edhoc 1.4.0 → 2.0.0

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c

@@ -1,3292 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  X.509 certificate parsing and verification
- *
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
- */
-/*
- *  The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
- *
- *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
- *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
- *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
- *
- *  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
- *  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
- *
- *  [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
-#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#include "psa_util_internal.h"
-#include "md_psa.h"
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-#include "pk_internal.h"
-
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
-#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
-#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
-#include <windows.h>
-#else
-#include <time.h>
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-#include <stdio.h>
-#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#if defined(__MBED__)
-#include <platform/mbed_retarget.h>
-#else
-#include <dirent.h>
-#endif /* __MBED__ */
-#include <errno.h>
-#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
- */
-typedef struct {
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
-    uint32_t flags;
-} x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
-
-/*
- * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
- */
-#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE    (MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2)
-
-/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security
- * concerns. */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default =
-{
-    /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection
-     * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
-    0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg    */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
-    /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection
-     * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) |
-    0,
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-    0,
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-    2048,
-};
-
-/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may
- * be tightened at any time. */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next =
-{
-    /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
-    0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg    */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
-    /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1),
-#else
-    0,
-#endif
-    2048,
-};
-
-/*
- * NSA Suite B Profile
- */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb =
-{
-    /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384),
-    /* Only ECDSA */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY),
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
-    /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
-    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1),
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-    0,
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-    0,
-};
-
-/*
- * Empty / all-forbidden profile
- */
-const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none =
-{
-    0,
-    0,
-    0,
-    (uint32_t) -1,
-};
-
-/*
- * Check md_alg against profile
- * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_md_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
-{
-    if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if ((profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(md_alg)) != 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check pk_alg against profile
- * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                     mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg)
-{
-    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if ((profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(pk_alg)) != 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check key against profile
- * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                  const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
-{
-    const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
-        if (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        return -1;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
-    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ||
-        pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
-        pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) {
-        const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(pk);
-
-        if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        if ((profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(gid)) != 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        return -1;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
- */
-static int x509_memcasecmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned char diff;
-    const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-        diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
-
-        if (diff == 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (diff == 32 &&
-            ((n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z') ||
-             (n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z'))) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
- */
-static int x509_check_wildcard(const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen(cn);
-
-    /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
-    if (name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.') {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i) {
-        if (cn[i] == '.') {
-            cn_idx = i;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (cn_idx == 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
-        x509_memcasecmp(name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
- * variations (but not all).
- *
- * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
- */
-static int x509_string_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b)
-{
-    if (a->tag == b->tag &&
-        a->len == b->len &&
-        memcmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if ((a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) &&
-        (b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) &&
-        a->len == b->len &&
-        x509_memcasecmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
- *
- * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
- * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
- * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
- * or space folding.)
- *
- * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
- */
-static int x509_name_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b)
-{
-    /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
-    while (a != NULL || b != NULL) {
-        if (a == NULL || b == NULL) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        /* type */
-        if (a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
-            a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
-            memcmp(a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len) != 0) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        /* value */
-        if (x509_string_cmp(&a->val, &b->val) != 0) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        /* structure of the list of sets */
-        if (a->next_merged != b->next_merged) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        a = a->next;
-        b = b->next;
-    }
-
-    /* a == NULL == b */
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
- */
-static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++) {
-        ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
-        ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1;
-    }
-
-    ver_chain->len = 0;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-    ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-}
-
-/*
- *  Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }
- */
-static int x509_get_version(unsigned char **p,
-                            const unsigned char *end,
-                            int *ver)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
-                                    0)) != 0) {
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
-            *ver = 0;
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-    }
-
-    end = *p + len;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- *  Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
- *       notBefore      Time,
- *       notAfter       Time }
- */
-static int x509_get_dates(unsigned char **p,
-                          const unsigned char *end,
-                          mbedtls_x509_time *from,
-                          mbedtls_x509_time *to)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret);
-    }
-
-    end = *p + len;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, from)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, to)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed)
- */
-static int x509_get_uid(unsigned char **p,
-                        const unsigned char *end,
-                        mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    if (*p == end) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    uid->tag = **p;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &uid->len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
-                                    n)) != 0) {
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-    }
-
-    uid->p = *p;
-    *p += uid->len;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p,
-                                      const unsigned char *end,
-                                      int *ca_istrue,
-                                      int *max_pathlen)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len;
-
-    /*
-     * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
-     *      cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
-     *      pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
-     */
-    *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
-    *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p == end) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end, ca_istrue)) != 0) {
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
-            ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ca_istrue);
-        }
-
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        if (*ca_istrue != 0) {
-            *ca_istrue = 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (*p == end) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, max_pathlen)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer
-     * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */
-    if (*max_pathlen == INT_MAX) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
-    }
-
-    (*max_pathlen)++;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
- *
- * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- */
-static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
-                                  const unsigned char *end,
-                                  mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
-    if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
- *
- * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
- */
-static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p,
-                                   const unsigned char *end,
-                                   mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len = 0u;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    subject_key_id->len = len;
-    subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-    subject_key_id->p = *p;
-    *p += len;
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
- *        keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
- *        authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
- *        authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
- *
- *    KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
- */
-static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p,
-                                     unsigned char *end,
-                                     mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len = 0u;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p + len != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
-
-    /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */
-    if (ret == 0) {
-        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len;
-        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p;
-        /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04.
