edhoc 1.0.1 → 1.0.3

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3607 @@
+/*
+ *  TLS client-side functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "ssl_client.h"
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+    return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
+                                 ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
+                                 psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                       unsigned char *buf,
+                                       const unsigned char *end,
+                                       size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
+     * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
+     * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding renegotiation extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len);
+
+    /*
+     * Secure renegotiation
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len + 1);
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len);
+
+    memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
+
+    *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                 unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 const unsigned char *end,
+                                                 size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension"));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 2;
+
+    *p++ = 1;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+    *olen = 6;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      unsigned char *buf,
+                                      const unsigned char *end,
+                                      size_t *olen)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t kkpp_len = 0;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+#else
+    if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /*
+     * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
+     * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
+     * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
+     */
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
+        ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("generating new ecjpake parameters"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                              p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+                                              MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+            psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                              p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
+                                              ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                                  "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+        ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc(1, kkpp_len);
+        if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("allocation failed"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len);
+        ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("re-using cached ecjpake parameters"));
+
+        kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p + 2, end, kkpp_len);
+
+        memcpy(p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len);
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *olen = kkpp_len + 4;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                             unsigned char *buf,
+                             const unsigned char *end,
+                             size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    /*
+     *   struct {
+     *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+     *   } ConnectionId;
+     */
+
+    *olen = 0;
+    if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+        ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding CID extension"));
+
+    /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
+     * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5));
+
+    /* Add extension ID + size */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+    ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
+    memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len);
+
+    *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             unsigned char *buf,
+                                             const unsigned char *end,
+                                             size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 1;
+
+    *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
+
+    *olen = 5;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          unsigned char *buf,
+                                          const unsigned char *end,
+                                          size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     unsigned char *buf,
+                                     const unsigned char *end,
+                                     size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char *buf,
+                                        const unsigned char *end,
+                                        size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding session ticket extension"));
+
+    /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + tlen);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen));
+
+    memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen);
+
+    *olen += tlen;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  unsigned char *buf,
+                                  const unsigned char *end,
+                                  size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0;
+    uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
+     * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *   SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+     *   opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+     * } UseSRTPData;
+     * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+     */
+    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) {
+        mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+    }
+    /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length,
+     *                    ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ),
+     *                    1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value
+     */
+    ext_len = 2 + 2 * (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) + 1 + mki_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding use_srtp extension"));
+
+    /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes
+     * - the extension tag (2 bytes)
+     * - the extension length (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ext_len + 4);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */
+    /* micro-optimization:
+     * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH
+     * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0
+     * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments
+     * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len )
+     *                        >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
+     */
+    *p++ = 0;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len);
+
+    for (protection_profiles_index = 0;
+         protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len;
+         protection_profiles_index++) {
+        profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
+                            (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]);
+        if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x",
+                                      profile_value));
+            MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, p, 0);
+            p += 2;
+        } else {
+            /*
+             * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles
+             * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function
+             */
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                  ("client hello, "
+                                   "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d",
+                                   ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]
+                                  ));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF;
+
+    if (mki_len != 0) {
+        memcpy(p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len);
+        /*
+         * Increment p to point to the current position.
