dsh-plugin-dev-kb 1.6.0 → 1.8.1

package/kb/site/reference/subsystems/sandbox.md

@@ -1,225 +1,250 @@
----
-editSource: "docs/subsystems/sandbox.zh.md"
-rawMarkdownPath: "reference/subsystems/sandbox.md"
-outline: [2,3]
----
-
-# 进程沙箱
-
-[dsh-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox) 的进程沙箱 seam 将与配套子进程提供方共享执行环境的子进程 argv 包装在文件效果策略中，而不将消费方耦合到特定平台运行器。[dsh-sandbox-local](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) 提供 Linux bwrap/Landlock、macOS Seatbelt 与 Windows ACL 受限令牌后端；[dsh-bash-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/shell/bash-sandbox) 和 [dsh-pwsh-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/shell/pwsh-sandbox) 是其消费方。[dsh-sandbox-ssh](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/ssh/sandbox-ssh/README.zh.md) 通过与 SSH 文件系统及子进程提供方配套的远端后端执行同一策略。
-
-源码：[`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
-
-## 模式与强制执行
-
-`SandboxMode` 仅管控文件系统效果。`read-only` 要求后端拒绝写入——POSIX runner 还会授予其 shell 所需的 `/dev/null` 接收器，而 Windows ACL runner 不授予任何显式可写根目录，并因环境 ACL 缺口报告部分强制执行；`workspace-write` 允许在工作区根目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；`danger-full-access` 绕过隔离。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * File-effect policy for confined processes. `read-only` permits only required
- * sinks such as `/dev/null`; `workspace-write` also permits the workspace and a
- * backend-defined temp area; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network
- * and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
- */
-type SandboxMode = 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'
-```
-
-只有前两种模式可以发送给提供方。`danger-full-access` 的消费方直接 spawn 原始 argv，不调用 `ctx.sandbox`。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/** A confining (non-`danger-full-access`) mode — the modes a {@link SandboxPolicy} can carry. */
-type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, 'danger-full-access'>
-```
-
-强制执行完整性是后端报告的事实。`full` 表示后端管控了该模式承诺的所有文件效果；`partial` 表示活跃后端或较旧的内核 ABI 仅管控其中一个子集，因此要求绝对保证的消费方必须拒绝或向上暴露这一区别。当前的部分强制执行情形包括较旧的 Landlock ABI，以及 Windows ACL runner 的硬链接、读取不受限与 AppContainer ACL 边界。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * Enforcement completeness for this host. `partial` means an active backend or
- * older kernel ABI cannot govern every promised file effect; callers requiring
- * an absolute boundary must not treat it as `full`.
- */
-type SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'
-```
-
-## 逐调用策略
-
-完整执行策略会按每次能力调用解析并携带。它包括 `danger-full-access`，因此消费方可以只解析一次策略，再决定是否绕过约束。普通工具调用从调用会话的不可变 cwd 派生 `workspaceRoot`；部署配置是没有 agent（智能体）时的回退值。解析器保留执行环境中的绝对路径写法。执行限制的提供方在文件实际存在的位置规范化根目录，因此包含 `symlink/..` 的 cwd 会标识配套子进程提供方实际运行的目录。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * The complete file-effect policy resolved for one capability call. The root
- * is carried even under modes that do not consume it so callers can resolve
- * policy once before choosing the enforcement path.
- */
-interface SandboxExecutionPolicy {
-  /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
-  mode: SandboxMode
-  /** Absolute root directory `workspace-write` may write under. */
-  workspaceRoot: string
-  /**
-   * Opaque identity of the calling session (the branded `dsh-session`
-   * SessionId). Backends key per-session state off it (e.g. windows-acl gives
-   * each live session/workspace pair a random private temp directory and SID,
-   * while the workspace SID and standing grant remain per-workspace); absent
-   * for agentless calls, which fall back to per-call backend state.
