 'selfAid']),
         permissionMode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['permissionMode', 'permission_mode']),
         isError: firstDefined(value, nested, ['isError', 'is_error']) ?? (value.ok === false || nested?.ok === false ? true : undefined),
         errorCode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['errorCode', 'error_code']),
+        decision: firstDefined(value, nested, ['decision']),
+        executed: firstDefined(value, nested, ['executed']),
+        executionState: firstDefined(value, nested, ['executionState', 'execution_state']),
         input: firstDefined(value, nested, ['input']),
         result: firstDefined(value, nested, ['result', 'content']),
         error: firstDefined(value, nested, ['error', 'errorMessage']),

package/dist/core/auth/auth-gateway.js

@@ -5,20 +5,8 @@ import { authorizeCommand, authorizeResolvedConfigCommand } from './operation-au
 import { auditCommandAuthorization } from './authorization-audit.js';
 import { hasTrustedPrincipal } from './authenticated-actor.js';
 import { resolveRuntimePermissionMode } from '../role/runtime-policy.js';
-const CROSS_AGENT_READ_OPERATIONS = new Set([
-    'trigger.list',
-    'trigger.show',
-    'trigger.history',
-]);
 export function isCrossAgentTriggerOperationAllowed(input) {
-    if (input.control || input.taskAgentAid === input.targetAgentAid)
-        return true;
-    if (!input.taskAgentAid || !input.targetManagement)
-        return false;
-    return CROSS_AGENT_READ_OPERATIONS.has(input.operation);
-}
-export function isCrossAgentTriggerReadOperation(operation) {
-    return CROSS_AGENT_READ_OPERATIONS.has(operation);
+    return input.control || input.daemonOwner === true || input.taskAgentAid === input.targetAgentAid;
 }
 export function buildAuthSubject(input) {
     const chatType = input.chatType === 'group' ? 'group' : 'private';
@@ -34,12 +22,14 @@ export function buildAuthSubject(input) {
         peerType: input.peerType,
     });
     const processOwners = input.processOwners ?? [];
-    const isDaemonOwner = isProcessOwner({
+    const isDaemonService = input.trustedProcessRole === 'daemon-service';
+    const isDaemonOwner = !isDaemonService && isProcessOwner({
         actor: roleDetail.actor,
         processOwners,
     });
     const suppliedRole = input.identity?.role && input.identity.role !== 'none' ? input.identity.role : undefined;
-    const role = suppliedRole ?? (isDaemonOwner ? 'owner' : roleDetail.effectiveRole ?? 'none');
+    const role = suppliedRole ?? roleDetail.effectiveRole ?? 'none';
+    const processRole = isDaemonService ? 'daemon-service' : isDaemonOwner ? 'daemon-owner' : 'none';
     return {
         selfAid: input.selfAid,
         actorId,
@@ -52,11 +42,13 @@ export function buildAuthSubject(input) {
         conversationId,
         peerKey: input.channelType && conversationId ? formatPeerKey(input.channelType, conversationId) : undefined,
         role,
-        roleSource: isDaemonOwner && !roleDetail.effectiveRole ? 'fallback' : roleDetail.source,
+        relationRole: role,
+        processRole,
+        roleSource: roleDetail.source,
         identity: input.identity ?? roleToSessionIdentity(role === 'none' ? null : role),
         isDaemonOwner,
         fromControlChannel: !!input.fromControlChannel,
-        allowAccess: isDaemonOwner || (suppliedRole
+        allowAccess: processRole !== 'none' || (suppliedRole
             ? checkRoleAccess(suppliedRole, input.selfAid)
             : roleDetail.allowAccess && checkRoleAccess(role, input.selfAid)),
         permissionMode: input.permissionMode
@@ -104,6 +96,7 @@ export function authorizeOperation(params) {
         selfAid: params.subject.selfAid,
         peerKey: params.subject.peerKey,
         role: params.subject.role,
+        processRole: params.subject.processRole,
         isDaemonOwner: params.subject.isDaemonOwner,
         fromControlChannel: params.subject.fromControlChannel,
         allowExplicitRelationTarget: params.allowExplicitRelationTarget,
@@ -183,10 +176,13 @@ function auditDecision(params, decision) {
         peerKey: params.subject.peerKey,
         channel: params.subject.channel,
         channelId: params.subject.channelId,
-        role: params.subject.role,
+        role: decision.allow ? decision.role : params.subject.role,
+        processRole: params.subject.processRole,
         isDaemonOwner: params.subject.isDaemonOwner,
         fromControlChannel: params.subject.fromControlChannel,
         decision: decision.allow ? 'allow' : 'deny',
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: decision.allow ? 'authorized' : 'blocked',
         code: decision.allow ? undefined : decision.code,
         reason: decision.allow ? undefined : decision.reason,
         matchedRule: decision.matchedRule,