+         */
+        p += mki_len;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "sending mki",  ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+                              ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes)
+     *                         + extension length (2 bytes)
+     *                         + protection profile length (2 bytes)
+     *                         + 2 * number of protection profiles
+     *                         + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte)
+     *                         + mki value
+     */
+    *olen = p - buf;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char *buf,
+                                              const unsigned char *end,
+                                              int uses_ec,
+                                              size_t *out_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t ext_len = 0;
+
+    (void) ssl;
+    (void) end;
+    (void) uses_ec;
+    (void) ret;
+    (void) ext_len;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
+     * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (uses_ec) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p, end,
+                                                         &ext_len)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+        p += ext_len;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p, end,
+                                                 &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+    *out_len = p - buf;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        size_t len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+        /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
+        if (len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
+            buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1,
+                              ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0 ||
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
+                              ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+    {
+        if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("non-zero length renegotiation info"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             size_t len)
+{
+    /*
+     * server should use the extension only if we did,
+     * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
+     */
+    if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
+        len != 1 ||
+        buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("non-matching max fragment length extension"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                             size_t len)
+{
+    size_t peer_cid_len;
+
+    if ( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
+        ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
+        /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
+        ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension unexpected"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    peer_cid_len = *buf++;
+    len--;
+
+    if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (len != peer_cid_len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+    ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated"));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                                          size_t len)
+{
+    if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
+        len != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    ((void) buf);
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     const unsigned char *buf,
+                                     size_t len)
+{
+    if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
+        len != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("non-matching extended master secret extension"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    ((void) buf);
+
+    ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        size_t len)
+{
+    if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
+        len != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("non-matching session ticket extension"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    ((void) buf);
+
+    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                 const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                 size_t len)
+{
+    size_t list_size;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    list_size = buf[0];
+
+    p = buf + 1;
+    while (list_size > 0) {
+        if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
+            p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+            defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED)
+            ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                             \
+            defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                             p[0]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0]));
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        list_size--;
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no point format in common"));
+    mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                   MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *buf,
+                                  size_t len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
+        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
+    mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache);
+    ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
+    ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+             &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+             MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) {
+        psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+        psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret);
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+#else
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                              buf, len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret);
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                              const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t list_len, name_len;
+    const char **p;
+
+    /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
+    if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching ALPN extension"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *     ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
+     * } ProtocolNameList;
+     *
+     * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
+     */
+
+    /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
+    if (len < 4) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
+    if (list_len != len - 2) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    name_len = buf[2];
+    if (name_len != list_len - 1) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
+    for (p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++) {
+        if (name_len == strlen(*p) &&
+            memcmp(buf + 3, *p, name_len) == 0) {
+            ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ALPN extension: no matching protocol"));
+    mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                   MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *buf,
+                                  size_t len)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+    size_t i, mki_len = 0;
+    uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0;
+
+    /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
+    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
+     * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *   SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+     *   opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+     * } UseSRTPData;
+
+     * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+     *
+     */
+    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) {
+        mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes)
+     *                                      + protection profile (2 bytes)
+     *                                      + mki_len(1 byte)
+     *                                      and optional srtp_mki
+     */
+    if ((len < 5) || (len != (buf[4] + 5u))) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * get the server protection profile
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only
+     * one protection profile in server Hello
+     */
+    if ((buf[0] != 0) || (buf[1] != 2)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    server_protection_profile_value = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3];
+    server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
+        server_protection_profile_value);
+    if (server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s",
+                                  mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+                                      server_protection)));
+    }
+
+    ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+
+    /*
+     * Check we have the server profile in our list
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) {
+        if (server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) {
+            ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s",
+                                      mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+                                          server_protection)));
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */
+    if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep
+     * one as negotiated */
+    if (len == 5) {
+        ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * RFC5764:
+     *  If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response
+     *  that is different than the one the client offered, then the client
+     *  MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert.
