edhoc 1.4.0 → 2.0.0

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/rsa.c

@@ -1,2640 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  The RSA public-key cryptosystem
- *
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
- */
-
-/*
- *  The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
- *  of the RSA algorithm:
- *
- *  [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
- *      R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman
- *      http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78
- *
- *  [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8
- *      Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
- *
- *  [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
- *      Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and
- *      Stefan Mangard
- *      https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2
- *
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
-#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
-#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
-#include "mbedtls/error.h"
-#include "constant_time_internal.h"
-#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
-#include "md_psa.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
-
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
-
-/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
- *  operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding).
- *
- * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value
- *       (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen
- *       in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
- *       is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which
- *       one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants.
- *
- * \param input          The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5
- *                       encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM"
- *                       by the terminology.
- * \param ilen           The length of the payload in the \p input buffer.
- * \param output         The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the
- *                       PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of
- *                       length \p output_max_len bytes.
- * \param olen           The address at which to store the length of
- *                       the payload. This must not be \c NULL.
- * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output.
- *
- * \return      \c 0 on success.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE
- *              The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload.
- * \return      #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
- *              The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding.
- */
-static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
-                                                size_t ilen,
-                                                unsigned char *output,
-                                                size_t output_max_len,
-                                                size_t *olen)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
-
-    /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
-     * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
-     * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
-     * this would open the execution of the function to
-     * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
-     * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
-     * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
-     * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
-     * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
-     * branch predictor). */
-    size_t pad_count = 0;
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad;
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done;
-    size_t plaintext_size = 0;
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large;
-
-    plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11
-                                                        : output_max_len;
-
-    /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
-     * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]);
-
-
-    /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
-     * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT));
-
-    /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
-     * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
-    pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
-    for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) {
-        mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0);
-        pad_done   = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found);
-        pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1);
-    }
-
-    /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done));
-
-    /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count));
-
-    /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
-     * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
-     * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
-     * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
-     * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
-     * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
-     * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
-        bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-        (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
-
-    /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
-     * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
-    output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size,
-                                          plaintext_max_size);
-
-    /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
-     * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
-     * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
-     *   plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
-     * - 0 if the padding is correct. */
-    ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(
-        bad,
-        MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
-        mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE)
-        );
-
-    /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
-     * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
-     * We need to copy the same amount of data
-     * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
-     * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
-     * through memory or cache access patterns. */
-    mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11);
-
-    /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
-     * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
-     * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
-     * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
-    plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
-                                        (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
-                                        (unsigned) plaintext_size);
-
-    /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
-     * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
-     * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
-     * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
-     * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
-     * information. */
-    mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
-                            plaintext_max_size,
-                            plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size);
-
-    /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output
-     * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer
-     * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined
-     * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the
-     * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext
-     * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
-     * secrets. */
-    if (output_max_len != 0) {
-        memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size);
-    }
-
-    /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
-     * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
-     * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
-     * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
-    *olen = plaintext_size;
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                       const mbedtls_mpi *N,
-                       const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                       const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) ||
-        (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) ||
-        (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->Q, Q)) != 0) ||
-        (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->D, D)) != 0) ||
-        (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->E, E)) != 0)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-    }
-
-    if (N != NULL) {
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                           unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len,
-                           unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len,
-                           unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len,
-                           unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len,
-                           unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    if (N != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
-    }
-
-    if (P != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
-    }
-
-    if (Q != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
-    }
-
-    if (D != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
-    }
-
-    if (E != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way
- * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error.
- * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters.
- */
-static int rsa_check_context(mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv,
-                             int blinding_needed)
-{
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether
-     * P,Q need to be present or not. */
-    ((void) blinding_needed);
-#endif
-
-    if (ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N) ||
-        ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli.