package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
 import { LogWriter } from '../../utils/log-writer.js';
 import { resolvePaths } from '../../paths.js';
 import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { buildAuthorizationEventKey } from '../audit/event-key.js';
 export function auditCommandAuthorization(event) {
     const shouldAudit = event.source === 'menu.cli' ||
         event.decision === 'deny' ||
@@ -23,11 +24,15 @@ export function auditCommandAuthorization(event) {
 export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
     auditCommandAuthorization({
         ts: Date.now(),
+        callId: input.requestId,
+        correlationId: input.requestId,
         source: 'agent-tool',
         operation: 'tool.preflight.deny',
         scope: 'filesystem',
         dangerous: false,
         decision: 'deny',
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: 'blocked',
         decisionSource: 'policy',
         toolName: input.toolName,
         policyCode: input.policyCode,
@@ -55,11 +60,14 @@ export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
 export function auditCodexApprovalDecision(input) {
     auditCommandAuthorization({
         ts: Date.now(),
+        callId: input.correlationId ?? input.requestId,
         source: 'agent-tool',
         operation: 'codex.approval',
         scope: input.toolName === 'PermissionGrant' ? 'agent' : 'filesystem',
         dangerous: input.toolName === 'PermissionGrant',
         decision: input.decision,
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: input.decision === 'allow' ? 'authorized' : 'blocked',
         decisionSource: input.decisionSource,
         requestId: input.requestId,
         correlationId: input.correlationId ?? input.requestId,
@@ -73,12 +81,58 @@ export function auditCodexApprovalDecision(input) {
         reason: input.reason,
         role: input.role ?? 'unknown',
         taskId: input.taskId,
-        argsSummary: { method: input.method, executed: false },
+        argsSummary: { method: input.method },
+    });
+}
+/** Record a fail-closed infrastructure condition before a tool can execute. */
+export function auditToolInfrastructureFailure(input) {
+    auditCommandAuthorization({
+        ts: Date.now(),
+        source: 'agent-tool',
+        operation: 'tool.execution.blocked',
+        scope: 'filesystem',
+        dangerous: false,
+        decision: 'deny',
+        decisionSource: 'infrastructure',
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: 'blocked',
+        callId: input.callId,
+        correlationId: input.callId,
+        requestId: input.callId,
+        sessionId: input.sessionId ?? 'unknown',
+        agentAid: input.agentAid ?? 'unknown',
+        permissionMode: input.permissionMode ?? 'unknown',
+        toolName: input.toolName,
+        policyCode: input.policyCode,
+        reason: input.reason,
+        role: input.role ?? 'unknown',
+        taskId: input.taskId,
+        argsSummary: input.occurrences && input.occurrences > 1
+            ? { occurrences: input.occurrences }
+            : undefined,
     });
 }
 function buildAuditRecord(event) {
+    const executed = event.executed ?? false;
+    const executionState = event.executionState
+        ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
+            ? 'blocked'
+            : executed
+                ? (event.exitCode === undefined || event.exitCode === 0 ? 'completed' : 'failed')
+                : 'authorized');
+    const lifecycleId = event.callId ?? event.correlationId ?? event.requestId;
     return {
         ts: event.ts,
+        eventKey: event.eventKey ?? (lifecycleId
+            ? buildAuthorizationEventKey({
+                sessionId: event.sessionId,
+                callId: event.callId,
+                correlationId: event.correlationId,
+                requestId: event.requestId,
+                operation: event.operation,
+            })
+            : undefined),
+        callId: event.callId,
         correlationId: event.correlationId ?? event.requestId,
         requestId: event.requestId,
         sessionId: event.sessionId,
@@ -96,23 +150,26 @@ function buildAuditRecord(event) {
         dangerous: event.dangerous,
         name: event.name,
         action: event.action,
-        args: event.args?.argv ? { argv: [...event.args.argv] } : undefined,
+        args: event.args?.argv ? { argv: sanitizeAuditArgv(event.args.argv, event.decision) } : undefined,
         actorId: redactIdentifier(event.actorId),
         selfAid: redactIdentifier(event.selfAid),
         peerKey: redactIdentifier(event.peerKey),
         channel: event.channel,
         channelId: redactIdentifier(event.channelId),
         role: event.role,
+        processRole: event.processRole,
         isDaemonOwner: event.isDaemonOwner,
         fromControlChannel: event.fromControlChannel,
