blitzstrike 1.0.77 → 1.0.82

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,72 @@ All notable changes to Blitz Strike are documented here.
 The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
+## [1.0.82] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Added — attack-vector focus + chain-to-chain composition
+
+- Attack vectors are now actionable: each of the 34 categories in
+  `attack_vectors.json` gained a `focus` (what to test / look for), surfaced by
+  `list_attack_vectors` and `attackVectors` — no longer bare names.
+- New `chain_links` MCP tool + `intelligence/chain_links.json`: 18 chain→chain
+  compositions (SSRF→metadata → default-creds→pivot via stolen IAM, XXE→SSRF →
+  cloud metadata, SQLi→RCE → hash-dump, …) so a complex bug can be traced across
+  chains instead of stopping at one.
+- Doctrine: RESOURCE MAP now tells a driving LLM WHEN to reach for each —
+  `list_attack_vectors` during recon, `list_chains` for escalation, `chain_links`
+  to compose chains, `bypass_lookup` when blocked, `payload_lookup` for probes.
+
+## [1.0.81] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Added — bypass techniques + chain doctrine
+
+- New `bypass_lookup` MCP tool + `intelligence/bypass_techniques.json`: concrete
+  bypass techniques for WAF, input filter/sanitizer, auth (401/403), and
+  rate-limit/captcha defenses (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked,
+  null byte, double-encoding, verb tampering, header spoofing, …) with examples,
+  plus alias resolution (`403` → auth, `firewall` → waf).
+- PERSISTENCE doctrine now tells a driving LLM to call `bypass_lookup` when a
+  probe is blocked, and to chain findings (a low-severity hit usually escalates
+  — match it to a multi-stage chain instead of stopping at the first vuln).
+
+## [1.0.80] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Added — full no-babysitting doctrine (resource map + persistence)
+
+- MCP `instructions` gained a "RESOURCE MAP" section teaching a driving LLM the
+  decision tree: TOOL acts, PLAYBOOK is the campaign plan for a target type,
+  SKILL is phase/technique doctrine, MANUAL is one-tool reference, PAYLOAD is
+  attack payloads, INTELLIGENCE is knowledge — and when to reach for each.
+- Added a "PERSISTENCE" section: complex bugs do not give up — vary probes,
+  re-run on empty output, challenge sanitizers, keep unconfirmed hypotheses,
+  trace the full chain. Updated resource counts (17 playbooks, 317 manuals,
+  66 payload collections).
+- `bs-orchestrate-engagement` now tells the agent to read the matching playbook
+  for the target type and carries the same persistence rule.
+
+## [1.0.79] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Fixed — scheme-less URL routing
+
+- `classifyTarget` now recognizes URLs without a scheme: a bare domain, IP, or
+  host:port (`example.com`, `192.168.1.1`, `example.com:8080`) is classified as
+  live and gets `https://` auto-prepended; a bare code filename (`myfile.php`)
+  is classified as source. `run_engagement` uses it, so a scheme-less URL routes
+  to the live pipeline without the caller normalizing it.
+- Routing doctrine (skill + MCP `instructions`) updated to state that a URL
+  often carries no `http://`/`https://` prefix.
+
+## [1.0.78] — 2026-09-13
+
+### Added — automatic target routing (URL vs source)
+
+- `bs-orchestrate-engagement` now leads with a "Target routing" table: a URL
+  or bare hostname → live engagement (scope-gated); a filesystem path / code
+  extension → source audit — classified automatically, no need to ask.
+- MCP `instructions` gained a "0. ROUTE BY TARGET" step so a driving LLM
+  auto-classifies the target and routes to the live or source pipeline without
+  being told.