-     */
-
-    /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for
-     * RSA public key operations. */
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->N, 0) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only
-     * used for private key operations and if CRT
-     * is used. */
-    if (is_priv &&
-        (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
-         mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->P, 0) == 0 ||
-         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0 ||
-         mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->Q, 0) == 0)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /*
-     * 2. Exponents must be positive
-     */
-
-    /* Always need E for public key operations */
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) <= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ
-     * as (unblinded) exponents. */
-    if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) <= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-#else
-    if (is_priv &&
-        (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) <= 0 ||
-         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) <= 0)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either,
-     * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been
-     * done as part of 1. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if (is_priv && blinding_needed &&
-        (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 ||
-         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied,
-     * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if (is_priv &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) <= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E;
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP;
-#endif
-    int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv;
-
-    have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0);
-    have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0);
-    have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0);
-    have_D = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0);
-    have_E = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0);
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    have_DP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) != 0);
-    have_DQ = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) != 0);
-    have_QP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) != 0);
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Check whether provided parameters are enough
-     * to deduce all others. The following incomplete
-     * parameter sets for private keys are supported:
-     *
-     * (1) P, Q missing.
-     * (2) D and potentially N missing.
-     *
-     */
-
-    n_missing  =              have_P &&  have_Q &&  have_D && have_E;
-    pq_missing =   have_N && !have_P && !have_Q &&  have_D && have_E;
-    d_missing  =              have_P &&  have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
-    is_pub     =   have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E;
-
-    /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */
-    is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing;
-
-    if (!is_priv && !is_pub) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided.
-     */
-
-    if (!have_N && have_P && have_Q) {
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P,
-                                       &ctx->Q)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-        }
-
-        ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters.
-     */
-
-    if (pq_missing) {
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(&ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D,
-                                        &ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-        }
-
-    } else if (d_missing) {
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(&ctx->P,
-                                                       &ctx->Q,
-                                                       &ctx->E,
-                                                       &ctx->D)) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific
-     *         to our current RSA implementation.
-     */
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    if (is_priv && !(have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP)) {
-        ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P,  &ctx->Q,  &ctx->D,
-                                     &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP);
-        if (ret != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-        }
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /*
-     * Step 3: Basic sanity checks
-     */
-
-    return rsa_check_context(ctx, is_priv, 1);
-}
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                           unsigned char *N, size_t N_len,
-                           unsigned char *P, size_t P_len,
-                           unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len,
-                           unsigned char *D, size_t D_len,
-                           unsigned char *E, size_t E_len)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    int is_priv;
-
-    /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
-
-    if (!is_priv) {
-        /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
-         * something must be wrong. */
-        if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-    }
-
-    if (N != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len));
-    }
-
-    if (P != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len));
-    }
-
-    if (Q != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len));
-    }
-
-    if (D != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len));
-    }
-
-    if (E != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len));
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                       mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                       mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    int is_priv;
-
-    /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
-
-    if (!is_priv) {
-        /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key,
-         * something must be wrong. */
-        if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-    }
-
-    /* Export all requested core parameters. */
-
-    if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(N, &ctx->N)) != 0) ||
-        (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(P, &ctx->P)) != 0) ||
-        (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &ctx->Q)) != 0) ||
-        (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(D, &ctx->D)) != 0) ||
-        (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(E, &ctx->E)) != 0)) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Export CRT parameters
- * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to
- * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt
- * can be used in this case.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                           mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    int is_priv;
-
-    /* Check if key is private or public */
-    is_priv =
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 &&
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0;
-
-    if (!is_priv) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */
-    if ((DP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DP, &ctx->DP)) != 0) ||
-        (DQ != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DQ, &ctx->DQ)) != 0) ||
-        (QP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(QP, &ctx->QP)) != 0)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-    }
-#else
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                      DP, DQ, QP)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret);