-         * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL),
-         * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */
-        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-
-        *p += len;
-    } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p < end) {
-        /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
-                                        1)) != 0) {
-            /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both
-               be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-        /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */
-        ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p,
-                                                    (*p+len),
-                                                    &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len;
-        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p;
-        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER;
-        *p += len;
-    }
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
-               MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 32 }
- *
- * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
- *
- * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
- *
- * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
- *     policyIdentifier   CertPolicyId,
- *     policyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
- *                             PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
- *
- * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
- *
- * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      policyQualifierId  PolicyQualifierId,
- *      qualifier          ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
- *
- * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
- *
- * id-qt          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-pkix 2 }
- * id-qt-cps      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 1 }
- * id-qt-unotice  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 2 }
- *
- * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
- *
- * Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
- *      cPSuri           CPSuri,
- *      userNotice       UserNotice }
- *
- * CPSuri ::= IA5String
- *
- * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      noticeRef        NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
- *      explicitText     DisplayText OPTIONAL }
- *
- * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      organization     DisplayText,
- *      noticeNumbers    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
- *
- * DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
- *      ia5String        IA5String      (SIZE (1..200)),
- *      visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
- *      bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
- *      utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200)) }
- *
- * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point
- * as defined in RFC 5280.
- */
-static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p,
-                                         const unsigned char *end,
-                                         mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies)
-{
-    int ret, parse_ret = 0;
-    size_t len;
-    mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
-    mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
-
-    /* Get main sequence tag */
-    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (*p + len != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Cannot be an empty sequence.
-     */
-    if (len == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    while (*p < end) {
-        mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid;
-        const unsigned char *policy_end;
-
-        /*
-         * Get the policy sequence
-         */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        policy_end = *p + len;
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
-        policy_oid.len = len;
-        policy_oid.p = *p;
-
-        /*
-         * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy.
-         */
-        if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) {
-            /*
-             * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this
-             * extension is critical.
-             */
-            parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-        }
-
-        /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
-        if (cur->buf.p != NULL) {
-            if (cur->next != NULL) {
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
-            }
-
-            cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
-
-            if (cur->next == NULL) {
-                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                         MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED);
-            }
-
-            cur = cur->next;
-        }
-
-        buf = &(cur->buf);
-        buf->tag = policy_oid.tag;
-        buf->p = policy_oid.p;
-        buf->len = policy_oid.len;
-
-        *p += len;
-
-        /*
-         * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end
-         * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end.
-         */
-        if (*p < policy_end) {
-            if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len,
-                                            MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) !=
-                0) {
-                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-            }
-            /*
-             * Skip the optional policy qualifiers.
-             */
-            *p += len;
-        }
-
-        if (*p != policy_end) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
-    cur->next = NULL;
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return parse_ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * X.509 v3 extensions
- *
- */
-static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p,
-                            const unsigned char *end,
-                            mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                            mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
-                            void *p_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len;
-    unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet;
-
-    if (*p == end) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len;
-    while (*p < end) {
-        /*
-         * Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
-         *      extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-         *      critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
-         *      extnValue   OCTET STRING  }
-         */
-        mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL };
-        int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
-        int ext_type = 0;
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        end_ext_data = *p + len;
-
-        /* Get extension ID */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
-        extn_oid.p = *p;
-        *p += extn_oid.len;
-
-        /* Get optional critical */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 &&
-            (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        /* Data should be octet string type */
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
-        }
-
-        start_ext_octet = *p;
-        end_ext_octet = *p + len;
-
-        if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Detect supported extensions
-         */
-        ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type);
-
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */
-            if (cb != NULL) {
-                ret = cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet);
-                if (ret != 0 && is_critical) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                *p = end_ext_octet;
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            /* No parser found, skip extension */
-            *p = end_ext_octet;
-
-            if (is_critical) {
-                /* Data is marked as critical: fail */
-                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                         MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
-            }
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* Forbid repeated extensions */
-        if ((crt->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
-        }
-
-        crt->ext_types |= ext_type;
-
-        switch (ext_type) {
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
-                /* Parse basic constraints */
-                if ((ret = x509_get_basic_constraints(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                      &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:
-                /* Parse key usage */
-                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                      &crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
-                /* Parse extended key usage */
-                if ((ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                  &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER:
-                /* Parse subject key identifier */
-                if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data,
-                                                   &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER:
-                /* Parse authority key identifier */
-                if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                     &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
-                /* Parse subject alt name
-                 * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
-                 */
-                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                             &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
-                /* Parse netscape certificate type */
-                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                         &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES:
-                /* Parse certificate policies type */
-                if ((ret = x509_get_certificate_policies(p, end_ext_octet,
-                                                         &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) {
-                    /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension
-                     * if it contains unsupported policies */
-                    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL &&
-                        cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical,
-                           start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet) == 0) {
-                        break;
-                    }
-
-                    if (is_critical) {
-                        return ret;
-                    } else
-                    /*
-                     * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we
-                     * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to
-                     * the user to choose how to enforce the policies,
-                     * unless the extension is critical.
