contextos-mcp 0.4.0

package/dist/security/repository-boundary.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/**
+ * Repository boundary enforcement with nearest-parent realpath resolution.
+ *
+ * Prevents arbitrary file reads/writes, path traversals (../),
+ * sibling-prefix escapes (e.g. /repo-sibling attempting to match /repo),
+ * UNC paths, null bytes, and symlink/junction escapes.
+ */
+import * as fs from "node:fs";
+import * as path from "node:path";
+export class SecurityBoundaryException extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "SecurityBoundaryException";
+    }
+}
+function normalizeForComparison(p) {
+    const normalized = path.normalize(p);
+    return process.platform === "win32" ? normalized.toLowerCase() : normalized;
+}
+function isUncPath(p) {
+    return p.startsWith("\\\\") || p.startsWith("//");
+}
+/**
+ * Checks whether targetPath is contained within repoRoot.
+ */
+export function isWithinRepository(targetPath, repoRoot) {
+    try {
+        assertWithinRepository(targetPath, repoRoot);
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Asserts that targetPath is strictly within repoRoot.
+ *
+ * If valid, returns the canonical resolved path.
+ * If targetPath or repoRoot escapes boundaries, throws SecurityBoundaryException.
+ */
+export function assertWithinRepository(targetPath, repoRoot) {
+    if (!targetPath || typeof targetPath !== "string") {
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException("Target path must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    if (!repoRoot || typeof repoRoot !== "string") {
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException("Repository root must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    if (targetPath.includes("\0") || repoRoot.includes("\0")) {
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException("Path contains null bytes");
+    }
+    if (isUncPath(targetPath) || isUncPath(repoRoot)) {
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException("UNC network paths are not permitted");
+    }
+    let canonicalRepoRoot;
+    try {
+        const absRepoRoot = path.resolve(repoRoot);
+        if (!fs.existsSync(absRepoRoot)) {
+            throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Repository root does not exist: ${repoRoot}`);
+        }
+        canonicalRepoRoot = fs.realpathSync(absRepoRoot);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof SecurityBoundaryException)
+            throw err;
+        const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Failed to resolve repository root: ${msg}`);
+    }
+    // Resolve target relative to canonicalRepoRoot if relative
+    const absoluteTarget = path.isAbsolute(targetPath)
+        ? path.resolve(targetPath)
+        : path.resolve(canonicalRepoRoot, targetPath);
+    let canonicalTarget;
+    if (fs.existsSync(absoluteTarget)) {
+        try {
+            canonicalTarget = fs.realpathSync(absoluteTarget);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+            throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Failed to resolve path: ${msg}`);
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        // Target does not exist yet: find nearest existing parent directory
+        let current = path.dirname(absoluteTarget);
+        const uncreatedSegments = [path.basename(absoluteTarget)];
+        while (!fs.existsSync(current)) {
+            const parent = path.dirname(current);
+            if (parent === current) {
+                throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Cannot resolve parent directory for: ${targetPath}`);
+            }
+            uncreatedSegments.unshift(path.basename(current));
+            current = parent;
+        }
+        try {
+            const resolvedParent = fs.realpathSync(current);
+            const normParent = normalizeForComparison(resolvedParent);
+            const normRoot = normalizeForComparison(canonicalRepoRoot);
+            const rootPrefix = normRoot.endsWith(path.sep) ? normRoot : normRoot + path.sep;
+            if (normParent !== normRoot && !normParent.startsWith(rootPrefix)) {
+                throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Parent directory ${resolvedParent} escapes repository boundary: ${canonicalRepoRoot}`);
+            }
+            canonicalTarget = path.join(resolvedParent, ...uncreatedSegments);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err instanceof SecurityBoundaryException)
+                throw err;
+            const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+            throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Failed to resolve parent directory: ${msg}`);
+        }
+    }
+    const normTarget = normalizeForComparison(canonicalTarget);
+    const normRoot = normalizeForComparison(canonicalRepoRoot);
+    const rootPrefix = normRoot.endsWith(path.sep) ? normRoot : normRoot + path.sep;
+    if (normTarget !== normRoot && !normTarget.startsWith(rootPrefix)) {
+        throw new SecurityBoundaryException(`Path "${targetPath}" resolves to "${canonicalTarget}" which is outside repository "${canonicalRepoRoot}"`);
+    }
+    return canonicalTarget;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=repository-boundary.js.map

package/dist/security/repository-boundary.js.map

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package/dist/security/secret-filter.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * Secret Filter — prevents sensitive data from leaking to external LLM agents.
+ *
+ * Scans file contents and paths before they are included in agent prompts.
+ * Blocks files that likely contain secrets (API keys, credentials, SSH keys).
+ */
+export interface SecretPatternDef {
+    name: string;
+    pattern: RegExp;
+}
+/** Structured secret pattern definitions with deterministic category names. */
+export declare const SECRET_PATTERN_DEFS: SecretPatternDef[];
+/** Backward-compatible array of RegExps */
+export declare const SECRET_CONTENT_PATTERNS: RegExp[];
+/**
+ * Check if a file path should be blocked from agent access.
+ *
+ * @param filePath - Relative or absolute path to check
+ * @returns true if the file should be BLOCKED (not sent to agents)
+ */
+export declare function isBlockedPath(filePath: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Check if file content contains obvious secrets.
+ *
+ * @param content - The file content to scan
+ * @returns true if secrets were detected (file should NOT be sent to agents)
+ */
+export declare function containsSecrets(content: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Sanitize a string by redacting any detected secret patterns.
+ * Replaces matched patterns with category-tagged [REDACTED:<NAME>].
+ *
+ * @param text - Text to sanitize
+ * @returns Text with secrets replaced by [REDACTED:<NAME>]
+ */
+export declare function redactSecrets(text: string): string;

package/dist/security/secret-filter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/**
+ * Secret Filter — prevents sensitive data from leaking to external LLM agents.
+ *
+ * Scans file contents and paths before they are included in agent prompts.
+ * Blocks files that likely contain secrets (API keys, credentials, SSH keys).
+ */
+import * as path from "node:path";
+/** Exact filenames that MUST NEVER be sent to external agents. */
+const BLOCKED_EXACT_FILENAMES = new Set([
+    "credentials",
+    "credentials.json",
+    "service-account.json",
+    "serviceaccountkey.json",
+    ".netrc",
+    ".git-credentials",
+    ".npmrc",
+    ".pypirc",
+]);
+/** File extensions that should never be sent. */
+const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = new Set([".pem", ".key", ".p12", ".pfx", ".jks", ".keystore", ".pkcs12", ".crt", ".der"]);
+/** Directory names that should be blocked entirely. */
+const BLOCKED_DIRS = new Set([".ssh", ".gnupg", ".aws", ".azure", ".gcp", ".kube", ".credentials"]);
+/** Structured secret pattern definitions with deterministic category names. */
+export const SECRET_PATTERN_DEFS = [
+    {
+        name: "AWS_KEY",
+        pattern: /\b(?:AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "GITHUB_FINE_GRAINED_PAT",
+        pattern: /\bgithub_pat_[0-9a-zA-Z_]{60,}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "GITHUB_PAT",
+        pattern: /\bghp_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "GITHUB_OAUTH",
+        pattern: /\bgho_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "SLACK_TOKEN",
+        pattern: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]{10,48}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "OPENAI_KEY",
+        pattern: /\bsk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "ANTHROPIC_KEY",
+        pattern: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9-]{90,}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "GOOGLE_KEY",
+        pattern: /\bAIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "NPM_TOKEN",
+        pattern: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,36}\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "PRIVATE_KEY",
+        pattern: /-----BEGIN\s+(?:[A-Z0-9_-]+\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END\s+(?:[A-Z0-9_-]+\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----|-----BEGIN\s+(?:[A-Z0-9_-]+\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "CERTIFICATE",
+        pattern: /-----BEGIN\s+CERTIFICATE-----[\s\S]*?-----END\s+CERTIFICATE-----|-----BEGIN\s+CERTIFICATE-----/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "JWT_TOKEN",
+        pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9-_=]+\.[A-Za-z0-9-_=]+\.?[A-Za-z0-9-_.+/=]*\b/,
+    },
+    {
+        name: "GENERIC_SECRET",
+        pattern: /(?:API[_-]?KEY|SECRET[_-]?KEY|ACCESS[_-]?KEY|PRIVATE[_-]?KEY|AUTH[_-]?TOKEN|PASSWORD)\s*[=:]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{16,}['"]?/i,
+    },
+];
+/** Backward-compatible array of RegExps */
+export const SECRET_CONTENT_PATTERNS = SECRET_PATTERN_DEFS.map((d) => d.pattern);
+/**
+ * Check if a file path should be blocked from agent access.
+ *
+ * @param filePath - Relative or absolute path to check
+ * @returns true if the file should be BLOCKED (not sent to agents)
+ */
+export function isBlockedPath(filePath) {
+    if (!filePath)
+        return false;
+    const normalized = path.normalize(filePath).replace(/\\/g, "/");
+    const basename = path.basename(normalized).toLowerCase();
+    const ext = path.extname(normalized).toLowerCase();
+    const parts = normalized
+        .split("/")
+        .map((p) => p.toLowerCase())
+        .filter(Boolean);
+    // Block all .env variants (.env, .env.local, .env.staging, foo.env)
+    if (basename === ".env" || basename.startsWith(".env.") || basename.endsWith(".env")) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Check blocked filenames
+    if (BLOCKED_EXACT_FILENAMES.has(basename)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Check blocked extensions
+    if (BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Check blocked directory segments
+    if (parts.some((p) => BLOCKED_DIRS.has(p))) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Check private SSH keys (id_rsa, id_ed25519, etc., except public keys ending in .pub)
+    if (basename.startsWith("id_") && !basename.endsWith(".pub")) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Check if file content contains obvious secrets.
+ *
+ * @param content - The file content to scan
+ * @returns true if secrets were detected (file should NOT be sent to agents)
+ */
+export function containsSecrets(content) {
+    if (!content)
+        return false;
+    // Scan up to 1MB of content for comprehensive coverage without memory spikes
+    const sample = content.length > 1_000_000 ? content.slice(0, 1_000_000) : content;
+    return SECRET_PATTERN_DEFS.some(({ pattern }) => pattern.test(sample));
+}
+/**
+ * Sanitize a string by redacting any detected secret patterns.
+ * Replaces matched patterns with category-tagged [REDACTED:<NAME>].
+ *
+ * @param text - Text to sanitize
+ * @returns Text with secrets replaced by [REDACTED:<NAME>]
+ */
+export function redactSecrets(text) {
+    if (!text)
+        return text;
+    let result = text;
+    for (const { name, pattern } of SECRET_PATTERN_DEFS) {
+        const flags = pattern.flags.includes("g") ? pattern.flags : `${pattern.flags}g`;
+        const regex = new RegExp(pattern.source, flags);
+        result = result.replace(regex, `[REDACTED:${name}]`);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=secret-filter.js.map

package/dist/security/secret-filter.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/swarm.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * Swarm mode — orchestrates coding agents in parallel via the RLM loop.
+ *
+ * Usage: swarm --dir ./my-project "add error handling to all API routes"
+ *
+ * This module:
+ *   1. Parses swarm-specific CLI args
+ *   2. Scans the target directory to build a codebase context
+ *   3. Sets up ThreadManager + WorktreeManager
+ *   4. Runs the RLM loop with the swarm orchestrator prompt
+ *   5. Cleans up worktrees on exit
+ */
+import "./env.js";
+export declare function runSwarmMode(rawArgs: string[]): Promise<void>;