-   */
-  sessionId?: SessionId
-}
-```
-
-`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` 接收活跃会话；对于已批准的重试，还接收显式模式。该服务拥有优先级与 root 回退规则，使 bash 和 fs 不必重复实现。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/** Inputs that select the sandbox policy for one capability call. */
-interface SandboxPolicyRequest {
-  /** Calling session; its immutable cwd becomes the workspace boundary. */
-  session?: Session
-  /** Explicit approved mode override, which outranks session policy. */
-  mode?: SandboxMode
-}
-```
-
-只有受约束的执行会到达 `ctx.sandbox`；传给提供方的策略在保留同一 root 的同时收窄模式。这使并发会话、消费方与一次性提权重试可以向同一提供方请求不同边界，而无需改变提供方状态。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * What one confined execution is allowed to touch — carried PER CALL, not
- * fixed on the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies
- * at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent
- * needs its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a
- * new call with a wider policy. Defaulting/resolution is an explicit step at
- * the consumer boundary; the provider treats the policy as fully specified.
- */
-interface SandboxPolicy extends SandboxExecutionPolicy {
-  /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
-  mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
-}
-```
-
-<a id="wrapped-argv-and-classification-dialects"></a>
-
-## 包装后的 argv 与分类方言
-
-`RunnerFailureRule` 汇集用于判定 runner 在执行命令前失败的证据。消费方要求进程以非零状态退出，并同时满足可选的允许退出码门控，以及余下某一 stderr 行中不区分大小写的致命签名。系统会先按不区分大小写的整行精确匹配移除信息性排除项，因此无害的 runner 通知本身不能证明失败。匹配到的行仍可用作错误详情；分类过程不会重写 stderr。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * Evidence that identifies a sandbox runner failing before it executes the
- * wrapped command. A consumer first applies {@link allowedExitCodes} when
- * present, removes {@link informationalLines} by case-insensitive exact line
- * equality, then matches {@link fatalSignatures} case-insensitively within
- * each remaining stderr line. Exit status alone never proves runner failure.
- */
-interface RunnerFailureRule {
-  /** Nonzero process exit codes on which this rule may match; omitted permits any nonzero exit. */
-  allowedExitCodes?: readonly number[]
-  /** Non-empty substrings identifying a fatal runner diagnostic on one stderr line. */
-  fatalSignatures: readonly string[]
-  /** Benign stderr lines excluded by exact full-line equality before fatal matching. */
-  informationalLines?: readonly string[]
-}
-```
-
-`ConfinedArgv` 是消费方实际 spawn 的内容。除了替换后的 argv，它还携带后端的强制执行事实和两种正交的 stderr 分类器。`denialSignatures` 用于识别沙箱正常工作时受限命令被阻止的情况。`runnerFailureRules` 用于识别沙箱 runner 在执行命令之前拒绝或失败的情况；消费方应先检查后者，将其作为沙箱基础设施故障上报，而非普通任务失败。
-
-```ts type-equiv
-/**
- * A {@link SandboxProvider.confine} result: the argv to spawn in place of
- * the caller's own, plus the enforcement completeness the selected backend
- * achieves for it.
- */
-interface ConfinedArgv {
-  /** The wrapped argv (runner, profile, separator, then the caller's argv). */
-  argv: string[]
-  /** How completely the selected backend enforces the policy's file effects. */
-  enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
-  /**
-   * The selected backend's denial DIALECT: the case-insensitive stderr
-   * substrings a file effect denied by THIS backend produces (EROFS text
-   * under bwrap's read-only binds, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under
-   * Seatbelt). A consumer that infers denials from a failed run's stderr
-   * matches against exactly these rather than a cross-backend union — the
-   * union claims denials a given backend never produces.
-   */
-  denialSignatures: readonly string[]
-  /**
-   * Structured runner-failure evidence rules. Consumers require a matching
-   * fatal stderr line (after informational exclusions) and any rule-specific
-   * exit-code gate before checking denial signatures: runner failure means the
-   * command never ran, while denial means confinement worked and blocked it.
