crewforth 0.0.1 → 3.0.0-rc.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +3784 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +37 -7
- package/VERSION +1 -0
- package/adopt.sh +1670 -0
- package/bin/cli.js +497 -0
- package/kit/AGENT_TEMPLATE.md +92 -0
- package/kit/CLAUDE.md +228 -0
- package/kit/README.md +107 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-backend-expert.md +95 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-commit-agent.md +96 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-database-expert.md +84 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-devops-expert.md +82 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-frontend-expert.md +85 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-performance-expert.md +78 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-planner.md +60 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-privacy-agent.md +71 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-review-agent.md +95 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-security-expert.md +73 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-session-manager.md +77 -0
- package/kit/agents/crew-test-expert.md +64 -0
- package/kit/eval/doctor.sh +465 -0
- package/kit/eval/gate-report.sh +137 -0
- package/kit/eval/golden-holdout.txt +53 -0
- package/kit/eval/golden-routing.txt +199 -0
- package/kit/eval/lib/crew-env.sh +14 -0
- package/kit/eval/lib/settings-json.awk +154 -0
- package/kit/eval/lib/star.sh +70 -0
- package/kit/eval/parser-conformance.sh +612 -0
- package/kit/eval/preflight.sh +186 -0
- package/kit/eval/routing-eval.sh +209 -0
- package/kit/eval/scan-skill.sh +162 -0
- package/kit/eval/smoke-test.sh +6693 -0
- package/kit/eval/update-guard.sh +81 -0
- package/kit/eval/utilization.sh +130 -0
- package/kit/hooks/board-sync.sh +106 -0
- package/kit/hooks/board.sh +962 -0
- package/kit/hooks/commit-msg +49 -0
- package/kit/hooks/context-usage.sh +353 -0
- package/kit/hooks/floor-blocklist.txt +124 -0
- package/kit/hooks/guard-bash.sh +1431 -0
- package/kit/hooks/guard-commit-scan.sh +511 -0
- package/kit/hooks/guard-write.sh +513 -0
- package/kit/hooks/pre-commit +577 -0
- package/kit/hooks/route-hint.sh +185 -0
- package/kit/hooks/secret-blocklist.txt +82 -0
- package/kit/hooks/session-guard.sh +149 -0
- package/kit/hooks/session-rehydrate.sh +41 -0
- package/kit/hooks/session-stats.sh +252 -0
- package/kit/hooks/session-update-check.sh +236 -0
- package/kit/hooks/skill-trust.sh +150 -0
- package/kit/hooks/trace-blocklist.txt +53 -0
- package/kit/settings.json +132 -0
- package/kit/skills/a11y/SKILL.md +44 -0
- package/kit/skills/adr/SKILL.md +74 -0
- package/kit/skills/api-design/SKILL.md +50 -0
- package/kit/skills/automode-policy/SKILL.md +91 -0
- package/kit/skills/automode-policy/references/policy.json +13 -0
- package/kit/skills/automode-policy/scripts/apply.sh +84 -0
- package/kit/skills/automode-policy/scripts/check.sh +102 -0
- package/kit/skills/backend-architecture/SKILL.md +103 -0
- package/kit/skills/brainstorm/SKILL.md +47 -0
- package/kit/skills/ci-pipeline/SKILL.md +38 -0
- package/kit/skills/commit-message/SKILL.md +82 -0
- package/kit/skills/commit-message/references/examples.md +8 -0
- package/kit/skills/confidence-check/SKILL.md +86 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-board/SKILL.md +55 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-brainstorm/SKILL.md +19 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-code-review/SKILL.md +151 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-code-review/references/history-search.md +19 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-code-review/references/panel-mode.md +32 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-code-review/references/receiving.md +23 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-doctor/SKILL.md +36 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-gates/SKILL.md +25 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-handoff/SKILL.md +14 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-plan/SKILL.md +18 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-review/SKILL.md +23 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-ship/SKILL.md +19 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-skill/SKILL.md +61 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-studio/SKILL.md +129 -0
- package/kit/skills/crew-update/SKILL.md +43 -0
- package/kit/skills/db-migration/SKILL.md +120 -0
- package/kit/skills/db-migration/references/backup-restore.md +33 -0
- package/kit/skills/db-migration/references/raw-sql.md +30 -0
- package/kit/skills/db-migration/references/tool-matrix.md +35 -0
- package/kit/skills/dependency-audit/SKILL.md +61 -0
- package/kit/skills/dependency-upgrade/SKILL.md +82 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/SKILL.md +100 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/references/proxy-ssl.md +56 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/references/rollback.md +18 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/references/scripts.md +9 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/references/topology-a.md +128 -0
- package/kit/skills/deploy/references/topology-b.md +44 -0
- package/kit/skills/docs-writer/SKILL.md +53 -0
- package/kit/skills/docs-writer/references/coauthoring.md +34 -0
- package/kit/skills/eval-grader/SKILL.md +75 -0
- package/kit/skills/eval-grader/references/method.md +51 -0
- package/kit/skills/frontend/SKILL.md +56 -0
- package/kit/skills/frontend/references/verify-contract.md +41 -0
- package/kit/skills/frontend-design/SKILL.md +71 -0
- package/kit/skills/frontend-design/references/design-review.md +34 -0
- package/kit/skills/frontend-rn-expo/SKILL.md +25 -0
- package/kit/skills/handoff/SKILL.md +71 -0
- package/kit/skills/handoff/references/cold-reader.md +51 -0
- package/kit/skills/i18n-integrity/SKILL.md +31 -0
- package/kit/skills/incident-runbook/SKILL.md +40 -0
- package/kit/skills/incident-runbook/references/postmortem.md +16 -0
- package/kit/skills/iterate/SKILL.md +40 -0
- package/kit/skills/mcp-builder/SKILL.md +54 -0
- package/kit/skills/mcp-builder/references/building.md +71 -0
- package/kit/skills/observability/SKILL.md +50 -0
- package/kit/skills/performance/SKILL.md +38 -0
- package/kit/skills/performance/references/bottlenecks.md +10 -0
- package/kit/skills/privacy-compliance/SKILL.md +75 -0
- package/kit/skills/red-team/SKILL.md +48 -0
- package/kit/skills/reflect/SKILL.md +57 -0
- package/kit/skills/release/SKILL.md +44 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md +99 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/references/ai-agents.md +107 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/references/fronts.md +99 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/references/prompting.md +23 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/references/reporting.md +75 -0
- package/kit/skills/security-scan/references/verify.md +131 -0
- package/kit/skills/sonarqube-check/SKILL.md +108 -0
- package/kit/skills/sonarqube-check/references/local-engines.md +32 -0
- package/kit/skills/sonarqube-check/references/stand-up-server.md +25 -0
- package/kit/skills/spec-planning/SKILL.md +92 -0
- package/kit/skills/systematic-debugging/SKILL.md +57 -0
- package/kit/skills/systematic-debugging/references/techniques.md +44 -0
- package/kit/skills/teamboard/SKILL.md +88 -0
- package/kit/skills/teamboard/references/setup.md +37 -0
- package/kit/skills/testing/SKILL.md +49 -0
- package/kit/skills/testing/references/flaky-triage.md +51 -0
- package/kit/skills/threat-model/SKILL.md +57 -0
- package/kit/skills/threat-model/references/interview.md +51 -0
- package/kit/skills/threat-model/references/schema.md +42 -0
- package/kit/skills/token-budget/SKILL.md +51 -0
- package/kit/skills/trace-scan/SKILL.md +43 -0
- package/kit/skills/worktree/SKILL.md +40 -0
- package/kit/studio/README.md +266 -0
- package/kit/studio/ensure-node.sh +471 -0
- package/kit/studio/package.json +14 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/hooks/studio-gate.sh +169 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/index.js +902 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/crew-env.js +11 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/fleet.js +146 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/graph.js +533 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/instance.js +135 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/kit-telemetry.js +182 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/kit.js +158 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/palette.js +118 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/peers.js +72 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/permissions.js +150 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/projects.js +294 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/roster.js +191 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/session.js +309 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/terminal.js +91 -0
- package/kit/studio/server/lib/transcript.js +100 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/app.js +1098 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/canvas.js +1179 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/chat.js +543 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/index.html +86 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/md.js +110 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/storage-migrate.js +23 -0
- package/kit/studio/web/style.css +1453 -0
- package/package.json +46 -8
- package/start.sh +748 -0
- package/bin/crewforth.js +0 -10
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Claude Code PreToolUse guard for the FILE tools (Write / Edit / NotebookEdit).
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# Companion to guard-bash.sh: that one covers shell tampering, this one covers the model editing the gate
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# scripts directly with its file tools. A gate you can silently rewrite is not a gate.
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#
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# stdin JSON: {"tool_name":"Write|Edit|...","tool_input":{"file_path":"...", ...}}
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#
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# HARD BLOCK (exit 2, every permission mode) when the target is a gate FILE:
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# - .claude/hooks/* (guard-bash.sh, guard-write.sh, pre-commit, commit-msg, session-guard.sh, blocklists)
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# - .git/hooks/* (the armed git hooks themselves)
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# - .claude/DISCIPLINE.md (kit-owned, @imported every session, and the text of §4.1-§4.5 itself — the gates
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# enforce those rules, so leaving the rules writable means the gates can be emptied without touching a gate)
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# settings.json is deliberately NOT blocked: the update-config skill legitimately edits it, and a hook/permission
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# change there is reviewable — the irreversible, silent move is rewriting the scripts, so that is what we gate.
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#
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# THE PATH IS NORMALISED BEFORE IT IS MATCHED, and that is the whole point of this file's second half.
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# Until this version the gate compared the RAW string, so it recognised exactly one spelling of each gate path.
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# Every line below was measured against the shipped hook and reached rc=0 — a SINGLE Write call, no shell
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# access, no symlink, no second step:
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# .claude/skills/../hooks/guard-bash.sh .claude//hooks/… .claude/./hooks/…
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# .git/refs/../hooks/pre-commit C:\…\.claude\hooks\… (backslashes)
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# The backslash row is a string fact, measured here: the matcher recognised `/` only, while five other hooks in
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# Crewforth already fold Windows separators and this one did not. What a real Windows install actually puts in
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# `file_path` is NOT measured on the machine this was written on and must not be assumed — it is verified on
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# Windows. Folding both spellings is correct either way, which is why the fix does not wait for that answer.
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# NotebookEdit was a sixth hole on any machine with neither jq nor python3 — the pre-tier-3 fallback read
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# only `file_path`, and `notebook_path` is a different key.
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# Claude Code passes file_path to the hook VERBATIM (measured: a `..` survives into the payload) while the
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# filesystem resolves it, so the string the model writes and the file it opens are two different things.
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# Normalise first, match second — and normalise with parameter expansion only, because this hook runs before
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# EVERY Write/Edit and a fork per call is a freeze on Windows (Git Bash charges 62-135 ms per process, measured).
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set -uo pipefail
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# The 2.x names of the variables a user can set still work (one helper: eval/lib/crew-env.sh).
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_crew_d="${BASH_SOURCE%/*}"; [ "$_crew_d" = "${BASH_SOURCE}" ] && _crew_d=.
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[ -f "$_crew_d/../eval/lib/crew-env.sh" ] && . "$_crew_d/../eval/lib/crew-env.sh"; unset _crew_d
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INPUT="$(cat)"
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# The two helpers below are a byte-identical copy of guard-bash.sh's block. A shared file would have to be
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# added to build-plugin.sh's explicit copy list and a miss there breaks the plugin channel silently — the same
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# reasoning as the CREW-TRANSCRIPT-DIR resolver, which is duplicated for the same reason. Two copies are only
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# safe while they cannot drift, so smoke-test pins these markers byte-identical rather than trusting it.
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# ---- CREW-JSON-PARSE ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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_json_slice(){ # $1 = whole payload, $2 = key -> the raw (still JSON-escaped) string value, "" if absent
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local LC_ALL=C # FIRST, so every expansion below -- the key search included -- counts and cuts in bytes.
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# Lengths from ${#x} are used as offsets into ${y:n}; with the locale set before any of
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# them, the two never disagree about a unit. Walking bytes is safe because no UTF-8
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# continuation byte can be 0x5C or 0x22, so a cut cannot land inside a character at a
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# quote or backslash edge. What this line is worth in SPEED depends on the platform --
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# read the table in _json_unescape below before quoting a number for it.
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local pre rest seg w r n base=0 j=0 cl lim run=0 chunk C=4096 W=256 hay="$1" k="\"$2\""; local -a acc=("")
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# It ALSO sets `_JS`, so a caller on the hot path can read the value without `$( )`, which is a fork. The
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# printf stays because the existing callers compose it (`_json_unescape "$(_json_slice …)"`), but the one
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# caller that used to do its own fork-free extraction — `_CWD` — reads `_JS` and keeps costing nothing.
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_JS=""
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# Every "step past X" here is arithmetic on a length, never `${s#"$literal"}`. That shape reads like a
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# constant-time strip and is not one: bash retries the pattern at every prefix length, so stripping an
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# n-byte literal costs O(n^2). It was in this function twice, and both were measured:
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# * `${1#*"$2"}` found the key -- cheap when the key sits near the front, quadratic in the distance to it
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# otherwise. `permission_mode` behind a 100 KB command took 7.94s on Git Bash, 0.27s in front of it.
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# Captured from Claude Code 2.1.267, the real order puts `permission_mode` BEFORE `tool_input`, so on
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# that version this cost was not reachable -- this file's header had shown the opposite order, and was
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# wrong. The parse stays order-independent regardless: the order is not a documented contract, and the
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# payload is still moving (`effort` is absent from the field list recorded on 2.1.246).
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# * `${tail#"$seg"\"}` stepped past each escaped quote: 16.8s for a single 100 KB step on Git Bash,
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# against 0.002s for `${tail:${#seg}+1}` doing exactly the same thing.
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# `${hay%%"$k"*}` finds the FIRST occurrence -- the longest suffix that starts with the key starts at the
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# earliest one. THAT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH, and the sentence that used to stand here said it was: it claimed a
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# command "containing the literal text `\"command\":\"` still cannot relocate the parse", which is true of
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# that byte sequence and irrelevant, because this search is for `"command"` WITHOUT the colon. A JSON VALUE
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# equal to the key name is exactly those bytes between two unescaped quotes. Measured on the shipped hook:
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# {"tool_name":"Bash","a":"command","ls":1,"tool_input":{"command":"rm -rf /"}} -> read `ls`
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# {"a":"permission_mode","default":1,"permission_mode":"bypassPermissions",…} -> read `default`
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# {"a":"file_path","/tmp/ok":1,"tool_input":{"file_path":".claude/hooks/x.sh"}} -> read `/tmp/ok`
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# In each case the gate judged a harmless string while a dangerous one was the actual argument, and jq read
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# the real value -- so on a stock Windows desktop, where this was already the only parser, the gate could be
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# aimed with one extra key. The loop below therefore accepts an occurrence only when optional JSON whitespace
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# and then `:` follow it, which is the only place a key can appear; everything else keeps searching.
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# Stepping by length removed the quadratic strip, but each escaped quote still sliced and re-assigned the
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# whole remainder, so an escape-dense command stayed k*n here as well (2.2s of the 6.8s described in
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# time and every per-quote operation stays inside the chunk. One thing is carried across edges on purpose
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# -- the length of the backslash run in front of a quote -- because that run can straddle a window or a
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# chunk, and its parity is what decides whether the quote ends the value. Isolated, escape-dense 44030 B:
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# 2.61s -> 0.41s on Git Bash 5.3.15, 0.93s -> 0.09s on macOS/bash 3.2.
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# Output is byte-identical to the previous shape across 378 cases at four chunk/window sizes down to 7 and 1
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# bytes, and that shape to the one before it across a 27-case battery (escaped quotes, backslash runs before
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# a quote, the key twice, the key appearing first as a value, glob metacharacters, UTF-8, no closing quote,
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# empty input). Broken twins -- the run not carried across a window, a byte skipped after a quote -- prove
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# the battery sees both.
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# a PreToolUse hook is a gate with an off switch, because a hook killed at its 60s timeout emits no exit 2.
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# Each decoy costs one more `%%` scan over the remainder, so the work is quadratic in the number of decoys.
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# Measured on macOS/bash, single call, `"k<i>":"command"` decoys in front of the real key:
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# 50 decoys 844 B 12 ms 800 decoys 13544 B 126 ms
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# 200 decoys 3344 B 19 ms 3200 decoys 56544 B 1839 ms
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# Git Bash's parameter expansion is several times slower again, so the tail is where the timeout lives. A
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# real payload carries ZERO decoys -- 64 is far above anything a producer can legitimately emit -- and going
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# over the cap is reported SEPARATELY (`_KC_CAPPED`), not as a large count, so the caller can refuse with a
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# reason the reader can act on instead of a sentinel dressed up as a measurement. Fail-closed either way.
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# THE COST IS ONE THIS CHANGE INTRODUCES, and it is worth saying so plainly rather than implying the cap
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# decoys cost essentially nothing (measured on stock Windows: 0 decoys 0.18 ms, 3200 decoys 1.60 ms per call,
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# roughly linear) -- and it read the decoy, which is the hole. The cap is load-bearing for the new cost, so
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# raising or removing it later is not a tidy-up.
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# The bound is on the LOOP, not on the payload, so an ordinary command pays nothing: the same 56572 B flood
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# is refused in 93-94 ms with jq/python3 present and 168-169 ms on the slice path this paragraph is about,
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# both far inside the 60s timeout, while a 46 KB legitimate command is 325 ms on macOS -- a figure that
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local _cap=64 _seen=0
|
|
110
|
+
while :; do
|
|
111
|
+
pre="${hay%%"$k"*}" # everything before the next `"key"`
|
|
112
|
+
[ "$pre" != "$hay" ] || return 0 # no further occurrence: emit nothing
|
|
113
|
+
_seen=$((_seen+1)); [ "$_seen" -le "$_cap" ] || return 0
|
|
114
|
+
rest="${hay:${#pre}+${#k}}" # past `"key"`
|
|
115
|
+
while [ -n "$rest" ] && [[ "${rest:0:1}" == [$' \t\n\r'] ]]; do rest="${rest:1}"; done
|
|
116
|
+
case "$rest" in
|
|
117
|
+
:*) rest="${rest:1}"; break ;; # whitespace then `:` -- this occurrence IS the key
|
|
118
|
+
*) hay="$rest" ;; # a value, or another token: keep looking
|
|
119
|
+
esac
|
|
120
|
+
done
|
|
121
|
+
# THE VALUE MUST BE A STRING. `"command":123}}` used to come back as the literal text `:123}}` -- the old
|
|
122
|
+
# shape skipped forward to the next quote wherever it was, so a non-string value handed the matchers the
|
|
123
|
+
# payload's own punctuation to judge. Emitting nothing instead lets the caller's "no readable command"
|
|
124
|
+
# refusal fire, which is the honest answer for a value these gates cannot read.
|
|
125
|
+
while [ -n "$rest" ] && [[ "${rest:0:1}" == [$' \t\n\r'] ]]; do rest="${rest:1}"; done
|
|
126
|
+
case "$rest" in '"'*) rest="${rest:1}" ;; *) return 0 ;; esac
|
|
127
|
+
# Walk to the closing quote that is NOT escaped. A `"` preceded by an odd number of backslashes is content.
|
|
128
|
+
n=${#rest}; chunk="${rest:0:C}"; cl=${#chunk}
|
|
129
|
+
while :; do
|
|
130
|
+
lim=$((cl - j))
|
|
131
|
+
if [ "$lim" -le 0 ]; then
|
|
132
|
+
[ $((base + cl)) -lt "$n" ] || break # no closing quote at all: everything is already taken
|
|
133
|
+
base=$((base + j)); chunk="${rest:base:C}"; cl=${#chunk}; j=0; continue
|
|
134
|
+
fi
|
|
135
|
+
[ "$lim" -le "$W" ] || lim=$W
|
|
136
|
+
w="${chunk:j:lim}"
|
|
137
|
+
seg="${w%%\"*}"
|
|
138
|
+
if [ "$seg" = "$w" ]; then # no quote in view: take all of it, carry the run
|
|
139
|
+
acc+=("$w"); j=$((j+lim))
|
|
140
|
+
r="${w##*[!\\]}"; case "$w" in *[!\\]*) run=${#r} ;; *) run=$((run+${#w})) ;; esac
|
|
141
|
+
continue
|
|
142
|
+
fi
|
|
143
|
+
acc+=("$seg"); j=$((j+${#seg}+1))
|
|
144
|
+
r="${seg##*[!\\]}"; case "$seg" in *[!\\]*) run=${#r} ;; *) run=$((run+${#seg})) ;; esac
|
|
145
|
+
if [ $((run % 2)) -eq 1 ]; then acc+=("\""); run=0; else break; fi
|
|
146
|
+
done
|
|
147
|
+
local IFS=''; _JS="${acc[*]}"; printf '%s' "$_JS"
|
|
148
|
+
}
|
|
149
|
+
_json_unescape(){ # left-to-right, a chunk at a time; a two-pass sed would corrupt `\\"` (escaped backslash + quote)
|
|
150
|
+
# This is the tier-3 path below -- the one a stock Windows install actually runs on. It used to walk ONE
|
|
151
|
+
# CHARACTER at a time, which is O(n^2) twice over: `${s%"${s#?}"}` matches a pattern the length of the
|
|
152
|
+
# entire remainder just to read one character, and `out="$out$c"` recopies the output for each one.
|
|
153
|
+
#
|
|
154
|
+
# That was not a comfort question. This hook's timeout is 60s -- set in settings.json, NOT Claude Code's
|
|
155
|
+
# default, and reading the default instead is how a first pass at this got the consequence wrong. A
|
|
156
|
+
# PreToolUse hook KILLED at its timeout emits no exit 2, so every rule below is simply skipped. Measured on
|
|
157
|
+
# the tier-3 path with jq and python3 both shadowed, the old shape crossed 60s at ~4.3 KB. And 4.3 KB is
|
|
158
|
+
# not exotic: across 6791 Bash calls in 280 real transcripts, 2.49% of commands are bigger, and the largest
|
|
159
|
+
# is 46815 B, which the old shape needed roughly 39 minutes to decode. One Bash call in forty walked past
|
|
160
|
+
# §4.4 and §4.5 entirely, silently, on every stock Windows desktop.
|
|
161
|
+
#
|
|
162
|
+
# Two changes, and their wins are NOT the same shape -- writing them down as one number was the mistake
|
|
163
|
+
# this comment exists to avoid repeating:
|
|
164
|
+
# * Taking the whole run up to the next backslash in ONE expansion, and indexing with `${s:0:1}` instead
|
|
165
|
+
# of matching a pattern, is 47x on a 4.4 KB payload. This one holds on every machine.
|
|
166
|
+
# * `local LC_ALL=C` makes these expansions byte-oriented instead of re-decoding the string on every
|
|
167
|
+
# substring operation. What that is WORTH depends on the platform, and putting a single number here
|
|
168
|
+
# would have been wrong three separate ways -- it was written as "another 5x" twice before this:
|
|
169
|
+
# macOS / bash 3.2, a locale set .................. 5x
|
|
170
|
+
# Git Bash 5.3.15, a locale set ................... 1.23x (measured on the OLD shape; the new one
|
|
171
|
+
# touches the locale once per escape
|
|
172
|
+
# rather than once per character, so its
|
|
173
|
+
# ratio is smaller and unmeasured)
|
|
174
|
+
# Git Bash, LANG empty -- what Claude Code starts .. nothing at all
|
|
175
|
+
# So speed is not what keeps this line; CORRECTNESS is, and that half holds everywhere. `[0-9a-fA-F]`
|
|
176
|
+
# below is a collation-defined range outside the C locale: on a tr_TR desktop it is not 0-9a-f. That
|
|
177
|
+
# alone would justify the line, and it costs nothing. `local` restores the previous locale on return
|
|
178
|
+
# -- verified on bash 3.2 and on Git Bash 5.3.15, not assumed.
|
|
179
|
+
#
|
|
180
|
+
# Then the cost moved rather than went away. With the per-character walk gone, each escape still sliced the
|
|
181
|
+
# whole REMAINDER -- `s="${s:${#pre}+1}"` -- so an escape-dense command stayed k*n: on Git Bash a 44080 B
|
|
182
|
+
# command with 2755 escapes took 6.8s, 11% of the timeout. The input is now touched only a chunk at a time
|
|
183
|
+
# (`${s:base:C}`, once per 4096 bytes) and every per-escape operation stays inside that chunk, so no escape
|
|
184
|
+
# pays for the length of the whole command. That is the change that matters: bounding only the lookahead,
|
|
185
|
+
# while still indexing the full string, was measured too and gave about 4x on both machines, against 6-12x
|
|
186
|
+
# for the chunked walk. Five bytes are held back at a chunk's end whenever more input follows, so a
|
|
187
|
+
# `\uXXXX` that starts in a chunk ends in it.
|
|
188
|
+
# The output goes into an array joined once, not a string recopied at every append, and `\n`/`\t` are
|
|
189
|
+
# written `$'\n'`/`$'\t'`, so this file carries no raw TAB for an editor or a copy to turn into spaces.
|
|
190
|
+
#
|
|
191
|
+
# Measured, isolated, previous shape -> this one:
|
|
192
|
+
# macOS/bash 3.2 escape-dense 44030 B, 2590 escapes .. 1.44s -> 0.12s
|
|
193
|
+
# sparse 100014 B, 4 escapes ........... 0.09s -> 0.02s
|
|
194
|
+
# Git Bash 5.3.15 escape-dense 44030 B, 2590 escapes .. 3.92s -> 0.54s
|
|
195
|
+
# (LANG empty) sparse 99997 B, 4 escapes ............ 0.49s -> 0.07s
|
|
196
|
+
# These numbers do not travel, which is why each one names its machine.
|
|
197
|
+
#
|
|
198
|
+
# Output is byte-identical to the previous shape across 478 cases, each run at four chunk/window sizes
|
|
199
|
+
# down to 7 and 1 bytes so that an edge falls every few bytes; that shape was itself byte-identical to
|
|
200
|
+
# the original character walk across a 31-case battery (escaped quotes, `\\`, a lone trailing backslash, a
|
|
201
|
+
# truncated `\u`, Turkish, emoji). Deliberately broken twins -- the 5-byte margin cut to 4, the backslash
|
|
202
|
+
# not stepped over -- prove the battery sees both edges, and tier 1 and tier 3 return the same verdict on
|
|
203
|
+
# the gate cases.
|
|
204
|
+
local LC_ALL=C
|
|
205
|
+
local s="$1" pre w c h n base=0 j=0 cl lim chunk C=4096 W=256; local -a acc=("")
|
|
206
|
+
case "$s" in *\\*) ;; *) printf '%s' "$s"; return 0 ;; esac # no escapes: the common case pays nothing
|
|
207
|
+
n=${#s}; chunk="${s:0:C}"; cl=${#chunk}
|
|
208
|
+
while :; do
|
|
209
|
+
lim=$((cl - j))
|
|
210
|
+
if [ $((base + cl)) -lt "$n" ]; then # more input after this chunk: hold 5 bytes back, so
|
|
211
|
+
lim=$((lim - 5)) # a `\uXXXX` that starts in a chunk also ends in it
|
|
212
|
+
if [ "$lim" -le 0 ]; then base=$((base + j)); chunk="${s:base:C}"; cl=${#chunk}; j=0; continue; fi
|
|
213
|
+
else
|
|
214
|
+
[ "$lim" -gt 0 ] || break
|
|
215
|
+
fi
|
|
216
|
+
[ "$lim" -le "$W" ] || lim=$W
|
|
217
|
+
w="${chunk:j:lim}"
|
|
218
|
+
pre="${w%%\\*}" # the literal run before the next backslash in view
|
|
219
|
+
if [ "$pre" = "$w" ]; then acc+=("$w"); j=$((j+lim)); continue; fi
|
|
220
|
+
acc+=("$pre"); j=$((j+${#pre}+1))
|
|
221
|
+
if [ $((base + j)) -ge "$n" ]; then acc+=("\\"); break; fi # a lone trailing backslash stays literal, as before
|
|
222
|
+
c="${chunk:j:1}"; j=$((j+1))
|
|
223
|
+
case "$c" in
|
|
224
|
+
n) acc+=($'\n') ;;
|
|
225
|
+
t) acc+=($'\t') ;;
|
|
226
|
+
r) ;;
|
|
227
|
+
b|f) acc+=(" ") ;;
|
|
228
|
+
u) if [ $((n - base - j)) -ge 4 ]; then h="${chunk:j:4}"; j=$((j+4)); else h=""; fi # a short tail is left alone, as before
|
|
229
|
+
# A `\uXXXX` used to become a literal `?`. That is not a lossy nicety, it is a hole: `\u002e` is `.`,
|
|
230
|
+
# so `\u002eclaude/hooks/guard-bash.sh` decoded to `?claude/…` and matched no gate pattern, while jq
|
|
231
|
+
# decoded the same bytes to the real path — the two tiers disagreed on whether a payload was an
|
|
232
|
+
# attack. Printable ASCII is decoded properly (builtin printf, no fork); anything else still becomes
|
|
233
|
+
# `?`, which is only ever a display concern because this value is used for MATCHING, never to write.
|
|
234
|
+
case "$h" in
|
|
235
|
+
00[2-7][0-9a-fA-F]) printf -v c "\\x${h#00}"; acc+=("$c") ;;
|
|
236
|
+
*) acc+=("?") ;;
|
|
237
|
+
esac ;;
|
|
238
|
+
*) acc+=("$c") ;;
|
|
239
|
+
esac
|
|
240
|
+
done
|
|
241
|
+
local IFS=''; printf '%s' "${acc[*]}"
|
|
242
|
+
}
|
|
243
|
+
_json_keycount(){ # $1 = payload, $2 = key -> sets _KC to how many times it occurs AS A KEY
|
|
244
|
+
# IT SETS A VARIABLE INSTEAD OF PRINTING, and that is not a style choice. Written as `n="$(_json_keycount
|
|
245
|
+
# …)"` first, which is a command substitution, which is a FORK -- on a hook that runs before every Bash and
|
|
246
|
+
# every Write call. Measured on macOS/bash, typical payload, 200 reps: the substitution form cost 0.790 ms
|
|
247
|
+
# per call against 0.090 ms for the raw byte test it replaces, and the whole hook went 15.00 -> 16.58 ms.
|
|
248
|
+
# This project's own recorded Git Bash process cost is 62-135 ms, rising to ~400 ms under load, so three
|
|
249
|
+
# added forks per call would have been a freeze on the platform the change is meant to protect. Setting _KC
|
|
250
|
+
# keeps the count in the caller's own shell: expansion only, zero forks.
|
|
251
|
+
# The counter the ambiguity refusals need, and it exists because the hand-written byte test they used to do
|
|
252
|
+
# looked for a DIFFERENT token than the parser above: `"key":` compact, while the parser searches `"key"` and
|
|
253
|
+
# tolerates whitespace before the colon. Two consequences, both measured on the shipped hook:
|
|
254
|
+
# * `{…"meta":{"command":"ls"},"tool_input":{"command" : "rm -rf /"}}` -- ONE SPACE and the duplicate-key
|
|
255
|
+
# refusal went blind while the parser happily read the first value.
|
|
256
|
+
# * a key name appearing as a VALUE was counted as an occurrence by neither, which is the hole the parser
|
|
257
|
+
# above now closes; counting the same form here is what keeps the two from drifting apart again.
|
|
258
|
+
# Sharing ONE definition with the parser is the point: a guard that searches for something else than the
|
|
259
|
+
# thing it guards is the defect, not an implementation detail.
|
|
260
|
+
# WHAT THE TOKEN CAN BE, stated correctly. An earlier version of this comment said the bytes `"command"`
|
|
261
|
+
# with both quotes unescaped "can only be a key or a value equal to the key name". That is wrong, and the
|
|
262
|
+
# counter-example was found by review, not by reasoning: a KEY whose own name ends with a quote spells the
|
|
263
|
+
# token out of its escaped quote plus the string's terminator --
|
|
264
|
+
# {"tool_input":{"x\"command":"DECOY","command":"rm -rf /"}} slice -> DECOY, count -> 2
|
|
265
|
+
# which is refused BECAUSE the count sees two, not because the invariant held. The same shape as a VALUE is
|
|
266
|
+
# harmless (a string's terminator is followed by `,` `}` `]`, never `:`, so it is skipped and not counted:
|
|
267
|
+
# {"description":"ends with \"command","command":"rm -rf /"} slice -> rm -rf /, count -> 1 ).
|
|
268
|
+
# What IS true, and is what keeps ordinary work from being refused: content can contribute at most one
|
|
269
|
+
# occurrence per string and only as that string's tail, where the next byte is never a colon. Measured on 19
|
|
270
|
+
# payloads built by a real JSON encoder -- `grep -rn '"command":' .`, a heredoc writing a hooks.json, `sed`
|
|
271
|
+
# over settings.json, a commit message quoting the word, commands ending in `"command` -- every count <= 1.
|
|
272
|
+
# Same pass cap as the slice, and over-cap reports AMBIGUOUS rather than a true count: the callers refuse on
|
|
273
|
+
# `> 1`, so a payload built to outrun the loop is refused instead of being timed out past the gate.
|
|
274
|
+
local LC_ALL=C hay="$1" k="\"$2\"" pre rest c=0 _cap=64 _seen=0
|
|
275
|
+
_KC=0; _KC_CAPPED=0
|
|
276
|
+
while :; do
|
|
277
|
+
pre="${hay%%"$k"*}"
|
|
278
|
+
[ "$pre" != "$hay" ] || { _KC=$c; return 0; }
|
|
279
|
+
# OVER-CAP IS ITS OWN ANSWER, not a large count. `_KC_CAPPED` lets the caller say what actually happened:
|
|
280
|
+
# the occurrences it stopped at are candidate positions, key-form or not, so calling them "65 keys" was a
|
|
281
|
+
# sentinel dressed up as a measurement and the remedy it offered ("send one key") was already satisfied.
|
|
282
|
+
_seen=$((_seen+1)); [ "$_seen" -le "$_cap" ] || { _KC=$((_cap+1)); _KC_CAPPED=$_cap; return 0; }
|
|
283
|
+
rest="${hay:${#pre}+${#k}}"
|
|
284
|
+
while [ -n "$rest" ] && [[ "${rest:0:1}" == [$' \t\n\r'] ]]; do rest="${rest:1}"; done
|
|
285
|
+
case "$rest" in :*) c=$((c+1)) ;; esac
|
|
286
|
+
hay="$rest"
|
|
287
|
+
done
|
|
288
|
+
}
|
|
289
|
+
# ---- /CREW-JSON-PARSE -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
290
|
+
|
|
291
|
+
block(){ # $1 = rule name for the log (must keep the `gate-file edit` prefix — /crew-gates groups on it), $2 = why
|
|
292
|
+
# Same write-only observability channel as guard-bash.sh, on by default into .claude/gate-log.tsv since 2.5.0
|
|
293
|
+
# and with the same rule about the payload: the path is NOT recorded unless CREW_GATE_LOG_CMD=1, because
|
|
294
|
+
# /crew-gates reports rule names and counts and never the argument. Logged after the verdict; it cannot
|
|
295
|
+
# change it. CREW_GATE_LOG overrides the path; point it at /dev/null to turn recording off.
|
|
296
|
+
_GL="${CREW_GATE_LOG:-}"
|
|
297
|
+
if [ -z "$_GL" ] && [ -d ".claude" ]; then
|
|
298
|
+
if ! git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1 || git check-ignore -q ".claude/gate-log.tsv" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
299
|
+
_GL=".claude/gate-log.tsv"
|
|
300
|
+
fi
|
|
301
|
+
fi
|
|
302
|
+
if [ -n "$_GL" ]; then
|
|
303
|
+
if [ "${CREW_GATE_LOG_CMD:-0}" = 1 ]; then
|
|
304
|
+
printf 'BLOCK\t§4.5\t%s\t%s\n' "$1" \
|
|
305
|
+
"$(printf '%s' "$FP" | tr -d '\000-\037' | cut -c1-200)" >> "$_GL" 2>/dev/null
|
|
306
|
+
else
|
|
307
|
+
printf 'BLOCK\t§4.5\t%s\t\n' "$1" >> "$_GL" 2>/dev/null
|
|
308
|
+
fi
|
|
309
|
+
fi
|
|
310
|
+
echo "GUARD (§4.5): editing '$FP' is blocked AT THE TOOL LEVEL." >&2
|
|
311
|
+
echo "$2" >&2
|
|
312
|
+
echo "Crewforth updates go through the installer/update script, not the assistant's file tools. If the user explicitly wants it changed, they edit it in their own editor." >&2
|
|
313
|
+
exit 2
|
|
314
|
+
}
|
|
315
|
+
WHY_SCRIPT="This file is a gate script — rewriting it would disarm the trace/secret/approval gates."
|
|
316
|
+
WHY_DISC="This file is Crewforth's discipline document — it IS the text of §4.1-§4.5, so editing it empties the rules the gates enforce."
|
|
317
|
+
WHY_LINK="A parent directory of this path is a symlink and it resolves into a gate directory, so the write would land on a gate file."
|
|
318
|
+
WHY_LONG="The path in this payload is longer than any filesystem accepts. It is refused rather than parsed, because parsing it is the slow path an attacker would aim at."
|
|
319
|
+
# Sized from the cost curve, not from PATH_MAX. Tier 3 walks the value character by character and bash string
|
|
320
|
+
# append is O(n) each time, so the walk is quadratic: measured 0.09s at 512 raw bytes, 0.52s at 1,024, 3.7s at
|
|
321
|
+
# 2,048, ~30s at 4,096. Real paths are nowhere near: measured on a Windows install, actual `file_path` values
|
|
322
|
+
# average ~60 bytes and Windows itself stops at 260 without the long-path opt-in (macOS PATH_MAX is 1,024).
|
|
323
|
+
# 2,048 therefore keeps every path anyone can really produce and bounds the worst case at a few seconds,
|
|
324
|
+
# well inside this hook's 60s timeout — the number that matters, because a hook killed at its timeout emits
|
|
325
|
+
# no exit 2 and the write proceeds.
|
|
326
|
+
MAXPATH=2048
|
|
327
|
+
|
|
328
|
+
# ---- extract ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
329
|
+
# Tiers are selected on whether they WORK, not on whether they exist — see the long note in guard-bash.sh.
|
|
330
|
+
# Short version, measured on a stock Windows 11 desktop: Windows ships a Microsoft Store redirector stub named
|
|
331
|
+
# python3 on PATH by default, `command -v` finds it, it exits 49 with an empty stdout, FP came back "" and
|
|
332
|
+
# `[ -z "$FP" ] && exit 0` let the model rewrite .claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh with its Write tool.
|
|
333
|
+
# AN AMBIGUOUS TARGET IS REFUSED, and this hook needed it most: it is the one that stops the model rewriting
|
|
334
|
+
# the other gates with its file tools. The parser takes the FIRST occurrence of the key, so a harmless path
|
|
335
|
+
# placed EARLIER used to decide the verdict. Measured on the shipped hook, tier 3 (the only tier on a stock
|
|
336
|
+
# Windows desktop), against `.claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh` as the real target:
|
|
337
|
+
# {"meta":{"file_path":"/tmp/ok.txt"},…"tool_input":{"file_path":".claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh"}} rc=0
|
|
338
|
+
# {"tool_input":{"file_path":".claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh"}} rc=2
|
|
339
|
+
# The raw-payload net further down only fires when FP is EMPTY, and here FP was a plausible non-gate path, so
|
|
340
|
+
# nothing looked at the real one. Counted on the raw payload rather than per tier, deliberately: refusing on
|
|
341
|
+
# one tier while another reads a different occurrence just moves the divergence instead of closing it.
|
|
342
|
+
# Both counts read `_KC` instead of `$( )`: a command substitution is a fork, and this hook runs before every
|
|
343
|
+
# Write, Edit, MultiEdit and NotebookEdit call. Measured on macOS the substitution form cost 0.79 ms per call
|
|
344
|
+
# and took the whole hook from 13.81 to 15.49 ms; on Git Bash a process is 62-135 ms, so two of them per call
|
|
345
|
+
# would have been a freeze on the platform this change exists to protect.
|
|
346
|
+
_json_keycount "$INPUT" file_path; _n_fp=$_KC; _cap_p=$_KC_CAPPED
|
|
347
|
+
_json_keycount "$INPUT" notebook_path; _n_nb=$_KC; [ "$_KC_CAPPED" = 0 ] || _cap_p=$_KC_CAPPED
|
|
348
|
+
if [ "$_cap_p" != 0 ]; then
|
|
349
|
+
echo "GUARD (§4.5): this payload contains more than $_cap_p occurrences of a path key, so the scan for" >&2
|
|
350
|
+
echo "the real one was stopped. Refusing rather than reading whichever one it had reached." >&2
|
|
351
|
+
exit 2
|
|
352
|
+
elif [ $((_n_fp + _n_nb)) -gt 1 ]; then
|
|
353
|
+
echo "GUARD (§4.5): this payload carries $((_n_fp + _n_nb)) path keys (file_path/notebook_path), so the" >&2
|
|
354
|
+
echo "file to judge is ambiguous. Refusing rather than reading whichever comes first." >&2
|
|
355
|
+
exit 2
|
|
356
|
+
fi
|
|
357
|
+
# ONE READER, EVERYWHERE — the jq/python3 ladder that stood here is gone; the reasoning and the measurements
|
|
358
|
+
# are in guard-bash.sh next to the same change. What the ladder cost THIS hook specifically: Windows ships a
|
|
359
|
+
# Microsoft Store redirector stub named python3 on PATH by default, `command -v` finds it, it exits 49 with an
|
|
360
|
+
# empty stdout, FP came back "" and `[ -z "$FP" ] && exit 0` let the model rewrite .claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh
|
|
361
|
+
# with its Write tool. Pure parameter expansion cannot fail that way.
|
|
362
|
+
_raw="$(_json_slice "$INPUT" file_path)"
|
|
363
|
+
[ -n "$_raw" ] || _raw="$(_json_slice "$INPUT" notebook_path)"
|
|
364
|
+
# THE CAP GOES BEFORE THE UNESCAPER, and the cost it bounds is one the shared reader INTRODUCED — worth saying
|
|
365
|
+
# plainly rather than dressing up as a pre-existing bug. What it replaced was a single `sed`, which is linear
|
|
366
|
+
# and was never slow; it was replaced because it truncated the value at the first escaped quote and never
|
|
367
|
+
# looked at `notebook_path`. The parser that fixes those walks character by character, which is quadratic in
|
|
368
|
+
# bash, and on Windows every separator is a backslash, i.e. an escape, so the "no escapes" fast path never
|
|
369
|
+
# fires. Uncapped, that is a gate with an off switch: a hook killed at its 60s timeout emits no exit 2 and the
|
|
370
|
+
# write proceeds. Refusing above the cap is safe in the direction that matters, and the cap sits far above any
|
|
371
|
+
# path a filesystem will accept.
|
|
372
|
+
# ONE cap, not two. The second check used to follow the unescaper because the jq tier reached the fold with no
|
|
373
|
+
# unescaper in front of it; with one reader that is gone, and the unescaper only ever SHRINKS its input —
|
|
374
|
+
# measured over 23 escape forms including a surrogate pair and a 4900-byte run of `€` across the chunk
|
|
375
|
+
# edge, with a deliberately-growing stand-in as the calibration, so the check could be seen to fail.
|
|
376
|
+
[ "${#_raw}" -le "$MAXPATH" ] || { FP="(oversized path: ${#_raw} bytes)"; block "gate-file edit (oversized path)" "$WHY_LONG"; }
|
|
377
|
+
FP="$(_json_unescape "$_raw")"
|
|
378
|
+
|
|
379
|
+
# Nothing extractable. Exiting 0 unconditionally is what a future field rename turns into a silent bypass, so
|
|
380
|
+
# look at the RAW payload instead: refuse only when the text itself names a gate tree. A payload that mentions
|
|
381
|
+
# no gate path still passes, so a rename cannot lock anyone out of ordinary work — it can only cost a false
|
|
382
|
+
# block on a file whose own path says `.claude/…hooks`, which is the trade this gate exists to make.
|
|
383
|
+
if [ -z "$FP" ]; then
|
|
384
|
+
case "$INPUT" in
|
|
385
|
+
*.claude*hooks*|*.git*hooks*|*DISCIPLINE.md*) FP="(unparsed payload naming a gate path)"; block "gate-file edit (unparsed payload)" "$WHY_SCRIPT" ;;
|
|
386
|
+
esac
|
|
387
|
+
exit 0
|
|
388
|
+
fi
|
|
389
|
+
|
|
390
|
+
# ---- normalise -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
391
|
+
# Windows separators first: Crewforth folds `\\` then `\` in five other hooks and this is the same idiom.
|
|
392
|
+
RP="${FP//\\\\//}"; RP="${RP//\\//}"; NP="$RP"
|
|
393
|
+
# Lexical resolution of `.`, `..` and repeated slashes. Lexical is the right kind here: it is what makes
|
|
394
|
+
# `.claude/skills/../hooks/x` and `.claude/hooks/x` the same string, it costs zero processes, and it cannot be
|
|
395
|
+
# defeated by a directory that does not exist yet (a `realpath` on an unborn path returns the input unchanged,
|
|
396
|
+
# which is exactly the hole this closes). Symlinks are the one thing lexical resolution gets wrong, and they
|
|
397
|
+
# are handled separately below.
|
|
398
|
+
_norm(){ # assigns NORM; NOT `NP="$(_norm …)"` — a command substitution is a
|
|
399
|
+
local p="$1" lead="" seg rest out="" # fork, and a fork per Write/Edit is the cost this whole file avoids
|
|
400
|
+
case "$p" in /*) lead="/" ;; esac
|
|
401
|
+
rest="$p"
|
|
402
|
+
while [ -n "$rest" ]; do
|
|
403
|
+
seg="${rest%%/*}"
|
|
404
|
+
if [ "$seg" = "$rest" ]; then rest=""; else rest="${rest#*/}"; fi
|
|
405
|
+
case "$seg" in
|
|
406
|
+
''|'.') continue ;;
|
|
407
|
+
'..')
|
|
408
|
+
if [ -n "$out" ] && [ "${out##*/}" != ".." ]; then
|
|
409
|
+
case "$out" in */*) out="${out%/*}" ;; *) out="" ;; esac
|
|
410
|
+
elif [ -z "$lead" ]; then
|
|
411
|
+
out="${out:+$out/}.." # relative path climbing above the cwd: keep it, it is not a gate path
|
|
412
|
+
fi
|
|
413
|
+
continue ;; # absolute path at the root: `/..` is `/`, so drop it
|
|
414
|
+
esac
|
|
415
|
+
# Trailing dots and spaces are stripped from every component, because Win32 strips them when it OPENS the
|
|
416
|
+
# file: `.claude./hooks/x` and `DISCIPLINE.md ` reach the same inode as the plain spelling there. The
|
|
417
|
+
# `DISCIPLINE.md` rule is an exact tail match with no trailing wildcard, so one trailing byte defeated it.
|
|
418
|
+
# This value is only ever compared, never written through, so a POSIX file genuinely named `foo.` is
|
|
419
|
+
# unaffected in every way except that it would be matched as `foo`.
|
|
420
|
+
while :; do case "$seg" in *.|*' ') seg="${seg%?}" ;; *) break ;; esac; done
|
|
421
|
+
[ -n "$seg" ] || continue
|
|
422
|
+
out="${out:+$out/}$seg"
|
|
423
|
+
done
|
|
424
|
+
NORM="$lead$out"
|
|
425
|
+
}
|
|
426
|
+
_norm "$NP"; NP="$NORM"
|
|
427
|
+
|
|
428
|
+
# ---- match -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
429
|
+
# One place where "is this a gate file?" is answered, because it has to be asked twice — once on the path as
|
|
430
|
+
# written, once on the path as it resolves through a symlink.
|
|
431
|
+
#
|
|
432
|
+
# THE PATTERNS FOLD CASE. APFS and NTFS are case-insensitive by default, so `.CLAUDE/HOOKS/GUARD-BASH.SH` and
|
|
433
|
+
# `.claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh` are the SAME FILE — measured on this machine: identical inode, and a write
|
|
434
|
+
# through the uppercase spelling landed in the real gate script. The shell-side guard already folds case
|
|
435
|
+
# (`grep -i`), so the two guards disagreed on the same path. The bracket form needs no `shopt`, cannot leak
|
|
436
|
+
# into a later `case`, and works on bash 3.2.
|
|
437
|
+
_is_gate(){ # 0 = gate file; sets GATE_RULE and GATE_WHY
|
|
438
|
+
case "$1" in
|
|
439
|
+
*/.[Cc][Ll][Aa][Uu][Dd][Ee]/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/*|.[Cc][Ll][Aa][Uu][Dd][Ee]/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/*)
|
|
440
|
+
GATE_RULE="gate-file edit (Write/Edit tools)"; GATE_WHY="$WHY_SCRIPT"; return 0 ;;
|
|
441
|
+
*/.[Gg][Ii][Tt]/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/*|.[Gg][Ii][Tt]/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/*)
|
|
442
|
+
GATE_RULE="gate-file edit (Write/Edit tools)"; GATE_WHY="$WHY_SCRIPT"; return 0 ;;
|
|
443
|
+
*/.[Cc][Ll][Aa][Uu][Dd][Ee]/[Dd][Ii][Ss][Cc][Ii][Pp][Ll][Ii][Nn][Ee].[Mm][Dd]|.[Cc][Ll][Aa][Uu][Dd][Ee]/[Dd][Ii][Ss][Cc][Ii][Pp][Ll][Ii][Nn][Ee].[Mm][Dd])
|
|
444
|
+
GATE_RULE="gate-file edit (discipline document)"; GATE_WHY="$WHY_DISC"; return 0 ;;
|
|
445
|
+
# The plugin edition keeps the SAME gate scripts at $CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/hooks/, which is not `.claude/hooks/`
|
|
446
|
+
# and so matched nothing above — one of Crewforth's four channels shipped an unguarded copy of its own gates.
|
|
447
|
+
# Matched by Crewforth's own filenames rather than by guessing a plugin path, so a project's unrelated
|
|
448
|
+
# `hooks/` directory is untouched.
|
|
449
|
+
*/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/[Gg][Uu][Aa][Rr][Dd]-*.[Ss][Hh]|*/[Hh][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ss]/[Ss][Ee][Ss][Ss][Ii][Oo][Nn]-[Gg][Uu][Aa][Rr][Dd].[Ss][Hh])
|
|
450
|
+
GATE_RULE="gate-file edit (Crewforth gate script)"; GATE_WHY="$WHY_SCRIPT"; return 0 ;;
|
|
451
|
+
esac
|
|
452
|
+
return 1
|
|
453
|
+
}
|
|
454
|
+
_is_gate "$NP" && block "$GATE_RULE" "$GATE_WHY"
|
|
455
|
+
|
|
456
|
+
# The one thing lexical resolution cannot see: a symlinked ancestor. Two directions matter and only the second
|
|
457
|
+
# one is dangerous — a link INTO the config tree (`cfg -> .claude`, then write `cfg/hooks/guard-bash.sh`),
|
|
458
|
+
# which names no gate path at all and so passes every pattern above. Measured before this loop existed: rc=0,
|
|
459
|
+
# and the file really was overwritten. The reverse direction — a symlink ABOVE the project (`~/Projects ->
|
|
460
|
+
# /Volumes/…`, or plain `/tmp -> private/tmp` on macOS) — is routine and must stay allowed.
|
|
461
|
+
#
|
|
462
|
+
# So the walk runs for EVERY path (`[ -L ]` is a builtin: no process, and the loop is bounded), and only when
|
|
463
|
+
# an ancestor really is a symlink does it pay ONE fork to resolve it and ask the same question again about the
|
|
464
|
+
# real location. That fork is charged to the rare case instead of to every Write, which is what the hot-path
|
|
465
|
+
# budget requires; an ordinary repo pays nothing at all.
|
|
466
|
+
# The walk runs over RP — the folded path BEFORE `..` was collapsed — and that ordering is the rule, not a
|
|
467
|
+
# detail. Lexical `..` collapsing is only valid when no component before it is a symlink: with `c -> .claude/
|
|
468
|
+
# skills`, the written path `c/../hooks/guard-bash.sh` collapses to `hooks/guard-bash.sh` (no gate) while the
|
|
469
|
+
# filesystem resolves `c/..` through the link to `.claude`, landing on the real gate script. Collapsing first
|
|
470
|
+
# would delete the very component that has to be examined. Resolving from RP and re-normalising afterwards
|
|
471
|
+
# gets both: `<real>/.claude/skills` + `/../hooks/guard-bash.sh` normalises back onto the gate.
|
|
472
|
+
_anc="$RP"; _sfx=""; _depth=0
|
|
473
|
+
while case "$_anc" in */*) true ;; *) false ;; esac; do
|
|
474
|
+
_depth=$((_depth+1)); [ "$_depth" -gt 64 ] && break
|
|
475
|
+
_sfx="${_anc##*/}${_sfx:+/$_sfx}"
|
|
476
|
+
_anc="${_anc%/*}"
|
|
477
|
+
[ -n "$_anc" ] || break
|
|
478
|
+
if [ -L "$_anc" ]; then
|
|
479
|
+
_real="$(cd -P "$_anc" 2>/dev/null && pwd)"
|
|
480
|
+
if [ -n "$_real" ]; then
|
|
481
|
+
_norm "$_real/$_sfx"
|
|
482
|
+
_is_gate "$NORM" && { FP="$FP (resolves to $NORM)"; block "gate-file edit (symlinked ancestor)" "$WHY_LINK"; }
|
|
483
|
+
fi
|
|
484
|
+
break
|
|
485
|
+
fi
|
|
486
|
+
done
|
|
487
|
+
|
|
488
|
+
# ---- team board: you may not start work nobody knows you started -----------------------------------------------
|
|
489
|
+
# The claim lock already makes it impossible for two people to HOLD the same item — a losing claim is refused in
|
|
490
|
+
# under a second, before any code exists. The hole this closes is the other one: somebody who never claims at all.
|
|
491
|
+
# Caught only at commit time, that is hours of work discovered as duplicated at the end, which is exactly the
|
|
492
|
+
# wasted effort the board exists to prevent. So the first file edit is where it is caught instead.
|
|
493
|
+
#
|
|
494
|
+
# Cost: this runs before EVERY Write/Edit, so it must not shell out. board.sh maintains a one-bit flag file
|
|
495
|
+
# (present == a board exists, it requires a claim, and this user holds none); everything here is a file test.
|
|
496
|
+
[ -n "${CREW_NO_BOARD:-}" ] && exit 0
|
|
497
|
+
GD=".git"
|
|
498
|
+
[ -d "$GD" ] || GD="$(git rev-parse --git-common-dir 2>/dev/null)" # worktree/submodule: .git is a file
|
|
499
|
+
if [ -n "$GD" ] && [ -f "$GD/crew-board-guard" ]; then
|
|
500
|
+
case "$FP" in
|
|
501
|
+
*/docs/*|docs/*|*/.claude/*|.claude/*) ;; # planning notes and kit config are not the work being claimed
|
|
502
|
+
*)
|
|
503
|
+
# /crew-board is user-only: name the command Claude can run itself, then the slash form for the user.
|
|
504
|
+
_gwd="${BASH_SOURCE%/*}"; _gwd="$(cd "$_gwd" 2>/dev/null && pwd)"
|
|
505
|
+
if [ -f "$_gwd/../.claude-plugin/plugin.json" ]; then _BB="bash \"$_gwd/board.sh\""; else _BB='bash .claude/hooks/board.sh'; fi
|
|
506
|
+
echo "BOARD GATE: you hold no work item, so nobody else can see what you are starting." >&2
|
|
507
|
+
echo "Claim one first: $_BB claim <id> — $_BB status lists what is free, what is blocked and who holds the rest (or the user can type /crew-board claim <id>)." >&2
|
|
508
|
+
echo "Work that belongs to no item: set CREW_NO_BOARD=1 for this session, and commit it with [chore]." >&2
|
|
509
|
+
echo "Just claimed one elsewhere? The board view is cached — $_BB sync refreshes it (or the user can type /crew-board sync)." >&2
|
|
510
|
+
exit 2 ;;
|
|
511
|
+
esac
|
|
512
|
+
fi
|
|
513
|
+
exit 0
|