botmux 3.10.0 → 3.23.1

package/dist/core/terminal-url.js

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-import { config } from '../config.js';
-import { formatUrlHost } from './dashboard-url.js';
-import { platformMachineBaseUrl, publicReverseProxyBaseUrl } from '../platform/binding.js';
-import { isRemoteAccessEnabled } from '../global-config.js';
-let proxyPort = 0;
-let proxyReady = false;
-// Port advertised in proxy-mode links, overriding the local proxy port.
-// 0 = unset → advertise the local proxy port. Set from WEB_EXTERNAL_PORT +
-// botIndex so a relay can front the terminal on a different port number.
-let externalPort = 0;
-/** Marks the proxy live on `port`. Called only after a successful bind. */
-export function setTerminalProxyPort(port) {
-    proxyPort = port;
-    proxyReady = true;
-}
-/** Override the port shown in proxy-mode links (WEB_EXTERNAL_PORT + botIndex).
- *  0 reverts to advertising the local proxy port. */
-export function setTerminalExternalPort(port) {
-    externalPort = port;
-}
-/** Bound proxy port, or 0 when the proxy is not available. */
-export function getTerminalProxyPort() {
-    return proxyReady ? proxyPort : 0;
-}
-/** Port clients should use to reach the proxy: the configured external port
- *  (WEB_EXTERNAL_PORT + botIndex) when set, else the bound proxy port; 0 when
- *  the proxy isn't up. Single source of truth for the proxy-mode port that both
- *  buildTerminalUrl (card links) and the dashboard rows advertise, so they agree
- *  on the same external port instead of diverging. */
-export function getTerminalAdvertisedPort() {
-    return proxyReady ? externalPort || proxyPort : 0;
-}
-/** Test/edge helper: revert to the no-proxy (direct-port) state. */
-export function resetTerminalProxy() {
-    proxyPort = 0;
-    proxyReady = false;
-    externalPort = 0;
-}
-function withCapability(base, name, value) {
-    return value ? `${base}?${name}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}` : base;
-}
-export function buildTerminalUrl(ds, opts = {}) {
-    // Riff backend: the AIO Sandbox link is the OPERATE entry — served via
-    // 「获取操作链接」/ write links only (opts.write). The read-only
-    // 「打开 Web 终端」keeps the local worker terminal (task log view), so both
-    // stay reachable: Web终端=日志页常驻，操作链接=AIO Sandbox。
-    if (ds.riffAccessUrl && opts.write)
-        return ds.riffAccessUrl;
-    // When 远程访问 is enabled AND this daemon is bound to the central platform AND
-    // the local terminal proxy is up, route terminal links through the machine
-    // subdomain (`https://m-<machineId>.<platformHost>/s/<sessionId>`). The platform
-    // reverse-proxies that subdomain to this daemon's dashboard, which in turn
-    // proxies `/s/*` to the local terminal proxy — so terminals are reachable
-    // centrally with no `:port`. Platform owner login grants write access, and an
-    // explicitly requested private write link keeps its worker token as an
-    // alternative capability. Read-only links carry a distinct view capability:
-    // knowing it never grants terminal input.
-    // When 远程访问 is off the platform base is null and we fall through — first
-    // to a self-hosted reverse proxy base (`BOTMUX_PUBLIC_URL`, same front-door
-    // `/s/<id>` form), then to the local proxy/worker port.
-    if (proxyReady) {
-        const platformBase = isRemoteAccessEnabled() ? platformMachineBaseUrl() : null;
-        if (platformBase) {
-            const base = `${platformBase}/s/${ds.session.sessionId}`;
-            return opts.write
-                ? withCapability(base, 'token', ds.workerToken)
-                : withCapability(base, 'viewToken', ds.workerViewToken);
-        }
-        // 自建反代（BOTMUX_PUBLIC_URL）：走 dashboard 前门 `/s/<id>`，无 per-bot 端口、
-        // 对所有 bot 通。这里没有平台 SSO 兜底，故写链接必须像本地分支一样保留 token，
-        // 否则终端会裸暴露在对外域名上。
-        const publicBase = publicReverseProxyBaseUrl();
-        if (publicBase) {
-            const url = `${publicBase}/s/${ds.session.sessionId}`;
-            return opts.write
-                ? withCapability(url, 'token', ds.workerToken)
-                : withCapability(url, 'viewToken', ds.workerViewToken);
-        }
-    }
-    const base = proxyReady
-        ? `http://${formatUrlHost(config.web.externalHost)}:${getTerminalAdvertisedPort()}/s/${ds.session.sessionId}`
-        : `http://${formatUrlHost(config.web.externalHost)}:${ds.workerPort ?? ds.session.webPort}`;
-    return opts.write
-        ? withCapability(base, 'token', ds.workerToken)
-        : withCapability(base, 'viewToken', ds.workerViewToken);
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=terminal-url.js.map

package/dist/core/terminal-url.js.map

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package/dist/core/terminal-write-auth.d.ts

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-export interface TerminalWriteInput {
-    /** Value of the `X-Botmux-Role` request header (normalized to a single string, or undefined). */
-    role: string | undefined;
-    /** Whether the request's `?token=` matched the worker's write token. */
-    tokenMatches: boolean;
-    /** Whether this machine is bound to a central platform (a trusted boundary fronts `/s`). */
-    platformBound: boolean;
-    /** Whether the request carried a valid platform-injected dashboard-token cookie,
-     *  i.e. it genuinely traversed the platform's authenticated reverse proxy. */
-    platformProxied: boolean;
-}
-export interface TerminalAccessInput extends TerminalWriteInput {
-    /** Whether the request's `?viewToken=` matched the worker's read capability. */
-    viewTokenMatches: boolean;
-}
-export interface TerminalAccessDecision {
-    hasRead: boolean;
-    hasWrite: boolean;
-    platformReadonly: boolean;
-}
-/**
- * Derive a stable, read-only terminal capability for one session.  The domain
- * separator prevents this HMAC from being confused with any other use of the
- * dashboard secret, while binding to sessionId keeps a token from opening a
- * different worker.  The host-only secret is masked from sandboxed CLIs.
- */
-export declare function deriveTerminalViewToken(secret: string, sessionId: string): string;
-/**
- * Derive a stable WRITE (operate) capability for one session. Mirrors
- * deriveTerminalViewToken but uses a DISTINCT domain separator so the two
- * capabilities can never collide — knowing the view token must never yield the
- * write token (and vice versa) even for the same session+secret.
- *
- * Rationale: the write token used to be a per-process `randomBytes(16)`, so an
- * already-issued 「操作链接」/write link (`?token=`) died the moment its worker
- * restarted (a silent daemon restart re-forks every worker → new token → old
- * link 403s). Deriving it from the host-only dashboard secret keeps the operate
- * link valid across restarts, exactly like the read-only view token. The
- * host-only secret is masked from sandboxed CLIs, so a sandboxed CLI still
- * can't mint its own write link.
- */
-export declare function deriveTerminalWriteToken(secret: string, sessionId: string): string;
-export declare function resolveTerminalWrite({ role, tokenMatches, platformBound, platformProxied }: TerminalWriteInput): {
-    hasWrite: boolean;
-    platformReadonly: boolean;
-};
-/** Resolve both read and write access without ever promoting a view token. */
-export declare function resolveTerminalAccess(input: TerminalAccessInput): TerminalAccessDecision;
-/** Constant-time equality (avoids leaking the dashboard token through compare timing). */
-export declare function safeTerminalTokenEqual(a: string | null | undefined, b: string): boolean;
-/** Extract the `botmux_dashboard_token` value from a request Cookie header. */
-export declare function readDashboardCookie(cookieHeader: string | string[] | undefined): string | null;
-/**
- * Resolve terminal write for one request: extract the `X-Botmux-Role` header
- * (a duplicated/array header is treated as absent), verify the request came
- * through the platform proxy (dashboard-token cookie matches this machine's
- * active token), and gate the role's trust on the machine's platform binding.
- *
- * Both `isPlatformBound` and `getDashboardToken` are thunks evaluated on EVERY
- * call — never snapshotted. `botmux bind`/unbind and `botmux dashboard` (token
- * rotation) rewrite state that the dashboard hot-reloads WITHOUT restarting live
- * workers; a cached value would go stale — keep trusting a request after an
- * unbind / token rotation, or deny legitimate platform writes after a bind.
- */
-export declare function resolveTerminalWriteForRequest(headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>, tokenMatches: boolean, isPlatformBound: () => boolean, getDashboardToken: () => string | null): {
-    hasWrite: boolean;
-    platformReadonly: boolean;
-};
-/**
- * Request-level terminal access gate.  Unlike the legacy write-only resolver,
- * this explicitly denies observation unless the caller has a view/write
- * capability or an authenticated dashboard cookie.
- */
-export declare function resolveTerminalAccessForRequest(headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>, tokenMatches: boolean, viewTokenMatches: boolean, isPlatformBound: () => boolean, getDashboardToken: () => string | null): TerminalAccessDecision;
-//# sourceMappingURL=terminal-write-auth.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/terminal-write-auth.d.ts.map