-                     */
-                    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
-                        return ret;
-                    }
-                }
-                break;
-
-            default:
-                /*
-                 * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer
-                 * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it,
-                 * skip the extension.
-                 */
-                if (is_critical) {
-                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
-                } else {
-                    *p = end_ext_octet;
-                }
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (*p != end) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
- */
-static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                   const unsigned char *buf,
-                                   size_t buflen,
-                                   int make_copy,
-                                   mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
-                                   void *p_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t len;
-    unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;
-    mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
-
-    memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
-    memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
-    memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
-
-    /*
-     * Check for valid input
-     */
-    if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
-    p = (unsigned char *) buf;
-    len = buflen;
-    end = p + len;
-
-    /*
-     * Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
-     *      tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
-     *      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
-     *      signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
-     */
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT;
-    }
-
-    end = crt_end = p + len;
-    crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
-    if (make_copy != 0) {
-        /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
-        crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len);
-        if (crt->raw.p == NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
-        }
-
-        memcpy(crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len);
-        crt->own_buffer = 1;
-
-        p += crt->raw.len - len;
-        end = crt_end = p + len;
-    } else {
-        crt->raw.p = (unsigned char *) buf;
-        crt->own_buffer = 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
-     */
-    crt->tbs.p = p;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-    }
-
-    end = p + len;
-    crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p;
-
-    /*
-     * Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }
-     *
-     * CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER
-     *
-     * signature            AlgorithmIdentifier
-     */
-    if ((ret = x509_get_version(&p, end, &crt->version)) != 0 ||
-        (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(&p, end, &crt->serial)) != 0 ||
-        (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crt->sig_oid,
-                                    &sig_params1)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
-    }
-
-    crt->version++;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1,
-                                        &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk,
-                                        &crt->sig_opts)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * issuer               Name
-     */
-    crt->issuer_raw.p = p;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->issuer)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p;
-
-    /*
-     * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
-     *      notBefore      Time,
-     *      notAfter       Time }
-     *
-     */
-    if ((ret = x509_get_dates(&p, end, &crt->valid_from,
-                              &crt->valid_to)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * subject              Name
-     */
-    crt->subject_raw.p = p;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
-                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (len && (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->subject)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p;
-
-    /*
-     * SubjectPublicKeyInfo
-     */
-    crt->pk_raw.p = p;
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &crt->pk)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-    crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p;
-
-    /*
-     *  issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-     *                       -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
-     *  subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-     *                       -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
-     *  extensions      [3]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
-     *                       -- If present, version shall be v3
-     */
-    if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) {
-        ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->issuer_id,  1);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) {
-        ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->subject_id,  2);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->version == 3) {
-        ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (p != end) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    end = crt_end;
-
-    /*
-     *  }
-     *  -- end of TBSCertificate
-     *
-     *  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
-     *  signatureValue       BIT STRING
-     */
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
-        memcmp(crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len) != 0 ||
-        sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag ||
-        sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
-        (sig_params1.len != 0 &&
-         memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crt->sig)) != 0) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (p != end) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
-                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
- * chained list
- */
-static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                                               const unsigned char *buf,
-                                               size_t buflen,
-                                               int make_copy,
-                                               mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
-                                               void *p_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
-
-    /*
-     * Check for valid input
-     */
-    if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    while (crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL) {
-        prev = crt;
-        crt = crt->next;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed.
-     */
-    if (crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL) {
-        crt->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
-
-        if (crt->next == NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
-        }
-
-        prev = crt;
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_init(crt->next);
-        crt = crt->next;
-    }
-
-    ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core(crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        if (prev) {
-            prev->next = NULL;
-        }
-
-        if (crt != chain) {
-            mbedtls_free(crt);
-        }
-
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                                      const unsigned char *buf,
-                                      size_t buflen)
-{
-    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                                           const unsigned char *buf,
-                                           size_t buflen,
-                                           int make_copy,
-                                           mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
-                                           void *p_ctx)
-{
-    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx);
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                               const unsigned char *buf,
-                               size_t buflen)
-{
-    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
- * list
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                           const unsigned char *buf,
-                           size_t buflen)
-{
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
-    int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
-    int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER;
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Check for valid input
-     */
-    if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or
-     * one or more PEM certificates.
