botmux 3.10.0 → 3.23.1

package/dist/adapters/cli/copilot.js

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-import { resolveCommand } from './registry.js';
-import { BOTMUX_SHELL_HINTS } from './shared-hints.js';
-import { delay } from '../../utils/timing.js';
-/** GitHub Copilot CLI adapter (`@github/copilot`).
- *
- *  Copilot CLI is an Ink-based interactive agent shipped as the `copilot`
- *  binary (npm `@github/copilot`). It manages sessions internally — botmux's
- *  `sessionId` cannot be forced as the CLI session id, so we always start
- *  fresh and rely on `--resume <id>` (or `--continue`) for resume. */
-export function createCopilotAdapter(pathOverride) {
-    // resolvedBin is lazy: setup constructs adapters only to read static
-    // modelChoices and must not shell out (see resolveCommand); the binary path
-    // is a spawn-time concern.
-    const rawBin = pathOverride ?? 'copilot';
-    let cachedBin;
-    return {
-        id: 'copilot',
-        get resolvedBin() { return (cachedBin ??= resolveCommand(rawBin)); },
-        buildArgs({ resume, resumeSessionId, model, disableCliBypass }) {
-            // --allow-all-tools puts Copilot in the same "act without per-tool
-            // approval" posture as cursor's --force / claude-code's
-            // --dangerously-skip-permissions. Without it every shell/edit bounces
-            // back to the TUI for confirmation, which the user can't see in Lark.
-            const args = disableCliBypass ? [] : ['--allow-all-tools'];
-            if (model && model.trim()) {
-                args.push('--model', model.trim());
-            }
-            if (!resume)
-                return args;
-            if (resumeSessionId)
-                return [...args, '--resume', resumeSessionId];
-            // No id on hand — fall back to "most recent session" so the user's
-            // context isn't lost. --continue is Copilot's shorthand for
-            // resume-latest.
-            return [...args, '--continue'];
-        },
-        buildResumeCommand({ cliSessionId }) {
-            // Copilot session ids are opaque and not derivable from botmux's
-            // sessionId; without one we can't print a precise one-liner — let the
-            // closed-session card fall back to its generic note.
-            if (!cliSessionId)
-                return null;
-            return `copilot --resume ${cliSessionId}`;
-        },
-        async writeInput(pty, content) {
-            // Copilot's Ink TUI behaves like Gemini/OpenCode: the TextInput
-            // component has an async startup phase; writing during that window can
-            // be silently lost. Once the prompt is rendered, sendText + Enter is
-            // reliable. No documented bracketed-paste fold (unlike cursor), so the
-            // simple write+Enter path mirrors the gemini adapter.
-            if (pty.sendText && pty.sendSpecialKeys) {
-                pty.sendText(content);
-                await delay(200);
-                pty.sendSpecialKeys('Enter');
-            }
-            else {
-                pty.write(content);
-                await delay(1000);
-                pty.write('\r');
-            }
-        },
-        completionPattern: undefined, // quiescence only — no explicit completion marker
-        readyPattern: undefined, // Ink TUI prompt is too generic to match reliably
-        systemHints: BOTMUX_SHELL_HINTS,
-        altScreen: true, // Ink renders in the alternate screen buffer
-        // Curated model list per Copilot CLI docs: default is Claude Sonnet 4;
-        // Sonnet 4.5 / GPT-5 available via /model. Setup always appends a free-form
-        // "Other" option, so this is curation only.
-        modelChoices: ['claude-sonnet-4', 'claude-sonnet-4.5', 'gpt-5'],
-    };
-}
-export const create = createCopilotAdapter;
-//# sourceMappingURL=copilot.js.map

package/dist/adapters/cli/copilot.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"copilot.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/adapters/cli/copilot.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAGvD,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;sEAKsE;AACtE,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,CAAC,YAAqB;IACxD,qEAAqE;IACrE,4EAA4E;IAC5E,2BAA2B;IAC3B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC;IACzC,IAAI,SAA6B,CAAC;IAClC,OAAO;QACL,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS;QACb,IAAI,WAAW,KAAa,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAE5E,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE;YAC5D,mEAAmE;YACnE,wDAAwD;YACxD,sEAAsE;YACtE,sEAAsE;YACtE,MAAM,IAAI,GAAa,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;YACrE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC1B,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACrC,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;gBAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;YACzB,IAAI,eAAe;gBAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;YACnE,mEAAmE;YACnE,4DAA4D;YAC5D,iBAAiB;YACjB,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QACjC,CAAC;QAED,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE;YACjC,iEAAiE;YACjE,sEAAsE;YACtE,qDAAqD;YACrD,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY;gBAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;YAC/B,OAAO,oBAAoB,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5C,CAAC;QAED,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAc,EAAE,OAAe;YAC9C,gEAAgE;YAChE,uEAAuE;YACvE,qEAAqE;YACrE,uEAAuE;YACvE,sDAAsD;YACtD,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;gBACxC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;gBACtB,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;gBACjB,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/B,CAAC;iBAAM,CAAC;gBACN,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;gBACnB,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBAClB,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YAClB,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,iBAAiB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAI,kDAAkD;QAClF,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,EAAS,kDAAkD;QAClF,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAiB,6CAA6C;QAC7E,uEAAuE;QACvE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,4CAA4C;QAC5C,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;KAChE,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC"}

package/dist/adapters/cli/cursor.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-import type { CliAdapter } from './types.js';
-export declare function createCursorAdapter(pathOverride?: string): CliAdapter;
-export declare const create: typeof createCursorAdapter;
-//# sourceMappingURL=cursor.d.ts.map

package/dist/adapters/cli/cursor.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"cursor.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/adapters/cli/cursor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAa,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAUxD,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,CA+FrE;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,MAAM,4BAAsB,CAAC"}

package/dist/adapters/cli/cursor.js

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-import { resolveCommand } from './registry.js';
-import { BOTMUX_SHELL_HINTS } from './shared-hints.js';
-import { delay } from '../../utils/timing.js';
-/** PTYs that have already received a writeInput. The first write lands while
- *  cursor-agent's TUI is still doing its startup render, so it needs a longer
- *  settle + throttle than later writes. Tracked by identity so the warmup state
- *  is shared across adapter instances. Mirrors claude-code's first-write guard. */
-const cursorFirstWriteSeen = new WeakSet();
-export function createCursorAdapter(pathOverride) {
-    // resolvedBin is lazy: setup constructs adapters only to read static
-    // modelChoices and must not shell out (see resolveCommand); the binary path
-    // is a spawn-time concern.
-    const rawBin = pathOverride ?? 'cursor-agent';
-    let cachedBin;
-    return {
-        id: 'cursor',
-        get resolvedBin() { return (cachedBin ??= resolveCommand(rawBin)); },
-        buildArgs({ resume, resumeSessionId, model, disableCliBypass }) {
-            // --force skips approvals so the model can act inside the topic without
-            // every shell/edit bouncing back to Lark for confirmation — same posture
-            // as codex's --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and claude-code's
-            // --dangerously-skip-permissions.
-            const base = disableCliBypass ? [] : ['--force'];
-            if (model && model.trim()) {
-                base.push('--model', model.trim());
-            }
-            if (!resume)
-                return base;
-            if (resumeSessionId)
-                return [...base, '--resume', resumeSessionId];
-            // No id on hand — fall back to "last chat" so we at least don't drop
-            // the user's context. --continue is cursor's shorthand for --resume=-1.
-            return [...base, '--continue'];
-        },
-        buildResumeCommand({ cliSessionId }) {
-            // Cursor's chat id is opaque and not derivable from botmux's sessionId;
-            // without one we can't print a precise one-liner, so let the closed-session
-            // card fall back to its generic note.
-            if (!cliSessionId)
-                return null;
-            return `cursor-agent --resume ${cliSessionId}`;
-        },
-        async writeInput(pty, content) {
-            // Emit line-by-line instead of writing the whole message at once.
-            // cursor-agent's paste detector folds a multi-line chunk that arrives in
-            // one burst into a `[Pasted text +N lines]` placeholder the model can't
-            // read; typing each line with a throttle between keeps it under that
-            // threshold so the text lands verbatim. Covers both backends — tmux
-            // (send-keys) and raw PTY (write only). Never use bracketed-paste markers
-            // (\x1b[200~ … \x1b[201~): they trigger the fold.
-            //
-            // Soft-newline differs per backend because the detector counts LF (0x0a)
-            // bytes arriving densely:
-            //   - tmux: Ctrl+J, cursor's native soft-newline — renders cleanly and
-            //     send-keys spaces the bytes out enough to never fold.
-            //   - raw PTY: a fast write('\n') folds, so send `\` + CR; cursor eats the
-            //     backslash-before-CR as a soft-newline (not part of the submitted
-            //     text) and no LF byte hits the stream, making it fold-immune. Costs a
-            //     cosmetic trailing `\` in the local TUI render only.
-            // Submit is always a bare Enter (\r). No on-disk submit verification —
-            // cursor's transcript path isn't documented, so the worker relies on
-            // idle detection + the bridge fallback timer.
-            const useKeys = !!(pty.sendText && pty.sendSpecialKeys);
-            const emitText = (s) => (useKeys ? pty.sendText(s) : pty.write(s));
-            const emitSoftNewline = () => {
-                if (useKeys) {
-                    pty.sendSpecialKeys('C-j');
-                }
-                else {
-                    pty.write('\\');
-                    pty.write('\r');
-                }
-            };
-            const emitEnter = () => (useKeys ? pty.sendSpecialKeys('Enter') : pty.write('\r'));
-            const isFirstWrite = !cursorFirstWriteSeen.has(pty);
-            if (isFirstWrite) {
-                cursorFirstWriteSeen.add(pty);
-                await delay(200);
-            }
-            const throttleMs = isFirstWrite ? 80 : 30;
-            const tick = () => delay(throttleMs);
-            const lines = content.split('\n');
-            for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-                if (lines[i].length > 0) {
-                    emitText(lines[i]);
-                    await tick();
-                }
-                if (i < lines.length - 1) {
-                    emitSoftNewline();
-                    await tick();
-                }
-            }
-            await delay(200);
-            emitEnter();
-        },
-        completionPattern: undefined,
-        skillsDir: '~/.cursor/skills',
-        systemHints: BOTMUX_SHELL_HINTS,
-        altScreen: true,
-        modelChoices: ['auto', 'claude-4-sonnet', 'claude-4-opus', 'gpt-5'],
-    };
-}
-export const create = createCursorAdapter;
-//# sourceMappingURL=cursor.js.map

package/dist/adapters/cli/cursor.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"cursor.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/adapters/cli/cursor.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAGvD,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE9C;;;mFAGmF;AACnF,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,EAAa,CAAC;AAEtD,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,YAAqB;IACvD,qEAAqE;IACrE,4EAA4E;IAC5E,2BAA2B;IAC3B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI,cAAc,CAAC;IAC9C,IAAI,SAA6B,CAAC;IAClC,OAAO;QACL,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ;QACZ,IAAI,WAAW,KAAa,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAE5E,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE;YAC5D,wEAAwE;YACxE,yEAAyE;YACzE,0EAA0E;YAC1E,kCAAkC;YAClC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;YACjD,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC1B,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACrC,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;gBAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;YACzB,IAAI,eAAe;gBAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;YACnE,qEAAqE;YACrE,wEAAwE;YACxE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QACjC,CAAC;QAED,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE;YACjC,wEAAwE;YACxE,4EAA4E;YAC5E,sCAAsC;YACtC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY;gBAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;YAC/B,OAAO,yBAAyB,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,CAAC;QAED,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAc,EAAE,OAAe;YAC9C,kEAAkE;YAClE,yEAAyE;YACzE,wEAAwE;YACxE,qEAAqE;YACrE,oEAAoE;YACpE,0EAA0E;YAC1E,kDAAkD;YAClD,EAAE;YACF,yEAAyE;YACzE,0BAA0B;YAC1B,uEAAuE;YACvE,2DAA2D;YAC3D,2EAA2E;YAC3E,uEAAuE;YACvE,2EAA2E;YAC3E,0DAA0D;YAC1D,uEAAuE;YACvE,qEAAqE;YACrE,8CAA8C;YAC9C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;YACxD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC,CAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5E,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE;gBAC3B,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,GAAG,CAAC,eAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC9B,CAAC;qBAAM,CAAC;oBACN,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;oBAChB,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBAClB,CAAC;YACH,CAAC,CAAC;YACF,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,eAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAEpF,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YACpD,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;gBACjB,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC9B,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YACnB,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;YAErC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YAClC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;gBACtC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBACxB,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;oBACnB,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,CAAC;gBACD,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBACzB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;oBAClB,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,CAAC;YACH,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACd,CAAC;QAED,iBAAiB,EAAE,SAAS;QAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;QACf,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;KACpE,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAC"}

package/dist/adapters/cli/fs-policy.d.ts

@@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Unified file-sandbox policy (FsPolicy) — the single source of truth for BOTH
- * platform sandbox engines.
- *
- * Model (three-tier whitelist, per product decision 2026-07-16, design doc
- * "botmux 文件沙盒重构方案"): every path gets one of three access levels —
- * readWrite / readOnly / deny — and EVERYTHING NOT COVERED BY A RULE IS
- * INACCESSIBLE (deny-by-default). Nested black/white lists are supported: the
- * DEEPEST matching rule wins (longest-prefix), so `readOnly ~/Library` +
- * `deny ~/Library/Keychains` and `deny bots/` + `readWrite bots/<self>` both
- * work. This replaces the previous "read-everything + enumerated blocklist"
- * model whose failure mode was silent secret exposure; here a missing baseline
- * entry fails loud (CLI error), never silent.
- *
- * Architecture: this module is PURE (no fs / no spawn — fully unit-testable).
- *   buildFsPolicy(ctx)      merges baseline preset + botmux-internal + adapter
- *                           + user rules into one ordered rule list
- *   compileToSeatbelt(...)  → macOS sandbox-exec profile text
- *   compileToBwrap(...)     → Linux bwrap argv prefix
- * Both engines resolve conflicts by "last emitted wins" (Seatbelt last-match /
- * bwrap mount order), so emitting rules sorted shallow→deep yields
- * longest-prefix-wins on BOTH platforms by construction — cross-platform
- * parity needs no hand-synced rule lists.
- *
- * The worker resolves every impure input up front (realpath, existence
- * filtering, sibling-free by design) and passes canonical absolute paths.
- */
-export type FsAccess = 'readWrite' | 'readOnly' | 'deny';
-export type FsRuleSource = 'baseline' | 'adapter' | 'internal' | 'user' | 'mandatory';
-export interface FsRule {
-    /** Canonical absolute path (no trailing slash). */
-    path: string;
-    access: FsAccess;
-    /** Where the rule came from — for the dashboard policy viewer / path tester. */
-    source: FsRuleSource;
-}
-export interface FsPolicy {
-    /** Deduped rules sorted shallow→deep (emission order = precedence order). */
-    rules: FsRule[];
-    /** Keep network egress (bwrap-only knob; Seatbelt does not confine net here). */
-    net: boolean;
-    /** Extra Seatbelt write-allow regexes (e.g. ~/.claude.json.tmp.* atomic-save
-     *  siblings when the CLI data dir is NOT redirected into BOT_HOME). */
-    writeRegexes: string[];
-    /** Final host-security denies that cannot be represented as path prefixes. */
-    denyRegexes?: string[];
-    /** Narrow read-only exceptions emitted after denyRegexes (macOS gateway socket). */
-    finalReadOnlyPaths?: string[];
-    /** No-transport turns: caller-supplied allow paths (extraWrite / readonlyRoots /
-     *  user RW+RO) that fell inside a Feishu-authority root and were dropped before
-     *  merge (fail-closed). Empty/absent otherwise. The worker LOGS these so a
-     *  silently-suppressed grant is diagnosable (codex: "至少要记录被抑制项"). */
-    suppressedAuthorityPaths?: string[];
-}
-export interface FsPolicyUserPaths {
-    readWrite?: readonly string[];
-    readOnly?: readonly string[];
-    deny?: readonly string[];
-}
-export interface FsPolicyContext {
-    platform: 'darwin' | 'linux';
-    /** All paths below must be CANONICAL (realpath'd by the worker). */
-    homeDir: string;
-    botmuxHome: string;
-    sessionDataDir: string;
-    workingDir: string;
-    currentAppId: string;
-    /** This session's id — scopes the turn-sends dedup marker to a single file
-     *  (`turn-sends/<sessionId>.jsonl`) so a sandboxed CLI cannot rewrite ANOTHER
-     *  session's markers. Optional: when absent, no turn-sends grant is emitted
-     *  (a non-session policy has no marker to write). */
-    sessionId?: string;
-    /** This bot's BOT_HOME (`<botmuxHome>/bots/<appId>`) — always readWrite. */
-    botHome: string;
-    /** This bot's OWN role-library subtree (`<roleLibraryRoot>/<appId>`) — readWrite.
-     *  Optional: absent when the subtree does not exist (bot never used roles) or
-     *  when building a non-session policy. See the emission site for why the whole
-     *  subtree — not just the active role dir — has to be writable. */
-    roleLibrarySubtree?: string;
-    /** True when the CLI's data root is redirected into BOT_HOME
-     *  (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR / CODEX_HOME). False → cliDataPaths are exposed rw. */
-    redirectedCliData: boolean;
-    /** The CLI's REAL data paths (e.g. ~/.claude, ~/.claude.json, ~/.codex) to
-     *  keep readWrite when NOT redirected. Ignored when redirectedCliData. */
-    cliDataPaths?: readonly string[];
-    /** Adapter auth/login paths kept readWrite (token refresh must persist). */
-    authPaths?: readonly string[];
-    /** Directories of every executable spawned inside the sandbox (cliBin dir,
-     *  node dir, adapter second-stage bins) — exposed readOnly. */
-    execPaths?: readonly string[];
-    /** Trusted runtime read-only roots (skill/plugin dirs, botmux dist). */
-    readonlyRoots?: readonly string[];
-    /** The botmux install/checkout root (dir containing dist/ + node_modules).
-     *  Exposed readOnly so the agent's `botmux` CLI and the claude hooks (which
-     *  exec `node <checkout>/dist/cli.js …`) can load — without this a sandboxed
-     *  `botmux send` / SessionStart+AskUserQuestion hooks EPERM on cli.js. */
-    botmuxInstallRoot?: string;
-    /** Daemon-mediated relay outbox (Linux) — readWrite. */
-    outbox?: string;
-    /** Extra writable roots (resolved TMPDIR, admin extras). */
-    extraWritePaths?: readonly string[];
-    /** Per-bot user config (bots.json sandboxPaths) — highest precedence. */
-    userPaths?: FsPolicyUserPaths;
-    /** Host-owned boundaries that user policy may not override. */
-    mandatoryDenyPaths?: readonly string[];
-    mandatoryDenyRegexes?: readonly string[];
-    mandatoryReadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];
-    net?: boolean;
-    /** Seatbelt write-allow regex passthrough (see FsPolicy.writeRegexes). */
-    writeRegexes?: readonly string[];
-    /** FALSE = a no-Lark-transport session (core-only apiOnly bot or HTTP virtual
-     *  chat). Generic read-isolation is NOT a credential boundary: it still grants
-     *  the bot's own lark-cli identity readWrite AND, when workingDir defaults to
-     *  `~`, re-opens $HOME (incl. bots.json + sibling BOT_HOMEs) readWrite. When
-     *  false, buildFsPolicy freezes the botmux authority ROOTS (configured + default
-     *  `~/.botmux`, `~/.lark-cli(-bots)`, macOS lark-cli store) as WHOLE-DIR denies,
-     *  withholds this bot's own lark-cli identity / keystore carve-out, and
-     *  FAIL-CLOSES any caller allow path (workingDir / userPaths / readonlyRoots)
-     *  that would fall inside an authority root — dropped BEFORE merge so a deeper
-     *  grant can't re-open the deny (deepest-prefix-wins). The model CLI's own
-     *  authPaths (`~/.codex` etc.) are NOT Feishu creds and stay granted readWrite.
-     *  Absent/true = normal behavior. */
-    larkTransportEnabled?: boolean;
-    /** No-transport ONLY: the SECOND botmux authority root to freeze, when the
-     *  daemon runs with a custom SESSION_DATA_DIR so `configuredBotmuxHome`
-     *  (= dirname(dataDir), passed as `botmuxHome`) differs from the default
-     *  `~/.botmux`. BOTH must be denied wholesale — the default root still holds
-     *  the live `.dashboard-secret` HMAC + bots.json even when the data dir moved
-     *  (codex P1: custom SESSION_DATA_DIR leaked the default `~/.botmux`). Ignored
-     *  when equal to `botmuxHome`. MUST be canonical + host-frozen (never derived
-     *  from agent-controllable env). */
-    defaultBotmuxHome?: string;
-    /** No-transport ONLY: the ACTUAL loaded bots-config path, frozen by the daemon
-     *  (`getLoadedConfigPath()`), NOT guessed from BOTS_CONFIG env by the worker.
-     *  When it lives INSIDE a frozen authority root the parent mask already covers
-     *  it (no extra rule needed). When it lives OUTSIDE every authority root,
-     *  buildFsPolicy THROWS {@link FsPolicyConfigError} — a no-transport turn must
-     *  not silently mask an arbitrary parent dir (`/tmp`, `/etc`, a project root),
-     *  which would break the core CLI (codex P1). Absent = default `~/.botmux/bots.json`. */
-    loadedBotsConfigPath?: string;
-}
-/** Normalize: require absolute, strip trailing slashes, reject `..` segments.
- *  Returns null for anything unusable (silently-dropped relative paths are a
- *  fail-open trap — callers log dropped entries). */
-export declare function normalizeFsPath(p: string): string | null;
-/** Is `p` equal to or an ancestor of `child`? (both normalized) */
-export declare function coversPath(p: string, child: string): boolean;
-/**
- * Which adapter `authPaths` survive a CLI-data redirect into BOT_HOME.
- *
- * When a bot redirects its CLI data (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME → BOT_HOME),
- * the adapter's REAL host data dir is rehomed: the isolated copy under BOT_HOME
- * is what the CLI reads/writes, and the host dir is denied-by-default (its
- * exposure was the whole point of read isolation). Any authPath that lives
- * INSIDE such a rehomed host root is therefore either (a) redundant — its
- * BOT_HOME equivalent is provisioned + covered readWrite by the botHome rule
- * (claude `.credentials.json`), or (b) an active leak we must NOT expose (codex's
- * whole `~/.codex`: history.jsonl, sessions/, state_*.sqlite). Both are dropped.
- *
- * But authPaths that live OUTSIDE every rehomed root are external login sources
- * the redirect does NOT rehome — e.g. Seed/Relay's `~/.local/share/bytedcli` SSO
- * dir (bytedcli login reuse). Dropping those regresses login (a fresh BOT_HOME /
- * expired token cold-start would have no credential source). They MUST survive.
- *
- * NOTE this is a SUPPRESSION-vs-KEEP decision only. A path inside a rehomed root
- * whose BOT_HOME copy is NOT provisioned (e.g. `<dataDir>/byted-cloud-auth.json`
- * — never seeded, and never the redirected read location since the CLI resolves
- * it under $CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=BOT_HOME) is still dropped: keeping the host path
- * would not help the redirected read anyway. Provisioning such files into
- * BOT_HOME is a separate concern (see provisionIsolatedBotHome), orthogonal to
- * closing the host-dir leak this filter exists for.
- *
- * @param authPaths     adapter authPaths, already `~`-expanded + normalized absolute
- * @param rehomedRoots  host data roots being redirected to BOT_HOME, normalized
- *                      (claude family: the host claudeDataDir; codex: `~/.codex`)
- */
-export declare function authPathsSurvivingCliDataRedirect(authPaths: readonly string[], rehomedRoots: readonly string[]): string[];
-/**
- * The COMPLETE authPaths the fs-policy should expose for a (possibly redirecting)
- * adapter. This is the single source of truth the worker calls — extracted so the
- * worker's call site and the tests exercise the SAME code, not a re-implementation
- * (a test that recomputes the rule would stay green if the worker stopped calling
- * this, which is exactly the wiring blind spot this avoids).
- *
- * - not redirected → expose the adapter's declared authPaths verbatim.
- * - redirected     → drop the ones inside a rehomed host data root
- *                    (authPathsSurvivingCliDataRedirect), keeping data-root-external
- *                    login sources (Seed/Relay bytedcli SSO).
- *
- * rehomedHostRoots is assembled from the adapter's ORIGINAL host data dir
- * (claude family) + the codex host root when applicable — passed in by the worker
- * (it owns `~`-expansion / existence-filter / canonicalization); this fn is pure.
- */
-export declare function resolveRedirectedAdapterAuthPaths(input: {
-    declaredAuthPaths: readonly string[];
-    willRedirectCliData: boolean;
-    rehomedHostRoots: readonly string[];
-}): string[];
-/**
- * Merge candidate rules into the final ordered list:
- *  - normalize paths, drop unusable entries
- *  - dedupe same-path conflicts: higher source rank wins (user > internal >
- *    adapter > baseline); tie → the MORE RESTRICTIVE access wins (deny >
- *    readOnly > readWrite) so a duplicated entry can never widen access
- *  - sort shallow→deep (stable within a depth) — the emission order both
- *    compilers rely on for longest-prefix-wins
- */
-export declare function mergeFsRules(candidates: readonly FsRule[]): FsRule[];
-/**
- * The effective access for `path` under `rules`: the DEEPEST rule whose path
- * covers it; no match → 'none' (inaccessible). This one function IS the policy
- * semantics — the dashboard path tester and the unit tests both call it, and
- * both compilers are tested to agree with it.
- */
-export declare function accessForPath(rules: readonly FsRule[], path: string): {
-    access: FsAccess | 'none';
-    rule?: FsRule;
-};
-/**
- * A no-transport (apiOnly / HTTP-virtual) session whose layout cannot be safely
- * confined — e.g. an external `BOTS_CONFIG` sitting outside every botmux
- * authority root, or a `workingDir` that IS a Feishu-authority root. buildFsPolicy
- * throws this instead of silently masking an arbitrary parent dir (which would
- * hide `/tmp`/`/etc`/a project root and brick the core CLI) or silently dropping
- * the working dir. The worker turns it into a hard spawn-abort with a diagnostic —
- * fail-closed, never fail-open (codex P1). Carries `.kind` so callers/tests can
- * branch without string-matching the message. */
-export declare class FsPolicyConfigError extends Error {
-    readonly kind: 'external-bots-config' | 'working-dir-is-authority' | 'bots-config-in-carveout';
-    constructor(kind: FsPolicyConfigError['kind'], message: string);
-}
-/**
- * Compute the frozen Feishu-authority roots for a no-transport turn. PURE +
- * exported so the worker's real path assembly and the unit matrix lock the SAME
- * provenance logic (codex P2: prior tests hand-fed roots and never touched this).
- *
- *  - ALWAYS freezes BOTH the configured botmux root (`botmuxHome` = dirname of the
- *    data dir) AND the canonical default `~/.botmux` — a custom SESSION_DATA_DIR
- *    moves the data dir but the default root still holds the live `.dashboard-secret`
- *    HMAC + bots.json, so denying only one leaves the sibling-daemon escalation
- *    open (codex P1).
- *  - freezes the lark-cli identity/key stores: bare `~/.lark-cli` (repo marks it
- *    sensitive), `~/.lark-cli-bots`, macOS lark-cli store.
- *  - the loaded bots-config path: OUTSIDE every root → THROW here (fail-closed);
- *    never mask its parent dir. Being INSIDE a root is necessary but NOT
- *    sufficient — a deeper trusted carve-out (own BOT_HOME / bin / attachments /
- *    outbox) can re-open it via deepest-prefix-wins, so buildFsPolicy ALSO runs a
- *    post-merge `accessForPath` self-check that the config + its dirname resolve
- *    to `deny`, else throws `bots-config-in-carveout` (codex P1).
- */
-export declare function computeNoTransportAuthorityRoots(input: {
-    homeDir: string;
-    botmuxHome: string;
-    defaultBotmuxHome?: string;
-    loadedBotsConfigPath?: string;
-}): string[];
-/**
- * Build the unified FsPolicy: baseline preset (platform) + adapter-declared
- * paths + botmux-internal injections + user sandboxPaths (highest precedence).
- * Pure — the worker canonicalizes and existence-filters all ctx paths first.
- */
-export declare function buildFsPolicy(ctx: FsPolicyContext): FsPolicy;
-/** Every strict ancestor of every non-deny rule path. Under read-deny-default,
- *  realpath()/stat of an intermediate dir fails and crashes CLIs that
- *  canonicalize their config dir — so each ancestor needs file-read-metadata
- *  (literal, NOT subpath: no listing/enumeration is granted). */
-export declare function ancestorsNeedingTraverse(rules: readonly FsRule[]): string[];
-/**
- * Compile the policy to a macOS Seatbelt profile. `(deny default)` + Apple's
- * bsd.sb base makes it deny-by-default for BOTH files and other operations,
- * then we re-allow the non-file operation classes the CLI needs (process/mach/
- * ipc/sysctl/signal/iokit-open, network gated on policy.net) and the three file tiers
- * emitted shallow→deep (Seatbelt applies the LAST matching rule → deepest rule
- * wins, matching accessForPath()).
- */
-export declare function compileToSeatbelt(policy: FsPolicy): string;
-export interface CompileBwrapOpts {
-    /** Top-level symlinks to replicate inside the tmpfs root (usrmerge /bin →
-     *  usr/bin etc.). Resolved by the worker (impure readlink). */
-    symlinks?: readonly {
-        path: string;
-        target: string;
-    }[];
-    /** A single MODE-000 EMPTY directory (worker-created, kept empty) ro-bound
-     *  over DIRECTORY-shaped deny rules. `--ro-bind emptyDir <deny>` masks the
-     *  real contents, makes the mountpoint read-only (unlike `--tmpfs <deny>`,
-     *  which left a WRITABLE tmpfs), AND — because the source is mode 000 — a
-     *  non-root process can't even list it (`ls`/`cat` fail, not just "returns
-     *  empty"). Root bypasses DAC and can traverse it, but the source is EMPTY, so
-     *  no real content leaks regardless of uid — emptiness is the guarantee, the
-     *  000 mode only hardens listing for non-root. A real deny is neither readable
-     *  (content), listable (non-root), nor writable. */
-    emptyDir: string;
-    /** Directory that will hold MODE-000 empty placeholder files for FILE-shaped
-     *  deny rules (dirs are masked with the empty ro-bind above; files need an
-     *  empty ro-bind source). The worker creates the returned `emptyFiles`
-     *  (mode 000) first. */
-    emptiesDir: string;
-    /** Rule paths that are FILES (not dirs) on the host — deny compiles to an
-     *  empty-file bind, readOnly/readWrite file binds work as-is. Resolved by
-     *  the worker (impure stat). A deny path NOT in this set is masked as a
-     *  DIRECTORY (covers both existing dirs and not-yet-existing paths). */
-    filePaths?: ReadonlySet<string>;
-    /** chdir target (the project working dir). */
-    chdir: string;
-    /** Drop `--unshare-pid` (keep the fresh `--proc /proc` mount, which works
-     *  without a new pid namespace). Set ONLY in a nested sandbox that can't
-     *  mount proc inside a new pid ns AND where no sibling secret is exposed via
-     *  /proc — see sandbox.coreOnlyPidNamespaceDegrade. The filesystem deny/allow
-     *  masks (the on-disk credential seal) are unaffected; this drops only the
-     *  process-isolation defense-in-depth. Default false = full isolation. */
-    skipPidNamespace?: boolean;
-}
-export interface BwrapCompilation {
-    /** bwrap argv prefix (caller appends --setenv pairs and `-- cli args`). */
-    args: string[];
-    /** Mode-000 empty placeholder files the worker must create before spawn
-     *  (the ro-bind SOURCE for file-shaped deny masks). */
-    emptyFiles: {
-        path: string;
-        maskedPath: string;
-    }[];
-    /** Every deny mountpoint that was masked, with its shape. The worker must
-     *  ensure each exists on the host BEFORE spawn (bwrap cannot bind onto a
-     *  missing target, and a missing target under a read-write parent would make
-     *  bwrap materialise it on the host anyway) — creating a mountpoint the host
-     *  can write to even when the policy makes its PARENT read-only in-sandbox,
-     *  which is exactly what closes the "host/other process creates the secret
-     *  mid-session" TOCTOU. Mountpoints the worker itself had to create (didn't
-     *  pre-exist) are removed at teardown IFF still empty (never a recursive rm —
-     *  content written by the host/a concurrent process is preserved). */
-    maskMounts: {
-        path: string;
-        kind: 'dir' | 'file';
-    }[];
-}
-/**
- * Compile the policy to a bwrap argv prefix. Deny-by-default is bwrap's
- * natural shape: a fresh tmpfs root, then ONLY the rule paths are bound in
- * (later mounts win → emitting shallow→deep gives deepest-rule-wins, matching
- * accessForPath()). deny rules materialize as READ-ONLY empty masks with the
- * real content HIDDEN (mode-000 empty-dir ro-bind for dirs, mode-000 empty-file
- * ro-bind for files; mode 000 additionally blocks listing for a non-root uid,
- * while root may list the empty mask — no real content leaks either way) and are
- * emitted whenever they sit under an exposed tree — outside it
- * they're unreachable already (deny-by-default), and bwrap would fail mounting
- * onto a void path.
- *
- * Two properties this must preserve (both cost real blockers in review):
- *  1. The mask is `--ro-bind` of an EMPTY source, NOT `--tmpfs`: a `--tmpfs
- *     <deny>` mount is WRITABLE inside the sandbox, so it hid the real contents
- *     but still let the CLI write into the denied path — not a real deny.
- *  2. A deny path is masked EVEN WHEN IT DOES NOT EXIST YET. Skipping absent
- *     denies left the path inside the read-write parent bind, so the sandbox
- *     could `mkdir`+write it straight onto the host, and anything the host
- *     created there mid-session became readable (a stat→exec TOCTOU). The
- *     worker pre-creates the mountpoint on the host so the mask always binds.
- */
-export declare function compileToBwrap(policy: FsPolicy, opts: CompileBwrapOpts): BwrapCompilation;
-export interface LegacySandboxFields {
-    sandbox?: boolean;
-    readIsolation?: boolean;
-    sandboxReadonlyPaths?: readonly string[];
-    sandboxHidePaths?: readonly string[];
-    readDenyExtraPaths?: readonly string[];
-}
-export interface MigratedSandboxFields {
-    sandbox: boolean;
-    sandboxPaths?: {
-        readWrite?: string[];
-        readOnly?: string[];
-        deny?: string[];
-    };
-}
-/**
- * old→new field mapping (lossless: the old fields' expressiveness is a subset
- * of the three-tier model). Used by the registry's load-time auto-migration,
- * which writes the NEW fields while KEEPING the old ones in bots.json — a
- * downgraded daemon reads the untouched old fields, so downgrade needs no
- * reverse script (design doc §6.2). Returns null when nothing to migrate.
- */
-export declare function migrateLegacySandboxFields(entry: LegacySandboxFields & {
-    sandboxPaths?: unknown;
-}): MigratedSandboxFields | null;
-//# sourceMappingURL=fs-policy.d.ts.map

package/dist/adapters/cli/fs-policy.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"fs-policy.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/adapters/cli/fs-policy.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA0BG;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AACzD,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC;AAEtF,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM;IACrB,mDAAmD;IACnD,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;IACjB,gFAAgF;IAChF,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;CACtB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ;IACvB,6EAA6E;IAC7E,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAChB,iFAAiF;IACjF,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACb;2EACuE;IACvE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACvB,8EAA8E;IAC9E,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACvB,oFAAoF;IACpF,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B;;;yEAGqE;IACrE,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACrC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC1B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7B,oEAAoE;IACpE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;yDAGqD;IACrD,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,4EAA4E;IAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB;;;uEAGmE;IACnE,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B;iFAC6E;IAC7E,iBAAiB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC3B;8EAC0E;IAC1E,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,4EAA4E;IAC5E,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B;mEAC+D;IAC/D,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B,wEAAwE;IACxE,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAClC;;;8EAG0E;IAC1E,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B,wDAAwD;IACxD,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,4DAA4D;IAC5D,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACpC,yEAAyE;IACzE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC9B,+DAA+D;IAC/D,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACvC,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,sBAAsB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC3C,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACd,0EAA0E;IAC1E,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC;;;;;;;;;;;yCAWqC;IACrC,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;;;;wCAOoC;IACpC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B;;;;;;6FAMyF;IACzF,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC/B;AAED;;qDAEqD;AACrD,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAMxD;AAQD,mEAAmE;AACnE,wBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAI5D;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA4BG;AACH,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,CAC/C,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,EAC5B,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,CAQV;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;IACvD,iBAAiB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACrC,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7B,gBAAgB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACrC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAGX;AAWD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAepE;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;IAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CASlH;AAuGD;;;;;;;;iDAQiD;AACjD,qBAAa,mBAAoB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAC5C,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,GAAG,0BAA0B,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC;gBACnF,IAAI,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;CAK/D;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,gCAAgC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;IACtD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC/B,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAmBX;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,QAAQ,CAkT5D;AAWD;;;iEAGiE;AACjE,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAc3E;AAUD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CA4D1D;AAID,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B;mEAC+D;IAC/D,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACvD;;;;;;;;wDAQoD;IACpD,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB;;;4BAGwB;IACxB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB;;;4EAGwE;IACxE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAChC,8CAA8C;IAC9C,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd;;;;;8EAK0E;IAC1E,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CAC5B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,2EAA2E;IAC3E,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACf;2DACuD;IACvD,UAAU,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACnD;;;;;;;;0EAQsE;IACtE,UAAU,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,EAAE,CAAC;CACtD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,GAAG,gBAAgB,CA0FzF;AAID,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAClC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAClB,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACzC,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACrC,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACxC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAqB;IACpC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;CAC/E;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,0BAA0B,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAAG;IAAE,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG,IAAI,CAiBhI"}