+     */
+    if (len > 5  && (buf[4] != mki_len ||
+                     (memcmp(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len)))) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    if (len > 5) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+                              ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len);
+    }
+#endif
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+/*
+ * Parse HelloVerifyRequest.  Only called after verifying the HS type.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+    uint16_t dtls_legacy_version;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+    uint8_t cookie_len;
+#else
+    uint16_t cookie_len;
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse hello verify request"));
+
+    /* Check that there is enough room for:
+     * - 2 bytes of version
+     * - 1 byte of cookie_len
+     */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *   ProtocolVersion server_version;
+     *   opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
+     * } HelloVerifyRequest;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2);
+    dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /*
+     * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff)
+     * The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to
+     * legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2)
+     */
+    if (dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server version"));
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    }
+
+    cookie_len = *p++;
+    if ((ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen) - p < cookie_len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("cookie length does not match incoming message size"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie", p, cookie_len);
+
+    mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie);
+
+    ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len);
+    if (ssl->handshake->cookie  == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len);
+    ssl->handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+    /* Start over at ClientHello */
+    ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse hello verify request"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret, i;
+    size_t n;
+    size_t ext_len;
+    unsigned char *buf, *ext;
+    unsigned char comp;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
+#endif
+    int handshake_failure = 0;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello"));
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        /* No alert on a read error. */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    buf = ssl->in_msg;
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+        if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            ssl->renego_records_seen++;
+
+            if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
+                ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                      ("renegotiation requested, but not honored by server"));
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            }
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("non-handshake message during renegotiation"));
+
+            ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        if (buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received hello verify request"));
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello"));
+            return ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(ssl);
+        } else {
+            /* We made it through the verification process */
+            mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie);
+            ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL;
+            ssl->handshake->cookie_len = 0;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+    if (ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) ||
+        buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     *  0   .  1    server_version
+     *  2   . 33    random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
+     * 34   . 34    session_id length = n
+     * 35   . 34+n  session_id
+     * 35+n . 36+n  cipher_suite
+     * 37+n . 37+n  compression_method
+     *
+     * 38+n . 39+n  extensions length (optional)
+     * 40+n .  ..   extensions
+     */
+    buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf, 2);
+    ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf,
+                                                                               ssl->conf->transport);
+    ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
+
+    if (ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version ||
+        ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              (
+                                  "server version out of bounds -  min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]",
+                                  (unsigned) ssl->conf->min_tls_version,
+                                  (unsigned) ssl->tls_version,
+                                  (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version));
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %lu",
+                              ((unsigned long) buf[2] << 24) |
+                              ((unsigned long) buf[3] << 16) |
+                              ((unsigned long) buf[4] <<  8) |
+                              ((unsigned long) buf[5])));
+
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32);
+
+    n = buf[34];
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3,   "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32);
+
+    if (n > 32) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 39 + n) {
+        ext_len = ((buf[38 + n] <<  8)
+                   | (buf[39 + n]));
+
+        if ((ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) ||
+            ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 40 + n + ext_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+    } else if (ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 38 + n) {
+        ext_len = 0;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* ciphersuite (used later) */
+    i = (buf[35 + n] << 8) | buf[36 + n];
+
+    /*
+     * Read and check compression
+     */
+    comp = buf[37 + n];
+
+    if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("server hello, bad compression: %d", comp));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize update checksum functions
+     */
+    ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(i);
+    if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int) i));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3,   "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n);
+
+    /*
+     * Check if the session can be resumed
+     */
+    if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 ||
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+        ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
+#endif
+        ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i ||
+        ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
+        memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n) != 0) {
+        ssl->state++;
+        ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+        ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+#endif
+        ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
+        ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
+        memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n);
+    } else {
+        ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed",
+                              ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: %d",
+                              buf[37 + n]));
+
+    /*
+     * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
+     */
+    i = 0;
+    while (1) {
+        if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+
+        if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] ==
+            ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+        ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version,
+                                         ssl->tls_version) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
+        ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
+        ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    ext = buf + 40 + n;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+                          ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                           ext_len));
+
+    while (ext_len) {
+        unsigned int ext_id   = ((ext[0] <<  8)
+                                 | (ext[1]));
+        unsigned int ext_size = ((ext[2] <<  8)
+                                 | (ext[3]));
+
+        if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        switch (ext_id) {
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension"));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+                renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
+#endif
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4,
+                                                        ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                      ("found max_fragment_length extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl,
+                                                             ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl,
+                                             ext + 4,
+                                             ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt_then_mac extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl,
+                                                          ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                      ("found extended_master_secret extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl,
+                                                     ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session_ticket extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl,
+                                                        ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+                defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+                defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                      ("found supported_point_formats extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl,
+                                                                 ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake_kkpp extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl,
+                                                  ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                      ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id));
+        }
+
+        ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
+        ext += 4 + ext_size;
+
+        if (ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the
+     * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in
+     * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension.