-     */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
-    if (buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' &&
-        strstr((const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") != NULL) {
-        buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM;
-    }
-
-    if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER) {
-        return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen);
-    }
-#else
-    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
-    if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM) {
-        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-        mbedtls_pem_context pem;
-
-        /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
-        while (buflen > 1) {
-            size_t use_len;
-            mbedtls_pem_init(&pem);
-
-            /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */
-            ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
-                                          "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
-                                          "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
-                                          buf, NULL, 0, &use_len);
-
-            if (ret == 0) {
-                /*
-                 * Was PEM encoded
-                 */
-                buflen -= use_len;
-                buf += use_len;
-            } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
-                return ret;
-            } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) {
-                mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
-
-                /*
-                 * PEM header and footer were found
-                 */
-                buflen -= use_len;
-                buf += use_len;
-
-                if (first_error == 0) {
-                    first_error = ret;
-                }
-
-                total_failed++;
-                continue;
-            } else {
-                break;
-            }
-
-            ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen);
-
-            mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
-
-            if (ret != 0) {
-                /*
-                 * Quit parsing on a memory error
-                 */
-                if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) {
-                    return ret;
-                }
-
-                if (first_error == 0) {
-                    first_error = ret;
-                }
-
-                total_failed++;
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            success = 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (success) {
-        return total_failed;
-    } else if (first_error) {
-        return first_error;
-    } else {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
-/*
- * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t n;
-    unsigned char *buf;
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n);
-
-    mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
-    int w_ret;
-    WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH];
-    char filename[MAX_PATH];
-    char *p;
-    size_t len = strlen(path);
-
-    WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
-    HANDLE hFind;
-
-    if (len > MAX_PATH - 3) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    memset(szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir));
-    memset(filename, 0, MAX_PATH);
-    memcpy(filename, path, len);
-    filename[len++] = '\\';
-    p = filename + len;
-    filename[len++] = '*';
-
-    /*
-     * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default
-     * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the
-     * output length is described in WCHARs.
-     */
-    w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir,
-                                MAX_PATH - 3);
-    if (w_ret == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    hFind = FindFirstFileW(szDir, &file_data);
-    if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    len = MAX_PATH - len;
-    do {
-        memset(p, 0, len);
-
-        if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
-                                    -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL);
-        if (w_ret == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, filename);
-        if (w_ret < 0) {
-            ret++;
-        } else {
-            ret += w_ret;
-        }
-    } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &file_data) != 0);
-
-    if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    FindClose(hFind);
-#else /* _WIN32 */
-    int t_ret;
-    int snp_ret;
-    struct stat sb;
-    struct dirent *entry;
-    char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN];
-    DIR *dir = opendir(path);
-
-    if (dir == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex)) != 0) {
-        closedir(dir);
-        return ret;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
-
-    memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
-
-    while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
-        snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof(entry_name),
-                                   "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name);
-
-        if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof(entry_name)) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
-            goto cleanup;
-        } else if (stat(entry_name, &sb) == -1) {
-            if (errno == ENOENT) {
-                /* Broken symbolic link - ignore this entry.
-                    stat(2) will return this error for either (a) a dangling
-                    symlink or (b) a missing file.
-                    Given that we have just obtained the filename from readdir,
-                    assume that it does exist and therefore treat this as a
-                    dangling symlink. */
-                continue;
-            } else {
-                /* Some other file error; report the error. */
-                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-        }
-
-        if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        // Ignore parse errors
-        //
-        t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, entry_name);
-        if (t_ret < 0) {
-            ret++;
-        } else {
-            ret += t_ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    closedir(dir);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
-
-#endif /* _WIN32 */
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
-#define PRINT_ITEM(i)                               \
-    do {                                            \
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep);  \
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;                 \
-        sep = ", ";                                 \
-    } while (0)
-
-#define CERT_TYPE(type, name)          \
-    do {                               \
-        if (ns_cert_type & (type)) {   \
-            PRINT_ITEM(name);          \
-        }                              \
-    } while (0)
-
-#define KEY_USAGE(code, name)      \
-    do {                           \
-        if (key_usage & (code)) {  \
-            PRINT_ITEM(name);      \
-        }                          \
-    } while (0)
-
-static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
-                                   const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    const char *desc;
-    size_t n = *size;
-    char *p = *buf;
-    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage;
-    const char *sep = "";
-
-    while (cur != NULL) {
-        if (mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) {
-            desc = "???";
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        sep = ", ";
-
-        cur = cur->next;
-    }
-
-    *size = n;
-    *buf = p;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int x509_info_cert_policies(char **buf, size_t *size,
-                                   const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    const char *desc;
-    size_t n = *size;
-    char *p = *buf;
-    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
-    const char *sep = "";
-
-    while (cur != NULL) {
-        if (mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) {
-            desc = "???";
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        sep = ", ";
-
-        cur = cur->next;
-    }
-
-    *size = n;
-    *buf = p;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return an informational string about the certificate.