+
 ## [1.0.77] — 2026-09-13
 
 ### Fixed — explicit tool argument names in doctrine

package/dist/index.js

@@ -30824,6 +30824,21 @@ function formatPlanChecklist(plan) {
   return rows.join(`
 `);
 }
+function classifyTarget(target) {
+  if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(target))
+    return { kind: "live", target };
+  try {
+    if (existsSync4(target) && (statSync2(target).isDirectory() || statSync2(target).isFile())) {
+      return { kind: "source", target };
+    }
+  } catch {}
+  const CODE_EXT = /\.(php|phtml|py|js|ts|jsx|tsx|java|rb|go|c|cpp|cs|swift|kt|rs|pl|sh|sql|html|vue|m|mm)$/i;
+  if (CODE_EXT.test(target) && !target.includes("/")) {
+    return { kind: "source", target };
+  }
+  const host = /^[\w.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}(:\d+)?([/?#].*)?$/.test(target) || /^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}(:\d+)?$/.test(target);
+  return { kind: "live", target: host ? `https://${target}` : target };
+}
 var _chainsCache = null;
 function loadChains() {
   if (_chainsCache)
@@ -31414,7 +31429,7 @@ function listAttackVectors() {
   return {
     total_categories: data.categories.length,
     total_vectors: data.categories.reduce((n, c) => n + c.vectors.length, 0),
-    categories: data.categories.map((c) => ({ id: c.id, title: c.title, count: c.vectors.length }))
+    categories: data.categories.map((c) => ({ id: c.id, title: c.title, count: c.vectors.length, focus: c.focus ?? "" }))
   };
 }
 function attackVectors(category) {
@@ -31427,7 +31442,7 @@ function attackVectors(category) {
     const matches = data.categories.filter((c) => c.title.toLowerCase().includes(category.toLowerCase()) || c.id.includes(q)).slice(0, 5).map((c) => c.id);
     return { found: false, query: category, suggestions: matches };
   }
-  return { found: true, id: found.id, title: found.title, count: found.vectors.length, vectors: found.vectors };
+  return { found: true, id: found.id, title: found.title, focus: found.focus ?? "", count: found.vectors.length, vectors: found.vectors };
 }
 var PACKAGE_PAYLOADS = join8(ROOT3, "payloads");
 var PACKAGE_TEMPLATES = join8(ROOT3, "templates");
@@ -31567,6 +31582,54 @@ function templateLookup(topic, limit = 10) {
   walk(TEMPLATES);
   return { found: hits.length > 0, topic, count: hits.length, templates: hits.slice(0, limit) };
 }
+var BYPASS_ALIASES = {
+  "403": "auth",
+  "401": "auth",
+  forbidden: "auth",
+  "auth bypass": "auth",
+  authorization: "auth",
+  acl: "auth",
+  access: "auth",
+  waf: "waf",
+  firewall: "waf",
+  modsecurity: "waf",
+  cloudflare: "waf",
+  filter: "filter",
+  sanitizer: "filter",
+  blacklist: "filter",
+  whitelist: "filter",
+  validation: "filter",
+  input: "filter",
+  "rate limit": "rate_limit",
+  ratelimit: "rate_limit",
+  captcha: "rate_limit",
+  bot: "rate_limit",
+  "bot protection": "rate_limit"
+};
+function bypassLookup(defense) {
+  const data = loadJson("bypass_techniques");
+  if (!data)
+    return { found: false, error: "bypass_techniques.json not found" };
+  const cats = data.categories;
+  if (!defense) {
+    return {
+      found: true,
+      categories: cats.map((c) => ({ id: c.id, defense: c.defense, techniques: c.techniques.length }))
+    };
+  }
+  const key = defense.toLowerCase();
+  const norm = BYPASS_ALIASES[key] ?? key;
+  const match = cats.find((c) => c.id === norm || c.defense.toLowerCase().includes(norm) || norm.includes(c.id));
+  if (!match)
+    return { found: false, defense, suggestions: cats.map((c) => c.id) };
+  return { found: true, defense: match.defense, techniques: match.techniques };
+}
+function chainLinks() {
+  const data = loadJson("chain_links");
+  if (!data)
+    return { found: false, error: "chain_links.json not found" };
+  return { found: true, total: data.links.length, links: data.links };
+}
 
 // src/active.ts
 var TIMEOUT_MS2 = 20000;
@@ -53328,7 +53391,8 @@ function createServer() {
     name: "blitzstrike",