+     */
+    if (ssl->handshake->resume) {
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Renegotiation security checks
+     */
+    if (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+        ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+             ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+             renegotiation_info_seen == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+               ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
+               MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+               renegotiation_info_seen == 1) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+    if (handshake_failure == 1) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                       \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      unsigned char **p,
+                                      unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    size_t dhm_actual_bitlen;
+
+    /*
+     * Ephemeral DH parameters:
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *     opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
+     *     opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
+     *     opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
+     * } ServerDHParams;
+     */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                       p, end)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, ("mbedtls_dhm_read_params"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx);
+    if (dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u",
+                                  dhm_actual_bitlen,
+                                  ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED)   ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)   ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char **p,
+                                        unsigned char *end)
+{
+    uint16_t tls_id;
+    size_t ecpoint_len;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+    size_t ec_bits = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     ECParameters curve_params;
+     *     ECPoint      public;
+     * } ServerECDHParams;
+     *
+     *  1       curve_type (must be "named_curve")
+     *  2..3    NamedCurve
+     *  4       ECPoint.len
+     *  5+      ECPoint contents
+     */
+    if (end - *p < 4) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */
+    if (*(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */
+    tls_id = *(*p)++;
+    tls_id <<= 8;
+    tls_id |= *(*p)++;
+
+    /* Check it's a curve we offered */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+                              ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u",
+                               (unsigned) tls_id));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type,
+                                                   &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+    handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+    handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits;
+
+    /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
+    ecpoint_len = *(*p)++;
+    if ((size_t) (end - *p) < ecpoint_len) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len);
+    handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
+    *p += ecpoint_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED   ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED   ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED)   ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED)    ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)   ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ||   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    uint16_t tls_id;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+    grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
+#else
+    grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
+#endif
+
+    tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id);
+    if (tls_id == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s",
+                              mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(tls_id)));
+
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                           MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED   ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED    ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED   ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) ||     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char **p,
+                                        unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    /*
+     * Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *     ECParameters curve_params;
+     *     ECPoint      public;
+     * } ServerECDHParams;
+     */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                        (const unsigned char **) p, end)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_read_params"), ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+        }
+#endif
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || \
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || \
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     unsigned char **p,
+                                     unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    uint16_t  len;
+    ((void) ssl);
+
+    /*
+     * PSK parameters:
+     *
+     * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
+     */
+    if (end - (*p) < 2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
+    *p += 2;
+
+    if (end - (*p) < len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one
+     * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if
+     * someone needs that feature.
+     */
+    *p += len;
+    ret = 0;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                           \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   size_t offset, size_t *olen,
+                                   size_t pms_offset)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len_bytes = 2;
+    unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
+    mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
+
+    if (offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small for encrypted pms"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Generate (part of) the pre-master as
+     *  struct {
+     *      ProtocolVersion client_version;
+     *      opaque random[46];
+     *  } PreMasterSecret;
+     */
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport,
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
+
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+    /*
+     * Now write it out, encrypted
+     */
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate key type mismatch"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt(peer_pk,
+                                  p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                  ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
+                                  MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
+                                  ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (len_bytes == 2) {
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen, ssl->out_msg, offset);
+        *olen += 2;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
+    mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+    /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
+     * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+    const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*peer_pk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    uint16_t tls_id = 0;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(peer_pk);
+
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+
+    tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id);
+    if (tls_id == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ECC group %u not suported",
+                                  grp_id));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be,
+       so there is no need to check the return value here */
+    mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type,
+                                               &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+    ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+
+    /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, peer_pk->pub_raw, peer_pk->pub_raw_len);
+    ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peer_pk->pub_raw_len;
+    ret = 0;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+    size_t olen = 0;
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q,
+                                         MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen,
+                                         ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
+                                         sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey));
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
+                                       MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
+     * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
+     * operations like ECDHE. */
+    mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ((void) p);
+    ((void) end);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret);
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ((void) p);
+    ((void) end);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
+        ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing) {
+        goto start_processing;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
+     * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
+     */
+    if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+            ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
+            /* Current message is probably either