- */
-#define BEFORE_COLON    18
-#define BC              "18"
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
-                          const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t n;
-    char *p;
-    char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];
-
-    p = buf;
-    n = size;
-
-    if (NULL == crt) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n");
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        return (int) (size - n);
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%scert. version     : %d\n",
-                           prefix, crt->version);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sserial number     : ",
-                           prefix);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &crt->serial);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name       : ", prefix);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->issuer);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject name      : ", prefix);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->subject);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissued  on        : " \
-                                 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
-                           crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon,
-                           crt->valid_from.day,  crt->valid_from.hour,
-                           crt->valid_from.min,  crt->valid_from.sec);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sexpires on        : " \
-                                 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
-                           crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon,
-                           crt->valid_to.day,  crt->valid_to.hour,
-                           crt->valid_to.min,  crt->valid_to.sec);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using      : ", prefix);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk,
-                                    crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts);
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    /* Key size */
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON,
-                                            mbedtls_pk_get_name(&crt->pk))) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str,
-                           (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&crt->pk));
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    /*
-     * Optional extensions
-     */
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix,
-                               crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false");
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if (crt->max_pathlen > 0) {
-            ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1);
-            MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name  :", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n,
-                                                      &crt->subject_alt_names,
-                                                      prefix)) != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type        : ", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage         : ", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sext key usage     : ", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if ((ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage(&p, &n,
-                                           &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-        if ((ret = x509_info_cert_policies(&p, &n,
-                                           &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) {
-            return ret;
-        }
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n");
-    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-
-    return (int) (size - n);
-}
-
-struct x509_crt_verify_string {
-    int code;
-    const char *string;
-};
-
-#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info },
-static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = {
-    MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST
-    { 0, NULL }
-};
-#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
-                                 uint32_t flags)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur;
-    char *p = buf;
-    size_t n = size;
-
-    for (cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL; cur++) {
-        if ((flags & cur->code) == 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-        flags ^= cur->code;
-    }
-
-    if (flags != 0) {
-        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sUnknown reason "
-                                     "(this should not happen)\n", prefix);
-        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
-    }
-
-    return (int) (size - n);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                     unsigned int usage)
-{
-    unsigned int usage_must, usage_may;
-    unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY
-                            | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY;
-
-    if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    usage_must = usage & ~may_mask;
-
-    if (((crt->key_usage & ~may_mask) & usage_must) != usage_must) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    usage_may = usage & may_mask;
-
-    if (((crt->key_usage & may_mask) | usage_may) != usage_may) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                              const char *usage_oid,
-                                              size_t usage_len)
-{
-    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;
-
-    /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */
-    if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list
-     */
-    for (cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-        const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf;
-
-        if (cur_oid->len == usage_len &&
-            memcmp(cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
-/*
- * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise.
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl)
-{
-    const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry;
-
-    while (cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0) {
-        if (crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&
-            memcmp(crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len) == 0) {
-            return 1;
-        }
-
-        cur = cur->next;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.
- * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.
- */
-static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
-                              mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list,
-                              const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                              const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
-{
-    int flags = 0;
-    unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm;
-#else
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-    size_t hash_length;
-
-    if (ca == NULL) {
-        return flags;
-    }
-
-    while (crl_list != NULL) {
-        if (crl_list->version == 0 ||
-            x509_name_cmp(&crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject) != 0) {
-            crl_list = crl_list->next;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
-         */
-        if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca,
-                                             MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
-            break;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
-         */
-        if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_md) != 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD;
-        }
-
-        if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_pk) != 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK;
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-        psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md);
-        if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm,
-                             crl_list->tbs.p,
-                             crl_list->tbs.len,
-                             hash,
-                             sizeof(hash),
-                             &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-            /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
-            break;
-        }
-#else
-        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md);
-        hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
-        if (mbedtls_md(md_info,
-                       crl_list->tbs.p,
-                       crl_list->tbs.len,
-                       hash) != 0) {
-            /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
-            break;
-        }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-
-        if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-        }
-
-        if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk,
-                                  crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length,
-                                  crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
-            break;
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
-        /*
-         * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
-         */
-        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED;
-        }
-
-        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE;
-        }
-#else
-        ((void) now);
-#endif
-
-        /*
-         * Check if certificate is revoked
-         */
-        if (mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(crt, crl_list)) {
-            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED;
-            break;
-        }
-
-        crl_list = crl_list->next;
-    }
-
-    return flags;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
-
-/*
- * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
-                                    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
-                                    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
-{
-    size_t hash_len;
-    unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md);
-    hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
-
-    /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
-    if (mbedtls_md(md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-#else
-    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md);
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg,
-                              child->tbs.p,
-                              child->tbs.len,
-                              hash,
-                              sizeof(hash),
-                              &hash_len);
-    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
-    }
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
-    /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
-    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if (rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
-        return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&parent->pk,
-                                             child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
-                                             child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk);
-    }
-#else
-    (void) rs_ctx;
-#endif
-
-    return mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
-                                 child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
-                                 child->sig.p, child->sig.len);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'.
- * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not.
- *
- * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
-                                 const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
-                                 int top)
-{
-    int need_ca_bit;
-
-    /* Parent must be the issuer */
-    if (x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &parent->subject) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */
-    need_ca_bit = 1;
-
-    /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */
-    if (top && parent->version < 3) {
-        need_ca_bit = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (need_ca_bit && !parent->ca_istrue) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (need_ca_bit &&
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL.