-    }
-#endif
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize an RSA context
- */
-void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
-
-    ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15;
-    ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been
-     * initialized and will need to be freed. */
-    ctx->ver = 1;
-    mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Set padding for an existing RSA context
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
-                            mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id)
-{
-    switch (padding) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            break;
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            break;
-#endif
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-    if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) &&
-        (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) {
-        /* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */
-        if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-        }
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-    ctx->padding = padding;
-    ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get padding mode of initialized RSA context
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->padding;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->hash_id;
-}
-
-/*
- * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus
- */
-size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->len;
-}
-
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
-
-/*
- * Generate an RSA keypair
- *
- * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of
- * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                        void *p_rng,
-                        unsigned int nbits, int exponent)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
-    int prime_quality = 0;
-
-    /*
-     * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
-     * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
-     * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
-     */
-    if (nbits > 1024) {
-        prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&H);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
-
-    if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
-     * 1.  |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 )
-     * 2.  GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
-     * 3.  E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 )
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent));
-
-    do {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
-                                              prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
-
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
-                                              prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng));
-
-        /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&H) <= ((nbits >= 200) ? ((nbits >> 1) - 99) : 0)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */
-        if (H.s < 0) {
-            mbedtls_mpi_swap(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q);
-        }
-
-        /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
-
-        /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L, NULL, &H, &G));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L));
-
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->D) <= ((nbits + 1) / 2)) {      // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a))
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        break;
-    } while (1);
-
-    /* Restore P,Q */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->P,  &ctx->P, 1));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->Q,  &ctx->Q, 1));
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q));
-
-    ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N);
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /*
-     * DP = D mod (P - 1)
-     * DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
-     * QP = Q^-1 mod P
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                           &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP));
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /* Double-check */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(ctx));
-
-cleanup:
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&H);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx);
-
-        if ((-ret & ~0x7f) == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret);
-        }
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
-
-/*
- * Check a public RSA key
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->E, 0) == 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E)     < 2  ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 ||
-        rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q,
-                                    &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    else if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D,
-                                      &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
-                               const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv)
-{
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub)  != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA public key operation
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                       const unsigned char *input,
-                       unsigned char *output)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t olen;
-    mbedtls_mpi T;
-
-    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    olen = ctx->len;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
-
-cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
- *  KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
- *  DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
- *  Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
- */
-static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
-{
-    int ret, count = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi R;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
-
-    if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) {
-        /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N));
-
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
-    do {
-        if (count++ > 10) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
-
-        /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
-
-        /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R
-         * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know
-         * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them.
-         * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */
-        ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N);
-        if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-    } while (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE);
-
-    /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N));
-
-    /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N
-     * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
-
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple
- * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there,
- * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
- *
- * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
- * observations on average.
- *
- * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
- * to make 2^112 observations on average.
- *
- * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
- * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.
- * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by
- * side-channel attacks like the one in [3])
- *
- * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a
- * single trace.