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package/dist/core/terminal-write-auth.js

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-// Terminal write-permission gate.
-//
-// The web terminal grants write access one of two ways:
-//
-//  1. Private write-link token — the `?token=<workerToken>` query param. An
-//     explicitly issued write link is an independent capability and wins
-//     outright, including for a viewer the platform sees as guest/teammate.
-//
-//  2. Platform-injected role — when a central platform fronts `/s`, it
-//     authenticates the viewer and injects `X-Botmux-Role` (owner | teammate |
-//     guest), first stripping any client-supplied copy. Only `owner` may write.
-//
-// The role header is trustworthy ONLY on a request that actually came through
-// the platform's authenticated reverse proxy. The dashboard `/s` bridge and the
-// terminal-proxy replay request headers verbatim, and the front door binds all
-// interfaces, so `X-Botmux-Role` alone is client-forgeable — a direct caller
-// could send `X-Botmux-Role: owner` and bypass the `?token=` gate. We therefore
-// honor the role header only when BOTH hold:
-//
-//   • this machine is bound to a central platform (`platformBound`), and
-//   • the request carries the platform-injected dashboard-token cookie
-//     (`platformProxied`) — the platform's proxy drops any client Cookie and
-//     injects this machine's real `botmux_dashboard_token`, a secret a direct
-//     caller doesn't have. Its presence proves the request traversed the
-//     platform's authenticated front door.
-//
-// Otherwise the role header is ignored and write falls back to `?token=`.
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
-/**
- * Derive a stable, read-only terminal capability for one session.  The domain
- * separator prevents this HMAC from being confused with any other use of the
- * dashboard secret, while binding to sessionId keeps a token from opening a
- * different worker.  The host-only secret is masked from sandboxed CLIs.
- */
-export function deriveTerminalViewToken(secret, sessionId) {
-    return createHmac('sha256', secret)
-        .update('botmux-terminal-view-v1\0')
-        .update(sessionId)
-        .digest('base64url');
-}
-/**
- * Derive a stable WRITE (operate) capability for one session. Mirrors
- * deriveTerminalViewToken but uses a DISTINCT domain separator so the two
- * capabilities can never collide — knowing the view token must never yield the
- * write token (and vice versa) even for the same session+secret.
- *
- * Rationale: the write token used to be a per-process `randomBytes(16)`, so an
- * already-issued 「操作链接」/write link (`?token=`) died the moment its worker
- * restarted (a silent daemon restart re-forks every worker → new token → old
- * link 403s). Deriving it from the host-only dashboard secret keeps the operate
- * link valid across restarts, exactly like the read-only view token. The
- * host-only secret is masked from sandboxed CLIs, so a sandboxed CLI still
- * can't mint its own write link.
- */
-export function deriveTerminalWriteToken(secret, sessionId) {
-    return createHmac('sha256', secret)
-        .update('botmux-terminal-write-v1\0')
-        .update(sessionId)
-        .digest('base64url');
-}
-export function resolveTerminalWrite({ role, tokenMatches, platformBound, platformProxied }) {
-    // A matching private write-link token is an independent capability: the owner
-    // explicitly issued that link, so it grants write even for a viewer the
-    // platform authenticated as guest/teammate. Without it, a verified platform
-    // role decides; a role header outside the verified-proxy path is ignored.
-    if (tokenMatches)
-        return { hasWrite: true, platformReadonly: false };
-    if (platformBound && platformProxied && typeof role === 'string' && role) {
-        const hasWrite = role === 'owner';
-        return { hasWrite, platformReadonly: !hasWrite };
-    }
-    return { hasWrite: false, platformReadonly: false };
-}
-/** Resolve both read and write access without ever promoting a view token. */
-export function resolveTerminalAccess(input) {
-    const write = resolveTerminalWrite(input);
-    return {
-        // A valid dashboard cookie proves that the request passed through the
-        // authenticated dashboard/platform front door.  It grants observation even
-        // on an unbound local dashboard, while write still follows the stricter
-        // token/platform-owner rules above.
-        hasRead: write.hasWrite || input.viewTokenMatches || input.platformProxied,
-        ...write,
-    };
-}
-/** Constant-time equality (avoids leaking the dashboard token through compare timing). */
-export function safeTerminalTokenEqual(a, b) {
-    if (!a)
-        return false;
-    const ab = Buffer.from(a);
-    const bb = Buffer.from(b);
-    if (ab.length !== bb.length)
-        return false;
-    return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
-}
-/** Extract the `botmux_dashboard_token` value from a request Cookie header. */
-export function readDashboardCookie(cookieHeader) {
-    const raw = Array.isArray(cookieHeader) ? cookieHeader.join('; ') : cookieHeader;
-    if (!raw)
-        return null;
-    for (const part of raw.split(';')) {
-        const eq = part.indexOf('=');
-        if (eq < 0)
-            continue;
-        if (part.slice(0, eq).trim() === 'botmux_dashboard_token')
-            return part.slice(eq + 1).trim() || null;
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-/**
- * Resolve terminal write for one request: extract the `X-Botmux-Role` header
- * (a duplicated/array header is treated as absent), verify the request came
- * through the platform proxy (dashboard-token cookie matches this machine's
- * active token), and gate the role's trust on the machine's platform binding.
- *
- * Both `isPlatformBound` and `getDashboardToken` are thunks evaluated on EVERY
- * call — never snapshotted. `botmux bind`/unbind and `botmux dashboard` (token
- * rotation) rewrite state that the dashboard hot-reloads WITHOUT restarting live
- * workers; a cached value would go stale — keep trusting a request after an
- * unbind / token rotation, or deny legitimate platform writes after a bind.
- */
-export function resolveTerminalWriteForRequest(headers, tokenMatches, isPlatformBound, getDashboardToken) {
-    const rawRole = headers['x-botmux-role'];
-    const role = typeof rawRole === 'string' ? rawRole : undefined;
-    const cookieToken = readDashboardCookie(headers['cookie']);
-    const activeToken = getDashboardToken();
-    const platformProxied = !!activeToken && safeTerminalTokenEqual(cookieToken, activeToken);
-    return resolveTerminalWrite({ role, tokenMatches, platformBound: isPlatformBound(), platformProxied });
-}
-/**
- * Request-level terminal access gate.  Unlike the legacy write-only resolver,
- * this explicitly denies observation unless the caller has a view/write
- * capability or an authenticated dashboard cookie.
- */
-export function resolveTerminalAccessForRequest(headers, tokenMatches, viewTokenMatches, isPlatformBound, getDashboardToken) {
-    const rawRole = headers['x-botmux-role'];
-    const role = typeof rawRole === 'string' ? rawRole : undefined;
-    const cookieToken = readDashboardCookie(headers['cookie']);
-    const activeToken = getDashboardToken();
-    const platformProxied = !!activeToken && safeTerminalTokenEqual(cookieToken, activeToken);
-    return resolveTerminalAccess({
-        role,
-        tokenMatches,
-        viewTokenMatches,
-        platformBound: isPlatformBound(),
-        platformProxied,
-    });
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=terminal-write-auth.js.map

package/dist/core/terminal-write-auth.js.map

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package/dist/core/tmux-recovery.d.ts

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Deterministic restart jitter for tmux-backed workers.
- *
- * A shared tmux outage makes many worker processes emit `claude_exit` together.
- * Delaying teardown by a target-specific amount prevents all of them from
- * running kill-session / has-session / functional probes in the same instant.
- * Deterministic jitter is preferable to Math.random here: the value is easy to
- * unit-test and still distributes independent bmx-* session ids uniformly.
- */
-export declare function tmuxRestartJitterMs(sessionId: string, restartOrdinal: number): number;
-//# sourceMappingURL=tmux-recovery.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/tmux-recovery.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/core/tmux-recovery.js

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Deterministic restart jitter for tmux-backed workers.
- *
- * A shared tmux outage makes many worker processes emit `claude_exit` together.
- * Delaying teardown by a target-specific amount prevents all of them from
- * running kill-session / has-session / functional probes in the same instant.
- * Deterministic jitter is preferable to Math.random here: the value is easy to
- * unit-test and still distributes independent bmx-* session ids uniformly.
- */
-export function tmuxRestartJitterMs(sessionId, restartOrdinal) {
-    const input = `${sessionId}:${restartOrdinal}`;
-    let hash = 2166136261;
-    for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i += 1) {
-        hash ^= input.charCodeAt(i);
-        hash = Math.imul(hash, 16777619);
-    }
-    return 250 + ((hash >>> 0) % 1750);
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=tmux-recovery.js.map

package/dist/core/tmux-recovery.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/core/trigger-final-suppression.d.ts

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-import type { DaemonSession } from './types.js';
-/**
- * Give a synthetic trigger turn the session's CURRENT fold-back anchor.
- *
- * `turnId` here is a daemon-minted `trg_<uuid>`, not an accepted Lark message
- * id, but the daemon's chat-scope send chokepoint (daemon.ts sessionReply →
- * `resolveSessionReplyTarget(ds, fallbackTurnId(ds, turnId))`) treats ANY
- * explicit turnId as "this caller knows its own turn" and therefore skips the
- * fallback to `currentReplyTarget`. Without an entry of its own, a loud trigger
- * that folds into a `shared`-mode chat-scope session would resolve to
- * `mode:'plain'` and post this turn's streaming card / notices at the group top
- * level instead of inside the shared topic — the exact leak reply-target.ts
- * documents (and e619250d already fixed once) for turn-less daemon sends.
- *
- * Inheriting the anchor keeps the suppression key turn-exact while making the
- * routing answer identical to what the same turn got before it carried an id.
- * No anchor (flat chat session, or a thread-scope session that never uses this
- * map) → nothing registered, so behavior is unchanged.
- */
-export declare function inheritTriggerReplyAnchor(ds: DaemonSession, turnId: string, nowIso?: string): void;
-export declare function armTriggerFinalSuppression(ds: DaemonSession, turnId: string, now?: number): void;
-export declare function isTriggerFinalSuppressed(ds: DaemonSession, turnId?: string, now?: number): boolean;
-export declare function disarmTriggerFinalSuppression(ds: DaemonSession, turnId: string): void;
-//# sourceMappingURL=trigger-final-suppression.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/trigger-final-suppression.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/core/trigger-final-suppression.js

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-// Turn-exact suppression of the daemon-rendered final_output for loud external
-// triggers whose owner opted into "no trailing final notice" (connector
-// suppressFinalOutput). Unlike silent scheduled fires this leaves the streaming
-// card and start notice alone — only the transcript-driven final_output reply
-// is dropped. Keyed on the trigger's turn id so a normal user turn queued on the
-// same session can neither inherit nor un-hush the suppression. Entries outlive
-// turn_terminal briefly to cover trailing worker events and are pruned by
-// age/size when new suppressions are armed.
-const SUPPRESS_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-const MAX_SUPPRESSED_TURNS_PER_SESSION = 256;
-/** Bound on the per-turn reply-target map, mirroring reply-target.ts's own
- *  REPLY_TARGETS_MAX so an inherited trigger anchor can never grow the map
- *  past what the normal IM path allows. */
-const REPLY_TARGETS_MAX = 32;
-/**
- * Give a synthetic trigger turn the session's CURRENT fold-back anchor.
- *
- * `turnId` here is a daemon-minted `trg_<uuid>`, not an accepted Lark message
- * id, but the daemon's chat-scope send chokepoint (daemon.ts sessionReply →
- * `resolveSessionReplyTarget(ds, fallbackTurnId(ds, turnId))`) treats ANY
- * explicit turnId as "this caller knows its own turn" and therefore skips the
- * fallback to `currentReplyTarget`. Without an entry of its own, a loud trigger
- * that folds into a `shared`-mode chat-scope session would resolve to
- * `mode:'plain'` and post this turn's streaming card / notices at the group top
- * level instead of inside the shared topic — the exact leak reply-target.ts
- * documents (and e619250d already fixed once) for turn-less daemon sends.
- *
- * Inheriting the anchor keeps the suppression key turn-exact while making the
- * routing answer identical to what the same turn got before it carried an id.
- * No anchor (flat chat session, or a thread-scope session that never uses this
- * map) → nothing registered, so behavior is unchanged.
- */
-export function inheritTriggerReplyAnchor(ds, turnId, nowIso = new Date().toISOString()) {
-    if (ds.scope !== 'chat')
-        return;
-    const anchor = ds.currentReplyTarget ?? ds.session.currentReplyTarget;
-    if (!anchor?.rootMessageId)
-        return;
-    const targets = { ...(ds.session.replyTargets ?? {}) };
-    if (targets[turnId])
-        return;
-    targets[turnId] = {
-        rootMessageId: anchor.rootMessageId,
-        updatedAt: nowIso,
-        ...(anchor.quoteOnly ? { quoteOnly: true } : {}),
-        ...(anchor.substitute ? { substitute: true } : {}),
-    };
-    const keys = Object.keys(targets);
-    if (keys.length > REPLY_TARGETS_MAX) {
-        keys
-            .sort((a, b) => (targets[a].updatedAt < targets[b].updatedAt ? -1 : 1))
-            .slice(0, keys.length - REPLY_TARGETS_MAX)
-            .forEach(k => { delete targets[k]; });
-    }
-    ds.session.replyTargets = targets;
-}
-function pruneTriggerFinalSuppression(ds, now) {
-    const turns = ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns;
-    if (!turns)
-        return;
-    for (const [turnId, armedAt] of turns) {
-        if (now - armedAt > SUPPRESS_TTL_MS)
-            turns.delete(turnId);
-    }
-    while (turns.size >= MAX_SUPPRESSED_TURNS_PER_SESSION) {
-        const oldest = turns.keys().next().value;
-        if (!oldest)
-            break;
-        turns.delete(oldest);
-    }
-    if (turns.size === 0)
-        ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns = undefined;
-}
-export function armTriggerFinalSuppression(ds, turnId, now = Date.now()) {
-    pruneTriggerFinalSuppression(ds, now);
-    const turns = ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns ??= new Map();
-    turns.set(turnId, now);
-}
-export function isTriggerFinalSuppressed(ds, turnId, now = Date.now()) {
-    if (!turnId)
-        return false;
-    const armedAt = ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns?.get(turnId);
-    if (armedAt === undefined)
-        return false;
-    if (now - armedAt <= SUPPRESS_TTL_MS)
-        return true;
-    ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns?.delete(turnId);
-    if (ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns?.size === 0)
-        ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns = undefined;
-    return false;
-}
-export function disarmTriggerFinalSuppression(ds, turnId) {
-    ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns?.delete(turnId);
-    if (ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns?.size === 0)
-        ds.suppressedTriggerFinalTurns = undefined;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=trigger-final-suppression.js.map

package/dist/core/trigger-final-suppression.js.map

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package/dist/core/trigger-session.d.ts

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-import { type ChatMode } from '../im/lark/client.js';
-import { type ChatReplyMode } from '../services/chat-reply-mode-store.js';
-import type { DaemonSession } from './types.js';
-import type { TriggerRequest, TriggerResponse } from '../services/trigger-types.js';
-export interface TriggerSessionDeps {
-    larkAppId: string;
-    activeSessions: Map<string, DaemonSession>;
-}
-/** Daemon-internal dispatch controls. These deliberately do not live in the
- * public TriggerRequest schema: an untrusted connector must not choose a turn
- * identity that participates in durable delivery reconciliation. */
-export interface TriggerSessionInternalOptions {
-    stableTurnId?: string;
-    /** Synchronous write-ahead hook invoked immediately before worker IPC/fork.
-     *  Durable receivers use it to persist DISPATCHED with the exact worker
-     *  generation. Throwing aborts the dispatch. */
-    beforeDispatch?: (context: {
-        sessionId: string;
-        workerGeneration: number;
-    }) => void | {
-        dispatchAttempt: number;
-    };
-    /** Suppress daemon-rendered final_output while preserving turn_terminal.
-     *  Used by analysis-only meeting consumers; explicit user IM turns do not
-     *  set it. */
-    suppressFinalOutput?: boolean;
-    /** Meeting raw text is intentionally ephemeral receiver input. Keep it out
-     *  of botmux's persisted Session.lastUserPrompt/lastCliInput fields; receipt
-     *  recovery asks the hub to resend the frozen envelope instead. */
-    persistInputHistory?: boolean;
-}
-/** Small, human-readable text for Codex App's visible UserMessage. The full
- * legacy event envelope still travels as hidden untrusted context. */
-export declare function buildExternalEventVisibleText(req: TriggerRequest, larkAppId?: string): string;
-/** Feishu topic seed for a new external-event session. `null` is an explicit
- * connector-owner choice to run without the otherwise required notice. */
-export declare function buildExternalEventTopicMessage(req: TriggerRequest, larkAppId?: string): string | null;
-/** Connector-owner directives are trusted application context. Keep them
- * separate from the full legacy wrapper, which also contains untrusted event
- * bytes and therefore must never be promoted wholesale to developer context. */
-export declare function buildExternalEventApplicationContext(req: TriggerRequest): string;
-export declare function buildUntrustedEventPrompt(req: TriggerRequest, triggerId: string): string;
-/** Data-only part of an external trigger. This is the only portion passed as
- * untrusted structured context; trusted connector instructions remain solely
- * in application context instead of being duplicated at user priority. */
-export declare function buildExternalEventDataContext(req: TriggerRequest, triggerId: string): string;
-/** Whether a webhook external-event turn for this chat should open its own topic
- *  + session (thread-scope) instead of folding into the group's one chat-scope
- *  session. Mirrors the inbound @mention routing (event-dispatcher's
- *  `regularGroupRouting`): a 话题群 always sessions per-topic, and a 普通群 only when
- *  its reply mode is `new-topic`. The other 普通群 modes (chat / shared / chat-topic)
- *  keep a top-level external event flat in the group chat-scope session, exactly
- *  as they route a top-level @mention. Exported for unit tests. */
-export declare function externalEventOpensOwnTopic(chatMode: ChatMode, regularGroupMode: ChatReplyMode): boolean;
-export declare function triggerSessionTurn(req: TriggerRequest, deps: TriggerSessionDeps, internal?: TriggerSessionInternalOptions): Promise<TriggerResponse>;
-//# sourceMappingURL=trigger-session.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/trigger-session.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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