discord-agent-bridge 0.1.0

package/dist/cli.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+// Mock the three modules cli.ts dispatches to so no real bot boots, no real wizard
+// runs, and no real config file is touched. Spies are declared via vi.hoisted so
+// they exist before the (hoisted) vi.mock factories reference them.
+//
+// `exists`/`tokenPresent` drive the mocked ConfigStore's needsSetup inputs: exists()
+// returns `exists`, and load() returns a config whose token is empty (needs setup)
+// or non-empty (already configured) based on `tokenPresent`. A load() that should
+// throw (invalid config) is exercised where noted.
+const { startBot, runSetup, exists, load } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+    startBot: vi.fn(async () => ({})),
+    runSetup: vi.fn(async () => { }),
+    exists: vi.fn(() => true),
+    load: vi.fn(() => ({ discord: { token: 'present', clientId: 'client-id-000' } })),
+}));
+vi.mock('./app.js', () => ({ startBot }));
+vi.mock('./setup/wizard.js', () => ({ runSetup }));
+vi.mock('./core/config.js', () => ({
+    ConfigStore: class {
+        exists = exists;
+        load = load;
+    },
+}));
+import { run, readVersion } from './cli.js';
+describe('cli.run — argv dispatch', () => {
+    let logSpy;
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        startBot.mockClear();
+        runSetup.mockClear();
+        exists.mockReset();
+        load.mockReset();
+        // Default: configured (config present, token present) so the no-flag path starts
+        // directly unless a test opts into the first-run condition below.
+        exists.mockReturnValue(true);
+        load.mockReturnValue({ discord: { token: 'present', clientId: 'client-id-000' } });
+        logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => { });
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        logSpy.mockRestore();
+    });
+    it('--version prints the package version and boots nothing', async () => {
+        await run(['--version']);
+        expect(logSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(readVersion());
+        // readVersion() reads the real package.json — assert it looks like a semver.
+        expect(readVersion()).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+/);
+        expect(startBot).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(runSetup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+    it('--setup calls runSetup only and boots nothing', async () => {
+        await run(['--setup']);
+        expect(runSetup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(startBot).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        // --setup must not even probe config presence: it is an explicit re-configure.
+        expect(exists).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+    it('no flag + no config → runs setup THEN starts the bot (in that order)', async () => {
+        exists.mockReturnValue(false); // no config.json → needs setup
+        await run([]);
+        expect(runSetup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(startBot).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        // Order: setup must complete before the bot starts.
+        expect(runSetup.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]).toBeLessThan(startBot.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]);
+        // load() is never consulted when the file does not exist.
+        expect(load).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+    it('no flag + config present with empty token → runs setup THEN starts the bot', async () => {
+        exists.mockReturnValue(true);
+        load.mockReturnValue({ discord: { token: '   ', clientId: 'client-id-000' } });
+        await run([]);
+        expect(runSetup).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(startBot).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(runSetup.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]).toBeLessThan(startBot.mock.invocationCallOrder[0]);
+    });
+    it('no flag + config present and valid → starts the bot only (setup NOT called)', async () => {
+        // Defaults from beforeEach: exists()=true, token present.
+        await run([]);
+        expect(startBot).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        expect(runSetup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+    it('no flag + present-but-invalid config → error propagates (no auto-setup swallow)', async () => {
+        exists.mockReturnValue(true);
+        load.mockImplementation(() => {
+            throw new Error('invalid config');
+        });
+        await expect(run([])).rejects.toThrow('invalid config');
+        // A real config bug must not trigger the wizard or a bot start.
+        expect(runSetup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(startBot).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli.test.js.map

package/dist/cli.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"cli.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/cli.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAEzE,mFAAmF;AACnF,iFAAiF;AACjF,oEAAoE;AACpE,EAAE;AACF,qFAAqF;AACrF,mFAAmF;AACnF,kFAAkF;AAClF,mDAAmD;AACnD,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7D,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAU,CAAC;IAC1C,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,GAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/B,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IACzB,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;CAClF,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEJ,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1C,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACnD,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,WAAW,EAAE;QACX,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;KACb;CACF,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEJ,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAE5C,QAAQ,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IACvC,IAAI,MAAmC,CAAC;IAExC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;QACd,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACnB,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACjB,iFAAiF;QACjF,kEAAkE;QAClE,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACnF,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACjE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACH,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;QACb,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;IACvB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QACtE,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACzB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACnD,6EAA6E;QAC7E,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,+CAA+C,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QAC7D,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvB,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,+EAA+E;QAC/E,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,sEAAsE,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QACpF,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,+BAA+B;QAE9D,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAEd,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,oDAAoD;QACpD,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CACvD,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAE,CACtC,CAAC;QACF,0DAA0D;QAC1D,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IACtC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,4EAA4E,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QAC1F,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAE/E,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAEd,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CACvD,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAE,CACtC,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,6EAA6E,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QAC3F,0DAA0D;QAC1D,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAEd,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,iFAAiF,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;QAC/F,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;YAC3B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;QACpC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;QACxD,gEAAgE;QAChE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/core/auditLog.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import * as os from 'node:os';
+import { redact } from './logger.js';
+// Append-only who/when/what audit trail (§7.5). Each record() appends ONE JSON
+// line to audit/audit.jsonl under the DAB home dir; it never rewrites the file,
+// so history is tamper-evident by append. Secrets are scrubbed via the chunk-1
+// logger's redact() before the line is written.
+//
+// The base dir is injectable (same convention as ConfigStore/StateStore): explicit
+// ctor arg > env DAB_HOME > ~/.discord-agent-bridge/, so tests never touch the real
+// home. The clock is injectable so the `when` timestamp is deterministic in tests.
+//
+// Optional Discord channel sink: an injectable callback the later Discord chunk
+// wires to a channel emitter (§7.5 "optionally mirrored"). discord.js is NOT
+// imported here — core stays mode/transport-agnostic.
+const DEFAULT_DIR_NAME = '.discord-agent-bridge';
+const AUDIT_FILE_NAME = 'audit.jsonl';
+function defaultBaseDir() {
+    const fromEnv = process.env.DAB_HOME;
+    if (fromEnv && fromEnv.length > 0)
+        return fromEnv;
+    return path.join(os.homedir(), DEFAULT_DIR_NAME);
+}
+export class AuditLog {
+    baseDir;
+    now;
+    sink;
+    constructor(options = {}) {
+        this.baseDir = options.baseDir ?? defaultBaseDir();
+        this.now = options.now ?? (() => new Date().toISOString());
+        this.sink = options.sink;
+    }
+    get dir() {
+        return path.join(this.baseDir, 'audit');
+    }
+    get filePath() {
+        return path.join(this.dir, AUDIT_FILE_NAME);
+    }
+    // Stamp the timestamp, redact secrets, append one JSON line. The dir is created
+    // if missing. Best-effort: a transient fs failure (mkdir/append) is logged
+    // loudly but NEVER thrown to the caller — audit is on the fire-and-forget turn
+    // pipeline (sessionOrchestrator drain), so a write failure must not stall a
+    // channel's turn queue. The optional sink still runs and the record is still
+    // returned even when the durable append failed.
+    record(entry) {
+        const record = { ...entry, timestamp: this.now() };
+        const scrubbed = redact(record);
+        try {
+            this.ensureDir();
+            fs.appendFileSync(this.filePath, JSON.stringify(scrubbed) + '\n', { encoding: 'utf-8' });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            console.error(`[audit] failed to write ${this.filePath}: ${String(err)}`);
+        }
+        this.sink?.(scrubbed);
+        return scrubbed;
+    }
+    ensureDir() {
+        if (!fs.existsSync(this.dir)) {
+            fs.mkdirSync(this.dir, { recursive: true });
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=auditLog.js.map

package/dist/core/auditLog.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auditLog.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/auditLog.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9B,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAClC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAE9B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErC,+EAA+E;AAC/E,gFAAgF;AAChF,+EAA+E;AAC/E,gDAAgD;AAChD,EAAE;AACF,mFAAmF;AACnF,oFAAoF;AACpF,mFAAmF;AACnF,EAAE;AACF,gFAAgF;AAChF,6EAA6E;AAC7E,sDAAsD;AACtD,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACjD,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC;AAEtC,SAAS,cAAc;IACrB,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IACrC,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;IAClD,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;AACnD,CAAC;AAcD,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;IACF,OAAO,CAAS;IAChB,GAAG,CAAe;IAClB,IAAI,CAAa;IAElC,YAAY,UAA2B,EAAE;QACvC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QACnD,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IAC3B,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,GAAG;QACL,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1C,CAAC;IAED,IAAI,QAAQ;QACV,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,CAAC;IAED,gFAAgF;IAChF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,+EAA+E;IAC/E,4EAA4E;IAC5E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,gDAAgD;IAChD,MAAM,CAAC,KAAiB;QACtB,MAAM,MAAM,GAAgB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAChE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAgB,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACjB,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3F,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACb,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,2BAA2B,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5E,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QACtB,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IAClB,CAAC;IAEO,SAAS;QACf,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC7B,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/core/auditLog.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import * as os from 'node:os';
+import { AuditLog } from './auditLog.js';
+const FIXED_NOW = '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z';
+function entry(overrides = {}) {
+    return {
+        actorId: 'u1',
+        roleTier: 'execute',
+        guildId: 'g1',
+        channelId: 'c1',
+        action: 'turn',
+        ...overrides,
+    };
+}
+describe('AuditLog', () => {
+    let dir;
+    function build(sink) {
+        return new AuditLog({ baseDir: dir, now: () => FIXED_NOW, sink });
+    }
+    function readLines(log) {
+        return fs
+            .readFileSync(log.filePath, 'utf-8')
+            .split('\n')
+            .filter((l) => l.length > 0);
+    }
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'dab-audit-'));
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+    it('creates the audit dir and appends one JSON line', () => {
+        const log = build();
+        expect(fs.existsSync(log.dir)).toBe(false); // dir not created until first record
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'command', command: 'ls -la' }));
+        expect(fs.existsSync(log.dir)).toBe(true);
+        const lines = readLines(log);
+        expect(lines).toHaveLength(1);
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(lines[0]);
+        expect(parsed.action).toBe('command');
+        expect(parsed.command).toBe('ls -la');
+    });
+    it('stamps the injected clock as the deterministic timestamp', () => {
+        const log = build();
+        const rec = log.record(entry());
+        expect(rec.timestamp).toBe(FIXED_NOW);
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(readLines(log)[0]);
+        expect(parsed.timestamp).toBe(FIXED_NOW);
+    });
+    it('appends (does not overwrite) across multiple records', () => {
+        const log = build();
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'turn' }));
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'command', command: 'git status' }));
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'tool', tool: 'Read' }));
+        const lines = readLines(log);
+        expect(lines).toHaveLength(3);
+        expect(JSON.parse(lines[0]).action).toBe('turn');
+        expect(JSON.parse(lines[1]).command).toBe('git status');
+        expect(JSON.parse(lines[2]).tool).toBe('Read');
+    });
+    it('redacts secrets in the written line', () => {
+        const log = build();
+        // Synthetic Discord-token-SHAPE value (23-28 . 6-7 . 27-40 chars), assembled
+        // at runtime so no realistic token literal lives in source.
+        const fakeToken = ['X'.repeat(24), 'Y'.repeat(6), 'Z'.repeat(28)].join('.');
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'command', command: `login ${fakeToken}` }));
+        const raw = fs.readFileSync(log.filePath, 'utf-8');
+        expect(raw).not.toContain(fakeToken);
+        expect(raw).toContain('[REDACTED]');
+        // Non-secret fields survive redaction.
+        expect(JSON.parse(readLines(log)[0]).actorId).toBe('u1');
+    });
+    it('is best-effort: a forced write failure does not throw out of record()', () => {
+        // Plant a regular FILE where the audit dir would go, so mkdir is skipped
+        // (existsSync true) and the append under it fails with ENOTDIR. record()
+        // must swallow this — a transient audit failure cannot stall the turn queue.
+        const log = build();
+        fs.writeFileSync(log.dir, 'not a directory');
+        const errors = [];
+        const orig = console.error;
+        console.error = (...a) => errors.push(a);
+        try {
+            const rec = log.record(entry({ action: 'turn' }));
+            // No throw; the record is still returned and the sink still runs.
+            expect(rec.action).toBe('turn');
+            expect(rec.timestamp).toBe(FIXED_NOW);
+        }
+        finally {
+            console.error = orig;
+        }
+        // The failure was logged loudly.
+        expect(errors.length).toBe(1);
+        // Nothing was durably written (the append failed).
+        expect(fs.existsSync(log.filePath)).toBe(false);
+    });
+    it('still runs the sink even when the durable append fails', () => {
+        const seen = [];
+        const log = build((r) => seen.push(r));
+        fs.writeFileSync(log.dir, 'not a directory');
+        const orig = console.error;
+        console.error = () => { };
+        try {
+            log.record(entry({ action: 'turn' }));
+        }
+        finally {
+            console.error = orig;
+        }
+        expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(seen[0].timestamp).toBe(FIXED_NOW);
+    });
+    it('invokes the optional sink with the redacted record', () => {
+        const seen = [];
+        const log = build((r) => seen.push(r));
+        const fakeToken = ['A'.repeat(24), 'B'.repeat(6), 'C'.repeat(28)].join('.');
+        log.record(entry({ action: 'command', command: `run ${fakeToken}` }));
+        expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+        expect(seen[0].timestamp).toBe(FIXED_NOW);
+        expect(JSON.stringify(seen[0])).not.toContain(fakeToken);
+        expect(JSON.stringify(seen[0])).toContain('[REDACTED]');
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=auditLog.test.js.map

package/dist/core/auditLog.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auditLog.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/auditLog.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9B,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAClC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAoB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAG3D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAE7C,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,YAAiC,EAAE;IAChD,OAAO;QACL,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI;QACb,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS;QACnB,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI;QACb,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;QACf,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;QACd,GAAG,SAAS;KACb,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IACxB,IAAI,GAAW,CAAC;IAEhB,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,IAA+B;QAC5C,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACpE,CAAC;IAED,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,GAAa;QAC9B,OAAO,EAAE;aACN,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;aACnC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;aACX,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IAED,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;QACd,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7D,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;QACb,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,iDAAiD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QACzD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,qCAAqC;QACjF,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5D,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAgB,CAAC;QACnD,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,0DAA0D,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAClE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QAChC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAgB,CAAC;QAC5D,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAC9D,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACtC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAChE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACpD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9B,MAAM,CAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAClE,MAAM,CAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QACzE,MAAM,CAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAClE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,qCAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAC7C,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,6EAA6E;QAC7E,4DAA4D;QAC5D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5E,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACxE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACnD,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACrC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QACpC,uCAAuC;QACvC,MAAM,CAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5E,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,uEAAuE,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAC/E,yEAAyE;QACzE,yEAAyE;QACzE,6EAA6E;QAC7E,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,MAAM,MAAM,GAAc,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAY,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACpD,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAClD,kEAAkE;YAClE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAChC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACxC,CAAC;gBAAS,CAAC;YACT,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QACD,iCAAiC;QACjC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9B,mDAAmD;QACnD,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAClD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAChE,MAAM,IAAI,GAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvC,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7C,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,GAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACzB,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACxC,CAAC;gBAAS,CAAC;YACT,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QACD,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,EAAE,CAAC,oDAAoD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;QAC5D,MAAM,IAAI,GAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5E,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QACtE,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/core/auth.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Tier ranking for the ⊇ relation (higher grants everything a lower one does).
+const TIER_RANK = { 'read-only': 1, execute: 2, admin: 3 };
+// Minimum tier each action requires. 'drive' (start session / run turn) and
+// 'run-command' (!cmd) are the execute-tier "driver" actions (§7.1); 'read'
+// (status/transcript/usage) needs only read-only; 'admin' needs admin.
+const ACTION_MIN_TIER = {
+    admin: 'admin',
+    drive: 'execute',
+    'run-command': 'execute',
+    read: 'read-only',
+};
+export class Authorizer {
+    configStore;
+    channelRegistry;
+    constructor(configStore, channelRegistry) {
+        this.configStore = configStore;
+        this.channelRegistry = channelRegistry;
+    }
+    authorize(input) {
+        const { guildId, channelId } = input.context;
+        // No guild → DM. Deny unless dmPolicy explicitly allows (deny-by-default, §7.1).
+        if (guildId === undefined) {
+            const global = this.configStore.load();
+            if (global.auth.dmPolicy !== 'allow') {
+                return { allowed: false, reason: 'DMs are not permitted (dmPolicy=deny).' };
+            }
+            // DM allowed: fall through with global-only allowlists (no server layer for DMs).
+            return this.decide(this.effectiveAuth(global, null), input, undefined);
+        }
+        const global = this.configStore.load();
+        const server = this.configStore.loadServerConfig(guildId);
+        const effective = this.effectiveAuth(global, server);
+        const binding = channelId !== undefined ? this.channelRegistry.get(guildId, channelId) : undefined;
+        return this.decide(effective, input, binding?.projectAuth);
+    }
+    // Layer server auth over global. A server allowlist, when present, replaces that
+    // tier's global list (server-scoped override, §7.1/§8.1); an absent server field
+    // falls through to global.
+    //
+    // AUTH MODEL (decided 2026-07-01): the server layer OVERRIDES per tier — a
+    // present server list REPLACES the global list for that tier and MAY WIDEN or
+    // NARROW it (it is not constrained to an intersection). The project-level ACL
+    // (projectAuth on the channel binding) then INTERSECTS on top (narrows only).
+    // So widening happens only at the server layer; the project layer can only
+    // further restrict. See auth.test.ts (server override widens) + §7.1/§8.1.
+    effectiveAuth(global, server) {
+        const g = global.auth;
+        const s = server?.auth;
+        return {
+            adminRoleIds: s?.adminRoleIds ?? g.adminRoleIds,
+            executeRoleIds: s?.executeRoleIds ?? g.executeRoleIds,
+            readOnlyRoleIds: s?.readOnlyRoleIds ?? g.readOnlyRoleIds,
+            dmPolicy: g.dmPolicy,
+        };
+    }
+    // Resolve the actor's highest tier from the allowlists, then check it clears the
+    // action's minimum tier and (if present) the per-project ACL.
+    decide(auth, input, projectAuth) {
+        // A Discord Administrator is ALWAYS the admin tier and bypasses both the role
+        // allowlists and the per-project ACL — the operator who set the bot up can never
+        // lock themselves out (e.g. by pointing the admin tier at the wrong role). This is
+        // the only widening path; every other actor stays deny-by-default below.
+        if (input.isAdministrator === true) {
+            return { allowed: true, tier: 'admin' };
+        }
+        const tier = this.resolveTier(auth, input.roleIds);
+        if (tier === null) {
+            return { allowed: false, reason: 'No authorized role for this actor (fail-secure).' };
+        }
+        const required = ACTION_MIN_TIER[input.action];
+        if (TIER_RANK[tier] < TIER_RANK[required]) {
+            return {
+                allowed: false,
+                reason: `Action '${input.action}' requires '${required}'; actor tier is '${tier}'.`,
+                tier,
+            };
+        }
+        // Per-project ACL narrows access: when a binding lists allowed roles/users, the
+        // actor must match one of them IN ADDITION to clearing the tier check (§7.1).
+        if (projectAuth) {
+            const allowedByUser = projectAuth.allowedUserIds.includes(input.userId);
+            const allowedByRole = input.roleIds.some((r) => projectAuth.allowedRoleIds.includes(r));
+            if (!allowedByUser && !allowedByRole) {
+                return {
+                    allowed: false,
+                    reason: 'Actor is not in this project’s access list (projectAuth).',
+                    tier,
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        return { allowed: true, tier };
+    }
+    // Highest tier the actor's roles grant, or null if none match (deny-by-default).
+    resolveTier(auth, roleIds) {
+        const roles = new Set(roleIds);
+        const has = (allow) => allow.some((id) => roles.has(id));
+        if (has(auth.adminRoleIds))
+            return 'admin';
+        if (has(auth.executeRoleIds))
+            return 'execute';
+        if (has(auth.readOnlyRoleIds))
+            return 'read-only';
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.js.map

package/dist/core/auth.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/auth.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAkBA,+EAA+E;AAC/E,MAAM,SAAS,GAA6B,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;AAErF,4EAA4E;AAC5E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,uEAAuE;AACvE,MAAM,eAAe,GAAiC;IACpD,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO;IACd,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;IAChB,aAAa,EAAE,SAAS;IACxB,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW;CAClB,CAAC;AAiCF,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;IAEF;IACA;IAFnB,YACmB,WAAwB,EACxB,eAAgC;QADhC,gBAAW,GAAX,WAAW,CAAa;QACxB,oBAAe,GAAf,eAAe,CAAiB;IAChD,CAAC;IAEJ,SAAS,CAAC,KAAgB;QACxB,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;QAE7C,iFAAiF;QACjF,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACvC,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;gBACrC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,wCAAwC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9E,CAAC;YACD,kFAAkF;YAClF,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QACzE,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QACvC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAErD,MAAM,OAAO,GACX,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;QACrF,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7D,CAAC;IAED,iFAAiF;IACjF,iFAAiF;IACjF,2BAA2B;IAC3B,EAAE;IACF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,2EAA2E;IAC3E,2EAA2E;IACnE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAiB,EAAE,MAA2B;QAClE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QACtB,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;QACvB,OAAO;YACL,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY;YAC/C,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc;YACrD,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe;YACxD,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ;SACrB,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,iFAAiF;IACjF,8DAA8D;IACtD,MAAM,CACZ,IAAmB,EACnB,KAAgB,EAChB,WAA+E;QAE/E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,iFAAiF;QACjF,mFAAmF;QACnF,yEAAyE;QACzE,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,eAAe,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACnC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1C,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACnD,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,kDAAkD,EAAE,CAAC;QACxF,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,OAAO;gBACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;gBACd,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,qBAAqB,IAAI,IAAI;gBACnF,IAAI;aACL,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,gFAAgF;QAChF,8EAA8E;QAC9E,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAChB,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACxE,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACxF,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;gBACrC,OAAO;oBACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;oBACd,MAAM,EAAE,2DAA2D;oBACnE,IAAI;iBACL,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,CAAC;IAED,iFAAiF;IACzE,WAAW,CAAC,IAAmB,EAAE,OAAiB;QACxD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,KAAe,EAAW,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5E,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;QAC3C,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;QAClD,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/core/auth.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import * as fs from 'node:fs';
+import * as path from 'node:path';
+import * as os from 'node:os';
+import { ConfigStore } from './config.js';
+import { CONFIG_VERSION } from './configSchema.js';
+import { StateStore } from './state/store.js';
+import { ChannelRegistry } from './channelRegistry.js';
+import { Authorizer } from './auth.js';
+// Zero-entropy fixture ids: no realistic secret/token shapes.
+const ADMIN_ROLE = 'role-admin';
+const EXEC_ROLE = 'role-exec';
+const READ_ROLE = 'role-read';
+function makeConfig(overrides = {}) {
+    return {
+        version: CONFIG_VERSION,
+        discord: { token: 'bot-token-abc', clientId: '123456789' },
+        auth: { adminRoleIds: [], executeRoleIds: [], readOnlyRoleIds: [], dmPolicy: 'deny' },
+        defaults: {
+            mode: 'claude',
+            claudeModel: 'opus',
+            codexModel: '',
+            permissionMode: 'default',
+            permissionProfile: null,
+            codexHome: '~/.codex',
+            codexCliCommand: 'codex',
+            codexCliVersion: null,
+        },
+        limits: { maxSessionsPerUser: 0, permissionTimeoutSec: 60, codexTimeoutMs: 1_800_000 },
+        policy: { unknownCommand: 'confirm', allowExtraCommands: [] },
+        autoAllowClaudeTools: ['Read', 'Glob', 'Grep'],
+        profiles: {},
+        usage: { userAgent: 'claude-code', cacheSec: 180 },
+        audit: { channelId: null },
+        locale: 'ko',
+        logLevel: 'info',
+        favorites: [],
+        ...overrides,
+    };
+}
+function binding(overrides = {}) {
+    return {
+        guildId: 'g1',
+        channelId: 'c1',
+        mode: 'claude',
+        sessionId: null,
+        cwd: '/abs/workspace',
+        ownerId: 'u1',
+        permMode: 'default',
+        profile: null,
+        ...overrides,
+    };
+}
+describe('Authorizer', () => {
+    let dir;
+    let store;
+    function build() {
+        const registry = new ChannelRegistry(new StateStore(dir), () => '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z');
+        const authz = new Authorizer(store, registry);
+        return { authz, registry };
+    }
+    function input(overrides = {}) {
+        return {
+            userId: 'u1',
+            roleIds: [],
+            action: 'read',
+            context: { guildId: 'g1', channelId: 'c1' },
+            ...overrides,
+        };
+    }
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'dab-auth-'));
+        store = new ConfigStore(dir);
+    });
+    afterEach(() => {
+        fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    });
+    it('fail-secure: empty allowlists deny everyone, even for read', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig());
+        const { authz } = build();
+        const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], action: 'read' }));
+        expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(r.reason).toMatch(/fail-secure/i);
+    });
+    it('admin tier is allowed every action', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, adminRoleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        for (const action of ['admin', 'drive', 'run-command', 'read']) {
+            const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], action }));
+            expect(r.allowed).toBe(true);
+            expect(r.tier).toBe('admin');
+        }
+    });
+    it('execute tier may drive and run commands but not admin', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'run-command' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'read' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        const denied = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'admin' }));
+        expect(denied.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(denied.tier).toBe('execute');
+    });
+    it('read-only tier may read but not drive/run-command/admin', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, readOnlyRoleIds: [READ_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [READ_ROLE], action: 'read' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [READ_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [READ_ROLE], action: 'run-command' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [READ_ROLE], action: 'admin' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+    it('unknown/no role → denied (fail-secure)', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action: 'read' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: ['role-stranger'], action: 'read' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+    it('server-level roles override/extend the global allowlist for that guild only', () => {
+        // Global grants nobody execute; the server grants EXEC_ROLE.
+        store.save(makeConfig());
+        const server = {
+            version: 1,
+            guildId: 'g1',
+            auth: { executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] },
+        };
+        store.saveServerConfig(server);
+        const { authz } = build();
+        // In g1, the server grant applies.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive', context: { guildId: 'g1', channelId: 'c1' } })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        // In g2 (no server file) the global (empty) applies → denied.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive', context: { guildId: 'g2', channelId: 'c1' } })).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+    it('server auth for one tier does not clear the global list of another tier', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, adminRoleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE] } }));
+        store.saveServerConfig({ version: 1, guildId: 'g1', auth: { executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } });
+        const { authz } = build();
+        // adminRoleIds falls through from global since the server only set executeRoleIds.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], action: 'admin' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+    });
+    it('per-project ACL narrows: a tier-cleared actor is still denied when not on the project list', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz, registry } = build();
+        registry.set(binding({ projectAuth: { allowedRoleIds: ['role-project'], allowedUserIds: [] } }));
+        const denied = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' }));
+        expect(denied.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(denied.reason).toMatch(/projectAuth/);
+        expect(denied.tier).toBe('execute');
+    });
+    it('per-project ACL admits a matching role or a matching user', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz, registry } = build();
+        registry.set(binding({ projectAuth: { allowedRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], allowedUserIds: [] } }));
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        registry.set(binding({ projectAuth: { allowedRoleIds: ['role-other'], allowedUserIds: ['u1'] } }));
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ userId: 'u1', roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+    });
+    it('DM (no guild) is denied by default', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, adminRoleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], action: 'read', context: {} }));
+        expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(r.reason).toMatch(/dmPolicy=deny/);
+    });
+    it('DM is allowed when dmPolicy=allow and the actor clears the tier', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { adminRoleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], executeRoleIds: [], readOnlyRoleIds: [], dmPolicy: 'allow' } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [ADMIN_ROLE], action: 'admin', context: {} })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        // Still tier-gated in a DM: a stranger is denied.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action: 'read', context: {} })).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+    // A Discord Administrator is granted the admin tier UNCONDITIONALLY (never locked
+    // out), even with a completely empty role allowlist — the fix for the /agent start
+    // lockout footgun. Role tiers remain additive for non-admins.
+    it('a Discord Administrator with NO configured role is authorized as admin', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig()); // empty allowlists
+        const { authz } = build();
+        for (const action of ['admin', 'drive', 'run-command', 'read']) {
+            const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action, isAdministrator: true }));
+            expect(r.allowed).toBe(true);
+            expect(r.tier).toBe('admin');
+        }
+    });
+    it('a non-admin with no configured role is denied (deny-by-default preserved)', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig()); // empty allowlists
+        const { authz } = build();
+        const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action: 'read', isAdministrator: false }));
+        expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(r.reason).toMatch(/fail-secure/i);
+    });
+    it('configured role tiers still work for a non-Administrator (additive, unchanged)', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz } = build();
+        // The configured execute role drives without any Administrator flag.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'drive' })).allowed).toBe(true);
+        // ...but that same execute role is NOT admin.
+        expect(authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [EXEC_ROLE], action: 'admin' })).allowed).toBe(false);
+    });
+    it('a Discord Administrator bypasses a narrowing per-project ACL (never locked out)', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig({ auth: { ...makeConfig().auth, executeRoleIds: [EXEC_ROLE] } }));
+        const { authz, registry } = build();
+        // A project ACL that lists neither the admin's role nor user would normally deny.
+        registry.set(binding({ projectAuth: { allowedRoleIds: ['role-project'], allowedUserIds: [] } }));
+        const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action: 'drive', isAdministrator: true }));
+        expect(r.allowed).toBe(true);
+        expect(r.tier).toBe('admin');
+    });
+    it('a denied DM is NOT rescued by the Administrator flag (dmPolicy stays authoritative)', () => {
+        store.save(makeConfig()); // dmPolicy defaults to 'deny'
+        const { authz } = build();
+        const r = authz.authorize(input({ roleIds: [], action: 'read', context: {}, isAdministrator: true }));
+        expect(r.allowed).toBe(false);
+        expect(r.reason).toMatch(/dmPolicy=deny/);
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.test.js.map