- *
- * Here suitable is defined as:
- *  1. subject name matches child's issuer
- *  2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
- *  3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
- *     (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
- *  4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
- *
- * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
- * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is
- * none).
- *
- * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted
- * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods.
- * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.)
- * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is
- * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that
- * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here.
- *
- * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might
- * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the
- * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't
- * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to
- * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].)
- *
- * Arguments:
- *  - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
- *  - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
- *  - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
- *  - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
- *  - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
- *         of the chain, 0 otherwise
- *  - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
- *  - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
- *         (will never be greater than path_cnt)
- *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- *  - 0 on success
- *  - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
- */
-static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
-    int *r_signature_is_good,
-    int top,
-    unsigned path_cnt,
-    unsigned self_cnt,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
-    const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
-    int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    /* did we have something in progress? */
-    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL) {
-        /* restore saved state */
-        parent = rs_ctx->parent;
-        fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;
-        fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;
-
-        /* clear saved state */
-        rs_ctx->parent = NULL;
-        rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
-        rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
-        /* resume where we left */
-        goto check_signature;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    fallback_parent = NULL;
-    fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
-    for (parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next) {
-        /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */
-        if (x509_crt_check_parent(child, parent, top) != 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */
-        if (parent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
-            (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* Signature */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-check_signature:
-#endif
-        ret = x509_crt_check_signature(child, parent, rs_ctx);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-            /* save state */
-            rs_ctx->parent = parent;
-            rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;
-            rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
-
-            return ret;
-        }
-#else
-        (void) ret;
-#endif
-
-        signature_is_good = ret == 0;
-        if (top && !signature_is_good) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
-        /* optional time check */
-        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 ||    /* past */
-            mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) {  /* future */
-            if (fallback_parent == NULL) {
-                fallback_parent = parent;
-                fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
-            }
-
-            continue;
-        }
-#else
-        ((void) now);
-#endif
-
-        *r_parent = parent;
-        *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
-
-        break;
-    }
-
-    if (parent == NULL) {
-        *r_parent = fallback_parent;
-        *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL.
- *
- * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found
- * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable).
- *
- * Arguments:
- *  - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
- *         by a chain of possible intermediates
- *  - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
- *  - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
- *  - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
- *  - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
- *  - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
- *  - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
- *         (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
- *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- *  - 0 on success
- *  - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
- */
-static int x509_crt_find_parent(
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
-    int *parent_is_trusted,
-    int *signature_is_good,
-    unsigned path_cnt,
-    unsigned self_cnt,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
-    const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
-
-    *parent_is_trusted = 1;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
-    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1) {
-        *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;
-        rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    while (1) {
-        search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
-
-        ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list,
-                                      parent, signature_is_good,
-                                      *parent_is_trusted,
-                                      path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-            /* save state */
-            rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;
-            return ret;
-        }
-#else
-        (void) ret;
-#endif
-
-        /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
-        if (*parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0) {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        /* prepare second iteration */
-        *parent_is_trusted = 0;
-    }
-
-    /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
-    if (*parent == NULL) {
-        *parent_is_trusted = 0;
-        *signature_is_good = 0;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted
- *
- * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only
- * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca)
-{
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *cur;
-
-    /* must be self-issued */
-    if (x509_name_cmp(&crt->issuer, &crt->subject) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */
-    for (cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-        if (crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len &&
-            memcmp(crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* too bad */
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Build and verify a certificate chain
- *
- * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and
- * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain
- *      EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj]
- * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one,
- * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible.
- *
- * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found.
- *
- * Special cases:
- * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it
- * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
- *   -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
- *
- * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
- * - trusted EE
- * - EE -> trusted root
- * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root
- * - if relevant: EE untrusted
- * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
- * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
- * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
- * enough (but length 1 is not in general).
