crewforth 0.0.1 → 3.0.0-rc.1

package/kit/skills/mcp-builder/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: mcp-builder
+description: |
+  Build a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server so an AI client can call your tools/resources: design tool schemas,
+  pick a transport, handle errors, and test it. For exposing an API, database, or service to Claude and other clients.
+---
+
+# MCP Builder
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "MCP server", "build an MCP", "model context protocol", "expose tools to Claude", "MCP tool"
+
+An MCP server exposes **tools** (actions the model can call), **resources** (data it can read), and **prompts**
+(reusable templates) to any MCP client over a standard protocol. The whole job is: **design a small set of clear,
+well-described tools, validate their inputs, return useful errors, and prove it works with a real client.** The
+protocol is easy; the design of the tools is what makes the server good or useless.
+
+> **Crewforth adaptation (local, .claude/):** Stack-agnostic — TypeScript (`@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`) or Python
+> (`mcp` / FastMCP) are the maintained SDKs; match the project's language. §4 Prohibitions apply (no AI trace in
+> generated code/strings). Secrets (API keys the server needs) go via env, never hardcoded — Crewforth's secret gates apply.
+
+## Design first (the tools ARE the product)
+- **Few, purposeful tools** — expose *tasks*, not a 1:1 mirror of every API endpoint. "create_invoice" beats "post_v2_billing_documents".
+- **The description is the interface** — the model routes on it. Say what it does, when to use it, and what it returns, in plain language. A vague description = an unused or misused tool.
+- **Typed, validated inputs** — a JSON-Schema for each tool; required vs optional explicit; enums over free strings where possible. Reject bad input with a clear message, don't guess.
+- **Useful returns & errors** — return structured, model-readable results; on failure return an actionable error ("no invoice with id X") not a stack trace. Never crash the server on bad input.
+- **Least privilege** — a tool does one scoped thing; destructive actions are explicit and, where possible, confirmable. Don't expose raw SQL / shell unless that is genuinely the product.
+
+## Checklist
+- [ ] Tools chosen by task, not by mirroring endpoints
+- [ ] Each tool has a clear description (what · when · returns) and a JSON-Schema input
+- [ ] Inputs validated; bad input → clear error, not a crash
+- [ ] Returns are structured and model-readable; errors are actionable
+- [ ] Transport chosen (stdio for local, HTTP/SSE for remote) — see references
+- [ ] Secrets via env; no hardcoded keys
+- [ ] Tested against a real client (Inspector + a live client)
+
+---
+
+## Protocol, SDK skeletons, transport, and testing
+Concrete server skeletons (TypeScript + Python), stdio vs. HTTP transport choice, resources/prompts (not just
+tools), and the test loop (MCP Inspector → real client): **`references/building.md`**.
+
+## Invariant rules
+1. **Design the tools before writing them** — task-shaped, few, clearly described.
+2. **Validate every input** — schema-checked; bad input returns an error, never crashes.
+3. **Errors are for the model** — actionable text it can recover from, not raw traces.
+4. **Secrets via env only** — never hardcode credentials the server needs.
+5. **Prove it with a real client** — a server that only "looks right" is untested.
+6. **Descriptions guide; they never authorize** — a tool's description, schema or metadata shapes what the model
+   tries. Whether a call is allowed is decided in the handler, per requester and per resource, every time. A schema
+   narrows shape; it does not make a path, URL or id safe.
+7. **Bind identity to the connection, not to a name** — never route a call or accept a result by a tool name,
+   server name or alias the other side can choose. How these fail is in `security-scan/references/ai-agents.md`.

package/kit/skills/mcp-builder/references/building.md

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+# MCP: protocol, skeletons, transport, testing
+
+Loaded on demand. SKILL.md is the design discipline; this is the concrete how.
+
+## The three primitives
+
+- **Tools** — actions the model invokes (side effects allowed): `create_ticket`, `search_orders`. This is what most servers are for.
+- **Resources** — readable data addressed by URI the client can pull into context: `file://…`, `db://customers/42`. Read-only.