+             * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
+            ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+            goto exit;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("server key exchange message must not be skipped"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+        ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
+    }
+
+start_processing:
+#endif
+    p   = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+    end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3,   "server key exchange", p, end - p);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+        if (ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(ssl, &p, end) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+    } /* FALLTHROUGH */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) ||                       \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
+        ; /* nothing more to do */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                       \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) {
+        if (ssl_parse_server_dh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) ||     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) {
+        if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        /*
+         * The first 3 bytes are:
+         * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+         * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+         *
+         * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only
+         * that TLS ID here
+         */
+        uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1);
+        uint16_t exp_tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(
+            MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
+
+        if (exp_tls_id == 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        }
+
+        if ((*p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) ||
+            (read_tls_id != exp_tls_id)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+
+        p += 3;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                 &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p,
+                 MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) {
+            psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+            psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret);
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+#else
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                             p, end - p);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret);
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        size_t sig_len, hashlen;
+        unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+        mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
+        unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+        size_t params_len = p - params;
+        void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+        uint16_t sig_alg;
+
+        mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+        peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+        if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+            /* Should never happen */
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+        peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+        /*
+         * Handle the digitally-signed structure
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+        sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
+                sig_alg, &pk_alg, &md_alg) != 0 &&
+            !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg) &&
+            !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg)) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+        p += 2;
+
+        if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Read signature
+         */
+
+        if (p > end - 2) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+        sig_len = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
+        p += 2;
+
+        if (p != end - sig_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "signature", p, sig_len);
+
+        /*
+         * Compute the hash that has been signed
+         */
+        if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen,
+                                                         params, params_len,
+                                                         md_alg);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        } else {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen);
+
+        /*
+         * Verify signature
+         */
+        if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+        if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+            rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
+        }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+        if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
+            mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options;
+            rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
+            rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len =
+                mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
+            if (rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len == 0) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(pk_alg, &rsassa_pss_options,
+                                        peer_pk,
+                                        md_alg, hash, hashlen,
+                                        p, sig_len);
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
+        ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk,
+                                            md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx);
+
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            int send_alert_msg = 1;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+            send_alert_msg = (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS);
+#endif
+            if (send_alert_msg) {
+                mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                    ssl,
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+            }
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+            }
+#endif
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+        /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
+         * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
+         * operations like ECDHE. */
+        mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+exit:
+    ssl->state++;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server key exchange"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request"));
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t n = 0;
+    size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    size_t sig_alg_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    unsigned char *sig_alg;
+    unsigned char *dn;
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request"));
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    ssl->state++;
+    ssl->handshake->client_auth =
+        (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got %s certificate request",
+                              ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no"));
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) {
+        /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
+        ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     *  struct {
+     *      ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+     *      SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
+     *        supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
+     *      DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+     *  } CertificateRequest;
+     *
+     *  Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
+     *  ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
+     *  certificate.
+     *
+     *  We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
+     *  if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
+     *  and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
+     *  the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
+     *
+     *  Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
+     *  point we only have one hash available (see comments in
+     *  write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
+     *
+     *  However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
+     *  superficially sane.
+     */
+    buf = ssl->in_msg;
+
+    /* certificate_types */
+    if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)];
+    n = cert_type_len;
+
+    /*
+     * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
+     *     * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
+     *       SSL is 3),
+     *     * distinguished name length otherwise.
+     * Both reach at most the index:
+     *    ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
+     * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
+     * regardless of the actual code path.
+     */
+    if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* supported_signature_algorithms */
+    sig_alg_len = ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] <<  8)
+                   | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n]));
+
+    /*
+     * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
+     *     sig_alg[i + 1],
+     * where:
+     *     sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
+     *     max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
+     * Therefore the furthest access is:
+     *     buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
+     * which reduces to:
+     *     buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
+     * which is one less than we need the buf to be.