- */
-#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA private key operation
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                        void *p_rng,
-                        const unsigned char *input,
-                        unsigned char *output)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t olen;
-
-    /* Temporary holding the result */
-    mbedtls_mpi T;
-
-    /* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the
-     * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */
-    mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R;
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */
-    mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ;
-
-    /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for
-     * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */
-    mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind;
-
-    /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded
-     * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
-    mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP;
-    mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ;
-#else
-    /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */
-    mbedtls_mpi D_blind;
-
-    /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded
-     * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */
-    mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double
-     * checked result; should be the same in the end. */
-    mbedtls_mpi I, C;
-
-    if (f_rng == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */,
-                          1 /* blinding on        */) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /* MPI Initialization */
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind);
-#else
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind);
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ);
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&I);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&C);
-
-    /* End of MPI initialization */
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len));
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T));
-
-    /*
-     * Blinding
-     * T = T * Vi mod N
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
-
-    /*
-     * Exponent blinding
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1));
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    /*
-     * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                                            f_rng, p_rng));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D));
-
-    D = &D_blind;
-#else
-    /*
-     * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                                            f_rng, p_rng));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind,
-                                        &ctx->DP));
-
-    DP = &DP_blind;
-
-    /*
-     * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING,
-                                            f_rng, p_rng));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind,
-                                        &ctx->DQ));
-
-    DQ = &DQ_blind;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
-#else
-    /*
-     * Faster decryption using the CRT
-     *
-     * TP = input ^ dP mod P
-     * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q
-     */
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ));
-
-    /*
-     * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &TP, &TQ));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->QP));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &TP, &ctx->P));
-
-    /*
-     * T = TQ + T * Q
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->Q));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP));
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-    /*
-     * Unblind
-     * T = T * Vf mod N
-     */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N));
-
-    /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E,
-                                        &ctx->N, &ctx->RN));
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    olen = ctx->len;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen));
-
-cleanup:
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind);
-#else
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind);
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ);
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&C);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&I);
-
-    if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret);
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-/**
- * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
- *
- * \param dst       buffer to mask
- * \param dlen      length of destination buffer
- * \param src       source of the mask generation
- * \param slen      length of the source buffer
- * \param md_alg    message digest to use
- */
-static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
-                    size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
-{
-    unsigned char counter[4];
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned int hlen;
-    size_t i, use_len;
-    unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-    int ret = 0;
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-    mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
-
-    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
-    if (md_info == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
-
-    memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
-    memset(counter, 0, 4);
-
-    /* Generate and apply dbMask */
-    p = dst;
-
-    while (dlen > 0) {
-        use_len = hlen;
-        if (dlen < hlen) {
-            use_len = dlen;
-        }
-
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) {
-            goto exit;
-        }
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) {
-            goto exit;
-        }
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) {
-            goto exit;
-        }
-        if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) {
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i) {
-            *p++ ^= mask[i];
-        }
-
-        counter[3]++;
-
-        dlen -= use_len;
-    }
-
-exit:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask));
-    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6.
- *
- * \param hash      the input hash
- * \param hlen      length of the input hash
- * \param salt      the input salt
- * \param slen      length of the input salt
- * \param out       the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg
- * \param md_alg    message digest to use
- */
-static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
-                       const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
-                       unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
-{
-    const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
-
-    mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
-    if (md_info == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) {
-        goto exit;
-    }
-
-exit:
-    mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compute a hash.
- *
- * \param md_alg    algorithm to use
- * \param input     input message to hash
- * \param ilen      input length
- * \param output    the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg
- */
-static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                        const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
-                        unsigned char *output)
-{
-    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
-
-    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
-    if (md_info == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                   int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                   void *p_rng,
-                                   const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
-                                   size_t ilen,
-                                   const unsigned char *input,
-                                   unsigned char *output)
-{
-    size_t olen;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char *p = output;
-    unsigned int hlen;
-
-    if (f_rng == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
-    if (hlen == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    olen = ctx->len;
-
-    /* first comparison checks for overflow */
-    if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    memset(output, 0, olen);
-
-    *p++ = 0;
-
-    /* Generate a random octet string seed */
-    if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
-    }
-
-    p += hlen;
-
-    /* Construct DB */
-    ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-    p += hlen;
-    p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
-    *p++ = 1;
-    if (ilen != 0) {
-        memcpy(p, input, ilen);
-    }
-
-    /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
-    if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
-                        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */
-    if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
-                        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                        void *p_rng, size_t ilen,
-                                        const unsigned char *input,
-                                        unsigned char *output)
-{
-    size_t nb_pad, olen;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char *p = output;
-
-    olen = ctx->len;
-
-    /* first comparison checks for overflow */
-    if (ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