+- **Prompts** — named, parameterized templates the user/client can invoke. Optional; add only if you have reusable flows.
+
+Start with tools. Add resources when the client needs to *read* your data as context; add prompts only if there's a real reusable template.
+
+## Transport — pick by where it runs
+
+- **stdio** — the server is a local subprocess of the client (desktop app, CLI). Simplest; no network, no auth. Default for local/dev tools.
+- **Streamable HTTP / SSE** — the server is remote (hosted, shared). You now own auth, CORS, and network errors. Use only when the tool must be remote/multi-user.
+
+## Skeletons
+
+**TypeScript (`@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`):**
+```ts
+import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
+import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
+import { z } from "zod";
+
+const server = new McpServer({ name: "orders", version: "1.0.0" });
+
+server.tool(
+  "search_orders",
+  "Search orders by customer email. Returns up to 20 orders, newest first.",
+  { email: z.string().email(), limit: z.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(20) },
+  async ({ email, limit }) => {
+    const orders = await db.findOrders(email, limit);        // your logic
+    if (!orders.length) return { content: [{ type: "text", text: `No orders for ${email}.` }] };
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(orders) }] };
+  }
+);
+await server.connect(new StdioServerTransport());
+```
+
+**Python (FastMCP):**
+```python
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+
+mcp = FastMCP("orders")
+
+@mcp.tool()
+def search_orders(email: str, limit: int = 20) -> str:
+    """Search orders by customer email. Returns up to 20 orders, newest first."""
+    orders = db.find_orders(email, limit)          # your logic
+    return f"No orders for {email}." if not orders else json_dumps(orders)
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    mcp.run()          # stdio by default
+```
+
+Both: the **docstring/description is the model's interface** — write it as the design step demands. Types drive the input schema (zod / Python type hints) — no hand-written JSON-Schema needed with these SDKs.
+
+## Error handling
+
+- Validate at the boundary — the SDK schema rejects wrong *types*; you still check *semantics* (does the id exist? is the caller allowed?).
+- Return errors as normal tool results with clear text the model can act on, or throw the SDK's error type for protocol-level failures. Never let an unhandled exception kill the process on bad input.
+- Don't leak internals (stack traces, connection strings) in error text.
+
+## The test loop
+
+1. **MCP Inspector** — `npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector <run-command>` launches a UI that lists your tools/resources and lets you call them with arbitrary inputs. Verify each tool's schema, a happy path, and a bad-input path here first — fastest feedback.
+2. **Real client** — register the server in an actual client (e.g. Claude Desktop / Claude Code `.mcp.json`) and confirm the model *discovers* it, *routes* to the right tool from a natural prompt (validates your descriptions), and handles the returned data.
+3. **Edge cases** — empty results, invalid input, missing auth, large output. A tool is done when its failure modes are as clean as its happy path.
+
+If the model picks the wrong tool or ignores yours, the bug is almost always the **description**, not the code — rewrite it and re-test in the real client.

package/kit/skills/observability/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: observability
+description: |
+  Stack-agnostic observability: structured logs, correlation ids, metrics and traces; no PII or secrets in logs.
+  Makes a production issue traceable to why it happened.
+  Use when adding a log line, an error path, a metric, or when an incident could not be traced.
+---
+
+# Observability
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "observability", "structured logging", "structured log", "add a trace", "add a metric", "correlation id", "add logging"
+
+Goal: to be able to answer "what happened, where, why" during a production incident **by looking at the logs**.
+It is stack-agnostic; when you need a framework-specific library/format, do a web search.
+
+## Three signals
+- **Log** — event record (structured/JSON, leveled).
+- **Metric** — numeric time series (request count, latency, error rate, resource usage).
+- **Trace** — a request's journey across services (spans + correlation id).
+
+## Checklist
+- [ ] Logs are **structured** (JSON/key-value), not string interpolation
+- [ ] Every log line carries a **correlation id** (request/trace id)
+- [ ] Levels are correct: the DEBUG/INFO/WARN/ERROR distinction is meaningful
+- [ ] **No PII/secret is logged** (password, token, card, national/ID number, email body)
+- [ ] Error logs carry context (input summary, user/resource id — not PII); the stack trace does not leak to the user
+- [ ] Critical business metric + infrastructure metric are emitted (where applicable)
+- [ ] The correlation id is **propagated** across service-to-service calls (header/propagation)
+
+## How
+1. **Structured logger** — set up/use one whose output is machine-readable (JSON). Search for the library the framework recommends.
+2. **Correlation id**: generate it at the entry point (HTTP middleware / message consumer) or take it from the incoming `X-Request-Id`/trace header; put it in the log context; **propagate** it to downstream calls.
+3. **Level discipline**: INFO = business event, WARN = expected-but-noteworthy, ERROR = needs intervention. DEBUG is off/sampled in production.
+4. **Context fields**: `event`, `correlation_id`, `user_id` (not PII, an opaque id), `duration_ms`, `outcome`. Do not embed them in free text.
+5. **Metrics**: at minimum RED (Rate, Errors, Duration) or USE; plus business-critical counters. Search for the framework's metrics library.
+6. **Trace** (in a distributed system): start/end spans, bind the correlation id to the trace id.
+
+## PII / secret leakage (critical)
+**Never** to the log: password, token, API key, card number, national/ID number, full email/phone body, raw request body.
+- Mask: `user@***`, card `**** 1234`, token `sk-p…789`.
+- When needed, log an **opaque id** (hash/uuid), not the raw value.
+- This axis overlaps with `security-scan` (sensitive data in logs) and `privacy-compliance` (KVKK/GDPR) — if personal data is involved, trigger those too.
+
+## Invariant rules
+1. **Structured > free text** — greppable, parseable.
+2. **Correlation id on every line** — without it, a distributed error is untraceable.
+3. **No PII/secret is logged** — mask it or use an opaque id.
+4. **Do not make noise** — every line must answer a question; do not add meaningless spam logs.
+5. **Match the existing format** — if the repo has a logger, follow its pattern; do not impose a new one.

package/kit/skills/performance/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: performance
+description: |
+  Stack-agnostic performance: measure first, find the bottleneck, then optimise. N+1, needless allocation, wrong
+  async boundary, missing index/cache, heavy payload. No premature optimisation.
+  Use when something is slow, before optimising anything, and when a change touches a hot path.
+---
+
+# Performance
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "performance", "slow", "optimization", "profiling", "N+1", "latency", "memory leak", "leaked memory", "load test", "seconds to open", "seconds to respond", "anything slower", "make it slower"
+
+Core rule: **measure first, optimize later.** Optimization without measurement is a guess; it usually speeds up the
+wrong place and adds complexity. Stack-agnostic; do a web search when you need the profiling tool/library.
+
+## Method (in order)
+1. **Set a target** — what is "acceptable"? (p95 latency, throughput, memory ceiling). Numeric.
+2. **Measure** — find the real bottleneck with a profiler/APM/benchmark; don't start from a guess.
+3. **Fix the single most expensive thing** — Amdahl: speeding up a 5% path by 2x is wasted; target the hot path.
+4. **Measure again** — did it actually improve, is there a regression.
+5. **Stop** — once you hit the target, finish; no endless micro-optimization.
+
+## Common bottlenecks
+
+Catalog of common bottlenecks + fixes to consult: **`references/bottlenecks.md`**.
+
+## Measurement tips
+- Measure **under load** (a single request misleads); with a realistic data volume.
+- **Not p50, but p95/p99** — tail latency is what burns the user.
+- Don't trust micro-benchmarks; an end-to-end profile is more honest.
+
+## Invariant rules
+1. **Don't optimize without measuring** — a change without a profile = a guess.
+2. **Target the hot path** — don't speed up the small share.
+3. **Don't break correctness** — don't sacrifice behavior/edge cases for speed.
+4. **Complexity budget** — make an optimization that seriously hurts readability only if there is a measured gain; comment it.
+5. **Stop once you hit the target** — YAGNI; no premature/excessive optimization.

