dompurify 3.4.11 → 3.4.13
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/dist/purify.cjs.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.cjs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.d.mts +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.es.mjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.js +274 -35
- package/dist/purify.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purify.min.js +2 -2
- package/dist/purify.min.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +6 -6
- package/src/attrs.ts +2 -0
- package/src/purify.ts +335 -35
package/dist/purify.es.mjs
CHANGED
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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1
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-
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.
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1
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+
/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.13 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.13/LICENSE */
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function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
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(null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
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@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongd
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const text = freeze(['#text']);
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const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
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-
const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
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const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
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const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
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@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options
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function createDOMPurify() {
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let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
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const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
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-
DOMPurify.version = '3.4.
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DOMPurify.version = '3.4.13';
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DOMPurify.removed = [];
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if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
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// Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
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@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
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const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
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const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
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const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
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// As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
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// new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
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// (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
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@@ -1106,6 +1107,13 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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* @param root the in-place root to empty
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*/
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const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
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/* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
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subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
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handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
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whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
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Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
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irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
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_neutralizeSubtree(root);
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const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
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if (childNodes) {
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const snapshot = [];
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@@ -1233,6 +1241,82 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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}
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}
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};
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/**
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* _neutralizePatchLinkage
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*
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* IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
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* hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
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*
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* The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
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* markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
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* reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
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* moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
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* node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
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* a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
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* range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
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* so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
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* whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
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* closing that window.
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*
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* This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
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* the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
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* but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
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* to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
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* stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
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*
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* Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
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* clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
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*
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* NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
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* .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
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* <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
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* surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
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* attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
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* that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
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*
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* @param root the in-place root to sweep
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*/
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const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
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if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
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return;
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}
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const stack = [root];
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while (stack.length > 0) {
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const node = stack.pop();
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const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
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/* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
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processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
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if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
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try {
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remove(node);
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} catch (_) {
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/* Best-effort */
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}
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continue;
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}
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/* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
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if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
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const element = node;
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const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
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try {
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if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
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element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
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}
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if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
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element.removeAttribute('for');
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}
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} catch (_) {
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/* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
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}
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}
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const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
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if (childNodes) {
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for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
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stack.push(childNodes[i]);
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}
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}
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}
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};
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/**
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* _initDocument
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*
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@@ -1290,7 +1374,17 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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* @return The created NodeIterator
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*/
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const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
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-
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/* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
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direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
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clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
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external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
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return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
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"Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
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the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
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any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
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returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
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const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
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return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
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NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
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};
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@@ -1330,7 +1424,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
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var _node$querySelectorAl;
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node.normalize();
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1333
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-
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/* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
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under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
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carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
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const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
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const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
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NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
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let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
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@@ -1483,15 +1581,21 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
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/**
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* Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
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* allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
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-
* early - namespace
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*
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*
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* early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
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* intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
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* content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
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*
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* A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
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* returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
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* afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
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* element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
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* elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
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*
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* @param currentNode the disallowed node
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* @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
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* @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
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*/
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-
const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
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const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
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1495
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/* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
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if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
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1601
|
if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
|
|
@@ -1514,27 +1618,26 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1514
1618
|
const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
|
|
1515
1619
|
if (childNodes && parentNode) {
|
|
1516
1620
|
const childCount = childNodes.length;
|
|
1517
|
-
/*
|
|
1518
|
-
|
|
1519
|
-
|
|
1520
|
-
|
|
1521
|
-
|
|
1522
|
-
|
|
1523
|
-
|
|
1524
|
-
|
|
1525
|
-
|
|
1526
|
-
|
|
1527
|
-
|
|
1528
|
-
|
|
1529
|
-
|
|
1530
|
-
|
|
1531
|
-
|
|
1532
|
-
event to neutralise.
|
|
1621
|
+
/* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
|
|
1622
|
+
it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
|
|
1623
|
+
nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
|
|
1624
|
+
re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
|
|
1625
|
+
empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
|
|
1626
|
+
pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
|
|
1627
|
+
an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
|
|
1628
|
+
onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
|
|
1629
|
+
relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
|
|
1630
|
+
The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
|
|
1631
|
+
The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
|
|
1632
|
+
ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
|
|
1633
|
+
leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
|
|
1634
|
+
the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
|
|
1635
|
+
here, so that path always takes the move branch.
|
|
1533
1636
|
`childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
|
|
1534
1637
|
valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
|
|
1535
1638
|
the list intact). */
|
|
1536
1639
|
for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
1537
|
-
const hoisted =
|
|
1640
|
+
const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
|
|
1538
1641
|
parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
|
|
1539
1642
|
}
|
|
1540
1643
|
}
|
|
@@ -1542,6 +1645,26 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1542
1645
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
1543
1646
|
return true;
|
|
1544
1647
|
};
|
|
1648
|
+
/**
|
|
1649
|
+
* Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
|
|
1650
|
+
* (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
|
|
1651
|
+
* hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
|
|
1652
|
+
* reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
|
|
1653
|
+
* already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
|
|
1654
|
+
*
|
|
1655
|
+
* @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
|
|
1656
|
+
* @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
|
|
1657
|
+
* @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
|
|
1658
|
+
* @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
|
|
1659
|
+
* @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
|
|
1660
|
+
* else set unchanged
|
|
1661
|
+
*/
|
|
1662
|
+
const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
|
|
1663
|
+
if (hookList.length === 0) {
|
|
1664
|
+
return set;
|
|
1665
|
+
}
|
|
1666
|
+
return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
|
|
1667
|
+
};
|
|
1545
1668
|
/**
|
|
1546
1669
|
* _sanitizeElements
|
|
1547
1670
|
*
|
|
@@ -1551,9 +1674,20 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1551
1674
|
* @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
|
|
1552
1675
|
* @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
|
|
1553
1676
|
*/
|
|
1554
|
-
|
|
1677
|
+
// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
|
|
1678
|
+
const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
|
|
1555
1679
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1556
1680
|
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
1681
|
+
/* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see the
|
|
1682
|
+
detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). On
|
|
1683
|
+
the IN_PLACE path, neutralize the detached subtree first so a queued
|
|
1684
|
+
resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
|
|
1685
|
+
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1686
|
+
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1687
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1688
|
+
}
|
|
1689
|
+
return true;
|
|
1690
|
+
}
|
|
1557
1691
|
/* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
|
|
1558
1692
|
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
1559
1693
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
@@ -1561,11 +1695,47 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1561
1695
|
}
|
|
1562
1696
|
/* Now let's check the element's type and name */
|
|
1563
1697
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
|
|
1698
|
+
/* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
|
|
1699
|
+
hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
|
|
1700
|
+
(e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
|
|
1701
|
+
aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
|
|
1702
|
+
reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
|
|
1703
|
+
ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
|
|
1564
1704
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1565
1705
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
|
|
1566
1706
|
tagName,
|
|
1567
1707
|
allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
|
|
1568
1708
|
});
|
|
1709
|
+
/* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
|
|
1710
|
+
user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
|
|
1711
|
+
Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
|
|
1712
|
+
genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
|
|
1713
|
+
output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
|
|
1714
|
+
processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
|
|
1715
|
+
checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
|
|
1716
|
+
the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
|
|
1717
|
+
wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
|
|
1718
|
+
opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
|
|
1719
|
+
exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
|
|
1720
|
+
be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
|
|
1721
|
+
REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
|
|
1722
|
+
responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
|
|
1723
|
+
DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
|
|
1724
|
+
DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
|
|
1725
|
+
can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
|
|
1726
|
+
that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
|
|
1727
|
+
in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
|
|
1728
|
+
reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
|
|
1729
|
+
documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
|
|
1730
|
+
the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
|
|
1731
|
+
stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
|
|
1732
|
+
as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
|
|
1733
|
+
if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
|
|
1734
|
+
if (IN_PLACE) {
|
|
1735
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
|
|
1736
|
+
}
|
|
1737
|
+
return true;
|
|
1738
|
+
}
|
|
1569
1739
|
/* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
|
|
1570
1740
|
if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
|
|
1571
1741
|
_forceRemove(currentNode);
|
|
@@ -1573,7 +1743,22 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1573
1743
|
}
|
|
1574
1744
|
/* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
|
|
1575
1745
|
if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
1576
|
-
|
|
1746
|
+
const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
|
|
1747
|
+
/* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
|
|
1748
|
+
CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
|
|
1749
|
+
_sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
|
|
1750
|
+
element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
|
|
1751
|
+
security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
|
|
1752
|
+
from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
|
|
1753
|
+
elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
|
|
1754
|
+
tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
|
|
1755
|
+
_sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
|
|
1756
|
+
deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
|
|
1757
|
+
skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
|
|
1758
|
+
if (removed === false) {
|
|
1759
|
+
_executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
|
|
1760
|
+
}
|
|
1761
|
+
return removed;
|
|
1577
1762
|
}
|
|
1578
1763
|
/* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
|
|
1579
1764
|
Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
|
|
@@ -1620,6 +1805,33 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1620
1805
|