         taskId: event.taskId,
         messageId: event.messageId,
         decision: event.decision,
+        executed,
+        executionState,
         code: event.code,
         reason: event.reason,
         matchedRule: event.matchedRule,
         argvHash: event.argvHash,
-        argsSummary: event.argsSummary,
+        argsSummary: summarizeAuthorizationArgs(event.operation, event.argsSummary),
         durationMs: event.durationMs,
         exitCode: event.exitCode,
     };
@@ -148,7 +205,9 @@ function logAuditEvent(record) {
         record.taskId ? `task=${record.taskId}` : null,
         record.messageId ? `message=${record.messageId}` : null,
         record.requestId ? `request=${record.requestId}` : null,
+        record.callId ? `call=${record.callId}` : null,
         record.correlationId ? `correlation=${record.correlationId}` : null,
+        record.eventKey ? `eventKey=${record.eventKey}` : null,
         record.sessionId ? `session=${record.sessionId}` : null,
         record.agentAid ? `agent=${record.agentAid}` : null,
         record.permissionMode ? `permissionMode=${record.permissionMode}` : null,
@@ -157,6 +216,8 @@ function logAuditEvent(record) {
         record.protectionClass ? `protectionClass=${record.protectionClass}` : null,
         record.matchedPath ? `matchedPath=${JSON.stringify(record.matchedPath)}` : null,
         record.decisionSource ? `decisionSource=${record.decisionSource}` : null,
+        `executed=${record.executed}`,
+        `executionState=${record.executionState}`,
         record.code ? `code=${record.code}` : null,
         record.matchedRule ? `rule=${record.matchedRule}` : null,
         record.dangerous ? 'dangerous=true' : null,
@@ -225,6 +286,52 @@ function writeRoleMutationAudit(payload) {
     }
     catch { }
 }
+function summarizeAuthorizationArgs(operation, args) {
+    if (!args)
+        return undefined;
+    const summary = {};
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(args)) {
+        if (value === undefined)
+            continue;
+        if (/^(?:self|peer|peerKey|target|targetId|session|sessionId|channelId)$/i.test(key)) {
+            summary[key] = typeof value === 'string' ? redactIdentifier(value) : '[redacted]';
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (/(?:value|token|secret|password|credential|content|payload|body|sql|query)/i.test(key)) {
+            summary[`${key}Type`] = Array.isArray(value) ? 'array' : typeof value;
+            summary[key] = '[redacted]';
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (typeof value === 'string') {
+            summary[key] = value.length <= 96 ? value : `${value.slice(0, 93)}...`;
+        }
+        else if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' || value === null) {
+            summary[key] = value;
+        }
+        else {
+            summary[key] = `[${Array.isArray(value) ? 'array' : 'object'}]`;
+        }
+    }
+    if (operation === 'ec.msg.history')
+        summary.kind = 'history';
+    return Object.keys(summary).length > 0 ? summary : undefined;
+}
+function sanitizeAuditArgv(argv, decision) {
+    if (decision === 'allow')
+        return [...argv];
+    const safe = [...argv];
+    if (safe[0] === 'config' && safe[1] === 'set' && safe.length > 3) {
+        safe[3] = '[redacted]';
+    }
+    for (let index = 0; index < safe.length - 1; index++) {
+        const flag = safe[index];
+        if (/^--(?:self|peer|session|channel|channel-id|token)$/i.test(flag)) {
+            safe[index + 1] = redactIdentifier(safe[index + 1]) ?? '[redacted]';
+            index++;
+        }
+    }
+    return safe;
+}
 function protectionClassForPolicy(policyCode) {
     if (!policyCode)
         return undefined;

package/dist/core/auth/authorization-denial.js

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+const NEXT_STEPS = {
+    DAEMON_OWNER_REQUIRED: 'Ask an AID listed in daemon.json.owners to run this operation from the daemon control channel or ECWeb.',
+    TARGET_SELF_ONLY: 'Target the current Agent, or ask a DaemonOwner to perform the cross-Agent operation.',
+    MANAGED_NON_INTERACTIVE_REQUIRED: 'Use the structured non-interactive Agent command (for example `ec agent new <aid> --non-interactive`) or ECWeb.',
+    PURGE_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED: 'Run the purge from the daemon control plane and add --confirm-purge after verifying the target Agent.',
+};
+export function authorizationNextStep(reasonCode) {
+    return NEXT_STEPS[reasonCode];
+}
+export function authorizationDenialData(reasonCode) {
+    return { reasonCode, nextStep: authorizationNextStep(reasonCode) };
+}
+export function formatAuthorizationDenial(reason, reasonCode) {
+    if (!reasonCode)
+        return reason;
+    return `${reason}\nNext step: ${authorizationNextStep(reasonCode)}`;
+}