apex-code 0.0.1-alpha.0 → 0.0.1-alpha.10

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { type CommandEscalationRequest } from "./rpc/command-proxy.ts";
+import { fillHostGitCredential } from "./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts";
+import type { SandboxBackend } from "./supervisor.ts";
+import type { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.ts";
+export interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {
+    /** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */
+    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
+    commandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;
+    violationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;
+    /** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */
+    spawnChild?: typeof spawn;
+    /**
+     * Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal and would otherwise be unable to
+     * exercise a released credential at all. Production builds the releaser from the
+     * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.
+     */
+    requestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;
+    /** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */
+    fillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;
+    /** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */
+    requestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/**
+ * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.
+ *
+ * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:
+ * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to
+ * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path
+ * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.
+ *
+ * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the
+ * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap
+ * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.
+ */
+export declare function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory?: string): {
+    hostSocketPath: string;
+    childSocketPath: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only
+ * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`
+ * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.
+ */
+export declare function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend;
+//# sourceMappingURL=linux-backend.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Production builds the releaser from the\n\t * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.\n\t */\n\trequestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */\n\tfillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */\n\trequestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\tlet handoff: TerminalHandoff | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialProxy: GitCredentialProxy | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tlet escalationProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCommandEscalationProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet escalationDirectory: string | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\thandoff = createTerminalHandoff(stateDirectory);\n\t\t\tconst gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tgitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t// Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own\n\t\t\t\t// deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t// After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the\n\t\t\t// credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session\n\t\t\t// cannot even open a connection to.\n\t\t\tgitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tisHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,\n\t\t\t\trequestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t// The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the\n\t\t\t\t// boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly\n\t\t\t\t// what the child cannot see.\n\t\t\t\tfillCredential: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\t(options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\twriteGitCredentialHelper(stateDirectory);\n\n\t\t\tconst escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tescalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\n\t\t\t// The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one\n\t\t\t// extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.\n\t\t\tescalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\trunEscalated: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\trunEscalatedCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\t\trequest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tspawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsockets: [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{ hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAPEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: process.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\targs: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\thandoff?.stop();\n\t\t\tawait escalationProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (escalationDirectory) rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait gitCredentialProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (gitCredentialDirectory) rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential\n * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the\n * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it\n * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked\n * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.\n */\nasync function runEscalatedCommand(options: {\n\trequest: CommandEscalationRequest;\n\tlaunch: SandboxLaunch;\n\tstateDirectory: string;\n\tspawnBwrap: typeof spawn;\n}): Promise<CommandEscalationResult> {\n\tconst { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;\n\tconst child = options.spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: [],\n\t\t\tsockets: [],\n\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tcommand: \"/bin/sh\",\n\t\t\targs: [\"-c\", request.command],\n\t\t}),\n\t\t{ stdio: [\"ignore\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"] },\n\t);\n\tlet stdout = \"\";\n\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\tchild.stdout?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\tchild.stdout?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\tstdout += chunk;\n\t});\n\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t});\n\tconst code = await new Promise<number>((resolveCode) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", () => resolveCode(1));\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));\n\t});\n\treturn { code, stdout, stderr };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { buildBwrapArguments } from "./bwrap-arguments.js";
+import { createCommandEscalationApprover, createCredentialReleaser, createHostApprover } from "./host-approval.js";
+import { createSandboxNetworkProxy } from "./network-proxy.js";
+import { COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE, createCommandEscalationProxy, resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths, } from "./rpc/command-proxy.js";
+import { fillHostGitCredential, GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE, resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths, writeGitCredentialHelper, } from "./rpc/git-credential-helper.js";
+import { createGitCredentialProxy } from "./rpc/git-credential-proxy.js";
+import { createTerminalHandoff, TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE } from "./terminal-handoff.js";
+import { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from "./terminal-size.js";
+/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */
+const SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;
+function commandExists(command) {
+    const result = spawnSync(command, ["--version"], { stdio: "ignore", timeout: 1_000 });
+    return result.status === 0;
+}
+function waitForExit(child) {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        child.once("error", reject);
+        child.once("exit", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.