     version: "1.0.0"
   }, {
-    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates). Beyond taint: route_scan (route confusion / dispatch abuse / batch forwarding) and complex_scan (deserialization->POP, type juggling, mass assignment) catch classes plain taint misses.\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL plus a BASELINE. The verdict is deterministic: marker " + "   reflected AND control inert = confirmed; both reflected = false_positive; " + "   marker not reflected = unconfirmed. Feed the verdict to strike_resolve to " + "   advance the finding lifecycle (hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Use " + "   read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's manual, payload_lookup for payloads, " + "   detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: ONE call does the whole audit (no babysitting). Source path -> " + "  full static pipeline + inline report (markdown/JSON/SARIF). URL target -> " + "  autonomous live marker sweep + confirmed findings + report. Prefer this first.\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 38 skills (WP/PHP 0-day, AD, " + "  malware, mobile, cloud, etc.).\\n" + "- read_playbook / read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 270 tool manuals + engagement " + "  playbooks.\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "IRON RULES:\\n" + "- Scope first; authorized targets only. Refuse out-of-scope or destructive/DoS work.\\n" + "- A hit is a hypothesis; a verified exploit (or proven data-flow) is the finding.\\n" + "- Prefer the one-call run_engagement path; fall back to granular tools when you " + "  need finer control."
+    instructions: "Blitz Strike is a universal penetration-testing toolbelt with three tiers — " + "BLITZ (reconnaissance / attack-surface mapping), EAGLE-EYE (source-to-sink " + "analysis), STRIKE (live validation) — plus a canonical evidence-first finding " + "engine and a multi-language taint engine.\\n\\n" + "CORE MENTAL MODEL:\\n" + "- A scanner hit is a HYPOTHESIS, not a finding. Live verification (or data-flow " + "  proof) is the verdict. Never report an unverified hit as a vulnerability.\\n" + "- Distinguish REACHABLE from mere PRESENT: a sink is only a finding when tainted " + "  input reaches it AND it is not neutralized by a sanitizer and not guarded by an " + "  auth gate.\\n\\n" + "HOW TO RUN AN AUDIT (start here):\\n" + "0. ROUTE BY TARGET. Classify the target automatically - no need to ask. A " + "   URL - with or without http/https (example.com, 192.168.1.1, host:8080) - " + "   is LIVE (scope-gated, then live_recon + active_scan + strike_verify). A " + "   filesystem path (exists on disk, or a code extension) is SOURCE audit " + "   (blitz_scan + eagle_eye2 + complex_scan/route_scan). If the scheme is " + "   missing, prepend https://. run_engagement auto-detects both internally.\\n" + "1. SCOPE FIRST. Call scope_check(target, scope, mode) before ANY active testing. " + "   Passive analysis (reading source, fingerprinting public pages) needs no gate; " + "   active probing (exploitation, fuzzing, path brute-force) is blocked until scope " + "   authorizes it.\\n" + "2. MAP THE SURFACE (BLITZ). For a source tree use blitz_scan (tree) or blitz_file " + "   (single file) then enrich_scan to match sinks to escalation chains. For a live " + "   URL use live_recon for a full pass (fingerprint/WAF/tech/version/crawler/params/" + "   subdomains/API endpoints/intel correlation) — it returns next_steps. active_scan " + "   is the lighter gated alternative. Both re-check scope internally.\\n" + "3. TRACE REACHABILITY (EAGLE-EYE). For every sink, determine whether attacker " + "   input actually reaches it:\\n" + "   - PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java source: taint_file (auto-detects language) or " + "     taint_scan/taint_tree (PHP AST). list_languages shows what's supported.