- *
- * Arguments:
- *  - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
- *  - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
- *  - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
- *  - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
- *      Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
- *      Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
- *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
- *
- * Return value:
- *  - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
- *  - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined,
- *      even if it was found to be invalid
- */
-static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-    mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
-    void *p_ca_cb,
-    const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
-{
-    /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
-     * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    uint32_t *flags;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
-    int parent_is_trusted;
-    int child_is_trusted;
-    int signature_is_good;
-    unsigned self_cnt;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL;
-    mbedtls_x509_time now;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
-    if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
-    }
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    /* resume if we had an operation in progress */
-    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent) {
-        /* restore saved state */
-        *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */
-        self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;
-
-        /* restore derived state */
-        cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
-        child = cur->crt;
-        flags = &cur->flags;
-
-        goto find_parent;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-    child = crt;
-    self_cnt = 0;
-    parent_is_trusted = 0;
-    child_is_trusted = 0;
-
-    while (1) {
-        /* Add certificate to the verification chain */
-        cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
-        cur->crt = child;
-        cur->flags = 0;
-        ver_chain->len++;
-        flags = &cur->flags;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
-        /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
-        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
-        }
-
-        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
-        }
-#endif
-
-        /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
-        if (child_is_trusted) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
-        if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, child->sig_md) != 0) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
-        }
-
-        if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, child->sig_pk) != 0) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
-        }
-
-        /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
-        if (ver_chain->len == 1 &&
-            x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(child, trust_ca) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-find_parent:
-#endif
-
-        /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback,
-         * or use statically provided list. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-        if (f_ca_cb != NULL) {
-            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
-            mbedtls_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
-            ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-
-            ret = f_ca_cb(p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
-            if (ret != 0) {
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
-            }
-
-            cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result;
-        } else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-        {
-            ((void) f_ca_cb);
-            ((void) p_ca_cb);
-            cur_trust_ca = trust_ca;
-        }
-
-        /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
-        ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent,
-                                   &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
-                                   ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx,
-                                   &now);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-            /* save state */
-            rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;
-            rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
-            rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
-
-            return ret;
-        }
-#else
-        (void) ret;
-#endif
-
-        /* No parent? We're done here */
-        if (parent == NULL) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
-         * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
-         * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
-        if (ver_chain->len != 1 &&
-            x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &child->subject) == 0) {
-            self_cnt++;
-        }
-
-        /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
-         * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
-        if (!parent_is_trusted &&
-            ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) {
-            /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
-        }
-
-        /* signature was checked while searching parent */
-        if (!signature_is_good) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
-        }
-
-        /* check size of signing key */
-        if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &parent->pk) != 0) {
-            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-        }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
-        /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
-        *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now);
-#else
-        (void) ca_crl;
-#endif
-
-        /* prepare for next iteration */
-        child = parent;
-        parent = NULL;
-        child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
-        signature_is_good = 0;
-    }
-}
-
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#ifdef _MSC_VER
-#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib")
-#include <winsock2.h>
-#include <ws2tcpip.h>
-#elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
-#include <winsock2.h>
-#include <ws2tcpip.h>
-#else
-/* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */
-#define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON
-#endif
-#elif defined(__sun)
-/* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */
-#elif defined(__has_include)
-#if __has_include(<sys/socket.h>)
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#endif
-#if __has_include(<arpa/inet.h>)
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#endif
-#endif
-
-/* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use
- * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below).  The local
- * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides
- * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the
- * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries.
- * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link
- * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies.
- * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler
- * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not
- * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above.
- * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names
- * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */
-#if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names
-/* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */
-static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst);
-
-#define li_cton(c, n) \
-    (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0))
-
-static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst)
-{
-    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src;
-    int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1;
-    uint16_t addr[8];
-    do {
-        /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */
-        uint16_t group = num_digits = 0;
-        for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) {
-            if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) {
-                break;
-            }
-            group = (group << 4) | digit;
-            p++;
-        }
-        if (num_digits != 0) {
-            MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups);
-            nonzero_groups++;
-            if (*p == '\0') {
-                break;
-            } else if (*p == '.') {
-                /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */
-                if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) ||
-                    nonzero_groups >= 7) {
-                    break;
-                }
-
-                /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */
-                int steps = 4;
-                do {
-                    p--;
-                    steps--;
-                } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0);
-
-                if (*p != ':') {
-                    break;
-                }
-                p++;
-                nonzero_groups--;
-                if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p,
-                                        addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) {
-                    break;
-                }
-
-                nonzero_groups += 2;
-                p = (const unsigned char *) "";
-                break;
-            } else if (*p != ':') {
-                return -1;
-            }
-        } else {
-            /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */
-            if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') {
-                return -1;
-            }
-            zero_group_start = nonzero_groups;
-
-            /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */
-            if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') {
-                return -1;
-            }
-
-            if (p[1] == '\0') {
-                ++p;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        ++p;
-    } while (nonzero_groups < 8);
-
-    if (*p != '\0') {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (zero_group_start != -1) {
-        if (nonzero_groups > 6) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-        int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups;
-        int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start;
-
-        /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */
-        if (groups_after_zero) {
-            memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups,
-                    addr + zero_group_start,
-                    groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr));
-        }
-        memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr));
-    } else {
-        if (nonzero_groups != 8) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-    }
-    memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr));
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst)
-{
-    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src;
-    uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst;
-    uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0;
-    uint8_t num_octets = 0;
-    uint16_t octet;
-
-    do {
-        octet = num_digits = 0;
-        do {
-            digit = *p - '0';
-            if (digit > 9) {
-                break;
-            }
-
-            /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format,
-             * which this implementation does not support. */
-            if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) {
-                return -1;
-            }
-
-            octet = octet * 10 + digit;
-            num_digits++;
-            p++;
-        } while (num_digits < 3);
-
-        if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) {
-            return -1;
-        }
-        *res++ = (uint8_t) octet;
-        num_octets++;
-    } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.');
-    return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-#else
-
-static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst)
-{
-    return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst)
-{
-    return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-#endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names
-
-size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst)
-{
-    return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL
-            ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0
-            : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for CN match
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name,
-                             const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
-{
-    /* try exact match */
-    if (name->len == cn_len &&
-        x509_memcasecmp(cn, name->p, cn_len) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* try wildcard match */
-    if (x509_check_wildcard(cn, name) == 0) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
-                                 const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
-{
-    uint32_t ip[4];
-    cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip);
-    if (cn_len == 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-        const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag &
-                                       MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK;
-        if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS &&
-            cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
-                                  const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
-{
-    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-        const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag &
-                                       MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK;
-        if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER &&
-            cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6
- */
-static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
-                              const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
-{
-    int san_ip = 0;
-    int san_uri = 0;
-    /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */
-    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-        switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) {
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
-                if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-                    return 0;
-                }
-                break;
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS:
-                san_ip = 1;
-                break;
-            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER:
-                san_uri = 1;
-                break;
-            /* (We may handle other types here later.) */
-            default: /* Unrecognized type */
-                break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (san_ip) {
-        if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    if (san_uri) {
-        if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL!