+ *
+ * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:
+ * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to
+ * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path
+ * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.
+ *
+ * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the
+ * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap
+ * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.
+ */
+export function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory = tmpdir()) {
+    const name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}.sock`;
+    // An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.
+    const base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? "/tmp" : temporaryDirectory;
+    return { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };
+}
+/**
+ * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return
+ * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.
+ *
+ * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a
+ * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox
+ * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than
+ * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never
+ * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records
+ * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.
+ */
+function classifySandboxFailure(stderr) {
+    if (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr))
+        return "filesystem";
+    if (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr))
+        return "network";
+    return undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only
+ * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`
+ * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.
+ */
+export function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options) {
+    const platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;
+    if (platform !== "linux") {
+        return {
+            status: { kind: "unavailable", reason: "OS sandbox is supported on Linux only." },
+            async launch() {
+                throw new Error("Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.");
+            },
+            async close() { },
+        };
+    }
+    const hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;
+    const violationStore = options?.violationStore;
+    let proxy;
+    let handoff;
+    let gitCredentialProxy;
+    let gitCredentialDirectory;
+    let escalationProxy;
+    let escalationDirectory;
+    if (!hasCommand("bwrap")) {
+        return {
+            status: { kind: "unavailable", reason: "Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing." },
+            async launch() {
+                throw new Error("Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.");
+            },
+            async close() { },
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        status: { kind: "enforced" },
+        async launch(launch) {
+            const stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, ".apex-code", "sandbox-state");
+            mkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });
+            const violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;
+            const { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();
+            handoff = createTerminalHandoff(stateDirectory);
+            const gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();
+            gitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;
+            proxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({
+                socketPath: hostSocketPath,
+                allowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,
+                violationStore,
+                // Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own
+                // deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.
+                requestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),
+            });
+            // After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the
+            // credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session
+            // cannot even open a connection to.
+            gitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({
+                socketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,
+                isHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,
+                requestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),
+                // The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the
+                // boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly
+                // what the child cannot see.
+                fillCredential: (request) => (options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),
+                violationStore,
+            });
+            writeGitCredentialHelper(stateDirectory);
+            const escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();
+            escalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;
+            // .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json "type"
+            // field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under "type": "module" and
+            // crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.
+            const relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, "relay.cjs");
+            writeFileSync(relayScriptPath, `
+const net = require("node:net");
+const child_process = require("node:child_process");
+
+const socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;
+const server = net.createServer((c) => {
+	const client = net.connect(socketPath);
+	c.pipe(client).pipe(c);
+	c.on("error", () => {});
+	client.on("error", () => {});
+});
+
+server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+	const port = server.address().port;
+	const env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {
+		HTTP_PROXY: \`http://127.0.0.1:\${port}\`,
+		HTTPS_PROXY: \`http://127.0.0.1:\${port}\`
+	});
+	const args = process.argv.slice(2);
+	const child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {
+		stdio: "inherit",
+		env: env,
+	});
+	child.on("exit", (code, signal) => {
+		process.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));
+	});
+});
+server.on("error", (err) => {
+	console.error("Relay error:", err);
+	process.exit(1);
+});
+`.trim());
+            const readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, "r"));
+            // The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed
+            // on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch
+            // leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.
+            // The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file
+            // here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.
+            const terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, "terminal-size");
+            const stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);
+            // The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one
+            // extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.
+            escalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({
+                socketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,
+                requestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),
+                violationStore,
+                runEscalated: (request) => runEscalatedCommand({
+                    request,
+                    launch,
+                    stateDirectory,
+                    spawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,
+                }),
+            });
+            try {
+                const spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;
+                const child = spawnBwrap("bwrap", buildBwrapArguments({
+                    workspace: launch.policy.workspace,
+                    additionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,
+                    readOnlyPaths: [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])],
+                    readOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],
+                    readOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],
+                    sockets: [
+                        { hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },
+                        // Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.