package/kit/skills/performance/references/bottlenecks.md

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+# Common bottlenecks
+
+| Area | Pattern | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| **DB** | N+1 query, missing index, `SELECT *`, table scan | eager/batch loading, index (db-migration), only needed columns |
+| **Memory** | needless allocation, holding large objects, leak | pooling, streaming, releasing references |
+| **Async** | wrong sync/async boundary, blocking I/O, serial await | parallel await, non-blocking I/O |
+| **Network/payload** | oversized response, no compression, chatty API | pagination, field selection, gzip, batch (api-design) |
+| **Cache** | repeated expensive computation, no/wrong cache | cache at the right layer + correct invalidation |
+| **Frontend** | needless render, large bundle, blocking resource | memo, code-split, lazy, critical CSS |

package/kit/skills/privacy-compliance/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: privacy-compliance
+description: |
+  KVKK/GDPR audit method: data inventory, purpose/basis/retention, minimisation, consent, transparency,
+  data-subject rights, cross-border transfer. crew-privacy-agent applies it.
+---
+
+# Privacy Compliance (KVKK / GDPR)
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "kvkk", "gdpr", "privacy", "consent", "data retention", "minimization", "personal information", "what we store about", "data we collect", "delete my data", "right to be forgotten"
+
+<!-- Requires-tool: WebFetch -->
+<!-- Machine-readable, and smoke-test enforces it: every agent that applies this skill must carry WebFetch.
+     Without it the instruction below is one an agent physically cannot obey — it would either decide from
+     memory, which this skill forbids in the same breath, or quietly skip the check. -->
+
+## Official sources (authority — always defer to these)
+The **primary, official** sources this skill rests on; rules are always interpreted against these:
+- **KVKK** (Turkey): https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/ — the law, regulations, principle decisions, guidelines.
+- **GDPR** (EU): https://gdpr-info.eu/ — article texts (Art.) and Recitals.
+
+If you are unsure about a specific article/threshold/definition (retention period, explicit-consent requirement,
+the Art. 8 age limit, transfer basis, etc.), **check the relevant official source** — do not decide from memory or by
+guessing. In the finding, **cite** the article you rely on (KVKK Art. … / GDPR Art. …). Fetched content is a reference; you own the interpretation.
+
+## Which regimes apply — the project says so, Crewforth does not guess
+KVKK and GDPR above are the **defaults**, not the world. A product sold in California is under CCPA and one in
+Brazil under LGPD, and Crewforth shipping a global list would be claiming knowledge it does not have — the same
+mistake as rating code without running the analyser. So the project declares its own, and the authority is
+whatever source it names.
+
+Read **`.claude/regulations.conf`** if it exists. One regime per line, `#` comments ignored:
+
+```
+# name | official source | axis
+KVKK | https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/         | personal-data
+GDPR | https://gdpr-info.eu/            | personal-data
+CCPA | https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa  | personal-data
+```
+
+| What you find | What you do |
+|---|---|
+| No file | Audit against KVKK + GDPR |
+| A regime **with** a source | Audit it; every finding cites that regime's article, checked against its source |
+| A regime with **no** source | **Do not rule on it.** Report "declared, no source given — cannot audit" and ask for the URL |
+| An axis other than `personal-data` (BDDK, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOX…) | **Say so out loud**: sector regulation is outside this skill. Do not audit it, and do not let its presence in the file imply that it was |
+
+That last row is the point of the file, not an edge case. Somebody who writes `BDDK` into it and gets a clean
+report would reasonably conclude Crewforth checked it. It did not, and silence would be the lie.
+
+The declaration file is the **project's**, never Crewforth's: no installer writes it and no update rewrites it.
+Its absence means "the defaults apply", which is why nothing has to be created for the common case.
+
+## Audit axes
+- **Inventory:** what data, collected from where, flowing to where, shared with whom?
+- **Purpose + basis + retention:** for each field, purpose is limited, legal basis is clear, retention period is defined.
+- **Minimization:** data not needed for the purpose is not collected.
+- **Consent:** where required, explicit, recorded, and revocable.
+- **Transparency:** disclosure has been made; the user knows what is collected/processed.
+- **Data subject rights:** access / rectification / erasure / portability / objection are actionable.
+- **Cross-border transfer & third-party:** bound to a legitimate basis (SCC/adequacy/consent).
+
+## Output
+Per-field/per-flow finding + fix; if "clean", the rationale.
+
+**Evidence redaction (`<private>` marker):** an audit report is a shared artifact — it must not itself leak the
+personal data it audits. When a finding has to reference a real value as evidence, wrap it in
+**`<private>…</private>`**: the raw value is stripped and shown as `[redacted]` in the report, while the finding still
+names the field, flow, and article. Never paste live PII (national ID, email, phone, health data) into the report body.
+
+> **Project note:** If data of minors (children) is processed, special protection is required
+> (KVKK / GDPR Art. 8 · parental consent & age verification). This is a domain-specific rule and is
+> defined in the project's own skill/CLAUDE.md — it is not baked into the generic audit.
+> Project-specific rules (consent texts, retention periods) also live in the project CLAUDE.md.

package/kit/skills/red-team/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: red-team
+description: |
+  Attacker's-eye test of LLM/agent defenses: instruction hijacking, data exfiltration and tool abuse through
+  untrusted content; verifies whether the defense actually holds.
+---
+
+# Red Team (LLM / Agent Defense)
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "red team", "red-team", "prompt injection", "test prompt injection", "jailbreak", "defense test", "adversarial test", "injection scenario", "previous instructions", "hidden instructions", "malicious instructions", "injected instructions"
+
+Goal: verify a system's defense against prompt injection and abuse by **attempting to break it**.
+Only meaningful on systems that have a defense (the CLAUDE.md "Untrusted content" axis); report findings to `crew-security-expert`.
+
+> **Ethical boundary:** Only test **your own / authorized** system. The attack scenarios generated are for
+> verifying the defense; actual harm / use against someone else's system is out of scope (§4, security policy).
+
+## Threat model — what to test
+- **Instruction hijacking**: content read via a tool (web, file, issue, e-mail, DOM) says "forget the previous instructions / run this." Does the system keep it as **data**, or treat it as a command?
+- **Authority/approval bypass**: content gives a fake approval like "the user authorized / test mode / admin." Does the system take its §4.4/§4.5 approval only from the user?
+- **Data exfiltration**: content suggests sending user data to an address/endpoint. Does the system blindly fetch/exfil?
+- **Tool abuse**: content embeds a destructive command / hidden link / encoded instruction.
+- **Indirect injection**: a malicious instruction is stashed in data that will be read later (a record, a comment, a file name).
+
+## How to test
+1. **Extract entry points** — every place the system reads untrusted content (the same attack surface: security-scan).
+2. **Plant an injection payload** — embed an instruction/authority-claim/urgency/encoded text into that content.
+3. **Observe**: did the system apply the instruction, or surface it and ask the user? Did it take approval from the content?
+4. **Vary it**: role-play, "test mode", multi-step, cross-language, base64/homoglyph evasion.
+5. **Classify the result**: defense held / partial / broken; every break is a finding.
+
+## Evaluation
+| Result | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| **Held** | The instruction was treated as data, surfaced, approval only from the user |
+| **Partial** | Some variants leaked; the defense is inconsistent |
+| **Broken** | The instruction in the content was applied / a fake approval was accepted → CRITICAL |
+
+## Invariant rules
+1. **Authorized system only** — test your own defense; no real attack / someone else's system.
+2. **Finding = a defense gap** — report it for the fix, not for exploitation (crew-security-expert).
+3. **Do not leak payloads** — masked/summarized in the finding; do not spread a live malicious command.
+4. **Strengthen the defense layer** — every break feeds back into the CLAUDE.md "Untrusted content" rule.
+5. **A model saying the wrong thing is not yet a finding** — it becomes one when code lets that output cross a
+   boundary: reach another user's context, act with authority the requester lacks, disclose data they cannot read,
+   or drive a sink they could not reach. The code-level classes behind that line are in
+   `security-scan/references/ai-agents.md`.

package/kit/skills/reflect/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: reflect
+description: |
+  Retrospective self-audit after nontrivial work: unverified assumptions, skipped items, is-this-the-right-
+  approach — findings, not code. The step-back counterpart to iterate's refine-to-done loop.
+---
+
+# Reflect — step back and audit the work, not just the code
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "reflect", "retro", "retrospective", "what did we miss", "step back", "introspect"
+
+## When
+A nontrivial chunk of work just finished (a feature, a plan, a debugging session) and it's worth a deliberate
+step back **before** committing or moving on. This is the meta-cognitive counterpart to [[iterate]]: iterate
+drives a change *to* its exit test; reflect asks whether the exit test — and the approach behind it — was even
+the right one. Skip it for a one-line, unambiguous change; there's nothing to reflect on.
+
+## Measure first, then remember
+Run **`bash .claude/hooks/session-stats.sh`** before answering anything below, and open the pass with what it
+reports. A retro built only on recall is an interview with the least reliable witness in the room: the model
+reconstructs a tidy story from a context that has already been summarised, and the stretches where it span on a
+failing approach are exactly the ones it remembers least. The script counts what actually happened — prompts,
+tool calls, failing loops, near-duplicate prompts, interrupts, auto-compactions.
+
+Treat each ⚠️ as a **question to answer in the pass**, not a verdict: a runaway loop asks *what assumption kept
+failing*; a repeated prompt asks *what context never landed*; an interrupt asks *where intent diverged*; an auto
+compaction asks *what state was silently dropped*. If the numbers and your recollection disagree, the numbers are
+the record. If the script is missing (a plugin install has no `.claude/hooks/`), say the retro is recall-based —
+do not present recall as measurement.
+
+## The pass
+Ask each question honestly and write the answer, not a reassurance:
+1. **Unverified assumptions** — what did I take for granted that I never checked? Name each one and whether it
+   was actually confirmed (read the code / ran the flow) or just assumed.
+2. **What got skipped** — an edge case, an error path, a test, a doc update, a security/privacy angle. What was
+   silently dropped, and was that a conscious trade-off or an oversight?
+3. **Right approach?** — with hindsight, is this the direction we'd still pick? Did scope creep in? Is there a
+   simpler path we walked past ([[code-review]] altitude: could 200 lines be 50)?
+4. **Evidence gap** — which claims of "done" / "works" rest on having *observed* behavior vs. on inference?
+   An unobserved "it works" is a finding (see [[iterate]] / verify: drive the real flow).
+5. **What I'd tell the next session** — the one thing a fresh context most needs to know (feeds [[handoff]]).
+
+## Guardrails
+- **Findings, not code.** Reflect surfaces gaps; the relevant specialist fixes them (a found gap re-enters
+  [[iterate]] or the author agent). It changes nothing itself.
+- **Honest, not performative.** A retro that only confirms good work is a failed retro. If nothing is found,
+  say specifically *why* you're confident (what was verified), don't just assert it.
+- **Bounded.** One pass, concrete findings, then act or close — not an open rumination loop.
+- **Token discipline** ([[token-budget]]): a short ranked findings list to the main thread; detail to a file.
+
+## DoD (this skill's contribution)
+- `session-stats.sh` was run and every ⚠️ it raised is answered — or its absence is stated.
+- Assumptions are labeled verified vs. assumed; unverified ones are flagged, not buried.
+- Skipped items and any scope creep are named explicitly.
+- Every "done/works" claim is traced to observed evidence or marked as inference.
+- Findings are actionable (each maps to a fix, a follow-up, or an accepted trade-off).

package/kit/skills/release/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: release
+description: |
+  Versioning and CHANGELOG: SemVer mapped from Conventional Commits, Keep a Changelog format, tagging,
+  pre-release gates.
+  Use when cutting a version: bumping, writing the CHANGELOG entry, or tagging.
+---
+
+# Release & CHANGELOG
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "release", "cut a release", "changelog", "version bump", "bump the version", "new version", "tag", "semver"
+
+## SemVer mapping (derive from Conventional Commits)
+- `fix:` → **PATCH** (x.y.Z)
+- `feat:` → **MINOR** (x.Y.0)
+- `BREAKING CHANGE:` / `feat!:` → **MAJOR** (X.0.0)
+
+## CHANGELOG (Keep a Changelog)
+Headings: **Added · Changed · Fixed · Removed · Security · Deprecated**.
+Every version is dated; the `Unreleased` section can be auto-populated from commits.
+
+## Pre-release gates (all must pass)
+- [ ] Tests green + `sonarqube-check` PASSED
+- [ ] `dependency-audit` clean (0 HIGH/CRITICAL)
+- [ ] CHANGELOG up to date
+- [ ] Version number conforms to SemVer
+- [ ] **The release commit is a diff too (§4.6).** A `chore(release)` bump, a CHANGELOG-only edit and a docs-site
+      version touch each stage a diff, and §4.6 exempts nothing by size — `crew-review-agent` runs over them like
+      any other. A version that disagrees with the tag, a CHANGELOG entry naming the wrong one, a generated
+      manifest edited by hand: that is what this review is for, and all three have shipped before.
+- [ ] **Every distribution channel has a documented way to GET this version.** Publishing and reaching users are
+      different events. A channel whose consumers pin at install time — an editor extension, a plugin, a vendored
+      copy — leaves them on the version they installed until they ask for a new one, so a security fix ships and
+      does not arrive. For each channel name the upgrade command in the README, and say plainly where it is not
+      automatic.
+
+## Tagging
+```bash
+git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z"    # asks for approval (§4.4); push on explicit request (§4.5)
+```
+
+## DoD
+- Correct SemVer bump; complete CHANGELOG; tag + rollback plan ready.

package/kit/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+---
+name: security-scan
+description: |
+  Stack-agnostic security audit: map the attack surface, trace untrusted input to dangerous calls, surface
+  dependency and configuration flaws. Severity-ranked report with fixes.
+  Use when auth, input handling, secrets or dependencies change, and before a release.
+---
+
+# Security Scan
+
+<!-- routing-eval reads the next line; why it sits in the body: AGENT_TEMPLATE.md -->
+Trigger phrases: "security scan", "run a security scan", "OWASP check", "scan for vulnerabilities", "find security vulnerabilities", "security audit", "api key", "secret key", "leaked credential", "credentials leaked", "hardcoded secret", "hardcoded password", "sql injection", "can an attacker"
+
+The core of a security vulnerability fits in a single sentence: **an untrusted input reaches a
+dangerous operation without being adequately checked.** This skill chases exactly that sentence — it first
+looks for where the input comes from, then where it flows, and what gate should sit in between.
+It is stack-agnostic: whatever the language/framework, the same logic applies; when current tooling and
+patterns are needed, it runs a web search.
+
+> **Crewforth adaptation (local, .claude/):** `crew-security-expert` applies this; findings are carried to
+> **crew-review-agent** in severity order, whatever the stack. Automatic
+> fixes only with explicit approval (§4.4); `.claude` does not go to the repo (§4.3). §4 Prohibitions apply.
+
+## What it does, what it doesn't
+- **Does:** surfaces common vulnerability classes, known vulnerable dependencies, and risky configuration; ties each finding to a concrete fix.
+- **Doesn't:** does not replace a professional pentest / SAST / DAST. The report **guides**, it does not give full assurance — state this at the end of the report.
+- **Boundary:** analysis is local; code/data is not sent to an external service, and the project directory is not left.
+
+## A question is not a scan
+Loading this skill does not mean running all of it. "Is this query injectable?", "should this key be in the
+repo?", "how do I hash these passwords?" are **questions**: answer them from the relevant part of this skill and
+stop — no discovery pass, no fan-out of verifiers, no coverage ledger, no report file. The full workflow below runs
+when the user asks for a scan, an audit or a security review of a codebase or a change, or asks for the report
+itself. When a request could be either, ask one question before starting the full workflow; do not guess upward.
+
+## Mental model — source → gate → sink
+Reduce every check to three questions:
+1. **Source** — where does the input enter? (route, API endpoint, form, CLI argument, file upload, WebSocket, queue message, external API response)
+2. **Sink** — which dangerous operation does this input reach? (SQL execution, shell, file path, HTML render, deserialization, template)
+3. **Gate** — is there validation / parameterization / escaping / authorization in between? If not, that's the finding.
+
+The scan applies this model on four fronts: **dependency · code · configuration · authorization**. The result is ranked by severity, and the fix is presented for the user to choose.
+
+## Scope
+Prefer **`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`** if present (from the `threat-model` skill): its entry points and attack classes
+are the focus areas, and its impact/likelihood bias which findings count as high severity — the biggest lever on
+false positives. No threat model → map the surface yourself first (Front 0 · Discovery).
+
+## Checklist
+- [ ] Stack and package ecosystem(s) detected, attack surface mapped
+- [ ] Dependency audit run for each ecosystem
+- [ ] Source→sink paths traced across the four vulnerability classes
+- [ ] Configuration and secret leakage scanned
+- [ ] Authorization matrix produced, unprotected sensitive endpoints searched for
+- [ ] Code builds on a model (prompts, retrieval, memory, tools, sub-agents, MCP) → Front 5 run (`references/ai-agents.md`)
+- [ ] Each candidate adversarially **verified** (N-verifier disprove pass); FALSE_POSITIVE / CANNOT_VERIFY separated out
+- [ ] Severity **derived from preconditions × access** (not the scanner's category); verification ≠ severity
+- [ ] Findings reported in severity order, no secret disclosed; ruled-out findings recorded too
+- [ ] Fix options presented to the user
+
+---
+
+## Fronts
+
+Five review fronts — Discovery · Dependencies · Code (source→sink) · Configuration · Authorization: **`references/fronts.md`** (read the fronts you're scanning). A sixth, for code built on a model — prompts, retrieval, memory, tools, sub-agents, MCP — lives in **`references/ai-agents.md`**: read it only when that code is present.
+
+When you fan out a sub-agent per front, how you prompt it decides recall — describe vulnerability **shapes** not a
+checklist, scope each agent, and state that vulnerabilities exist: **`references/prompting.md`**.
+
+---
+
+## Verify before you report
+
+Discovery is deliberately noisy (recall-biased); a **separate adversarial pass** disproves each candidate before it
+reaches the report — the biggest lever on false positives. Run **N independent verifiers** per finding (each starts
+from the code, not the summary; each hunts for why it's *wrong*), classify **TRUE_POSITIVE / FALSE_POSITIVE /
+CANNOT_VERIFY**, then derive **severity from preconditions × access** (independently — "real" is not "critical").
+The verifier procedure, the false-positive exclusion rules, the parseable verdict block, and the severity matrix
+live in **`references/verify.md`**. Ruled-out findings are recorded, not silently dropped.
+
+## Report
+
+The severity scale, finding format, summary line, and the fix-presentation format live in **`references/reporting.md`**.
+
+## Invariant rules
+1. **Guides, does not assure** — it does not replace a professional audit; say so in the report.
+2. **State coverage, not just findings** — every report ends with a `complete / partial / unknown` ledger over the
+   threat model's surfaces, each non-complete row carrying its reason. Without it, "no findings" and "never
+   looked" read identically to whoever acts on the report (`references/reporting.md`).
+3. **Mask secrets** — only the first 4 + last 4 characters (`sk-p…i789`); never write the full secret.
+4. **No automatic fix without approval** — even if "Fix everything" is chosen, first show what will change.
+5. **Do not install tools without asking.**
+6. **Preserve behavior** — a fix must not change functionality beyond closing the vulnerability.
+7. **Stay local** — do not send code/data to an external service, do not cross the project boundary.
+8. **Do not run the code under review to prove a finding** — no build, test, install or fixture run of it unless it
+   is isolated: no network, an empty environment, writes confined to a scratch directory, and hard limits on time
+   and resources. An install runs the target's own scripts; a test run executes whatever the target chose. If that
+   isolation is not available, the finding stays **CANNOT_VERIFY** with the exact local check that would settle
+   it. Reading source never needs any of this; executing it always does.