-
-    *p++ = 0;
-
-    if (f_rng == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
-
-    while (nb_pad-- > 0) {
-        int rng_dl = 100;
-
-        do {
-            ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1);
-        } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0);
-
-        /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */
-        if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
-        }
-
-        p++;
-    }
-
-    *p++ = 0;
-    if (ilen != 0) {
-        memcpy(p, input, ilen);
-    }
-
-    return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
-/*
- * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                              int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                              void *p_rng,
-                              size_t ilen,
-                              const unsigned char *input,
-                              unsigned char *output)
-{
-    switch (ctx->padding) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
-                                                       ilen, input, output);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
-                                                  ilen, input, output);
-#endif
-
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                   int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                   void *p_rng,
-                                   const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
-                                   size_t *olen,
-                                   const unsigned char *input,
-                                   unsigned char *output,
-                                   size_t output_max_len)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
-    unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-    unsigned int hlen;
-
-    /*
-     * Parameters sanity checks
-     */
-    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    ilen = ctx->len;
-
-    if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
-    if (hlen == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    // checking for integer underflow
-    if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * RSA operation
-     */
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Unmask data and generate lHash
-     */
-    /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
-    if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
-                        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 ||
-        /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
-        (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
-                        (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /* Generate lHash */
-    ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id,
-                       label, label_len, lhash);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check contents, in "constant-time"
-     */
-    p = buf;
-
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */
-
-    p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
-
-    /* Check lHash */
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen)));
-    p += hlen;
-
-    /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
-     * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
-    pad_len = 0;
-    in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
-    for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) {
-        in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0));
-        pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1);
-    }
-
-    p += pad_len;
-    bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01));
-
-    /*
-     * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
-     * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
-     * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
-     * the different error conditions.
-     */
-    if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
-    if (*olen != 0) {
-        memcpy(output, p, *olen);
-    }
-    ret = 0;
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(lhash, sizeof(lhash));
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                        void *p_rng,
-                                        size_t *olen,
-                                        const unsigned char *input,
-                                        unsigned char *output,
-                                        size_t output_max_len)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t ilen;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
-
-    ilen = ctx->len;
-
-    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen,
-                                               output, output_max_len, olen);
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                              int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                              void *p_rng,
-                              size_t *olen,
-                              const unsigned char *input,
-                              unsigned char *output,
-                              size_t output_max_len)
-{
-    switch (ctx->padding) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen,
-                                                       input, output, output_max_len);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0,
-                                                  olen, input, output,
-                                                  output_max_len);
-#endif
-
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                               int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                               void *p_rng,
-                               mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                               unsigned int hashlen,
-                               const unsigned char *hash,
-                               int saltlen,
-                               unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    size_t olen;
-    unsigned char *p = sig;
-    unsigned char *salt = NULL;
-    size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t msb;
-
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (f_rng == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    olen = ctx->len;
-
-    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
-        /* Gather length of hash to sign */
-        size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
-        if (exp_hashlen == 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-    }
-
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
-    if (hlen == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) {
-        /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
-         * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length
-         * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not
-         * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
-         * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
-         * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
-         * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
-        min_slen = hlen - 2;
-        if (olen < hlen + min_slen + 2) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        } else if (olen >= hlen + hlen + 2) {
-            slen = hlen;
-        } else {
-            slen = olen - hlen - 2;
-        }
-    } else if ((saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    } else {
-        slen = (size_t) saltlen;
-    }
-
-    memset(sig, 0, olen);
-
-    /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
-    p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
-    *p++ = 0x01;
-
-    /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */
-    salt = p;
-    if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret);
-    }
-
-    p += slen;
-
-    /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */
-    ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
-    if (msb % 8 == 0) {
-        offset = 1;
-    }
-
-    /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */
-    ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen,
-                   (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
-    sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb);
-
-    p += hlen;
-    *p++ = 0xBC;
-
-    return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig);
-}
-
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with
- * the option to pass in the salt length.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                    int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                    void *p_rng,
-                                    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                    unsigned int hashlen,
-                                    const unsigned char *hash,
-                                    int saltlen,
-                                    unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                               hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                void *p_rng,
-                                mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                unsigned int hashlen,
-                                const unsigned char *hash,
-                                unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                               hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig);
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
- */
-
-/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message
- *
- * This is used both for signature generation and verification.