+                        ...(launch.credentialChannel
+                            ? [
+                                {
+                                    hostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,
+                                    childPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,
+                                },
+                            ]
+                            : []),
+                        {
+                            hostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,
+                            childPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,
+                        },
+                    ],
+                    environment: {
+                        HOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,
+                        TMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,
+                        APEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,
+                        [TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,
+                        [TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: stateDirectory,
+                        [GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,
+                        [COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,
+                    },
+                    command: process.execPath,
+                    args: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],
+                }), { env: launch.environment, stdio: ["inherit", "inherit", "pipe", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] });
+                let stderr = "";
+                child.stderr?.setEncoding("utf8");
+                child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+                    stderr += chunk;
+                    process.stderr.write(chunk);
+                });
+                const exitCode = await waitForExit(child);
+                await proxy?.close();
+                const proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;
+                const kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;
+                if (kind) {
+                    violationStore?.add({
+                        kind,
+                        command: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(" "),
+                        detail: stderr.trim(),
+                        timestamp: new Date(),
+                    });
+                }
+                return exitCode;
+            }
+            finally {
+                stopPublishingTerminalSize();
+                for (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors)
+                    closeSync(descriptor);
+                // The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean
+                // it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.
+                rmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });
+            }
+        },
+        async close() {
+            handoff?.stop();
+            await escalationProxy?.close();
+            if (escalationDirectory)
+                rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
+            await gitCredentialProxy?.close();
+            if (gitCredentialDirectory)
+                rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });
+            await proxy?.close();
+        },
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.
+ *
+ * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential
+ * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the
+ * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it
+ * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked
+ * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.
+ */
+async function runEscalatedCommand(options) {
+    const { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;
+    const child = options.spawnBwrap("bwrap", buildBwrapArguments({
+        workspace: launch.policy.workspace,
+        additionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],
+        readOnlyPaths: launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [],
+        readOnlyFiles: [],
+        readOnlyBinaries: [],
+        sockets: [],
+        environment: {
+            HOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,
+            TMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,
+        },
+        command: "/bin/sh",
+        args: ["-c", request.command],
+    }), { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] });
+    let stdout = "";
+    let stderr = "";
+    child.stdout?.setEncoding("utf8");
+    child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+        stdout += chunk;
+    });
+    child.stderr?.setEncoding("utf8");
+    child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+        stderr += chunk;
+    });
+    const code = await new Promise((resolveCode) => {
+        child.once("error", () => resolveCode(1));
+        child.once("exit", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));
+    });
+    return { code, stdout, stderr };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=linux-backend.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/linux-backend.js.map

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{ spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { join } from \"node:path\";\nimport { buildBwrapArguments } from \"./bwrap-arguments.ts\";\nimport { createCommandEscalationApprover, createCredentialReleaser, createHostApprover } from \"./host-approval.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tCOMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\ttype CommandEscalationRequest,\n\ttype CommandEscalationResult,\n\tcreateCommandEscalationProxy,\n\tresolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths,\n} from \"./rpc/command-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tfillHostGitCredential,\n\tGIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\tresolveGitCredentialChannelPaths,\n\twriteGitCredentialHelper,\n} from \"./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts\";\nimport { createGitCredentialProxy, type GitCredentialProxy } from \"./rpc/git-credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { createTerminalHandoff, TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE, type TerminalHandoff } from \"./terminal-handoff.ts\";\nimport { publishTerminalSize, TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE } from \"./terminal-size.