+     */
+    if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                              ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x",
+                               sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1]));
+    }
+#endif
+
+    n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
+
+    /* certificate_authorities */
+    dn_len = ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] <<  8)
+              | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n]));
+
+    n += dn_len;
+    if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n - dn_len;
+    for (size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len) {
+        unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2;
+        mbedtls_x509_name name;
+        size_t asn1_len;
+        char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
+        memset(&name, 0, sizeof(name));
+        dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(dn + i, 0);
+        if (dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 ||
+            mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) != 0 ||
+            mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + asn1_len, &name) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+                ssl,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                              ("DN hint: %.*s",
+                               mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(s, sizeof(s), &name), s));
+        mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(name.next);
+    }
+#endif
+
+exit:
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello done"));
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_hslen  != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) ||
+        ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello done"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t header_len;
+    size_t content_len;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) {
+        /*
+         * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
+         */
+        content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx);
+
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4);
+        header_len = 6;
+
+        ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                      (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx),
+                                      &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
+                                      ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX);
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                           ssl->handshake->premaster,
+                                           MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
+                                           &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ||                   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||                      \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+        header_len = 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."));
+
+        /*
+         * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
+         */
+
+        /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
+         * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
+         * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
+         * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
+         * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
+         * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
+         * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
+        key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+        psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+        psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+        psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type);
+        psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+        /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+        status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes,
+                                  &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+         * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
+         * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
+        unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1;
+        unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+        size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey);
+        size_t own_pubkey_len;
+
+        status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+                                       &own_pubkey_len);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
+        content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
+
+        /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
+
+        /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+        status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+                                       ssl->handshake->premaster,
+                                       sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster),
+                                       &ssl->handshake->pmslen);
+
+        destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+        }
+#else
+        /*
+         * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
+         */
+        header_len = 4;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+        if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+            if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret) {
+                goto ecdh_calc_secret;
+            }
+
+            mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx);
+        }
+#endif
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                       &content_len,
+                                       &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000,
+                                       ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+            }
+#endif
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+        if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+            ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len;
+            ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
+        }
+
+ecdh_calc_secret:
+        if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+            content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
+        }
+#endif
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                            &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                            ssl->handshake->premaster,
+                                            MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
+                                            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+            }
+#endif
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                           \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+        /*
+         * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+            /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
+             * and we check that the server's choice is among the
+             * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* uint16 to store content length */
+        const size_t content_len_size = 2;
+
+        header_len = 4;
+
+        if (header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len
+            > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+
+        unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+
+        *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len);
+        *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len);
+        header_len += content_len_size;
+
+        memcpy(p, ssl->conf->psk_identity,
+               ssl->conf->psk_identity_len);
+        p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+        header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."));
+
+        /*
+         * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
+         */
+
+        /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
+         * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
+         * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
+         * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
+         * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
+         * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
+         * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
+        key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+        psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+        psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+        psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type);
+        psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+        /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+        status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes,
+                                  &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+        }
+
+        /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+         * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
+         * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
+        unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1;
+        unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+        size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey);
+        size_t own_pubkey_len = 0;
+
+        status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+                                       &own_pubkey_len);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+        }
+
+        *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
+        content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
+
+        /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+         * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+         * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+         * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+         * - the PSK itself
+         */
+        unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+        const unsigned char * const pms_end = pms +
+                                              sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+        /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+        const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+        size_t zlen = 0;
+
+        /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */
+        status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+                                       pms + zlen_size,
+                                       pms_end - (pms + zlen_size),
+                                       &zlen);
+
+        destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+        } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status);
+        }
+
+        /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, pms, 0);
+        pms += zlen_size + zlen;
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        /*
+         * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+            /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
+             * and we check that the server's choice is among the
+             * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        header_len = 4;
