cool-workflow 0.1.98 → 0.2.0

package/dist/shell/trust-audit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+"use strict";
+// shell/trust-audit.ts — MILESTONE 8: extended from milestone 6+7's
+// scoped-down subset to the FULL trust-audit hash chain: eventHash (the
+// JSON round-trip pre-pass), verifyTrustAudit (chain-link recompute +
+// the era rule — a log is fully chained OR fully legacy, never mixed),
+// event append (hash-chained), the evidence normalizer, and the
+// sandbox-path decision helper.
+//
+// The milestone-6+7 subset (recordTrustAuditEvent, recordSandboxPath-
+// Decision, normalizeEvidence, ensureTrustAudit) keeps its existing
+// signatures byte-for-byte — shell/commit.ts and shell/worker-
+// isolation.ts already import them. This edit ADDS verifyTrustAudit +
+// the era-rule check + trustAuditGenesis on top, and switches
+// computeEventHash to use core/hash.ts's named `eventHashInput` export
+// (byte-identical behavior to the pre-existing inline JSON-round-trip,
+// now shared with the rest of the hash-dedup story per v2/PLAN.md byte-
+// compat item 2).
+//
+// Evidence: SPEC/ledger-trust.md "Trust-audit chain", invariant 10 (era
+// rule), byte-compat item 2; SPEC/pipeline-run.md's worker-accept
+// references; plugins/cool-workflow/src/trust-audit.ts:1-731 (byte-exact
+// source for the pieces ported here).
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
+    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
+}) : function(o, v) {
+    o["default"] = v;
+});
+var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
+    var ownKeys = function(o) {
+        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
+            var ar = [];
+            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
+            return ar;
+        };
+        return ownKeys(o);
+    };
+    return function (mod) {
+        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
+        var result = {};
+        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
+        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
+        return result;
+    };
+})();
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION = void 0;
+exports.ensureTrustAudit = ensureTrustAudit;
+exports.trustAuditGenesis = trustAuditGenesis;
+exports.listTrustAuditEvents = listTrustAuditEvents;
+exports.verifyTrustAudit = verifyTrustAudit;
+exports.recordTrustAuditEvent = recordTrustAuditEvent;
+exports.recordSandboxPathDecision = recordSandboxPathDecision;
+exports.normalizeEvidence = normalizeEvidence;
+exports.writeTrustAuditIndexPlaceholder = writeTrustAuditIndexPlaceholder;
+exports.summarizeTrustAudit = summarizeTrustAudit;
+const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
+const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
+const hash_1 = require("../core/hash");
+const fs_atomic_1 = require("./fs-atomic");
+exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+function trustAuditPaths(run) {
+    const dir = run.paths.auditDir || path.join(run.paths.runDir, "audit");
+    return {
+        eventLogPath: path.join(dir, "events.jsonl"),
+        summaryPath: path.join(dir, "summary.json"),
+        indexPath: path.join(dir, "index.json"),
+    };
+}
+function ensureTrustAudit(run) {
+    const dir = run.paths.auditDir || path.join(run.paths.runDir, "audit");
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    run.paths.auditDir = dir;
+    const audit = { schemaVersion: 1, ...trustAuditPaths(run) };
+    run.audit = audit;
+    if (!fs.existsSync(audit.eventLogPath))
+        fs.writeFileSync(audit.eventLogPath, "", "utf8");
+    return audit;
+}
+/** Genesis prevHash for a run's chain (no prior event). Exported so
+ *  callers outside this module (verify tooling, tests) can recompute it
+ *  independently rather than trusting a stored value. */
+function trustAuditGenesis(runId) {
+    return (0, hash_1.sha256)(`cw-trust-audit:${runId}`);
+}
+/** Canonical bytes the eventHash binds: every field EXCEPT eventHash
+ *  itself, via core/hash.ts's `eventHashInput` (the JSON round-trip
+ *  pre-pass that drops nested `undefined`-valued keys BEFORE the
+ *  sort-and-stringify step — not a formatting flag on the same shape,
+ *  see v2/PLAN.md byte-compat item 2). Hashing the PERSISTED form this
+ *  way makes record-time hashes equal verify-time (parsed-from-disk)
+ *  hashes. */
+function computeEventHash(event) {
+    const { eventHash, ...rest } = event;
+    void eventHash;
+    return (0, hash_1.sha256)((0, hash_1.eventHashInput)(rest));
+}
+/** Read events in FILE (append) order, tolerating corrupt lines — one
+ *  bad line must not brick the whole audit read surface (it is counted,
+ *  not thrown). The chain links append order, so this is the order
+ *  verification walks. */
+function readEventsRawCounted(eventLogPath) {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(eventLogPath))
+        return { events: [], corruptLines: 0 };
+    let corruptLines = 0;
+    const events = [];
+    for (const line of fs.readFileSync(eventLogPath, "utf8").split(/\n/g)) {
+        const trimmed = line.trim();
+        if (!trimmed)
+            continue;
+        try {
+            events.push(JSON.parse(trimmed));
+        }
+        catch {
+            corruptLines += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    return { events, corruptLines };
+}
+function readEventsRaw(eventLogPath) {
+    return readEventsRawCounted(eventLogPath).events;
+}
+/** Every recorded trust-audit event for this run, in append (file) order.
+ *  Used by trust-policy/collaboration summaries (e.g.
+ *  hasAcceptedJudgeRationale, summarizeMultiAgentTrust). */
+function listTrustAuditEvents(run) {
+    return readEventsRaw(ensureTrustAudit(run).eventLogPath);
+}
+/** Re-prove the run's trust-audit chain: prevEventHash linkage (append
+ *  order) + per-event hash recompute. A corrupt line, an edited event,
+ *  or a removed event flips verified=false. Legacy events without a
+ *  hash are reported as `unchained` (skipped), NOT treated as a forgery
+ *  — they predate the chain.
+ *
+ *  ERA RULE (v2/PLAN.md, SPEC/ledger-trust.md invariant 10): a single
+ *  run is written by one code version, so a log is all-chained (chain
+ *  era) or all-legacy (pre-chain). An unchained (eventHash-less) line
+ *  mixed into an otherwise-chained log is a forgery attempt — dropping
+ *  the hash to be waved through as "legacy" — so it fails with
+ *  `trust-audit-unchained-event`, never silently accepted. */
+function verifyTrustAudit(run) {
+    const audit = ensureTrustAudit(run);
+    const { events, corruptLines } = readEventsRawCounted(audit.eventLogPath);
+    const checks = [];
+    let verified = corruptLines === 0;
+    if (corruptLines > 0)
+        checks.push({ name: "parse", pass: false, code: "trust-audit-corrupt-line" });
+    let chained = 0;
+    let unchained = 0;
+    let expectedPrev = trustAuditGenesis(run.id);
+    for (let i = 0; i < events.length; i++) {
+        const event = events[i];
+        const recomputed = computeEventHash(event);
+        if (event.eventHash === undefined) {
+            unchained += 1;
+            expectedPrev = recomputed; // advance the chain over legacy events
+            continue;
+        }
+        chained += 1;
+        if (event.eventHash !== recomputed) {
+            verified = false;
+            checks.push({ name: `event-hash[${i}]`, pass: false, code: "trust-audit-digest-mismatch" });
+        }
+        if (event.prevEventHash !== undefined && event.prevEventHash !== expectedPrev) {
+            verified = false;
+            checks.push({ name: `chain-link[${i}]`, pass: false, code: "trust-audit-chain-broken" });
+        }
+        expectedPrev = event.eventHash;
+    }
+    // Era rule: a log with ANY chained event must have EVERY event chained.
+    if (chained > 0 && unchained > 0) {
+        verified = false;
+        checks.push({ name: "unchained-events", pass: false, code: "trust-audit-unchained-event" });
+    }
+    return { present: events.length > 0, verified, eventCount: events.length, chained, unchained, corruptLines, checks };
+}
+function unique(values) {
+    return Array.from(new Set(values.filter(Boolean)));
+}
+function scrubMetadata(value) {
+    const result = {};
+    for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(value)) {
+        if (entry === undefined)
+            continue;
+        if (/secret|token|password|credential|authorization|api[_-]?key/i.test(key)) {
+            result[key] = "[redacted]";
+        }
+        else if (Array.isArray(entry)) {
+            result[key] = entry.map((item) => (typeof item === "string" && item.includes("=") ? item.split("=")[0] : item));
+        }
+        else if (entry && typeof entry === "object") {
+            result[key] = scrubMetadata(entry);
+        }
+        else {
+            result[key] = entry;
+        }
+    }
+    return Object.keys(result).length ? result : undefined;
+}
+function compact(value) {
+    return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(value).filter(([, entry]) => entry !== undefined));
+}
+function createEventId(run, kind) {
+    const count = readEventsRaw(trustAuditPaths(run).eventLogPath).length + 1;
+    return `audit-${(0, fs_atomic_1.safeFileName)(kind)}-${String(count).padStart(4, "0")}`;
+}
+/** Correlation-id keys copied verbatim (and no others) — byte-exact list/
+ *  order to the old build's CORRELATION_ID_FIELDS. */
+const CORRELATION_ID_FIELDS = [
+    "candidateId",
+    "scoreId",
+    "selectionId",
+    "commitId",
+    "multiAgentRunId",
+    "agentRoleId",
+    "agentGroupId",
+    "agentMembershipId",
+    "agentFanoutId",
+    "agentFaninId",
+    "blackboardId",
+    "blackboardTopicId",
+    "blackboardMessageId",
+    "blackboardContextId",
+    "blackboardArtifactRefId",
+    "blackboardSnapshotId",
+    "coordinatorDecisionId",
+    "topologyId",
+    "topologyRunId",
+];
+function pickCorrelationIds(source) {
+    const picked = {};
+    for (const field of CORRELATION_ID_FIELDS)
+        picked[field] = source[field];
+    return picked;
+}
+/** The audit index historically omits scoreId (byte-exact to the old build's
+ *  INDEX_OMITTED_CORRELATION_IDS). */
+const INDEX_OMITTED_CORRELATION_IDS = new Set(["scoreId"]);
+function indexCorrelationIds(event) {
+    const picked = {};
+    for (const field of CORRELATION_ID_FIELDS) {
+        if (INDEX_OMITTED_CORRELATION_IDS.has(field))
+            continue;
+        picked[field] = event[field];
+    }
+    return picked;
+}
+function recordTrustAuditEvent(run, input) {
+    const audit = ensureTrustAudit(run);
+    const event = compact({
+        schemaVersion: exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        id: createEventId(run, input.kind),
+        createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        runId: run.id,
+        kind: input.kind,
+        decision: input.decision,
+        source: input.source,
+        actor: input.actor,
+        workerId: input.workerId,
+        taskId: input.taskId,
+        nodeId: input.nodeId,
+        feedbackIds: input.feedbackIds?.filter(Boolean).sort(),
+        ...pickCorrelationIds(input),
+        sandboxProfileId: input.sandboxProfileId || input.policySnapshot?.id,
+        policyRef: input.policyRef || (input.policySnapshot?.id ? `run.sandboxProfiles.${input.policySnapshot.id}` : undefined),
+        policySnapshot: input.policySnapshot,
+        normalizedPath: input.normalizedPath ? path.resolve(input.normalizedPath) : undefined,
+        command: input.command,
+        networkTarget: input.networkTarget,
+        evidence: normalizeEvidence(run, input.evidence || [], { source: input.source, workerId: input.workerId, taskId: input.taskId, resultNodeId: input.nodeId }),
+        evidenceRefs: unique(input.evidenceRefs || []).sort(),
+        parentEventIds: unique(input.parentEventIds || []).sort(),
+        metadata: scrubMetadata(input.metadata || {}),
+    });
+    const prior = readEventsRaw(audit.eventLogPath);
+    event.prevEventHash = prior.length ? prior[prior.length - 1].eventHash || computeEventHash(prior[prior.length - 1]) : trustAuditGenesis(run.id);
+    event.eventHash = computeEventHash(event);
+    (0, fs_atomic_1.durableAppendFileSync)(audit.eventLogPath, `${JSON.stringify(event)}\n`);
+    return event;
+}
+function recordSandboxPathDecision(run, input) {
+    return recordTrustAuditEvent(run, {
+        kind: "sandbox.path",
+        decision: input.decision,
+        source: "cw-validated",
+        workerId: input.workerId,
+        taskId: input.taskId,
+        sandboxProfileId: input.sandboxProfileId,
+        policySnapshot: input.policySnapshot,
+        normalizedPath: input.target,
+        metadata: input.metadata,
+    });
+}
+/** normalizeEvidence — GROUNDING-ONLY provenance. Never carries the
+ *  agent's command/args/model/handle (those live ONLY in
+ *  node.metadata.agentDelegation) — this is the exact hygiene split
+ *  exechard-evidence-triple-hygiene.case.js pins. */
+function normalizeEvidence(run, evidence, provenance) {
+    return evidence.map((entry) => ({
+        ...entry,
+        confidence: entry.confidence || (entry.locator || entry.path || entry.summary ? "grounded" : "ungrounded"),
+        provenance: {
+            schemaVersion: exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+            runId: run.id,
+            source: provenance.source || entry.provenance?.source || "runtime-derived",
+            workerId: provenance.workerId || entry.provenance?.workerId,
+            taskId: provenance.taskId || entry.provenance?.taskId,
+            resultNodeId: provenance.resultNodeId || entry.provenance?.resultNodeId,
+            verifierNodeId: provenance.verifierNodeId || entry.provenance?.verifierNodeId,
+            candidateId: provenance.candidateId || entry.provenance?.candidateId,
+            scoreId: provenance.scoreId || entry.provenance?.scoreId,
+            selectionId: provenance.selectionId || entry.provenance?.selectionId,
+            commitId: provenance.commitId || entry.provenance?.commitId,
+            parentEvidenceIds: unique([...(entry.provenance?.parentEvidenceIds || []), ...(provenance.parentEvidenceIds || [])]).sort(),
+            auditEventIds: unique([...(entry.provenance?.auditEventIds || []), ...(provenance.auditEventIds || [])]).sort(),
+            note: provenance.note || entry.provenance?.note,
+        },
+    }));
+}
+function writeTrustAuditIndexPlaceholder(run) {
+    const audit = ensureTrustAudit(run);
+    (0, fs_atomic_1.writeJson)(audit.summaryPath, { schemaVersion: 1, runId: run.id, eventCount: readEventsRaw(audit.eventLogPath).length });
+}
+function countBy(values, key) {
+    const counts = {};
+    for (const value of values) {
+        const bucket = key(value);
+        counts[bucket] = (counts[bucket] || 0) + 1;
+    }
+    return counts;
+}
+/** MILESTONE 11 (reporting/observability) — the `## Trust Audit` report
+ *  section's data source. A scoped-down port of the old build's
+ *  `summarizeTrustAudit` (plugins/cool-workflow/src/trust-audit.ts:413+):
+ *  this milestone's report.ts only renders eventCount/integrity/byDecision/
+ *  bySource/bySandboxProfile/paths, so those are the only fields carried
+ *  here — the old build's extra workers/candidates/commits/multiAgent/
+ *  blackboard rollups are milestone 9's own summarizeMultiAgent/
+ *  candidate-scoring-io/coordinator-io surfaces, not duplicated here. */
+function workerRows(events, run) {
+    const workerIds = unique([...(run.workers || []).map((w) => w.id), ...events.map((e) => e.workerId || "")]).sort();
+    return workerIds.filter(Boolean).map((workerId) => {
+        const worker = (run.workers || []).find((w) => w.id === workerId);
+        const scoped = events.filter((e) => e.workerId === workerId);
+        return {
+            workerId,
+            taskId: worker?.taskId || scoped.find((e) => e.taskId)?.taskId,
+            sandboxProfileId: worker?.sandboxProfileId || scoped.find((e) => e.sandboxProfileId)?.sandboxProfileId,
+            decisions: countBy(scoped, (e) => e.decision),
+            denied: scoped.filter((e) => e.decision === "denied" || e.decision === "rejected").length,
+            feedbackIds: unique(scoped.flatMap((e) => e.feedbackIds || [])).sort(),
+        };
+    });
+}
+function candidateRows(events, run) {
+    const cands = run.candidates || [];
+    const selectionsAll = run.candidateSelections || [];
+    const ids = unique([...cands.map((c) => c.id), ...events.map((e) => e.candidateId || "")]).sort();
+    return ids.filter(Boolean).map((candidateId) => {
+        const candidate = cands.find((c) => c.id === candidateId);
+        const selections = selectionsAll.filter((s) => s.candidateId === candidateId);
+        const scoped = events.filter((e) => e.candidateId === candidateId);
+        return {
+            candidateId,
+            scoreIds: unique([...(candidate?.scores || []), ...scoped.map((e) => e.scoreId || "")]).filter(Boolean).sort(),
+            selectionIds: unique([...selections.map((s) => s.id), ...scoped.map((e) => e.selectionId || "")]).filter(Boolean).sort(),
+            evidenceCount: candidate?.evidence?.length || scoped.flatMap((e) => e.evidence || []).length,
+        };
+    });
+}
+function commitRows(events, run) {
+    const ids = unique([...(run.commits || []).map((c) => c.id), ...events.map((e) => e.commitId || "")]).sort();
+    return ids.filter(Boolean).map((commitId) => {
+        const commit = (run.commits || []).find((c) => c.id === commitId);
+        return {
+            commitId,
+            verifierGated: Boolean(commit?.verifierGated),
+            candidateId: commit?.candidateId,
+            selectionId: commit?.selectionId,
+            evidenceCount: commit?.evidence?.length || 0,
+            rationale: commit?.acceptanceRationale,
+        };
+    });
+}
+function summarizeTrustAudit(run) {
+    const audit = ensureTrustAudit(run);
+    const events = readEventsRaw(audit.eventLogPath);
+    const ma = run.multiAgent;
+    const bb = run.blackboard;
+    const summary = {
+        schemaVersion: exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        runId: run.id,
+        generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        eventCount: events.length,
+        integrity: verifyTrustAudit(run),
+        eventLogPath: audit.eventLogPath,
+        indexPath: audit.indexPath,
+        summaryPath: audit.summaryPath,
+        byKind: countBy(events, (event) => event.kind),
+        byDecision: countBy(events, (event) => event.decision),
+        bySource: countBy(events, (event) => event.source),
+        bySandboxProfile: countBy(events.filter((event) => event.sandboxProfileId), (event) => event.sandboxProfileId || "none"),
+        workers: workerRows(events, run),
+        candidates: candidateRows(events, run),
+        commits: commitRows(events, run),
+        multiAgent: {
+            runs: ma?.runs.length || 0,
+            roles: ma?.roles.length || 0,
+            groups: ma?.groups.length || 0,
+            memberships: ma?.memberships.length || 0,
+            fanouts: ma?.fanouts.length || 0,
+            fanins: ma?.fanins.length || 0,
+            events: events.filter((e) => Boolean(e.multiAgentRunId || e.agentRoleId || e.agentGroupId || e.agentMembershipId || e.agentFanoutId || e.agentFaninId)).length,
+        },
+        blackboard: {
+            boards: bb?.boards.length || 0,
+            topics: bb?.topics.length || 0,
+            messages: bb?.messages.length || 0,
+            contexts: bb?.contexts.length || 0,
+            artifacts: bb?.artifacts.length || 0,
+            snapshots: bb?.snapshots.length || 0,
+            decisions: bb?.decisions.length || 0,
+            events: events.filter((e) => Boolean(e.blackboardId || e.blackboardTopicId || e.blackboardMessageId || e.blackboardContextId || e.blackboardArtifactRefId || e.blackboardSnapshotId || e.coordinatorDecisionId)).length,
+        },
+        topologies: {
+            runs: run.topologies?.runs.length || 0,
+            events: events.filter((e) => Boolean(e.topologyId || e.topologyRunId || e.kind.startsWith("topology."))).length,
+        },
+        multiAgentTrust: {
+            rolePolicies: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "multi-agent.role-policy").length,
+            permissionDecisions: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "multi-agent.permission").length,
+            blackboardWrites: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "blackboard.write").length,
+            messageProvenance: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "blackboard.message-provenance").length,
+            judgeRationales: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "judge.rationale").length,
+            panelDecisions: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "judge.panel-decision").length,
+            policyViolations: events.filter((e) => e.kind === "policy.violation").length,
+        },
+    };
+    // Durable: the summary/index are the read-side view of the audit log; persist
+    // them durably so a crash can't leave them pointing past the last durably-
+    // appended event. Byte-behavior port of the old build's summarizeTrustAudit.
+    (0, fs_atomic_1.writeJson)(audit.summaryPath, summary, { durable: true });
+    (0, fs_atomic_1.writeJson)(audit.indexPath, {
+        schemaVersion: exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        runId: run.id,
+        events: events.map((event) => ({
+            id: event.id,
+            createdAt: event.createdAt,
+            kind: event.kind,
+            decision: event.decision,
+            source: event.source,
+            workerId: event.workerId,
+            taskId: event.taskId,
+            ...indexCorrelationIds(event),
+            sandboxProfileId: event.sandboxProfileId,
+            policyRef: event.policyRef,
+        })),
+    }, { durable: true });
+    run.audit = { schemaVersion: exports.TRUST_AUDIT_SCHEMA_VERSION, ...audit };
+    return summary;
+}