- */
-static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                 const char *cn,
-                                 uint32_t *flags)
-{
-    const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
-    size_t cn_len = strlen(cn);
-
-    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) {
-        if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-            return;
-        }
-    } else {
-        for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) {
-            if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 &&
-                x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
-                return;
-            }
-        }
-
-    }
-
-    *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
-}
-
-/*
- * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback
- */
-static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
-    uint32_t *flags,
-    const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
-    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
-    void *p_vrfy)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned i;
-    uint32_t cur_flags;
-    const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
-
-    for (i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i) {
-        cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];
-        cur_flags = cur->flags;
-
-        if (NULL != f_vrfy) {
-            if ((ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags)) != 0) {
-                return ret;
-            }
-        }
-
-        *flags |= cur_flags;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
- *
- * This function:
- *  - checks the requested CN (if any)
- *  - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
- *    as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
- *  - builds and verifies the chain
- *  - then calls the callback and merges the flags
- *
- * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb`
- * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the
- * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will
- * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list
- * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list
- * of CRLs.
- */
-static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                             mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-                                             mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
-                                             mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
-                                             void *p_ca_cb,
-                                             const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                             const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
-                                             int (*f_vrfy)(void *,
-                                                           mbedtls_x509_crt *,
-                                                           int,
-                                                           uint32_t *),
-                                             void *p_vrfy,
-                                             mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
-    uint32_t ee_flags;
-
-    *flags = 0;
-    ee_flags = 0;
-    x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ver_chain);
-
-    if (profile == NULL) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    /* check name if requested */
-    if (cn != NULL) {
-        x509_crt_verify_name(crt, cn, &ee_flags);
-    }
-
-    /* Check the type and size of the key */
-    pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(&crt->pk);
-
-    if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, pk_type) != 0) {
-        ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
-    }
-
-    if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &crt->pk) != 0) {
-        ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-    }
-
-    /* Check the chain */
-    ret = x509_crt_verify_chain(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
-                                f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile,
-                                &ver_chain, rs_ctx);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    /* Merge end-entity flags */
-    ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;
-
-    /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
-    ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
-
-exit:
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result);
-    mbedtls_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result);
-    ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-    if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(rs_ctx);
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
-     * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
-     * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
-    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        *flags = (uint32_t) -1;
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (*flags != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                            mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-                            mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
-                            const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
-                            int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
-                            void *p_vrfy)
-{
-    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
-                                             NULL, NULL,
-                                             &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default,
-                                             cn, flags,
-                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                         mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-                                         mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
-                                         const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                         const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
-                                         int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
-                                         void *p_vrfy)
-{
-    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
-                                             NULL, NULL,
-                                             profile, cn, flags,
-                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-/*
- * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback,
- *                                  not restartable).
- */
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                       mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
-                                       void *p_ca_cb,
-                                       const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                       const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
-                                       int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
-                                       void *p_vrfy)
-{
-    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, NULL, NULL,
-                                             f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb,
-                                             profile, cn, flags,
-                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-
-int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
-                                        mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
-                                        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
-                                        const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
-                                        const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
-                                        int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
-                                        void *p_vrfy,
-                                        mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
-{
-    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
-                                             NULL, NULL,
-                                             profile, cn, flags,
-                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Initialize a certificate chain
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
-{
-    memset(crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
-}
-
-/*
- * Unallocate all certificate data
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
-{
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt;
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv;
-
-    while (cert_cur != NULL) {
-        mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
-        mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts);
-#endif
-
-        mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next);
-        mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next);
-        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next);
-        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next);
-        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next);
-        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next);
-
-        if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) {
-            mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len);
-        }
-
-        cert_prv = cert_cur;
-        cert_cur = cert_cur->next;
-
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
-        if (cert_prv != crt) {
-            mbedtls_free(cert_prv);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
-/*
- * Initialize a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    mbedtls_pk_restart_init(&ctx->pk);
-
-    ctx->parent = NULL;
-    ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
-    ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
-
-    ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
-
-    ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;
-    ctx->self_cnt = 0;
-    x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ctx->ver_chain);
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of a restart context
- */
-void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    if (ctx == NULL) {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_pk_restart_free(&ctx->pk);
-    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(ctx);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */