create-ailk 0.1.1 → 0.3.0

package/templates/apps/api/src/services/tenant-context.ts

@@ -1,451 +0,0 @@
-// oss: false
-/**
- * Tenant-context service — the multi-tenant module's guard + tenancy assembly
- * (FEAT-042, design decision (a): row-level isolation at ONE data-access
- * boundary + a default-deny scope layer + a guard).
- *
- * This module and `../lib/tenant-db.ts` are the ONLY two files allowed to
- * touch tenancy/domain Prisma models directly (enforced by the
- * `forbidden_pattern` tenant-scope rule in architecture.yaml). Everything
- * here follows the ADR 0009 D3 service-layer convention: cross-namespace
- * assembly (auth-namespace Membership/Workspace/Session ↔ content-namespace
- * AgentSession/Artifact) happens only in `apps/api/src/services/`.
- *
- * The guard model (default-deny — every branch that is not an explicit grant
- * is a denial):
- *
- *   1. `resolveActiveTenant` — validates the caller's OWN session context:
- *      cookie session present (bearer tokens carry no workspace binding —
- *      #3591), an active workspace set, the workspace row exists, the
- *      session's activeOrganizationId matches the workspace's organization,
- *      and a Membership(user, org) row exists. Result: a `TenantContext`
- *      every downstream domain query is scoped by.
- *   2. Workspace-target routes compare the URL's workspaceId against the
- *      resolved context — mismatch is `forbidden` WITHOUT looking the target
- *      up (no tenant enumeration).
- *   3. Session/artifact-target routes never load the target unscoped at the
- *      route layer; `tenant-db.ts` scopes every lookup by workspaceId, so a
- *      foreign target is indistinguishable from a missing one (`not_found`).
- *
- * Service results use the discriminated `{ ok } | { ok: false, error }`
- * convention from `lead-routing.ts`; routes translate kinds to HTTP statuses.
- */
-import {
-  DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
-  DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_ID,
-  OPERATOR_MEMBERSHIP_ID,
-} from "@working-theory/database/tenancy";
-import { isSentinel, type Id } from "@working-theory/ids";
-
-import { prisma } from "../lib/prisma.js";
-import type { SessionTenant } from "../middleware/auth.js";
-
-export type MembershipRole = "owner" | "admin" | "member";
-
-/**
- * The tenant scope every domain query is bound to. Ids carry the ADR-0031
- * brand; values originating from Prisma reads are brand-asserted at the read
- * edge (the DB CHECK constraints are the runtime guarantee).
- */
-export interface TenantContext {
-  userId: Id<"user">;
-  organizationId: Id<"organization">;
-  workspaceId: Id<"workspace">;
-  role: MembershipRole;
-}
-
-export type TenantErrorKind = "forbidden" | "not_found" | "conflict";
-
-export type TenantResult<T> =
-  | { ok: true; value: T }
-  | { ok: false; error: { kind: TenantErrorKind; message: string } };
-
-function deny<T>(kind: TenantErrorKind, message: string): TenantResult<T> {
-  return { ok: false, error: { kind, message } };
-}
-
-/**
- * TOFU-binds the operator Membership for a single-tenant deployment (spec
- * D1–D4) — the replacement for the deleted user-agnostic `owner` grant. The
- * Membership is created with a fixed, well-known id
- * (`OPERATOR_MEMBERSHIP_ID`); the `Membership.id` primary-key uniqueness —
- * not a read-then-write "is this the first user?" guard — enforces exactly
- * one owner under a concurrent first-login race. The losing caller's
- * `create` raises `P2002`, swallowed here: that caller is then unbound and
- * denied by the `membership.findUnique` the caller of this function runs
- * next.
- *
- * Idempotent + at-most-once: a caller who already holds the Membership (a
- * repeat call, or the deployment's steady state after the first bind) hits
- * the same `P2002` path and is a no-op. Reachable ONLY from
- * `resolveSingleTenantDefault`, itself gated by the
- * `count === 1 && default-workspace-exists` check — unreachable from any
- * multi-tenant state (`count > 1`).
