cc-safe-setup 29.8.0 → 30.0.4

package/examples/xml-format-leak-detector.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# ================================================================
+# xml-format-leak-detector.sh — Warn when legacy XML tool-use
+#   format markers leak into tool_use input fields in the trailing
+#   transcript, signalling sub-pattern 12D (the long-payload
+#   attention-dilution decoder flip).
+# ================================================================
+# PURPOSE:
+#   Issue #49747 documents that on longer payloads, Opus 4.7
+#   intermittently emits legacy Anthropic XML tool-use syntax
+#   inside JSON-format tool calls. Specifically, a string-valued
+#   argument ends with a literal `</parameter_name>` closing tag
+#   *inside the JSON string*, and subsequent parameters appear as
+#   `<parameter name="X">value</parameter>` XML blocks instead of
+#   JSON key-value pairs. Because the runtime parses tool calls
+#   as strict JSON, the XML-declared parameters never reach the
+#   parsed arguments object — required fields come through as
+#   undefined, schema validation fails, and the model is forced
+#   to retry (the reporter observed 4-6 consecutive attempts per
+#   logical turn, each progressively shorter, burning ~1k tokens
+#   per failed attempt).
+#
+#   The reporter confirmed this is a decoder-level format switch:
+#   explicit system-prompt rules forbidding XML tags in tool-call
+#   strings did NOT prevent the bug. The trigger correlates with
+#   total payload length — short arguments succeed on first try,
+#   paragraph-length arguments almost always trigger the leak.
+#   This is a regression from Opus 4.6.
+#
+#   The other Cluster 12 sub-pattern detectors react to surface
+#   markers ("malformed and could not be parsed") or structural
+#   mismatches (stop_reason vs. content blocks). Sub-pattern 12D
+#   has neither of those signals — the tool call IS parseable as
+#   JSON, just with the XML format chars sitting in a string
+#   field. The detection signal for 12D is the literal XML
+#   tool-use markers appearing inside tool_use input values.
+#
+# TRIGGER: PostToolUse  MATCHER: ""
+# CLUSTER: 12 (Tool Call Parsing failures in Opus 4.7)
+# SUB-PATTERN: 12D (long-payload attention dilution; decoder flip)
+#
+# BEHAVIOR:
+#   - Read transcript_path from PostToolUse hook input.
+#   - Scan the trailing LOOKBACK lines for assistant turns
+#     carrying tool_use blocks.
+#   - For each tool_use block, serialize the input field and
+#     search for the literal XML tool-use markers (the lexical
+#     fingerprint of the decoder flip): `<parameter name=`,
+#     `</parameter>`, `<invoke name=`, `</invoke>`,
+#     `</function_calls>`.
+#   - If at or above the threshold, emit a one-screen stderr
+#     advisory naming sub-pattern 12D and the payload-shortening
+#     recovery path.
+#   - Rate-limit advisory emission per session via a counter
+#     file so the warning does not repeat on every PostToolUse
+#     after the first detection.
+#   - Always exits 0 (advisory only; never blocks tool execution).
+#
+# WHY THE TOOL_USE-INPUT CHECK:
+#   The XML markers can appear in transcript text for many
+#   reasons unrelated to 12D — documentation, prose, discussion
+#   of tool-call mechanics. A naive grep of the transcript would
+#   fire on those. The 12D signature is specifically the XML
+#   markers appearing INSIDE tool_use.input string fields, where
+#   they have no semantic role — the model emitted them mid-
+#   argument because the decoder flipped from JSON to XML mode.
+#   Checking only tool_use.input narrows the detection to the
+#   structural location where the leak actually shows up.
+#
+# CONFIGURATION (env vars):
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_DISABLE       Set to "1" to silence.
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_LOOKBACK      How many recent transcript lines
+#                             to scan. Default 200.
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_THRESHOLD     Minimum number of tool_use blocks
+#                             with XML markers in input in
+#                             LOOKBACK to fire. Default 1.
+#                             Single occurrences are rare enough
+#                             to be informative; raise if you
+#                             work with prose that intentionally
+#                             contains these strings.
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_COOLDOWN      Minimum tool calls between repeat
+#                             advisories per session. Default 30.
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_TRANSCRIPT    Override transcript path
+#                             (used by tests).
+#   CC_XML_LEAK_STATE_DIR     Override state directory
+#                             (used by tests). Default
+#                             /tmp/cc-xml-leak.
+#
+# UPSTREAM REFERENCES:
+#   #49747 (central case: long-payload XML leak in MCP tool calls,
+#           filed 2026-04-17 as the precursor to the May surge)
+#   #62123 (the broader "retry also failed" central case, 21 reactions)
+#   #62344 (sub-pattern 12A, in-context few-shot poisoning)
+#   #62467 (sub-pattern 12B, extended-thinking serialization)
+#   #62700 (sub-pattern 12C, spurious malformed notice)
+#
+# RECOVERY ON A HIT:
+#   The defect is at the decoder/serialization layer; explicit
+#   prompt-layer rules ("do not emit XML tags") do not recover.
+#   The operator-side workarounds documented in #49747:
+#     - Shorten string-valued tool arguments. Paragraph-length
+#       arguments almost always trigger the leak; one-phrase
+#       arguments succeed reliably.
+#     - Break a single verbose tool call into multiple smaller
+#       tool calls with short payloads each.
+#     - For MCP tools you control, lower the verbosity invited
+#       by argument descriptions ("brief summary" rather than
+#       "detailed explanation").
+#     - If using a custom MCP server, consider validating with
+#       a parser that recognizes both JSON and legacy XML tool-
+#       use formats and reconciles them.
+#   /clear (the 12A recovery) and model switching (the 12B
+#   recovery) do not address 12D — the defect re-fires on the
+#   next long-payload tool call in any session on Opus 4.7.
+# ================================================================
+
+set -u
+
+if [ "${CC_XML_LEAK_DISABLE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+LOOKBACK="${CC_XML_LEAK_LOOKBACK:-200}"
+THRESHOLD="${CC_XML_LEAK_THRESHOLD:-1}"
+COOLDOWN="${CC_XML_LEAK_COOLDOWN:-30}"
+STATE_DIR="${CC_XML_LEAK_STATE_DIR:-/tmp/cc-xml-leak}"
+
+INPUT=$(cat 2>/dev/null || true)
+
+TRANSCRIPT_PATH="${CC_XML_LEAK_TRANSCRIPT:-}"
+if [ -z "$TRANSCRIPT_PATH" ]; then
+    TRANSCRIPT_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.transcript_path // empty' 2>/dev/null)
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$TRANSCRIPT_PATH" ] || [ ! -f "$TRANSCRIPT_PATH" ]; then
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+SESSION_ID=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.session_id // "default"' 2>/dev/null)
+[ -z "$SESSION_ID" ] && SESSION_ID="default"
+
+SAFE_SESSION=$(printf '%s' "$SESSION_ID" | tr -c 'A-Za-z0-9._-' '_' | head -c 80)
+[ -z "$SAFE_SESSION" ] && SAFE_SESSION="default"
+
+mkdir -p "$STATE_DIR" 2>/dev/null
+
+COUNTER_FILE="$STATE_DIR/${SAFE_SESSION}.count"
+LASTFIRED_FILE="$STATE_DIR/${SAFE_SESSION}.lastfired"
+
+COUNT=$(cat "$COUNTER_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+COUNT=$((COUNT + 1))
+echo "$COUNT" > "$COUNTER_FILE"
+
+# Extract every tool_use block's input from the trailing window,
+# serialize it back to a compact JSON string, and check whether
+# that string contains the literal XML tool-use markers. The
+# markers, when they appear inside a JSON string value, are the
+# decoder-flip signature documented in #49747.
+#
+# We check for any of the following substrings:
+#   <parameter name=        — opening of a leaked parameter tag
+#   </parameter>            — closing of a leaked parameter tag
+#   <invoke name=           — opening of a leaked invoke wrapper
+#   </invoke>               — closing of a leaked invoke wrapper
+#   </function_calls>       — closing of a leaked function_calls wrapper
+#
+# Lines that fail to parse as JSON are silently skipped.
+LEAKS=$(tail -n "$LOOKBACK" "$TRANSCRIPT_PATH" 2>/dev/null | jq -R -r '
+    try (fromjson) catch null | select(. != null) | . as $obj |
+    (($obj.content // $obj.message.content // [])) as $blocks |
+    if ($blocks | type) == "array" then
+        $blocks
+        | map(select(.type == "tool_use" and (.input != null)))
+        | map(.input | tojson)
+        | .[]
+    else
+        empty
+    end
+' 2>/dev/null | grep -c -E '<parameter name=|</parameter>|<invoke name=|</invoke>|</function_calls>' || true)
+
+LEAKS="${LEAKS:-0}"
+
+if [ "$LEAKS" -lt "$THRESHOLD" ]; then
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+LASTFIRED=$(cat "$LASTFIRED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+SINCE=$((COUNT - LASTFIRED))
+
+if [ "$LASTFIRED" -gt 0 ] && [ "$SINCE" -lt "$COOLDOWN" ]; then
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "$COUNT" > "$LASTFIRED_FILE"
+
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+⚠️  Detected ${LEAKS} tool_use block(s) whose input contained the
+    literal XML tool-use format markers (<parameter name=, </parameter>,
+    <invoke name=, </invoke>, or </function_calls>) in the trailing
+    ${LOOKBACK} transcript lines.
+
+This is the structural signal for sub-pattern 12D (long-payload
+attention dilution / decoder flip), the case filed in #49747. On
+longer tool-call payloads, Opus 4.7 intermittently emits legacy
+Anthropic XML tool-use syntax inside a JSON-format tool call — a
+string-valued argument ends with a literal </parameter_name> tag,
+and subsequent parameters appear as XML blocks instead of JSON
+key-value pairs. Because the runtime parses tool calls as strict
+JSON, the XML-declared parameters never reach the parsed arguments
+object: required fields come through as undefined, schema
+validation fails, and the model retries 4-6 times per logical turn
+(each retry burns ~1k tokens before one finally stays short enough
+to escape the decoder flip).
+
+Sub-pattern 12D is distinct from:
+  - 12A (#62344) → /clear to recover. 12A is in-context few-shot
+    poisoning at the model attention layer. 12D is a decoder-layer
+    format switch that does NOT depend on conversation history;
+    /clear does not fix it.
+  - 12B (#62467) → switch model / disable extended thinking. 12B
+    is the extended-thinking serialization defect. 12D fires
+    independently of extended thinking; switching model is the
+    right workaround only if you are willing to drop to Sonnet
+    for the duration of long-payload work.
+  - 12C (#62700) → ignore the spurious notice, the tool succeeded.
+    12C is a harness false-negative. 12D is a model true-negative:
+    the tool genuinely failed to parse because required fields
+    are missing from the JSON view.
+
+The reporter (#49747) confirmed this is a decoder-level format
+switch: explicit system-prompt rules forbidding XML tags in
+tool-call strings did NOT prevent the bug. Recovery is at the
+payload-length layer:
+
+  - Shorten string-valued tool arguments. Paragraph-length
+    arguments almost always trigger the leak; one-phrase
+    arguments succeed reliably.
+  - Break a single verbose tool call into multiple smaller
+    tool calls with short payloads each.
+  - For MCP tools you control, lower the verbosity invited by
+    argument descriptions ("brief summary" rather than "detailed
+    explanation"). The schema's prose shapes the model's
+    expansion budget.
+  - If using a custom MCP server, consider validating with a
+    parser that recognizes both JSON and legacy XML tool-use
+    formats and reconciles them, so the leak does not block
+    progress entirely.
+
+This filing predates the May 25-27 surge by more than a month
+and is the precursor signal for Cluster 12; the upstream fix
+surface depends on which root cause Anthropic prioritizes.
+
+References: #49747 (the central long-payload case), #62123 (the
+broader "retry also failed" central case), Cluster 12 in the
+cc-safe-setup tracker:
+https://yurukusa.github.io/cc-safe-setup/cluster-tracker.html#cluster-tool-call-parsing
+
+Silence: set CC_XML_LEAK_DISABLE=1.
+Tune sensitivity: CC_XML_LEAK_THRESHOLD (default 1),
+                  CC_XML_LEAK_LOOKBACK (default 200 lines),
+                  CC_XML_LEAK_COOLDOWN (default 30 tool calls).
+
+EOF
+
+exit 0

package/examples/yaml-syntax-check.sh

@@ -17,6 +17,18 @@
 #   }
 # }
 
+# Without jq, the parse below silently yields empty and this hook stops
+# guarding - with no error anywhere. Say so. We deliberately do not exit
+# here: blocking would halt every tool call, and exiting 0 would change
+# the behaviour of guards that do not depend on the parsed value.
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  _nojq_warned="/tmp/cc-nojq-warned-yaml-syntax-check-$PPID"
+  [ -f "$_nojq_warned" ] || {
+    echo "WARNING [yaml-syntax-check]: jq not found - this hook cannot inspect tool calls and is NOT protecting you. Install jq." >&2
+    : > "$_nojq_warned"
+  }
+fi
+
 INPUT=$(cat)
 FILE=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty' 2>/dev/null)
 [ -z "$FILE" ] && exit 0

package/hooks/hooks.json

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(echo \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; if echo \"$CMD\" | grep -qE '^\\s*(sudo\\s+)?rm\\s+.*-[rRf]*[rR]' && ! echo \"$CMD\" | grep -qE '(node_modules|dist|build|__pycache__|/tmp)'; then echo 'BLOCKED: recursive rm on non-safe target. Use specific paths.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
+            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(printf %s \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; STMTS=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$CMD\" | awk '{ if (sub(/\\\\[ \\t]*$/, \" \")) { b = b $0; next } print b $0; b = \"\" } END { if (b != \"\") print b }' | tr ';&|' '\\n' | sed -E 's/#.*$//'); HIT=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$STMTS\" | grep -E '^[[:space:]]*(sudo[[:space:]]+)?rm[[:space:]]+([^[:space:]]+[[:space:]]+)*(-[a-zA-Z]*[rR]|--recursive)' | grep -vE '(^|[[:space:]/])(node_modules|dist|build|__pycache__|tmp)(/|[[:space:]]|$)'); if [ -n \"$HIT\" ]; then echo 'BLOCKED: recursive rm on non-safe target. Use specific paths.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
           }
         ]
       },
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(echo \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; if echo \"$CMD\" | grep -qE 'git\\s+push\\s+.*--force|git\\s+reset\\s+--hard|git\\s+clean\\s+-fd'; then echo 'BLOCKED: destructive git operation. Use safer alternatives.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
+            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(printf %s \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; CHECK=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$CMD\" | awk '{ if (sub(/\\\\[ \\t]*$/, \" \")) { b = b $0; next } print b $0; b = \"\" } END { if (b != \"\") print b }' | sed -E 's/--force-with-lease(=[^[:space:]]*)?//g'); if printf '%s\\n' \"$CHECK\" | grep -qE 'git[[:space:]]+push[[:space:]]+.*--force|git[[:space:]]+reset[[:space:]]+--hard|git[[:space:]]+clean[[:space:]]+-[a-zA-Z]*[fd]'; then echo 'BLOCKED: destructive git operation. Confirm before proceeding.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
           }
         ]
       },
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(echo \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; if echo \"$CMD\" | grep -qiE '(api.key|secret|password|token).*=.*[A-Za-z0-9]{20}'; then echo 'BLOCKED: potential credential in command. Use environment variables.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
+            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); CMD=$(printf %s \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty'); [ -z \"$CMD\" ] && exit 0; CHECK=$(printf '%s\\n' \"$CMD\" | awk '{ if (sub(/\\\\[ \\t]*$/, \" \")) { b = b $0; next } print b $0; b = \"\" } END { if (b != \"\") print b }'); if printf '%s\\n' \"$CHECK\" | grep -qiE '(api[._-]?key|secret|password|token).*=.*[A-Za-z0-9]{20}'; then echo 'BLOCKED: potential credential in command. Use environment variables.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
           }
         ]
       },
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); FILE=$(echo \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty'); [ -z \"$FILE\" ] && exit 0; if echo \"$FILE\" | grep -qE '\\.(env|pem|key|credentials|secret)$'; then echo 'BLOCKED: writing to sensitive file. Check if this is intentional.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
+            "command": "INPUT=$(cat); FILE=$(printf %s \"$INPUT\" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty'); [ -z \"$FILE\" ] && exit 0; BASE=$(basename \"$FILE\"); if echo \"$BASE\" | grep -qE '^\\.env\\.(example|sample|template)$'; then exit 0; fi; if echo \"$BASE\" | grep -qE '^\\.env(\\..+)?$|\\.(pem|key|p12|pfx|credentials|secret)$|^(credentials|secrets?|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\\.netrc|\\.npmrc)$'; then echo 'BLOCKED: writing to sensitive file. Check if this is intentional.' >&2; exit 2; fi"
           }
         ]
       },
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "~/.claude/hooks/move-delete-sequence-guard.sh"
+            "command": "sh -c 'H=\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}/examples/move-delete-sequence-guard.sh\"; if [ -x \"$H\" ]; then exec \"$H\"; fi; W=\"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/cc-missing-hook-move-delete-sequence-guard-$PPID\"; if [ ! -f \"$W\" ]; then printf \"WARNING [move-delete-sequence-guard]: hook script not found at %s - this hook is NOT protecting you. Install cc-safe-setup as a plugin so CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is set, or replace this entry with the absolute path to the script.\\n\" \"$H\" >&2; : > \"$W\"; fi; cat >/dev/null; exit 0'"
           }
         ]
       },
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
         "hooks": [
           {
             "type": "command",
-            "command": "~/.claude/hooks/system-dir-protection-guard.sh"
+            "command": "sh -c 'H=\"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}/examples/system-dir-protection-guard.sh\"; if [ -x \"$H\" ]; then exec \"$H\"; fi; W=\"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/cc-missing-hook-system-dir-protection-guard-$PPID\"; if [ ! -f \"$W\" ]; then printf \"WARNING [system-dir-protection-guard]: hook script not found at %s - this hook is NOT protecting you. Install cc-safe-setup as a plugin so CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is set, or replace this entry with the absolute path to the script.\\n\" \"$H\" >&2; : > \"$W\"; fi; cat >/dev/null; exit 0'"
           }
         ]
       }