-   */
-  runnerFailureRules: readonly RunnerFailureRule[]
-}
-```
-
-[本地提供方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.zh.md)拥有运维配置，并将其 runner 方言映射到这些规则。[沙箱化 bash 消费方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/shell/bash-sandbox/README.zh.md)拥有 spawn 与结果归因。
-
-## 提供方与 fail-closed 错误
-
-`await ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy, signal)` 在执行环境中解析策略路径并返回 `ConfinedArgv`，没有可用后端时以 `SandboxUnavailableError`（错误码 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`）拒绝。可选信号可在启动前取消解析。消费方也可以在 spawn 或观察所返回的 argv 时对失败进行分类；该归因属于消费方约定。对于受限策略，静默的无隔离透传永远不合法。
-
-提供方选择、探测、缓存和后端特定的强制执行报告归[本地提供方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.zh.md)所有。
-
-<!-- BEGIN GENERATED cordis-surface (gen-cordis-catalog.ts) — do not edit between markers -->
-
-<a id="cordis-surface"></a>
-
-## Cordis API
-
-Generated from source by `scripts/gen-cordis-catalog.ts` (verified fresh by `pnpm run verify-cordis-catalog` in doc-sync; regenerate with `pnpm run gen-cordis-catalog`) — the language sides differ only in locale-specific paired document paths. Signature blocks use a `ts cordis-catalog` fence and keep the original source JSDoc; dispatch modes are defined in the [primer](../cordis-primer.md#dispatch-modes), and the framework-inherited `ctx` API lives in [cordis-api/inherited.md](../cordis-api/inherited.md).
-
-<a id="ctxsandbox--sandboxprovider-abstract-seam"></a>
-
-### `ctx.sandbox` — `SandboxProvider` (abstract seam)
-
-Abstract process-sandbox service. confine must return enforcing argv or fail closed at wrap or runner-execution time; silent unconfined passthrough is forbidden. Functional probes arbitrate multi-runner chains and may be skipped for a sole candidate, whose own refusal remains the fail-closed end.
-
-```ts cordis-catalog
-/**
- * Wrap `argv` so it executes confined under `policy` on this host; the
- * caller spawns the returned argv in place of its own.
- * @param argv - the exact argv the caller is about to spawn (program plus
- *   arguments), NOT a shell string — a shell-shaped consumer passes
- *   `['bash', '-c', command]`.
- * @param policy - the file-effect policy this execution runs under,
- *   carried per call (see {@link SandboxPolicy}).
- * @param signal - cancellation while the provider resolves the policy and runner.
- * @returns the argv to spawn instead, plus the enforcement completeness
- *   the selected backend achieves for it.
- */
-abstract confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<ConfinedArgv>
-```
-
-Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
-
-<a id="ctxsandboxpolicy--sandboxpolicyservice"></a>
-
-### `ctx.sandboxPolicy` — `SandboxPolicyService`
-
-The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment default mode, fallback workspace root, and current request-time policy section. Tool layers call resolve for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
-
-```ts cordis-catalog
-/**
- * Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
- * mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
- * deployment default. A session cwd is its workspace-write boundary; the
- * configured root is the fallback for agentless calls and sessions without a
- * cwd.
- * @param request - optional session and approved mode override.
- * @returns the fully resolved per-call mode and absolute workspace root.
- */
-resolve(request: SandboxPolicyRequest = {}): SandboxExecutionPolicy
-
-/**
- * Read the session override without applying the deployment default.
- * @param session - session whose log supplies the override.
- * @returns the last logged mode, or `undefined` without one.
