dompurify 3.4.11 → 3.4.13
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/dist/purify.cjs.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.js +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.min.js +2 -2
- package/dist/purify.min.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +6 -6
- package/src/attrs.ts +2 -0
- package/src/purify.ts +335 -35
package/dist/purify.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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1
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-
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.
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1
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+
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.13 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.13/LICENSE */
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(function (global, factory) {
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typeof exports === 'object' && typeof module !== 'undefined' ? module.exports = factory() :
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@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@
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const text = freeze(['#text']);
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const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
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320
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-
const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
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const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
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@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@
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function createDOMPurify() {
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let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
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const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
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-
DOMPurify.version = '3.4.
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+
DOMPurify.version = '3.4.13';
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DOMPurify.removed = [];
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if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
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// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
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@@ -461,6 +461,7 @@
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const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
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const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
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const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
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const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
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// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
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// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
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// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
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@@ -1112,6 +1113,13 @@
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* @param root the in-place root to empty
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*/
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const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
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/* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
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subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
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handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
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whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
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Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
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irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
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_neutralizeSubtree(root);
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const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
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if (childNodes) {
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const snapshot = [];
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@@ -1239,6 +1247,82 @@
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}
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}
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};
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/**
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* _neutralizePatchLinkage
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*
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* IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
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* hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
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*
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* The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
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* markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
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* reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
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* moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
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* node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
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* a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
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* range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
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* so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
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* whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
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* closing that window.
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*
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* This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
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* the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
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* but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
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* to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
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* stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
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*
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* Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
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* clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
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*
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* NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
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* .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
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* <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
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* surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
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* attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
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* that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
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*
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* @param root the in-place root to sweep
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*/
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const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
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if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
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return;
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}
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const stack = [root];
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while (stack.length > 0) {
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const node = stack.pop();
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const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
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/* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
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processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
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if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
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try {
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remove(node);
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} catch (_) {
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/* Best-effort */
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}
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continue;
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}
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/* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
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if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
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const element = node;
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const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
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try {
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if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
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element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
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}
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if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
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element.removeAttribute('for');
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}
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} catch (_) {
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/* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
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}
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}
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const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
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if (childNodes) {
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for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
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stack.push(childNodes[i]);
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}
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}
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}
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};
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/**
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* _initDocument
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*
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* @return The created NodeIterator
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*/
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const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
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-
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/* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
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direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
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clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
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external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
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return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
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"Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
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the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
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any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
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returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
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const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
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return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
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NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
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};
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@@ -1336,7 +1430,11 @@
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const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
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var _node$querySelectorAl;
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node.normalize();
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-
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/* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
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under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
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carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
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const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
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const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
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NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
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let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
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@@ -1489,15 +1587,21 @@
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/**
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* Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
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* allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
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* early - namespace
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*
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*
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* early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
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* intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
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* content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
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*
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* A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
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* returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
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* afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
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* element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
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* elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
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*
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* @param currentNode the disallowed node
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* @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
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* @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
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*/
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-
const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
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const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
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/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
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if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
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if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
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@@ -1520,27 +1624,26 @@
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1624
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
|
|
1521
1625
|
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
|
|
1522
1626
|
const childCount = childNodes.length;
|
|
1523
|
-
/*
|
|
1524
|
-
|
|
1525
|
-
|
|
1526
|
-
|
|
1527
|
-
|
|
1528
|
-
|
|
1529
|
-
|
|
1530
|
-
|
|
1531
|
-
|
|
1532
|
-
|
|
1533
|
-
|
|
1534
|
-
|
|
1535
|
-
|
|
1536
|
-
|
|
1537
|
-
|
|
1538
|
-
event to neutralise.
|
|
1627
|
+
/* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
|
|
1628
|
+
it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
|
|
1629
|
+
nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
|
|
1630
|
+
re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
|
|
1631
|
+
empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
|
|
1632
|
+
pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
|
|
1633
|
+
an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
|
|
1634
|
+
onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
|
|
1635
|
+
relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
|
|
1636
|
+
The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
|
|
1637
|
+
The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
|
|
1638
|
+
ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
|
|
1639
|
+
leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
|
|
1640
|
+
the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
|
|
1641
|
+
here, so that path always takes the move branch.