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\n/** AF_UNIX `sun_path` is 108 bytes on Linux, including the terminating NUL. */\nconst SUN_PATH_LIMIT = 108;\n\nexport interface LinuxSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/** Injectable only to prove crash cleanup in tests; production spawns `bwrap` directly. */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal and would otherwise be unable to\n\t * exercise a released credential at all. Production builds the releaser from the\n\t * terminal handoff, and its absence there is what makes a headless session refuse.\n\t */\n\trequestGitCredentialRelease?: (host: string) => Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production resolves against the real host store. */\n\tfillGitCredential?: typeof fillHostGitCredential;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */\n\trequestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nfunction commandExists(command: string): boolean {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"--version\"], { stdio: \"ignore\", timeout: 1_000 });\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Where the supervisor's proxy socket lives on each side of the boundary.\n *\n * AF_UNIX caps `sun_path` at 108 bytes, so the socket cannot live under the workspace:\n * a deep-but-ordinary project directory exhausts that budget and the sandbox fails to\n * start at all with `listen EINVAL`. The host side therefore gets a short, unique path\n * under the system temp directory, and it is bind-mounted into the child.\n *\n * The child-side path has to sit under `/home`. That is the one writable mount at the\n * point the mountpoint is created — the sandbox root is a read-only bind, so bwrap\n * cannot create a mountpoint at `/run`, `/tmp`, or anywhere else on it.\n */\nexport function resolveProxySocketPaths(temporaryDirectory: string = tmpdir()): {\n\thostSocketPath: string;\n\tchildSocketPath: string;\n} {\n\tconst name = `apex-${process.pid}-${randomBytes(4).toString(\"hex\")}.sock`;\n\t// An unusually long TMPDIR would reintroduce the very limit this avoids.\n\tconst base = join(temporaryDirectory, name).length + 1 > SUN_PATH_LIMIT ? \"/tmp\" : temporaryDirectory;\n\treturn { hostSocketPath: join(base, name), childSocketPath: `/home/${name}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an unsuccessful child from what its stderr actually evidences, or return\n * undefined when nothing suggests the boundary refused anything.\n *\n * A non-zero exit is not a violation. An invalid API key, a failing test command, or a\n * script exiting 1 are the child's own business, and recording them as sandbox\n * violations blames the boundary for failures it had no part in — which is worse than\n * silence, because it sends whoever reads the output looking for a refusal that never\n * happened. Only Linux's own refusal wording earns a violation here; the proxy records\n * network refusals itself, before this fallback is consulted.\n */\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | undefined {\n\tif (/Read-only file system|Permission denied|Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (/Network is unreachable|ENETUNREACH|EHOSTUNREACH/i.test(stderr)) return \"network\";\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Linux's deliberately small platform adapter. The sandbox starts from a read-only\n * host root and bind-mounts only the canonical workspace as writable. `--unshare-net`\n * removes all direct network interfaces for the child and every descendant.\n */\nexport function createLinuxSandboxBackend(options?: LinuxSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"linux\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on Linux only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? commandExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\tlet handoff: TerminalHandoff | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialProxy: GitCredentialProxy | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tlet escalationProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCommandEscalationProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet escalationDirectory: string | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"bwrap\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"Bubblewrap (bwrap) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"Linux sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(launch.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\tconst { hostSocketPath, childSocketPath } = resolveProxySocketPaths();\n\t\t\thandoff = createTerminalHandoff(stateDirectory);\n\t\t\tconst gitCredentialPaths = resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tgitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t// Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own\n\t\t\t\t// deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t// After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give: the\n\t\t\t// credential channel must never hand out a token for a host this session\n\t\t\t// cannot even open a connection to.\n\t\t\tgitCredentialProxy = await createGitCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tisHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,\n\t\t\t\trequestRelease: options?.requestGitCredentialRelease ?? createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t// The supervisor's own environment, deliberately: this runs outside the\n\t\t\t\t// boundary and must resolve against the real host home, which is exactly\n\t\t\t\t// what the child cannot see.\n\t\t\t\tfillCredential: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\t(options?.fillGitCredential ?? fillHostGitCredential)(request, { environment: process.env }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\twriteGitCredentialHelper(stateDirectory);\n\n\t\t\tconst escalationPaths = resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tescalationDirectory = escalationPaths.hostSocketDirectory;\n\n\t\t\t// .cjs forces CommonJS regardless of the target workspace's package.json \"type\"\n\t\t\t// field -- a plain .js here would be parsed as ESM under \"type\": \"module\" and\n\t\t\t// crash on `require`, since Node resolves module type from the nearest package.json.\n\t\t\tconst relayScriptPath = join(stateDirectory, \"relay.cjs\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(\n\t\t\t\trelayScriptPath,\n\t\t\t\t`\nconst net = require(\"node:net\");\nconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\nconst socketPath = process.env.APEX_UDS_PATH;\nconst server = net.createServer((c) => {\n\tconst client = net.connect(socketPath);\n\tc.pipe(client).pipe(c);\n\tc.on(\"error\", () => {});\n\tclient.on(\"error\", () => {});\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", () => {\n\tconst port = server.address().port;\n\tconst env = Object.assign({}, process.env, {\n\t\tHTTP_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`,\n\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: \\`http://127.0.0.1:\\${port}\\`\n\t});\n\tconst args = process.argv.slice(2);\n\tconst child = child_process.spawn(args[0], args.slice(1), {\n\t\tstdio: \"inherit\",\n\t\tenv: env,\n\t});\n\tchild.on(\"exit\", (code, signal) => {\n\t\tprocess.exit(code ?? (signal ? 