- *
- * Parameters:
- * - md_alg:  Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash;
- *            MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed.
- * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE.
- * - hash:    Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data.
- * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message.
- * - dst:     Buffer to hold the encoded message.
- *
- * Assumptions:
- * - hash has size hashlen.
- * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len.
- *
- */
-static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                       unsigned int hashlen,
-                                       const unsigned char *hash,
-                                       size_t dst_len,
-                                       unsigned char *dst)
-{
-    size_t oid_size  = 0;
-    size_t nb_pad    = dst_len;
-    unsigned char *p = dst;
-    const char *oid  = NULL;
-
-    /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */
-    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
-        unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
-        if (md_size == 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        if (hashlen != md_size) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a
-         * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */
-        if (8 + hashlen + oid_size  >= 0x80         ||
-            10 + hashlen            <  hashlen      ||
-            10 + hashlen + oid_size <  10 + hashlen) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Static bounds check:
-         * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs.
-         *   (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of
-         *    Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification)
-         * - Need hashlen bytes for hash
-         * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID.
-         */
-        if (nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-        nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size;
-    } else {
-        if (nb_pad < hashlen) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        nb_pad -= hashlen;
-    }
-
-    /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes),
-     * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */
-    if (nb_pad < 3 + 8) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-    nb_pad -= 3;
-
-    /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled
-     * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */
-
-    /* Write signature header and padding */
-    *p++ = 0;
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
-    memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad);
-    p += nb_pad;
-    *p++ = 0;
-
-    /* Are we signing raw data? */
-    if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
-        memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure
-     *
-     * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
-     *   digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
-     *   digest Digest }
-     * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-     * Digest ::= OCTET STRING
-     *
-     * Schematic:
-     * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID  + LEN [ OID  ]
-     *                                 TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ]
-     *                 TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ]
-     */
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x08 + oid_size + hashlen);
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x04 + oid_size);
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size;
-    memcpy(p, oid, oid_size);
-    p += oid_size;
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL;
-    *p++ = 0x00;
-    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
-    *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen;
-    memcpy(p, hash, hashlen);
-    p += hashlen;
-
-    /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic
-     * after the initial bounds check. */
-    if (p != dst + dst_len) {
-        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dst, dst_len);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                      void *p_rng,
-                                      mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                      unsigned int hashlen,
-                                      const unsigned char *hash,
-                                      unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
-
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier)
-     */
-
-    if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash,
-                                           ctx->len, sig)) != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    /* Private key operation
-     *
-     * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
-     * temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
-     */
-
-    sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
-    if (sig_try == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len);
-    if (verif == NULL) {
-        mbedtls_free(sig_try);
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif));
-
-    if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len);
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len);
-    mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        memset(sig, '!', ctx->len);
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                           int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                           void *p_rng,
-                           mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                           unsigned int hashlen,
-                           const unsigned char *hash,
-                           unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    switch (ctx->padding) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng,
-                                                     md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
-                                               hashlen, hash, sig);
-#endif
-
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-}
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                      mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                      unsigned int hashlen,
-                                      const unsigned char *hash,
-                                      mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
-                                      int expected_salt_len,
-                                      const unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    size_t siglen;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *hash_start;
-    unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
-    unsigned int hlen;
-    size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
-    unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 };
-
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    siglen = ctx->len;
-
-    if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    p = buf;
-
-    if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-
-    if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
-        /* Gather length of hash to sign */
-        size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
-        if (exp_hashlen == 0) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-
-        if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) {
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        }
-    }
-
-    hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id);
-    if (hlen == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
-     */
-    msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1;
-
-    if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb)) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
-    if (msb % 8 == 0) {
-        p++;
-        siglen -= 1;
-    }
-
-    if (siglen < hlen + 2) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-    hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1;
-
-    ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb);
-
-    while (p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0) {
-        p++;
-    }
-
-    if (*p++ != 0x01) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-
-    observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
-
-    if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
-        observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Generate H = Hash( M' )
-     */
-    ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len,
-                      result, mgf1_hash_id);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                  mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                  unsigned int hashlen,
-                                  const unsigned char *hash,
-                                  const unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)
-                             ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
-                             : md_alg;
-
-    return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx,
-                                             md_alg, hashlen, hash,
-                                             mgf1_hash_id,
-                                             MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
-                                             sig);
-
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-/*
- * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                                        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                                        unsigned int hashlen,
-                                        const unsigned char *hash,
-                                        const unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    size_t sig_len;
-    unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL;
-
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    sig_len = ctx->len;
-
-    /*
-     * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash.