- */
-overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined
-```
-
-Types: [Session](./session.md)
-
-Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
-<!-- END GENERATED cordis-surface -->
+---
+editSource: "docs/subsystems/sandbox.zh.md"
+rawMarkdownPath: "reference/subsystems/sandbox.md"
+outline: [2,3]
+---
+
+# 进程沙箱
+
+[dsh-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox) 的进程沙箱 seam 将与配套子进程提供方共享执行环境的子进程 argv 包装在文件效果策略中，而不将消费方耦合到特定平台运行器。[dsh-sandbox-local](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) 提供 Linux bwrap/Landlock、macOS Seatbelt 与 Windows ACL 受限令牌后端；[dsh-bash-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/shell/bash-sandbox) 和 [dsh-pwsh-sandbox](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/shell/pwsh-sandbox) 是其消费方。[dsh-sandbox-ssh](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/ssh/sandbox-ssh/README.zh.md) 通过与 SSH 文件系统及子进程提供方配套的远端后端执行同一策略。
+
+源码：[`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
+
+## 模式与强制执行
+
+`SandboxMode` 仅管控文件系统效果。`read-only` 要求后端拒绝写入——POSIX runner 还会授予其 shell 所需的 `/dev/null` 接收器，而 Windows ACL runner 不授予任何显式可写根目录，并因环境 ACL 缺口报告部分强制执行；`workspace-write` 允许在工作区根目录、受支持的额外目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；`danger-full-access` 绕过隔离。Windows 子进程忽略额外目录授权；Harness 文件工具独立执行这些授权。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * File-effect policy for confined processes. `read-only` permits only required
+ * sinks such as `/dev/null`; `workspace-write` also permits the workspace,
+ * explicit extra roots where supported, and backend-defined temp areas; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network
+ * and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
+ */
+type SandboxMode = 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'
+```
+
+只有前两种模式可以发送给提供方。`danger-full-access` 的消费方直接 spawn 原始 argv，不调用 `ctx.sandbox`。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/** A confining (non-`danger-full-access`) mode — the modes a {@link SandboxPolicy} can carry. */
+type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, 'danger-full-access'>
+```
+
+强制执行完整性是后端报告的事实。`full` 表示后端管控了该模式承诺的所有文件效果；`partial` 表示活跃后端或较旧的内核 ABI 仅管控其中一个子集，因此要求绝对保证的消费方必须拒绝或向上暴露这一区别。当前的部分强制执行情形包括较旧的 Landlock ABI，以及 Windows ACL runner 的硬链接、读取不受限与 AppContainer ACL 边界。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * Enforcement completeness for this host. `partial` means an active backend or
+ * older kernel ABI cannot govern every promised file effect; callers requiring
+ * an absolute boundary must not treat it as `full`.
+ */
+type SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'
+```
+
+## 逐调用策略
+
+完整执行策略会按每次能力调用解析并携带。它包括 `danger-full-access`，因此消费方可以只解析一次策略，再决定是否绕过约束。普通工具调用从调用会话的不可变 cwd 派生 `workspaceRoot`；部署配置提供无 agent 调用的回退值和共享的额外写入授权。存活 Session 的注册为后续解析添加 effect 生命周期内的目录授权。解析器保留执行环境中的绝对路径写法。执行限制的提供方在文件实际存在的位置规范化根目录，因此包含 `symlink/..` 的 cwd 会标识配套子进程提供方实际运行的目录。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * The complete file-effect policy resolved for one capability call. The root
+ * is carried even under modes that do not consume it so callers can resolve
+ * policy once before choosing the enforcement path.
+ */
+interface SandboxExecutionPolicy {
+  /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
+  mode: SandboxMode
+  /** Absolute root directory `workspace-write` may write under. */
+  workspaceRoot: string
+  /**
+   * Extra physical absolute directories `workspace-write` may also write under.
+   * Absence means none. The enforcing host rejects missing, non-directory, and
+   * symlinked entries on each call. Remote paths are checked on the remote host.
+   * Windows process confinement ignores these; harness filesystem operations honor them.
+   * These grant nothing under `read-only` or `danger-full-access`.
+   */
+  additionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Opaque identity of the calling session (the branded `dsh-session`
+   * SessionId). Backends key per-session state off it (e.g. windows-acl gives
+   * each live session/workspace pair a random private temp directory and SID,
+   * while the workspace SID and standing grant remain per-workspace); absent
+   * for agentless calls, which fall back to per-call backend state.
+   */
+  sessionId?: SessionId
+}
+```
+
+`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` 接收活跃会话；对于已批准的重试，还接收显式模式。该服务拥有优先级与 root 回退规则，使 bash 和 fs 不必重复实现。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/** Inputs that select the sandbox policy for one capability call. */
+interface SandboxPolicyRequest {
+  /** Calling session; its immutable cwd becomes the workspace boundary. */
+  session?: Session
+  /** Explicit approved mode override, which outranks session policy. */
+  mode?: SandboxMode
+}
+```
+
+只有受约束的执行会到达 `ctx.sandbox`；传给提供方的策略在保留同一 root 的同时收窄模式。这使并发会话、消费方与一次性提权重试可以向同一提供方请求不同边界，而无需改变提供方状态。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * What one confined execution is allowed to touch — carried PER CALL, not
+ * fixed on the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies
+ * at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent
+ * needs its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a
+ * new call with a wider policy. Defaulting/resolution is an explicit step at
+ * the consumer boundary; the provider treats the policy as fully specified.
+ */
+interface SandboxPolicy extends SandboxExecutionPolicy {
+  /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
+  mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
+}
+```
+
+<a id="wrapped-argv-and-classification-dialects"></a>
+
+## 包装后的 argv 与分类方言
+
+`RunnerFailureRule` 汇集用于判定 runner 在执行命令前失败的证据。消费方要求进程以非零状态退出，并同时满足可选的允许退出码门控，以及余下某一 stderr 行中不区分大小写的致命签名。系统会先按不区分大小写的整行精确匹配移除信息性排除项，因此无害的 runner 通知本身不能证明失败。匹配到的行仍可用作错误详情；分类过程不会重写 stderr。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * Evidence that identifies a sandbox runner failing before it executes the
+ * wrapped command. A consumer first applies {@link allowedExitCodes} when
+ * present, removes {@link informationalLines} by case-insensitive exact line
+ * equality, then matches {@link fatalSignatures} case-insensitively within
+ * each remaining stderr line. Exit status alone never proves runner failure.
+ */
+interface RunnerFailureRule {
+  /** Nonzero process exit codes on which this rule may match; omitted permits any nonzero exit. */
+  allowedExitCodes?: readonly number[]
+  /** Non-empty substrings identifying a fatal runner diagnostic on one stderr line. */
+  fatalSignatures: readonly string[]
+  /** Benign stderr lines excluded by exact full-line equality before fatal matching. */
+  informationalLines?: readonly string[]
+}
+```
+
+`ConfinedArgv` 是消费方实际 spawn 的内容。除了替换后的 argv，它还携带后端的强制执行事实和两种正交的 stderr 分类器。`denialSignatures` 用于识别沙箱正常工作时受限命令被阻止的情况。`runnerFailureRules` 用于识别沙箱 runner 在执行命令之前拒绝或失败的情况；消费方应先检查后者，将其作为沙箱基础设施故障上报，而非普通任务失败。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * A {@link SandboxProvider.confine} result: the argv to spawn in place of
+ * the caller's own, plus the enforcement completeness the selected backend
+ * achieves for it.
+ */
+interface ConfinedArgv {
+  /** The wrapped argv (runner, profile, separator, then the caller's argv). */
+  argv: string[]
+  /** How completely the selected backend enforces the policy's file effects. */
+  enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
+  /**
+   * The selected backend's denial DIALECT: the case-insensitive stderr
+   * substrings a file effect denied by THIS backend produces (EROFS text
+   * under bwrap's read-only binds, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under
+   * Seatbelt). A consumer that infers denials from a failed run's stderr
+   * matches against exactly these rather than a cross-backend union — the
+   * union claims denials a given backend never produces.
+   */
+  denialSignatures: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Structured runner-failure evidence rules. Consumers require a matching
+   * fatal stderr line (after informational exclusions) and any rule-specific
+   * exit-code gate before checking denial signatures: runner failure means the
+   * command never ran, while denial means confinement worked and blocked it.
+   */
+  runnerFailureRules: readonly RunnerFailureRule[]
+}
+```
+
+[本地提供方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.zh.md)拥有运维配置，并将其 runner 方言映射到这些规则。[沙箱化 bash 消费方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/shell/bash-sandbox/README.zh.md)拥有 spawn 与结果归因。
+
+## 提供方与 fail-closed 错误
+
+`await ctx.sandbox.confine(argv, policy, signal)` 在执行环境中解析策略路径并返回 `ConfinedArgv`，没有可用后端时以 `SandboxUnavailableError`（错误码 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`）拒绝，提供方无法为该模式准备主机状态时以 `SandboxPreparationError`（`SANDBOX_PREPARATION_FAILED`、`SANDBOX_INVALID_TEMP_ROOT`）拒绝。可选信号可在启动前取消解析。消费方也可以在 spawn 或观察所返回的 argv 时对失败进行分类；该归因属于消费方约定。对于受限策略，静默的无隔离透传永远不合法。
+
+提供方选择、探测、缓存和后端特定的强制执行报告归[本地提供方](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-local/README.zh.md)所有。
+
+<!-- BEGIN GENERATED cordis-surface (gen-cordis-catalog.ts) — do not edit between markers -->
+
+<a id="cordis-surface"></a>
+
+## Cordis API
+
+Generated from source by `scripts/gen-cordis-catalog.ts` (verified fresh by `pnpm run verify-cordis-catalog` in doc-sync; regenerate with `pnpm run gen-cordis-catalog`) — the language sides differ only in locale-specific paired document paths. Signature blocks use a `ts cordis-catalog` fence and keep the original source JSDoc; dispatch modes are defined in the [primer](../cordis-primer.md#dispatch-modes), and the framework-inherited `ctx` API lives in [cordis-api/inherited.md](../cordis-api/inherited.md).
+
+<a id="ctxsandbox--sandboxprovider-abstract-seam"></a>
+
+### `ctx.sandbox` — `SandboxProvider` (abstract seam)
+
+Abstract process-sandbox service. confine must return enforcing argv or fail closed at wrap or runner-execution time; silent unconfined passthrough is forbidden. Functional probes arbitrate multi-runner chains and may be skipped for a sole candidate, whose own refusal remains the fail-closed end.
+
+```ts cordis-catalog
+/**
+ * Wrap `argv` so it executes confined under `policy` on this host; the
+ * caller spawns the returned argv in place of its own.
+ * @param argv - the exact argv the caller is about to spawn (program plus
+ *   arguments), NOT a shell string — a shell-shaped consumer passes
+ *   `['bash', '-c', command]`.
+ * @param policy - the file-effect policy this execution runs under,
+ *   carried per call (see {@link SandboxPolicy}).
+ * @param signal - cancellation while the provider resolves the policy and runner.
+ * @returns the argv to spawn instead, plus the enforcement completeness
+ *   the selected backend achieves for it.
+ */
+abstract confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<ConfinedArgv>
+```
+
+Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts)
+
+<a id="ctxsandboxpolicy--sandboxpolicyservice"></a>
+
+### `ctx.sandboxPolicy` — `SandboxPolicyService`
+
+The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment default mode, fallback workspace root, session-scoped directory grants, and request-time policy section. Tool layers call resolve for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
+
+```ts cordis-catalog
+/**
+ * Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
+ * mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
+ * deployment default. A session cwd is its workspace-write boundary; the
+ * configured root is the fallback for agentless calls and sessions without a
+ * cwd. Configured extra roots and this Session's active registrations are
+ * snapshotted together; existing operations and processes keep their policy.
+ * @param request - optional session and approved mode override.
+ * @returns the fully resolved per-call mode and absolute workspace root.
+ * @throws `SandboxInvalidRootError` (`SANDBOX_INVALID_ROOT`) when the session's recorded cwd is
+ *   relative or contains a NUL byte.
+ */
+resolve(request: SandboxPolicyRequest = {}): SandboxExecutionPolicy
+
+/**
+ * Permit writes under one directory in this Session's future workspace-write
+ * operations. The calling context owns the effect; disposal removes only this
+ * registration. Other grants to the directory remain effective. Existing
+ * operations and persistent processes retain their resolved permissions.
+ * Grants are runtime-only and must be registered again after resume or fork.
+ * On Windows, only harness file tools honor extra grants; process permissions stay unchanged.
+ * @param session - exact live Session receiving the grant; other Sessions and agentless calls are unaffected.
+ * @param directory - absolute execution-world path; execution rejects missing, non-directory, or symlinked paths.
+ * @returns the exact Cordis effect disposer for this registration.
+ * @throws when the directory is relative or contains a NUL byte.
+ */
+registerWritableRoot(session: Session, directory: string): () => void
+
+/**
+ * Read the session override without applying the deployment default.
+ * @param session - session whose log supplies the override.
+ * @returns the last logged mode, or `undefined` without one.
+ */
+overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined
+```
+
+Types: [Session](./session.md)
+
+Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts`](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/blob/master/packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
+<!-- END GENERATED cordis-surface -->