128 : 1));\n\t});\n});\nserver.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n\tconsole.error(\"Relay error:\", err);\n\tprocess.exit(1);\n});\n`.trim(),\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFileDescriptors = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => openSync(path, \"r\"));\n\t\t\t// The descriptors above are opened before the child spawns and must be closed\n\t\t\t// on every exit path -- including a spawn/wait rejection -- or a crashed launch\n\t\t\t// leaks an open handle onto a host-owned credential file for the process's life.\n\t\t\t// The workspace is bind-mounted read-write into the sandbox, so a file\n\t\t\t// here is visible at the same absolute path on both sides of it.\n\t\t\tconst terminalSizePath = join(stateDirectory, \"terminal-size\");\n\t\t\tconst stopPublishingTerminalSize = publishTerminalSize(terminalSizePath);\n\n\t\t\t// The second child derives its argv from the same builder as the first, with one\n\t\t\t// extra writable root. Nothing about the original child's namespace changes.\n\t\t\tescalationProxy = await createCommandEscalationProxy({\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\trunEscalated: (request) =>\n\t\t\t\t\trunEscalatedCommand({\n\t\t\t\t\t\trequest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlaunch,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tstateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tspawnBwrap: options?.spawnChild ?? spawn,\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst spawnBwrap = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\t\tconst child = spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\t\t\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: [process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: launch.readOnlyFiles ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: launch.readOnlyBinaries ?? [],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsockets: [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{ hostPath: hostSocketPath, childPath: childSocketPath },\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// Its child-side path is what `APEX_CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PATH` names.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...(launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? [\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: launch.credentialChannel.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thostPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchildPath: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAPEX_UDS_PATH: childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_SIZE_PATH_VARIABLE]: terminalSizePath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: process.execPath,\n\t\t\t\t\t\targs: [relayScriptPath, launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t\t}),\n\t\t\t\t\t{ env: launch.environment, stdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\", ...readOnlyFileDescriptors] },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\tstopPublishingTerminalSize();\n\t\t\t\tfor (const descriptor of readOnlyFileDescriptors) closeSync(descriptor);\n\t\t\t\t// The socket now lives outside the workspace, so nothing else will ever clean\n\t\t\t\t// it up; leaving it would litter the temp directory once per launch.\n\t\t\t\trmSync(hostSocketPath, { force: true });\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\thandoff?.stop();\n\t\t\tawait escalationProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (escalationDirectory) rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait gitCredentialProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (gitCredentialDirectory) rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Start one approved command in its own child, with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Deliberately minimal compared with the session child: no network relay, no credential\n * channels, no terminal handoff. An escalated command is a single shell invocation the\n * human just read and approved, not a session, and every channel omitted here is one it\n * cannot reach. Its stdio is captured rather than inherited so the session that asked\n * receives the output instead of the escalated process writing over the TUI.\n */\nasync function runEscalatedCommand(options: {\n\trequest: CommandEscalationRequest;\n\tlaunch: SandboxLaunch;\n\tstateDirectory: string;\n\tspawnBwrap: typeof spawn;\n}): Promise<CommandEscalationResult> {\n\tconst { request, launch, stateDirectory } = options;\n\tconst child = options.spawnBwrap(\n\t\t\"bwrap\",\n\t\tbuildBwrapArguments({\n\t\t\tworkspace: launch.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles: [],\n\t\t\treadOnlyBinaries: [],\n\t\t\tsockets: [],\n\t\t\tenvironment: {\n\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tcommand: \"/bin/sh\",\n\t\t\targs: [\"-c\", request.command],\n\t\t}),\n\t\t{ stdio: [\"ignore\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"] },\n\t);\n\tlet stdout = \"\";\n\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\tchild.stdout?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\tchild.stdout?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\tstdout += chunk;\n\t});\n\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t});\n\tconst code = await new Promise<number>((resolveCode) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", () => resolveCode(1));\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (exitCode) => resolveCode(exitCode ?? 1));\n\t});\n\treturn { code, stdout, stderr };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/macos-backend.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { type CommandEscalationRequest } from "./rpc/command-proxy.ts";
+import type { SandboxBackend } from "./supervisor.ts";
+import type { SandboxViolationStore } from "./violations.ts";
+export interface MacosSandboxBackendOptions {
+    /** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */
+    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
+    commandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;
+    violationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;
+    /**
+     * Injectable only so violation attribution can be tested off macOS; production
+     * spawns `sandbox-exec` directly. Without this the decision about what counts as a
+     * violation would be verifiable only on a macOS host.