|
|
1539
1642
|
`childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
|
|
1540
1643
|
valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
|
|
1541
1644
|
the list intact). */
|
|
1542
1645
|
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
1543
|
-
const hoisted =
|
|
1646
|
+
const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
|
|
1544
1647
|
parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
|
|
1545
1648
|
}
|
|
1546
1649
|
}
|
|
@@ -1548,6 +1651,26 @@
|
|
|
1548
1651
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
1549
1652
|
return true;
|
|
1550
1653
|
};
|
|
1654
|
+
/**
|
|
1655
|
+
* Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
|
|
1656
|
+
* (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
|
|
1657
|
+
* hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
|
|
1658
|
+
* reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
|
|
1659
|
+
* already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
|
|
1660
|
+
*
|
|
1661
|
+
* @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
|
|
1662
|
+
* @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
|
|
1663
|
+
* @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
|
|
1664
|
+
* @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
|
|
1665
|
+
* @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
|
|
1666
|
+
* else set unchanged
|
|
1667
|
+
*/
|
|
1668
|
+
const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
|
|
1669
|
+
if (hookList.length === 0) {
|
|
1670
|
+
return set;
|
|
1671
|
+
}
|
|
1672
|
+
return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
|
|
1673
|
+
};
|
|
1551
1674
|
/**
|
|
1552
1675
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
1553
1676
|
*
|
|
@@ -1557,9 +1680,20 @@
|
|
|
1557
1680
|
* @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
1558
1681
|
* @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
1559
1682
|
*/
|
|
1560
|
-
|
|
1683
|
+
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
1684
|
+
const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
|
|
1561
1685
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1562
1686
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
1687
|
+
/* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see the
|
|
1688
|
+
detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). On
|
|
1689
|
+
the IN_PLACE path, neutralize the detached subtree first so a queued
|
|
1690
|
+
resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
|
|
1691
|
+
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1692
|
+
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1693
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1694
|
+
}
|
|
1695
|
+
return true;
|
|
1696
|
+
}
|
|
1563
1697
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
1564
1698
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
1565
1699
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
@@ -1567,11 +1701,47 @@
|
|
|
1567
1701
|
}
|
|
1568
1702
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
1569
1703
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
1704
|
+
/* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
|
|
1705
|
+
hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
|
|
1706
|
+
(e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
|
|
1707
|
+
aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
|
|
1708
|
+
reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
|
|
1709
|
+
ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
1570
1710
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1571
1711
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
|
|
1572
1712
|
tagName,
|
|
1573
1713
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
1574
1714
|
});
|
|
1715
|
+
/* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
|
|
1716
|
+
user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
|
|
1717
|
+
Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
|
|
1718
|
+
genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
|
|
1719
|
+
output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
|
|
1720
|
+
processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
|
|
1721
|
+
checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
|
|
1722
|
+
the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
|
|
1723
|
+
wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
|
|
1724
|
+
opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
|
|
1725
|
+
exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
|
|
1726
|
+
be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
|
|
1727
|
+
REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
|
|
1728
|
+
responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
|
|
1729
|
+
DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
|
|
1730
|
+
DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
|
|
1731
|
+
can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
|
|
1732
|
+
that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
|
|
1733
|
+
in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
|
|
1734
|
+
reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
|
|
1735
|
+
documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
|
|
1736
|
+
the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
|
|
1737
|
+
stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
|
|
1738
|
+
as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
|
|
1739
|
+
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1740
|
+
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1741
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1742
|
+
}
|
|
1743
|
+
return true;
|
|
1744
|
+
}
|
|
1575
1745
|
/* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
|
|
1576
1746
|
if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
|
|
1577
1747
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
@@ -1579,7 +1749,22 @@
|
|
|
1579
1749
|
}
|
|
1580
1750
|
/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
|
|
1581
1751
|
if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
1582
|
-
|
|
1752
|
+
const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
|
|
1753
|
+
/* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
|
|
1754
|
+
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
|
|
1755
|
+
_sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
|
|
1756
|
+
element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
|
|
1757
|
+
security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
|
|
1758
|
+
from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
|
|
1759
|
+
elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
|
|
1760
|
+
tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
|
|
1761
|
+
_sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
|
|
1762
|
+
deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
|
|
1763
|
+
skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
|
|
1764
|
+
if (removed === false) {
|
|
1765
|
+
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
1766
|
+
}
|
|
1767
|
+
return removed;
|
|
1583
1768
|
}
|
|
1584
1769
|
/* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
|
|
1585
1770
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
|
|
@@ -1626,6 +1811,33 @@
|
|
|
1626
1811
|
if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
1627
1812
|
return false;
|
|
1628
1813
|
}
|
|
1814
|
+
/* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
|
|
1815
|
+
(https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
|
|
1816
|
+
Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
|
|
1817
|
+
test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
|
|
1818
|
+
sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
|
|
1819
|
+
parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
|
|
1820
|
+
tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
|
|
1821
|
+
weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
|
|
1822
|
+
stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
|
|
1823
|
+
Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
|
|
1824
|
+
This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
|
|
1825
|
+
it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
|
|
1826
|
+
in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
|
|
1827
|
+
engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
|
|
1828
|
+
anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
|
|
1829
|
+
target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
|
|
1830
|
+
`patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
|
|
1831
|
+
mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
|
|
1832
|
+
other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
|
|
1833
|
+
the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
|
|
1834
|
+
_isUnsafeNode. */
|
|
1835
|
+
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
|
|
1836
|
+
return false;
|
|
1837
|
+
}
|
|
1838
|
+
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
|
|
1839
|
+
return false;
|
|
1840
|
+
}
|
|
1629
1841
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
1630
1842
|
if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
|
|
1631
1843
|
return false;
|
|
@@ -1742,6 +1954,9 @@
|
|
|
1742
1954
|
if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
1743
1955
|
return;
|
|
1744
1956
|
}
|
|
1957
|
+
/* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
|
|
1958
|
+
attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
|
|
1959
|
+
ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
1745
1960
|
const hookEvent = {
|
|
1746
1961
|
attrName: '',
|
|
1747
1962
|
attrValue: '',
|
|
@@ -1835,7 +2050,7 @@
|
|
|
1835
2050
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1836
2051
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
|
|
1837
2052
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
1838
|
-
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
|
|
2053
|
+
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
|
|
1839
2054
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
1840
2055
|
_sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
|
|
1841
2056
|
/* Deep shadow DOM detected.
|
|
@@ -2026,6 +2241,11 @@
|
|
|
2026
2241
|
keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
|
|
2027
2242
|
const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
|
|
2028
2243
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
2244
|
+
/* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
|
|
2245
|
+
linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
|
|
2246
|
+
mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
|
|
2247
|
+
it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
|
|
2248
|
+
_neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
|
|
2029
2249
|
/* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
|
|
2030
2250
|
Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
|
|
2031
2251
|
child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
|
|
@@ -2035,6 +2255,9 @@
|
|
|
2035
2255
|
if (typeof nn === 'string') {
|
|
2036
2256
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
|
|
2037
2257
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
2258
|
+
/* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
|
|
2259
|
+
throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
|
|
2260
|
+
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2038
2261
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
2039
2262
|
}
|
|
2040
2263
|
}
|
|
@@ -2049,6 +2272,10 @@
|
|
|
2049
2272
|
the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
|
|
2050
2273
|
the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
|
|
2051
2274
|
if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
|
|
2275
|
+
/* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
|
|
2276
|
+
_neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
|
|
2277
|
+
form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
|
|
2278
|
+
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2052
2279
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
2053
2280
|
}
|
|
2054
2281
|
/* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
|
|
@@ -2101,20 +2328,24 @@
|
|
|
2101
2328
|
_forceRemove(body.firstChild);
|
|
2102
2329
|
}
|
|
2103
2330
|
/* Get node iterator */
|
|
2104
|
-
const
|
|
2331
|
+
const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
|
|
2105
2332
|
/* Now start iterating over the created document.
|
|
2106
2333
|
The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
|
|
2107
2334
|
engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
|
|
2108
2335
|
`_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
|
|
2109
2336
|
barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
|
|
2110
|
-
unvisited tail still armed.
|
|
2111
|
-
|
|
2112
|
-
|
|
2113
|
-
|
|
2337
|
+
unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
|
|
2338
|
+
barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
|
|
2339
|
+
and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
|
|
2340
|
+
closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
|
|
2341
|
+
strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
|
|
2342
|
+
contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
|
|
2343
|
+
body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
|
|
2114
2344
|
try {
|
|
2345
|
+
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
|
|
2115
2346
|
while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
2116
2347
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
2117
|
-
_sanitizeElements(currentNode);
|
|
2348
|
+
_sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
|
|
2118
2349
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
2119
2350
|
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
|
|
2120
2351
|
/* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
|
|
@@ -2128,6 +2359,14 @@
|
|
|
2128
2359
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
2129
2360
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
2130
2361
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2362
|
+
/* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
|
|
2363
|
+
detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
|
|
2364
|
+
reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
|
|
2365
|
+
arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
|
|
2366
|
+
if (entry.element) {
|
|
2367
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
|
|
2368
|
+
}
|
|
2369
|
+
});
|
|
2131
2370
|
}
|
|
2132
2371
|
throw error;
|
|
2133
2372
|
}
|