- *
- * When `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` is set (spec D4 — trimmed + lowercased before
- * comparison), the bind is attempted ONLY for the caller whose `User.email`
- * matches it; every other caller returns without writing and is denied
- * downstream. An empty/whitespace-only `AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL` normalizes to
- * `""`, which is falsy — treated as unset (pure TOFU), so a blank pin can
- * never "match" a blank `User.email`. When unset, the bind is pure TOFU —
- * first caller wins.
- */
-async function bindOperatorMembership(userId: Id<"user">): Promise<void> {
-  const pinnedEmail = process.env.AILK_OPERATOR_EMAIL?.trim().toLowerCase();
-  if (pinnedEmail) {
-    const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
-      where: { id: userId },
-      select: { email: true },
-    });
-    if (!user || user.email.trim().toLowerCase() !== pinnedEmail) {
-      return;
-    }
-  }
-  try {
-    await prisma.membership.create({
-      data: {
-        id: OPERATOR_MEMBERSHIP_ID,
-        organizationId: DEFAULT_ORG_ID,
-        userId,
-        role: "owner",
-      },
-    });
-  } catch (error) {
-    if (!isUniqueViolation(error)) {
-      throw error;
-    }
-    // Another caller already holds OPERATOR_MEMBERSHIP_ID (the TOFU race
-    // winner, or a prior deployment run) — swallow and fall through.
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolves the default single-tenant scope when the deployment is
- * unambiguously single-tenant — the default Workspace (`DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_ID`)
- * exists AND it is the ONLY Workspace (`workspace.count() === 1`), the exact
- * mirror of the Phase-1 provision guard's `count === 0` check (spec D2).
- * Returns `null` (never grants) the instant a second Workspace exists, or the
- * sole Workspace is not the well-known default — the caller falls through to
- * the existing multi-tenant default-deny in that case.
- *
- * Converges on the SAME Membership-based authz the multi-tenant path uses
- * (spec D1 — the fix): attempts to TOFU-bind the caller as operator
- * (`bindOperatorMembership`, a no-op once an operator is already bound or
- * the caller doesn't match the optional env pin), then runs the real
- * `membership.findUnique` check. A caller holding no Membership on the
- * default Org — including every caller after the first once TOFU has bound
- * someone else — resolves `null` here, and `resolveActiveTenant` denies.
- * There is no more user-agnostic `owner` grant.
- */
-async function resolveSingleTenantDefault(
-  userId: Id<"user">,
-): Promise<TenantContext | null> {
-  const workspaceCount = await prisma.workspace.count();
-  if (workspaceCount !== 1) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  const workspace = await prisma.workspace.findUnique({
-    where: { id: DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_ID },
-    select: { id: true, organizationId: true },
-  });
-  // The default workspace must hang off the sentinel default Organization
-  // (ADR-0031 rule 7): keyed on the reserved-range predicate, not a literal.
-  if (!workspace || !isSentinel(workspace.organizationId)) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  await bindOperatorMembership(userId);
-  const membership = await prisma.membership.findUnique({
-    where: {
-      organizationId_userId: {
-        organizationId: workspace.organizationId,
-        userId,
-      },
-    },
-    select: { role: true },
-  });
-  if (!membership) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  return {
-    userId,
-    organizationId: workspace.organizationId as Id<"organization">,
-    workspaceId: workspace.id as Id<"workspace">,
-    role: membership.role as MembershipRole,
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate the caller's active tenant context. See the guard model above.
- * `sessionTenant` is undefined for bearer-authenticated requests — denied
- * here (default-deny) until agent tokens carry a workspace binding (#3591).
- */
-export async function resolveActiveTenant(params: {
-  userId: Id<"user">;
-  sessionTenant: SessionTenant | undefined;
-}): Promise<TenantResult<TenantContext>> {
-  const { userId, sessionTenant } = params;
-  if (!sessionTenant) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Tenant context requires a cookie session");
-  }
-  const { activeOrganizationId, activeWorkspaceId } = sessionTenant;
-  if (!activeWorkspaceId || !activeOrganizationId) {
-    // Single-tenant default resolution (spec D1/D2) — only on the previously
-    // unconditional-deny branch, so multi-tenant explicit-binding paths below
-    // add zero extra queries. Falls through to the deny below in any
-    // multi-tenant state (count > 1, or count === 1 but not the default).
-    const singleTenantDefault = await resolveSingleTenantDefault(userId);
-    if (singleTenantDefault) {
-      return { ok: true, value: singleTenantDefault };
-    }
-    return deny("forbidden", "No active workspace");
-  }
-
-  const workspace = await prisma.workspace.findUnique({
-    where: { id: activeWorkspaceId },
-    select: { id: true, organizationId: true },
-  });
-  if (!workspace) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Active workspace no longer exists");
-  }
-  if (workspace.organizationId !== activeOrganizationId) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Stale session tenant context");
-  }
-
-  const membership = await prisma.membership.findUnique({
-    where: {
-      organizationId_userId: {
-        organizationId: workspace.organizationId,
-        userId,
-      },
-    },
-    select: { role: true },
-  });
-  if (!membership) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Not a member of the active organization");
-  }
-
-  return {
-    ok: true,
-    value: {
-      userId,
-      organizationId: workspace.organizationId as Id<"organization">,
-      workspaceId: workspace.id as Id<"workspace">,
-      role: membership.role as MembershipRole,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/** The switcher payload: every org the user belongs to, with its workspaces. */
-export interface TenancyListing {
-  activeOrganizationId: Id<"organization"> | null;
-  activeWorkspaceId: Id<"workspace"> | null;
-  organizations: Array<{
-    id: Id<"organization">;
-    name: string;
-    slug: string;
-    role: MembershipRole;
-    workspaces: Array<{ id: Id<"workspace">; name: string; slug: string }>;
-  }>;
-}
-
-/**
- * List the caller's organizations + workspaces (WorkspaceSwitcher hydration).
- * Membership-scoped by construction: starts from Membership rows, so no org
- * outside the caller's memberships can appear.
- */
-export async function listTenancy(params: {
-  userId: Id<"user">;
-  sessionTenant: SessionTenant | undefined;
-}): Promise<TenantResult<TenancyListing>> {
-  const memberships = await prisma.membership.findMany({
-    where: { userId: params.userId },
-    select: {
-      role: true,
-      organization: {
-        select: {
-          id: true,
-          name: true,
-          slug: true,
-          workspaces: {
-            select: { id: true, name: true, slug: true },
-            orderBy: { createdAt: "asc" },
-          },
-        },
-      },
-    },
-    orderBy: { createdAt: "asc" },
-  });
-
-  return {
-    ok: true,
-    value: {
-      activeOrganizationId: params.sessionTenant?.activeOrganizationId ?? null,
-      activeWorkspaceId: params.sessionTenant?.activeWorkspaceId ?? null,
-      organizations: memberships.map((m) => ({
-        id: m.organization.id as Id<"organization">,
-        name: m.organization.name,
-        slug: m.organization.slug,
-        role: m.role as MembershipRole,
-        workspaces: m.organization.workspaces as Array<{
-          id: Id<"workspace">;
-          name: string;
-          slug: string;
-        }>,
-      })),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Switch the caller's active workspace (and, implicitly, organization).
- * Grant requires the target workspace to exist AND the caller to hold a
- * Membership in its organization — both failures return `not_found` so a
- * non-member cannot distinguish "exists" from "doesn't" (no enumeration).
- * The update is server-side on the Session row (the thin activeWorkspaceId
- * session extension the apps/workspace auth config declares).
- */
-export async function activateWorkspace(params: {
-  userId: Id<"user">;
-  sessionTenant: SessionTenant | undefined;
-  workspaceId: Id<"workspace">;
-}): Promise<TenantResult<TenantContext>> {
-  const { userId, sessionTenant, workspaceId } = params;
-  if (!sessionTenant) {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Tenant context requires a cookie session");
-  }
-
-  const workspace = await prisma.workspace.findUnique({
-    where: { id: workspaceId },
-    select: { id: true, organizationId: true },
-  });
-  if (!workspace) {
-    return deny("not_found", "Workspace not found");
-  }
-
-  const membership = await prisma.membership.findUnique({
-    where: {
-      organizationId_userId: {
-        organizationId: workspace.organizationId,
-        userId,
-      },
-    },
-    select: { role: true },
-  });
-  if (!membership) {
-    return deny("not_found", "Workspace not found");
-  }
-
-  await prisma.session.update({
-    where: { id: sessionTenant.sessionRowId },
-    data: {
-      activeWorkspaceId: workspace.id,
-      activeOrganizationId: workspace.organizationId,
-    },
-  });
-
-  return {
-    ok: true,
-    value: {
-      userId,
-      organizationId: workspace.organizationId as Id<"organization">,
-      workspaceId: workspace.id as Id<"workspace">,
-      role: membership.role as MembershipRole,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a workspace in an organization. Role floor: admin (owner > admin).
- * Non-members get `not_found` (no org enumeration); members below the floor
- * get `forbidden`.
- */
-export async function createWorkspace(params: {
-  userId: Id<"user">;
-  organizationId: Id<"organization">;
-  name: string;
-}): Promise<
-  TenantResult<{
-    id: Id<"workspace">;
-    name: string;
-    slug: string;
-    organizationId: Id<"organization">;
-  }>
-> {
-  const { userId, organizationId, name } = params;
-
-  const membership = await prisma.membership.findUnique({
-    where: { organizationId_userId: { organizationId, userId } },
-    select: { role: true },
-  });
-  if (!membership) {
-    return deny("not_found", "Organization not found");
-  }
-  if (membership.role !== "owner" && membership.role !== "admin") {
-    return deny("forbidden", "Creating a workspace requires the admin role");
-  }
-
-  const slug = slugify(name);
-  try {
-    const workspace = await prisma.workspace.create({
-      data: { organizationId, name, slug },
-      select: { id: true, name: true, slug: true, organizationId: true },
-    });
-    return {
-      ok: true,
-      value: {
-        ...workspace,
-        id: workspace.id as Id<"workspace">,
-        organizationId: workspace.organizationId as Id<"organization">,
-      },
-    };
-  } catch (error) {
-    if (isUniqueViolation(error)) {
-      return deny(
-        "conflict",
-        "A workspace with this name already exists in the organization",
-      );
-    }
-    throw error;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Delete-cascade for a workspace's site config — the service-layer replacement
- * for the dropped cross-namespace FK (ADR-0009 D3 / #3634 D3). Removes the
- * workspace's `WorkspaceTheme` / `WorkspaceSiteIdentity` / `WorkspaceSEO` rows,
- * each scoped by `workspaceId` (the `@unique` key), so it can never touch
- * another workspace's rows.
- *
- * OPTION 1 (Sam-disposed, #3634): this is a HELPER ONLY — no DELETE route,
- * caller, or invocation exists in this phase. The destructive owner-gated
- * entry-point that will call it is a separate, parked, Sam-reviewed issue. It
- * takes a bare `workspaceId` (not a `TenantContext`) because that future caller
- * has already authorized the delete; scope-safety is the caller's contract.
- *
- * Lives here (a `tenant-scope`-excluded file) so the raw `prisma.workspace*`
- * calls pass the architecture lint.
- */
-export async function deleteWorkspaceConfig(workspaceId: string): Promise<void> {
-  await prisma.workspaceTheme.deleteMany({ where: { workspaceId } });
-  await prisma.workspaceSiteIdentity.deleteMany({ where: { workspaceId } });
-  await prisma.workspaceSEO.deleteMany({ where: { workspaceId } });
-}
-
-function slugify(name: string): string {
-  return (
-    name
-      .toLowerCase()
-      .replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, "-")
-      .replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
-      .slice(0, 48) || "workspace"
-  );
-}
-
-function isUniqueViolation(error: unknown): boolean {
-  return (
-    typeof error === "object" &&
-    error !== null &&
-    "code" in error &&
-    (error as { code?: unknown }).code === "P2002"
-  );
-}