+        content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+        if (header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                  ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+        }
+
+        ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len);
+        ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len);
+
+        memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len,
+               ssl->conf->psk_identity,
+               ssl->conf->psk_identity_len);
+        header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) {
+            content_len = 0;
+        } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
+            if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len,
+                                               &content_len, 2)) != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) {
+            /*
+             * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
+             */
+            content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx);
+
+            if (header_len + 2 + content_len >
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                      ("psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short"));
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+            }
+
+            ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len);
+            ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len);
+
+            ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                          (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx),
+                                          &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
+                                          ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+            unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+            unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+            size_t pms_len;
+
+            /* Write length only when we know the actual value */
+            if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                               pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len,
+                                               ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
+            MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0);
+            pms += 2 + pms_len;
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+#endif
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                             \
+        defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+        if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+            /*
+             * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
+             */
+            ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                           &content_len,
+                                           &ssl->out_msg[header_len],
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                   MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q);
+        } else
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+        {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+                                                    (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+                                                    key_exchange)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                                  "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) {
+        header_len = 4;
+        if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len,
+                                           &content_len, 0)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+        header_len = 4;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
+        unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+                               header_len;
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                              out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len,
+                                              MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+            psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                              ssl->out_msg + header_len,
+                                              MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
+                                              &content_len,
+                                              ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                            ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+    {
+        ((void) ciphersuite_info);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = header_len + content_len;
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+
+    ssl->state++;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client key exchange"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify"));
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
+    unsigned char hash[48];
+    unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+    size_t hashlen;
+    void *rs_ctx = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+    size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#else
+    size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
+        ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign) {
+        goto sign;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 ||
+        mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify"));
+        ssl->state++;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key for certificate"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Make a signature of the handshake digests
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+        ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
+    }
+
+sign:
+#endif
+
+    ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * digitally-signed struct {
+     *     opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
+     * };
+     *
+     * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
+     * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
+     * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
+     *
+     * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
+     * shortcut.
+     *
+     * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and
+     *         SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server
+     *         side.
+     */
+    if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) {
+        md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
+        ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
+    } else {
+        md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
+        ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
+    }
+    ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl));
+
+    /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
+    hashlen = 0;
+    offset = 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) {
+        rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl),
+                                           md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
+                                           ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset,
+                                           out_buf_len - 6 - offset,
+                                           &n,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+        }
+#endif
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4);
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = 6 + n + offset;
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
+
+    ssl->state++;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify"));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    uint32_t lifetime;
+    size_t ticket_len;
+    unsigned char *ticket;
+    const unsigned char *msg;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket"));
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
+     *     opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
+     * } NewSessionTicket;
+     *
+     * 0  .  3   ticket_lifetime_hint
+     * 4  .  5   ticket_len (n)
+     * 6  .  5+n ticket content
+     */
+    if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
+        ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+    lifetime = (((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) |
+               (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]);
+
+    ticket_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]);
+
+    if (ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) != ssl->in_hslen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len));
+
+    /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
+    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+    ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+
+    /*
+     * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
+     * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
+     */
+    if (ticket_len == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL) {
+        mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session->ticket,
+                                 ssl->session->ticket_len);
+        ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
+        ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
+                             ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len);
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
+
+    if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len);
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
+
+    /*
+     * RFC 5077 section 3.4:
+     * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
+     * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket in use, discarding session id"));
+    ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+/*
+ * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
+     * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+        ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
+        ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    switch (ssl->state) {
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+            ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  ==>   ClientHello
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  <==   ServerHello
+         *        Certificate
+         *      ( ServerKeyExchange  )
+         *      ( CertificateRequest )
+         *        ServerHelloDone
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_parse_server_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+            ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+            ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+            ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  ==> ( Certificate/Alert  )
+         *        ClientKeyExchange
+         *      ( CertificateVerify  )
+         *        ChangeCipherSpec
+         *        Finished
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+            ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+            ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+            /*
+             *  <==   ( NewSessionTicket )
+             *        ChangeCipherSpec
+             *        Finished
+             */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
+            ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+            break;
+#endif
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done"));
+            ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */