code-ai-installer 2.4.1 → 3.0.0

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/SKILL.md

@@ -1,553 +0,0 @@
----
-name: review-reference-snippets
-description: Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability.
----
-
-# Skill: Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)
-
-## Goal
-Provide the Reviewer with ready-made wordings and reference do/don't examples so that the review is specific, reproducible, and uniform in style.
-
----
-
-## A) Secrets (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T (P0): hardcode secrets
-```ts
-const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx";
-const dbPassword = "supersecret";
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: secrets via env/secret manager + fail-fast check for presence
-```ts
-const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY;
-if (!apiKey) throw new Error("OPENAI_API_KEY not configured");
-
-const dbPassword = process.env.DB_PASSWORD;
-if (!dbPassword) throw new Error("DB_PASSWORD not configured");
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment Template
-- **P0:** Secret is hardcoded/gets into the repo. Move to secret manager/env, remove from logs, check git history and secret rotation.
-
----
-
-## B) Secrets in logs (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: log body/headers completely
-```ts
-logger.info({ headers: req.headers, body: req.body }, "incoming_request");
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: log only safe fields + request_id
-```ts
-logger.info(
-  { request_id: req.requestId, route: req.path, user_id: ctx.user?.id ?? null },
-  "incoming_request"
-);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** Possible leak of PII/tokens in logs. An allowlist of fields + redaction is needed.
-
----
-
-## C) Input validation at the boundary (P0/P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: schema at the boundary (Zod example)
-```ts
-import { z } from "zod";
-
-const Schema = z.object({
-  email: z.string().email(),
-  name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
-});
-
-const input = Schema.parse(req.body);
-```
-
-### ❌ DON'T: use req.body directly
-```ts
-service.create(req.body);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0/P1:** No input validation at the boundary. Add schema validation and return 422/400 according to the contract.
-
----
-
-## D) Safe errors (P0/P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: expose stack/internal details to the user
-```ts
-res.status(500).json({ message: err.message, stack: err.stack });
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: unified error format + safe message
-```ts
-res.status(500).json({
-  error_code: "INTERNAL_ERROR",
-  message: "Unexpected error",
-});
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0/P1:** Leak of internals. For 5xx — only safe message; details — in structured logs.
-
----
-
-## E) SQL Injection (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: SQL concatenation
-```ts
-await db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email='${email}'`);
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: parameterized queries / ORM
-```ts
-await db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email=$1", [email]);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** SQL injection risk. Only parameterization/ORM, without concatenation.
-
----
-
-## E2) NoSQL Injection — MongoDB (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: pass req.query/req.body directly to Mongoose
-```ts
-// Attack: ?email[$gt]= → object { $gt: "" } → matches ALL documents
-const user = await User.findOne({ email: req.query.email });
-
-// Attack: body = { "role": { "$ne": null } } → bypasses filter
-const users = await User.find(req.body);
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: cast to type + safe filter builder + strictQuery
-```ts
-// Force string — strip operator injection
-const email = String(req.query.email);
-const user = await User.findOne({ email });
-
-// Or Zod validation at boundary (best)
-const { email } = emailSchema.parse(req.query);
-
-// Global Mongoose defense
-mongoose.set('strictQuery', true);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** NoSQL injection risk. User input is passed directly to the Mongoose query. Cast to type / Zod validation + `strictQuery: true`.
-
----
-
-## E3) N+1 Query (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: DB query in a loop
-```ts
-const orders = await Order.find({ userId });
-for (const order of orders) {
-  order.items = await Item.find({ orderId: order._id }); // N queries!
-}
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: batch query with $in or $lookup
-```ts
-const orders = await Order.find({ userId });
-const orderIds = orders.map(o => o._id);
-const items = await Item.find({ orderId: { $in: orderIds } }); // 1 query
-// Map items to orders in memory
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** N+1 query (DB call in a loop). Replace with batch `$in` or `$lookup` in aggregation.
-
----
-
-## E4) React Performance (P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: new object/function on every render
-```tsx
-function Parent() {
-  return (
-    <Child
-      style={{ color: 'red' }}       // new object every render
-      onClick={() => doSomething()}   // new function every render
-      data={items.filter(x => x.active)} // new array every render
-    />
-  );
-}
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: stable references via useMemo/useCallback
-```tsx
-function Parent() {
-  const style = useMemo(() => ({ color: 'red' }), []);
-  const handleClick = useCallback(() => doSomething(), []);
-  const activeItems = useMemo(() => items.filter(x => x.active), [items]);
-
-  return <Child style={style} onClick={handleClick} data={activeItems} />;
-}
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Inline object/function in JSX props causes unnecessary re-renders. Use `useMemo`/`useCallback` for stable references.
-
----
-
-## E5) Layer Boundary Violation (P0/P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: DB call in route/controller
-```ts
-// routes/coupons.js — route layer has direct DB access
-router.get('/coupons', async (req, res) => {
-  const coupons = await Coupon.find({ appInstanceId: req.appInstanceId }); // P0!
-  res.json(coupons);
-});
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: route → controller → service → repository
-```ts
-// routes/coupons.js
-router.get('/coupons', auth, couponController.list);
-
-// controllers/coupon.js
-async list(req, res) {
-  const coupons = await couponService.list(req.appInstanceId);
-  res.json({ data: coupons });
-}
-
-// services/coupon.js
-async list(appInstanceId) {
-  return couponRepo.findByAppInstanceId(appInstanceId);
-}
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0/P1:** Layer violation — direct DB call in route/controller. Move to service → repository.
-
----
-
-## F) Command/Path Injection (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: shell exec with user input
-```ts
-import { exec } from "node:child_process";
-exec(`convert ${userPath} -resize 200x200 out.png`);
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: avoid shell, use safe APIs/libraries
-```ts
-// preferably a library with safe arguments, without shell
-await imageLib.resize({ inputPath: safePath, width: 200, height: 200 });
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** command/path injection risk. Cannot exec with user arguments; an allowlist/safe APIs are needed.
-
----
-
-## G) AuthN/AuthZ (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: "UI hid the button — so it's safe"
-```ts
-// server does not check role/ownership
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: authz before critical operations + ownership check
-```ts
-if (!ctx.user) throw new AppError(401, "UNAUTHORIZED", "Auth required");
-if (ctx.user.role !== "admin") throw new AppError(403, "FORBIDDEN", "Not enough permissions");
-
-// ownership example
-if (resource.ownerId !== ctx.user.id) throw new AppError(403, "FORBIDDEN", "Not owner");
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** No server-side authz/ownership. Add check for roles/resource ownership.
-
----
-
-## H) CSRF (cookie-based sessions) (P1 → P0 if there is risk)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: cookie auth without CSRF protection
-```txt
-Cookie session + POST/PUT/DELETE without CSRF protection
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: SameSite + CSRF token (if required)
-```txt
-SameSite=Strict/Lax + CSRF token (double-submit or synchronizer token)
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1/P0:** If auth is on cookie — CSRF protection + checking origin/referer according to the policy is needed.
-
----
-
-## I) XSS / user HTML (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: dangerouslySetInnerHTML with user input
-```tsx
-<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userContent }} />
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: sanitization + CSP (if applicable)
-```tsx
-const safeHtml = sanitize(userContent); // allowlist tags/attrs
-return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: safeHtml }} />;
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** XSS risk. Sanitization/escaping and (if possible) CSP is needed.
-
----
-
-## J) SSRF (P0 if there is external URL fetch)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: accept URL from user and fetch without restrictions
-```ts
-await fetch(req.body.url);
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: allowlist of domains + block internal addresses
-```ts
-const url = new URL(req.body.url);
-if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(url.hostname)) throw new AppError(400, "BAD_URL", "Host not allowed");
-// + protection against private ranges / metadata endpoints
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** SSRF risk. Allowlist + block internal/metadata addresses is required.
-
----
-
-## K) Rate limiting (P1 → P0 if a public/expensive endpoint)
-
-### ✅ DO: basic limit on API + stricter on expensive ops
-```ts
-app.use("/api", limiter);
-app.use("/api/auth/login", strictLimiter);
-app.use("/api/search", searchLimiter);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1/P0:** No rate limiting. For public/expensive endpoints — mandatory.
-
----
-
-## L) Idempotency (P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: repeatable POST leads to double actions
-```txt
-Repeating the request creates 2 orders/2 charges
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: idempotency key for risky operations
-```txt
-Idempotency-Key header + storing result/status by key for TTL
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** For create/charge operations, idempotency is needed (especially during retries/network failures).
-
----
-
-## M) API contract mismatches (P1/P0)
-
-### ✅ DO: unified error format + status codes
-```json
-{ "error_code": "VALIDATION_ERROR", "message": "Invalid input", "details": { "field": "email" } }
-```
-
-### ❌ DON'T: different error formats on different endpoints
-```json
-{ "error": "bad" }
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1/P0:** The error contract must be unified across the project, otherwise the client/tests will break.
-
----
-
-## N) Observability: request_id/trace_id (P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: logs without correlation
-```ts
-logger.info("created user");
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: structured logs + request_id + key fields
-```ts
-logger.info({ request_id: req.requestId, user_id: user.id }, "user_created");
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Request correlation (request_id/trace_id) according to the Observability Plan is needed.
-
----
-
-## O) Audit logging for critical operations (P1 → P0 if compliance/finances)
-
-### ✅ DO: audit events (without PII/secrets)
-```ts
-logger.info(
-  { audit: true, action: "ORDER_REFUND", actor_id: ctx.user.id, order_id: order.id, request_id: req.requestId },
-  "audit_event"
-);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1/P0:** For critical actions, an audit trail is needed (who/what/when).
-
----
-
-## P) Dependency & supply chain (P1)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: add dubious/unnecessary packages without justification
-```txt
-Added a package with low reputation / duplicating functionality
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: minimization + audit + lockfile
-```txt
-Justify the dependency, check the audit, update the lockfile, enable CI checks.
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Check the necessity of the dependency, audit results, and absence of known vulnerabilities.
-
----
-
-## Q) CI/CD security (P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: OIDC instead of long-lived tokens + secret scanning + audit
-```yaml
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-steps:
-  - uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
-  - run: npm audit --audit-level=high
-  - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
-    with:
-      role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123:role/ci
-      aws-region: eu-central-1
-```
-
-### ❌ DON'T: store persistent keys in CI variables without rotation/restrictions
-```txt
-AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY are long-lived and have broad permissions
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Transition to OIDC, minimal permissions, secret scanning, dependency audit.
-
----
-
-## R) IAM least privilege (P0)
-
-### ❌ DON'T: wildcard access
-```yaml
-iam_role:
-  permissions: ["s3:*"]
-  resources: ["*"]
-```
-
-### ✅ DO: exact actions + resources
-```yaml
-iam_role:
-  permissions:
-    - s3:GetObject
-    - s3:ListBucket
-  resources:
-    - arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket
-    - arn:aws:s3:::my-bucket/*
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** IAM permissions are too broad. Least privilege is needed (specific actions + resources).
-
----
-
-## S) Network security (P0/P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: DB is not public + restricted security groups
-```txt
-DB private subnet, inbound only from app subnet/SG, no 0.0.0.0/0
-```
-
-### ❌ DON'T: open the DB to the Internet
-```txt
-Inbound 0.0.0.0/0 on 5432
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P0:** Public DB is a critical vulnerability. Close access, leave only private networks/SG.
-
----
-
-## T) CDN/WAF/Security headers (P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: security headers on edge + WAF rules
-```ts
-headers.set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
-headers.set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
-headers.set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** No security headers/WAF. For production — enable managed rules + basic headers.
-
----
-
-## U) Backup/DR (P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: retention + deletion protection + recovery plan
-```hcl
-backup_retention_period = 30
-deletion_protection     = true
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Backups/retention/rollback are needed. Minimum: retention, (opt.) PITR, recovery test, runbook.
-
----
-
-## V) Security tests (P1)
-
-### ✅ DO: tests for auth/authz/validation/rate limit
-```ts
-expect(resp.status).toBe(401);
-expect(resp.status).toBe(403);
-expect(resp.status).toBe(422);
-expect(resp.status).toBe(429);
-```
-
-### ✅ Comment
-- **P1:** Add security tests (auth/authz/validation/rate limiting) for critical endpoints.
-
----
-
-## W) Final review template (briefly)
-
-### ✅ Summary Template
-```txt
-Summary:
-- PASS: <what is ok>
-- MISSING: <what needs to be added>
-
-P0 (Blockers):
-- [ ] <what / where / why is it a blocker / how to fix>
-
-P1 (Important):
-- [ ] ...
-
-P2 (Nice-to-have):
-- [ ] ...
-
-Next Actions:
-- REV-01 ...
-- DEV-02 ...
-```

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/claude.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "review-reference-snippets",
-  "display_name": "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-  "description": "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability.",
-  "default_prompt": "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill.",
-  "triggers": [
-    "review-reference-snippets",
-    "review reference snippets",
-    "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-    "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't)"
-  ],
-  "capabilities": [
-    "review",
-    "reference",
-    "snippets"
-  ],
-  "tools": [],
-  "implicit_invocation": true
-}

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/copilot.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "review-reference-snippets",
-  "display_name": "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-  "description": "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability.",
-  "default_prompt": "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill.",
-  "triggers": [
-    "review-reference-snippets",
-    "review reference snippets",
-    "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-    "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't)"
-  ],
-  "capabilities": [
-    "review",
-    "reference",
-    "snippets"
-  ],
-  "tools": [],
-  "implicit_invocation": true
-}

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/gemini.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "review-reference-snippets",
-  "display_name": "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-  "description": "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability.",
-  "default_prompt": "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill.",
-  "triggers": [
-    "review-reference-snippets",
-    "review reference snippets",
-    "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-    "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't)"
-  ],
-  "capabilities": [
-    "review",
-    "reference",
-    "snippets"
-  ],
-  "tools": [],
-  "implicit_invocation": true
-}

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/openai.yaml

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-interface:
-  display_name: "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)"
-  short_description: "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts…"
-  default_prompt: "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill."
-dependencies:
-  tools: []
-policy:
-  allow_implicit_invocation: true

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/qwen.json

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "review-reference-snippets",
-  "display_name": "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-  "description": "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability.",
-  "default_prompt": "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill.",
-  "triggers": [
-    "review-reference-snippets",
-    "review reference snippets",
-    "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)",
-    "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't)"
-  ],
-  "capabilities": [
-    "review",
-    "reference",
-    "snippets"
-  ],
-  "tools": [],
-  "implicit_invocation": true
-}

package/locales/en/.agents/skills/review-reference-snippets/agents/skill.yaml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-version: 1
-name: "review-reference-snippets"
-display_name: "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)"
-description: "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't): AppSec, Cloud/CI, API contracts, tests, observability."
-default_prompt: "Use $review-reference-snippets when the task matches the \"Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)\" skill."
-triggers:
-  - "review-reference-snippets"
-  - "review reference snippets"
-  - "Review Reference Snippets (Do/Don't)"
-  - "Single set of review comment templates and examples (do/don't)"
-capabilities:
-  - "review"
-  - "reference"
-  - "snippets"
-tools: []
-invocation:
-  explicit: true
-  implicit: true
-localization:
-  default_locale: "en"
-  available_locales:
-    - "ru"
-    - "en"