if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
|
|
1621
1806
|
return false;
|
|
1622
1807
|
}
|
|
1808
|
+
/* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
|
|
1809
|
+
(https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
|
|
1810
|
+
Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
|
|
1811
|
+
test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
|
|
1812
|
+
sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
|
|
1813
|
+
parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
|
|
1814
|
+
tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
|
|
1815
|
+
weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
|
|
1816
|
+
stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
|
|
1817
|
+
Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
|
|
1818
|
+
This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
|
|
1819
|
+
it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
|
|
1820
|
+
in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
|
|
1821
|
+
engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
|
|
1822
|
+
anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
|
|
1823
|
+
target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
|
|
1824
|
+
`patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
|
|
1825
|
+
mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
|
|
1826
|
+
other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
|
|
1827
|
+
the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
|
|
1828
|
+
_isUnsafeNode. */
|
|
1829
|
+
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
|
|
1830
|
+
return false;
|
|
1831
|
+
}
|
|
1832
|
+
if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
|
|
1833
|
+
return false;
|
|
1834
|
+
}
|
|
1623
1835
|
/* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
|
|
1624
1836
|
if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
|
|
1625
1837
|
return false;
|
|
@@ -1736,6 +1948,9 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1736
1948
|
if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
|
|
1737
1949
|
return;
|
|
1738
1950
|
}
|
|
1951
|
+
/* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
|
|
1952
|
+
attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
|
|
1953
|
+
ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
|
|
1739
1954
|
const hookEvent = {
|
|
1740
1955
|
attrName: '',
|
|
1741
1956
|
attrValue: '',
|
|
@@ -1829,7 +2044,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
1829
2044
|
/* Execute a hook if present */
|
|
1830
2045
|
_executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
|
|
1831
2046
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
1832
|
-
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
|
|
2047
|
+
_sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
|
|
1833
2048
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
1834
2049
|
_sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
|
|
1835
2050
|
/* Deep shadow DOM detected.
|
|
@@ -2020,6 +2235,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
2020
2235
|
keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
|
|
2021
2236
|
const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
|
|
2022
2237
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
2238
|
+
/* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
|
|
2239
|
+
linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
|
|
2240
|
+
mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
|
|
2241
|
+
it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
|
|
2242
|
+
_neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
|
|
2023
2243
|
/* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
|
|
2024
2244
|
Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
|
|
2025
2245
|
child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
|
|
@@ -2029,6 +2249,9 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
2029
2249
|
if (typeof nn === 'string') {
|
|
2030
2250
|
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
|
|
2031
2251
|
if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
|
|
2252
|
+
/* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
|
|
2253
|
+
throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
|
|
2254
|
+
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2032
2255
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
2033
2256
|
}
|
|
2034
2257
|
}
|
|
@@ -2043,6 +2266,10 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
2043
2266
|
the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
|
|
2044
2267
|
the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
|
|
2045
2268
|
if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
|
|
2269
|
+
/* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
|
|
2270
|
+
_neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
|
|
2271
|
+
form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
|
|
2272
|
+
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2046
2273
|
throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
|
|
2047
2274
|
}
|
|
2048
2275
|
/* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
|
|
@@ -2095,20 +2322,24 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
2095
2322
|
_forceRemove(body.firstChild);
|
|
2096
2323
|
}
|
|
2097
2324
|
/* Get node iterator */
|
|
2098
|
-
const
|
|
2325
|
+
const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
|
|
2099
2326
|
/* Now start iterating over the created document.
|
|
2100
2327
|
The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
|
|
2101
2328
|
engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
|
|
2102
2329
|
`_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
|
|
2103
2330
|
barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
|
|
2104
|
-
unvisited tail still armed.
|
|
2105
|
-
|
|
2106
|
-
|
|
2107
|
-
|
|
2331
|
+
unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
|
|
2332
|
+
barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
|
|
2333
|
+
and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
|
|
2334
|
+
closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
|
|
2335
|
+
strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
|
|
2336
|
+
contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
|
|
2337
|
+
body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
|
|
2108
2338
|
try {
|
|
2339
|
+
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
|
|
2109
2340
|
while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
|
|
2110
2341
|
/* Sanitize tags and elements */
|
|
2111
|
-
_sanitizeElements(currentNode);
|
|
2342
|
+
_sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
|
|
2112
2343
|
/* Check attributes next */
|
|
2113
2344
|
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
|
|
2114
2345
|
/* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
|
|
@@ -2122,6 +2353,14 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
|
|
|
2122
2353
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
2123
2354
|
if (inPlace) {
|
|
2124
2355
|
_neutralizeRoot(dirty);
|
|
2356
|
+
/* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
|
|
2357
|
+
detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
|
|
2358
|
+
reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
|
|
2359
|
+
arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
|
|
2360
|
+
if (entry.element) {
|
|
2361
|
+
_neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
|
|
2362
|
+
}
|
|
2363
|
+
});
|
|
2125
2364
|
}
|
|
2126
2365
|
throw error;
|
|
2127
2366
|
}
|