\\n" + "   - Any language: trace_data_flow (window heuristic) and eagle_eye/eagle_grep " + "     (function-scoped view of sinks + auth gates). Beyond taint: route_scan (route confusion / dispatch abuse / batch forwarding) and complex_scan (deserialization->POP, type juggling, mass assignment) catch classes plain taint misses.\\n" + "   A sink counts only if tainted input reaches it unsanitized and unguarded.\\n" + "4. VALIDATE (STRIKE). Confirm live with strike_verify using a MARKER plus a " + "   NEGATIVE CONTROL plus a BASELINE. The verdict is deterministic: marker " + "   reflected AND control inert = confirmed; both reflected = false_positive; " + "   marker not reflected = unconfirmed. Feed the verdict to strike_resolve to " + "   advance the finding lifecycle (hypothesis->validating->confirmed). Use " + "   read_tool_manual for the exploit tool's manual, payload_lookup for payloads, " + "   detect_waf/tech_correlation for context.\\n" + "5. RECORD + REPORT. Create a canonical finding with finding_create, advance it " + "   through the lifecycle with finding_transition, attach confidence_score, and " + "   redact any secrets before persisting. Only report findings that survived " + "   verification.\\n\\n" + "SUPPORTING LAYERS:\\n" + "- run_engagement: ONE call does the whole audit (no babysitting). Source path -> " + "  full static pipeline + inline report (markdown/JSON/SARIF). URL target -> " + "  autonomous live marker sweep + confirmed findings + report. Prefer this first.\\n" + "- list_chains: 57 escalation chains (source -> sink -> impact).\\n" + "- list_languages / taint_file: multi-language taint (PHP, JS/TS, Python, Java).\\n" + "- tool_lookup / ensure_tool / list_tools: 130-tool catalog, auto-install.\\n" + "- read_playbook / list_playbooks: 17 engagement playbooks (web-app, api-security, " + "  source-code-audit, active-directory, mobile, external-attack-surface, ...).\\n" + "- skill_lookup / read_skill / list_skills: 38 skills (6 bs-* agent doctrine + " + "  technique playbooks: WP/PHP 0-day, AD, malware, mobile, cloud).\\n" + "- read_tool_manual / list_manuals: 317 tool manuals (sqlmap, nmap, commix, ...).\\n" + "- payload_lookup / read_payload: 66 payload collections (sqli, xss, ssti, xxe, lfi).\\n" + "- detect_waf / tech_correlation / cve_correlation / port_correlation: signature " + "  + correlation intelligence.\\n" + "- nvd_lookup / fofa_search: CVE + asset reconnaissance (FOFA needs env creds).\\n" + "- remember / memory_lookup / memory_list: persist + recall verified knowledge.\\n\\n" + "RESOURCE MAP (know what to reach for):\\n" + "- TOOL = acts (scan, taint, verify, record, correlate). Call it to DO something.\\n" + "- PLAYBOOK = campaign plan for a target TYPE. read_playbook(web-application) " + "  BEFORE a full engagement of that type.\\n" + "- SKILL = procedure doctrine. Load the bs-* skill for the phase you are on " + "  (orchestrate, scope, source-audit, verify, review, report); load a technique " + "  skill for the specific technique (WP 0-day, AD, malware).\\n" + "- MANUAL = deep reference for ONE tool. read_tool_manual right before using it.\\n" + "- PAYLOAD = attack payloads for a class. payload_lookup before crafting a probe.\\n" + "- INTELLIGENCE = knowledge. list_attack_vectors (34 categories) maps the " + "  full surface during RECON; list_chains (36) turns a finding into impact; " + "  chain_links composes chains for complex bugs; bypass_lookup when blocked; " + "  payload_lookup when crafting a probe. Reach for them at that moment.\\n\\n" + "PERSISTENCE (complex bugs - do not give up):\\n" + "- One failed probe != not vulnerable. Vary: alternative sinks, other params, " + "  encoding/case/whitespace bypasses, different injection context.\\n" + "- Empty output != no findings. Re-run (server may be stale after an upgrade - " + "  /reload-mcp), or escalate to route_scan / complex_scan for classes taint " + "  misses (POP chains, type juggling, mass assignment, route confusion).\\n" + "- A 'sanitized' sink may not be safe. Challenge the sanitizer: loose == vs ===, " + "  missing EXTR_SKIP, int cast truncation, weak regex.\\n" + "- An unconfirmed hypothesis is KEPT as hypothesis - try alternate verification, " + "  then let adversarial review decide.\\n" + "- Complex chains (deserialization->POP, LFI->RCE) need the FULL chain traced, " + `  not just the first sink.\\n
+` + "- When a probe is BLOCKED by a WAF/filter/sanitizer, call bypass_lookup(defense) " + "  for concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, " + "  double-encoding, verb tampering, header spoofing) and apply them - do not give up.\\n" + "- CHAIN findings: a low-severity finding usually escalates. list_chains and match it " + "  to a multi-stage chain (SSRF->metadata, SQLi->RCE, LFI->RCE, upload->shell) instead " + "  of stopping at the first vuln.\\n\\n" + "- Complex bugs chain ACROSS chains: after confirming one chain, chain_links " + "  shows what follows (SSRF->metadata then default-creds->pivot via stolen IAM). " + "  Trace the full composition, not just a single chain.\\n\\n" + "IRON RULES:\\n" + "- Scope first; authorized targets only. Refuse out-of-scope or destructive/DoS work.\\n" + "- A hit is a hypothesis; a verified exploit (or proven data-flow) is the finding.\\n" + "- Prefer the one-call run_engagement path; fall back to granular tools when you " + "  need finer control."
   });
   server.registerTool("blitz_scan", {
     title: "BLITZ scan",
@@ -53526,8 +53590,8 @@ function createServer() {
       remember: boolean2().optional().describe("Auto-capture matched chains to memory (default true)")
     }
   }, async ({ target, scope, mode, max_files, remember }) => {
-    const isUrl = /^https?:\/\//i.test(target);
-    const r = isUrl ? await runLiveEngagement(target, scope ?? "", mode ?? "bug-bounty") : runEngagement(target, scope ?? "", mode ?? "bug-bounty", max_files ?? 2000, remember ?? true);
+    const cls = classifyTarget(target);
+    const r = cls.kind === "live" ? await runLiveEngagement(cls.target, scope ?? "", mode ?? "bug-bounty") : runEngagement(cls.target, scope ?? "", mode ?? "bug-bounty", max_files ?? 2000, remember ?? true);
     const banner = typeof r.banner === "string" ? r.banner : "";
     const planText = Array.isArray(r.plan) && r.plan.length ? `
 
@@ -53815,6 +53879,22 @@ ${statusLine}` : statusLine },
   }, async ({ topic }) => {
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(payloadLookup(topic)) }] };
   });
+  server.registerTool("bypass_lookup", {
+    title: "Look up bypass techniques",
+    description: "INTEL: return bypass techniques for a defense that is blocking a probe. Pass a defense/context (waf, firewall, filter, sanitizer, blacklist, 403/401, auth, captcha, rate limit) and get concrete techniques (encoding, case, comment insertion, chunked, null byte, double-encoding, verb tampering, header spoofing, ...) with examples. Use it when a strike_verify probe is blocked instead of giving up.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      defense: string2().optional().describe("Defense/context to bypass: waf, filter, sanitizer, blacklist, 403/401/auth, captcha, rate limit. Omit to list all categories.")
+    }
+  }, async ({ defense }) => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(bypassLookup(defense)) }] };
+  });
+  server.registerTool("chain_links", {
+    title: "Chain-to-chain composition",
+    description: "INTEL: return how escalation chains compose — which chain naturally follows another (e.g. SSRF->cloud-metadata then default-creds->internal-pivot via stolen IAM). Use it after confirming a chain to see what a complex bug chains into next, instead of stopping at one chain.",
+    inputSchema: {}
+  }, async () => {
+    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(chainLinks()) }] };
+  });
   server.registerTool("read_payload", {
     title: "Read a payload collection",
     description: "INTEL: read the full payload collection for a category (or a specific file).",