-     */
-
-    if ((encoded          = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL ||
-        (encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len,
-                                           encoded_expected)) != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash.
-     */
-
-    ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Compare
-     */
-
-    if ((ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected,
-                                 sig_len)) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-
-    if (encoded != NULL) {
-        mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len);
-    }
-
-    if (encoded_expected != NULL) {
-        mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len);
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
-/*
- * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
-                             mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
-                             unsigned int hashlen,
-                             const unsigned char *hash,
-                             const unsigned char *sig)
-{
-    if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    switch (ctx->padding) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg,
-                                                       hashlen, hash, sig);
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
-        case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21:
-            return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg,
-                                                 hashlen, hash, sig);
-#endif
-
-        default:
-            return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * Copy the components of an RSA key
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src)
-{
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-
-    dst->len = src->len;
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E));
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q));
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ));
-#endif
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN));
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf));
-
-    dst->padding = src->padding;
-    dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
-
-cleanup:
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        mbedtls_rsa_free(dst);
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free the components of an RSA key
- */
-void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx)
-{
-    if (ctx == NULL) {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N);
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
-    /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */
-    if (ctx->ver != 0) {
-        mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
-        ctx->ver = 0;
-    }
-#endif
-}
-
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
-
-#include "mbedtls/md.h"
-
-/*
- * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
- */
-#define KEY_LEN 128
-
-#define RSA_N   "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
-                "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
-                "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
-                "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
-                "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
-                "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
-                "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
-                "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
-
-#define RSA_E   "10001"
-
-#define RSA_D   "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
-                "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
-                "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
-                "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
-                "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
-                "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
-                "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
-                "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
-
-#define RSA_P   "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
-                "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
-                "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
-                "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
-
-#define RSA_Q   "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
-                "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
-                "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
-                "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
-
-#define PT_LEN  24
-#define RSA_PT  "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
-                "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
-{
-#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__)
-    size_t i;
-
-    if (rng_state != NULL) {
-        rng_state  = NULL;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
-        output[i] = rand();
-    }
-#else
-    if (rng_state != NULL) {
-        rng_state = NULL;
-    }
-
-    arc4random_buf(output, len);
-#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */
-
-    return 0;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-
-/*
- * Checkup routine
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
-    size_t len;
-    mbedtls_rsa_context rsa;
-    unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
-    unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
-    unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
-    unsigned char sha1sum[20];
-#endif
-
-    mbedtls_mpi K;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-    mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa);
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_P));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_Q));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_D));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_E));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K));
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa));
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("  RSA key validation: ");
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 ||
-        mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 encryption : ");
-    }
-
-    memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN);
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                                  PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext,
-                                  rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 decryption : ");
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                                  &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
-                                  sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("  PKCS#1 data sign  : ");
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1),
-                   rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL,
-                               MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
-                               sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("passed\n  PKCS#1 sig. verify: ");
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20,
-                                 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) {
-        if (verbose != 0) {
-            mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
-
-    if (verbose != 0) {
-        mbedtls_printf("\n");
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-    mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-    ((void) verbose);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
-    return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */