blitzstrike 1.0.77 → 1.0.82

package/intelligence/bypass_techniques.json

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{
+  "_comment": "Bypass techniques for when a probe is blocked by a defense (WAF, filter/sanitizer, auth gate, rate-limit). Look up the matching defense and apply the technique instead of giving up.",
+  "categories": [
+    {
+      "id": "waf",
+      "defense": "WAF / web application firewall",
+      "techniques": [
+        {"id": "encoding", "name": "Encoding", "how": "URL-encode, double-encode, or unicode-escape the payload so the signature never matches.", "example": "%2527%2520OR%25201%253D1"},
+        {"id": "case", "name": "Case variation", "how": "Alternate keyword case to evade case-sensitive signatures.", "example": "SeLeCt * FrOm users"},
+        {"id": "comment", "name": "Inline comments", "how": "Insert inline comments inside keywords to split the signature.", "example": "UN/**/ION SE/**/LECT"},
+        {"id": "separator", "name": "Separator variation", "how": "Swap spaces for tabs/newlines/alternative separators.", "example": "SELECT%0a*%0aFROM"},
+        {"id": "concat", "name": "String concatenation", "how": "Break the payload into concatenated fragments.", "example": "se'||'lect"},
+        {"id": "chunked", "name": "Chunked / HTTP smuggling", "how": "Split the payload across chunked-encoding or HTTP/2 boundaries to bypass inspection."},
+        {"id": "param_pollution", "name": "Parameter pollution", "how": "Send duplicate parameters; the WAF checks one, the app uses the other.", "example": "id=1&id=1' OR '1'='1"}
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "filter",
+      "defense": "Input filter / sanitizer / blacklist",
+      "techniques": [
+        {"id": "null_byte", "name": "Null byte", "how": "Insert a null byte to truncate validation while the sink reads past it.", "example": "file.php%00.jpg"},
+        {"id": "double_encode", "name": "Double encoding", "how": "Encode twice; the filter decodes once, the sink decodes again.", "example": "%252e%252e%252f"},
+        {"id": "unicode", "name": "Unicode / normalization", "how": "Use fullwidth, overlong UTF-8, or unicode lookalikes the filter misses.", "example": "＜script＞ or %c0%af"},
+        {"id": "case_mix", "name": "Case mixing", "how": "Bypass blacklists with mixed case when the filter is case-sensitive.", "example": "<ScRiPt>"},
+        {"id": "whitespace", "name": "Whitespace / padding", "how": "Insert spaces/tabs/newlines the filter strips or ignores.", "example": "<scr ipt>"},
+        {"id": "nested", "name": "Nested / recursive", "how": "Nest a blocked token inside an allowed one so the filter strips one layer.", "example": "<scr<script>ipt>"},
+        {"id": "cast_truncate", "name": "Cast / length truncation", "how": "Exploit int cast or length truncation that drops the dangerous tail.", "example": "1e99 (loose comparison to 1)"}
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "auth",
+      "defense": "Authentication / authorization (401/403)",
+      "techniques": [
+        {"id": "path_traversal", "name": "Path normalization", "how": "Bypass path-based ACL with traversal or encoding.", "example": "/admin/../admin, /admin%2f, /admin/.;/"},
+        {"id": "verb", "name": "HTTP verb tampering", "how": "Switch the method (GET->POST, add X-HTTP-Method-Override).", "example": "GET /admin -> POST /admin"},
+        {"id": "header", "name": "Header spoofing", "how": "Spoof X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP / X-Original-URL to appear internal.", "example": "X-Original-URL: /admin"},
+        {"id": "case_path", "name": "Case / suffix", "how": "Vary case or append suffix to dodge exact-match rules.", "example": "/Admin, /admin/.json, /admin/."},
+        {"id": "param", "name": "Parameter override", "how": "Override auth via a second parameter or body field the backend trusts.", "example": "user=guest&user=admin"}
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "rate_limit",
+      "defense": "Rate limit / captcha / bot protection",
+      "techniques": [
+        {"id": "rotation", "name": "IP / header rotation", "how": "Rotate source IP or spoof client headers to evade per-IP limits.", "example": "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"},
+        {"id": "slow", "name": "Low-and-slow", "how": "Stay under the threshold with pacing + jitter."},
+        {"id": "header_spoof", "name": "Header spoofing", "how": "Spoof User-Agent / Referer to look like a real browser."},
+        {"id": "token_reuse", "name": "Token/session reuse", "how": "Reuse a valid session/token across requests to skip per-request checks."},
+        {"id": "burst", "name": "Burst vs window", "how": "Exploit the difference between per-second and per-window limits."}
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/intelligence/chain_links.json

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "_comment": "Chain-to-chain composition: which escalation chains naturally follow another. A complex bug chains several of these. Each link: from -> to (via the pivot primitive).",
+  "links": [
+    {"from": "ssrf_cloud_metadata", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "stolen IAM/cloud credentials"},
+    {"from": "xxe_to_ssrf_and_file_read", "to": ["ssrf_cloud_metadata", "ssrf_to_redis_rce"], "via": "SSRF primitive gained from XXE"},
+    {"from": "ssrf_to_redis_rce", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot"], "via": "OS shell on internal service"},
+    {"from": "sqli_to_rce", "to": ["sqli_to_hash_dump_and_crack", "path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "OS shell / DB access"},
+    {"from": "file_upload_to_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "default_creds_to_internal_pivot"], "via": "web shell on host"},
+    {"from": "lfi_to_rce_via_log_poisoning", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "ssti_to_full_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "deserialization_to_rce", "to": ["path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "code execution on host"},
+    {"from": "xss_to_account_takeover", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover", "api_key_leak_to_account_takeover"], "via": "session/account control"},
+    {"from": "idor_to_admin_takeover", "to": ["api_key_leak_to_account_takeover"], "via": "admin access"},
+    {"from": "api_key_leak_to_account_takeover", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover"], "via": "account takeover"},
+    {"from": "default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "to": ["docker_container_breakout", "kubernetes_pod_escape"], "via": "internal foothold"},
+    {"from": "docker_container_breakout", "to": ["kubernetes_pod_escape"], "via": "host access"},
+    {"from": "open_redirect_to_oauth_theft", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "stolen OAuth token"},
+    {"from": "subdomain_takeover_to_cookie_theft", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "cookie scope control"},
+    {"from": "cache_poison_to_stored_xss", "to": ["xss_to_account_takeover"], "via": "persistent XSS"},
+    {"from": "graphql_idor_to_data_theft", "to": ["idor_to_admin_takeover"], "via": "admin identifier leaked"},
+    {"from": "path_traversal_to_credential_theft", "to": ["default_creds_to_internal_pivot", "docker_container_breakout"], "via": "credentials/hashes recovered"}
+  ]
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "blitzstrike",
-  "version": "1.0.77",
+  "version": "1.0.82",
   "description": "Blitz Strike — a universal MCP security-audit toolbelt. BLITZ sweeps the attack surface, EAGLE-EYE traces source-to-sink, STRIKE verifies live. 57 attack chains, 130-tool catalog, intelligence data layer. One server, every agent.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/skills/bs-orchestrate-engagement.md

@@ -8,6 +8,32 @@ description: Use when the user asks for a full security engagement ("fullscan",
 You are the brain. Blitz Strike is the hands. Drive the full cycle with the
 deterministic MCP tools; never guess a finding — produce it from tool output.
 
+## Target routing (auto-detect first — no need to ask)
+
+Classify the target before any tool call. This is automatic, driven by the
+shape of what the user gave you. A URL often has NO `http://`/`https://` prefix
+— a bare domain, IP, or host:port is still a live target:
+
+| Target shape | Flow |
+|---|---|
+| URL — with or without scheme (`https://x.com`, `x.com`, `sub.x.com/path`, `x.com:8080`, `192.168.1.1`) | **Live** — `scope_check` (authorization) → `live_recon` → `active_scan` → `strike_verify` → report |
+| Filesystem path (exists on disk, or starts `/` `./` `../` `~`, or ends in a code extension `.php` `.py` `.js` `.ts` `.java` …) | **Source** — `blitz_scan` → `eagle_eye2` → `complex_scan`/`route_scan` → report |
+
+Rule of thumb: check "is it a filesystem path?" FIRST (exists on disk, or a
+code extension). If it is NOT a path, treat it as a live host — prepend
+`https://` when the scheme is missing (`example.com` → `https://example.com`)
+and confirm scope before any request.
+
+`run_engagement` auto-detects both internally (path on disk → source pipeline;
+anything else → live, scope-gated). For the granular sub-agent flow, route the
+workstreams yourself: URL → live workstreams, path → source workstreams.
+
+After routing, read the matching playbook (`read_playbook`) for the target type
+— `web-application`, `api-security`, `source-code-audit`, `active-directory`,
+`mobile-application`, `external-attack-surface` — it is the campaign plan for
+that type. Load the phase skill (`source-audit`, `verify-finding`, …) for the
+step you are on. Do not improvise a plan the playbook already spells out.
+
 ## The cycle
 
 1. **Scope gate (always first).** Call `scope_check` before any live action.
@@ -78,6 +104,11 @@ user sees you working, not a silent tool call.
 
 ## Rules
 
+- **Persist — complex bugs do not give up.** A failed probe is not "not
+  vulnerable" (vary sinks, params, encodings); empty output is not "no
+  findings" (re-run or escalate to `route_scan`/`complex_scan`); a "sanitized"
+  sink is not safe until you challenge the sanitizer (loose `==`, missing
+  `EXTR_SKIP`, cast truncation). Keep unconfirmed work as hypotheses.
 - One hypothesis per finding; `finding_create` + `finding_transition` for the
   strict lifecycle (candidate → confirmed → rejected).
 - `dedup_findings` before reporting — collapse shared-root duplicates.