+     */
+    spawnChild?: typeof spawn;
+    /** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */
+    requestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/**
+ * macOS's platform adapter. Seatbelt (`sandbox-exec`) allows reads broadly except
+ * the invoking account's home directory, denies writes outside the workspace, and
+ * denies network outside the sandbox proxy's exact loopback port -- narrower than
+ * the wildcard `localhost:*` pattern some other sandboxes use. This mirrors Linux's
+ * actual posture (`--ro-bind / /` plus a hidden `/home`) rather than the narrower
+ * read-allowlist this design started with, which broke ordinary process startup.
+ */
+export declare function createMacosSandboxBackend(options?: MacosSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend;
+//# sourceMappingURL=macos-backend.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/macos-backend.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"macos-backend.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/macos-backend.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAMtD,OAAO,EAEN,KAAK,wBAAwB,EAG7B,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAQhC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAiB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAErE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE7D,MAAM,WAAW,0BAA0B;IAC1C,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC3B,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7C,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IACvC;;;;OAIG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC1B,qFAAqF;IACrF,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CACnF;AA6ED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,cAAc,CAqO9F","sourcesContent":["import { spawn, spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { mkdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { homedir } from \"node:os\";\nimport { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from \"node:path\";\nimport { createCommandEscalationApprover, createCredentialReleaser, createHostApprover } from \"./host-approval.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxNetworkProxy, type SandboxNetworkProxy } from \"./network-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tCOMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\ttype CommandEscalationRequest,\n\tcreateCommandEscalationProxy,\n\tresolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths,\n} from \"./rpc/command-proxy.ts\";\nimport {\n\tfillHostGitCredential,\n\tGIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE,\n\tresolveGitCredentialChannelPaths,\n\twriteGitCredentialHelper,\n} from \"./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts\";\nimport { createGitCredentialProxy, type GitCredentialProxy } from \"./rpc/git-credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxBackend, SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { createTerminalHandoff, TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE, type TerminalHandoff } from \"./terminal-handoff.ts\";\nimport type { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface MacosSandboxBackendOptions {\n\t/** Injectable only for preflight tests; production uses the running platform. */\n\tplatform?: NodeJS.Platform;\n\tcommandExists?: (command: string) => boolean;\n\tviolationStore?: SandboxViolationStore;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only so violation attribution can be tested off macOS; production\n\t * spawns `sandbox-exec` directly. Without this the decision about what counts as a\n\t * violation would be verifiable only on a macOS host.\n\t */\n\tspawnChild?: typeof spawn;\n\t/** Injectable only for tests, which have no terminal to approve an escalation at. */\n\trequestCommandEscalation?: (request: CommandEscalationRequest) => Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nfunction sandboxExecExists(command: string): boolean {\n\t// sandbox-exec has no --version flag; a real, minimal profile run is the\n\t// standard existence-and-basic-functionality probe (see the 2b.5 prototype's\n\t// own positive control).\n\tconst result = spawnSync(command, [\"-p\", \"(version 1)(allow default)\", \"/usr/bin/true\"], {\n\t\tstdio: \"ignore\",\n\t\ttimeout: 2_000,\n\t});\n\treturn result.status === 0;\n}\n\nfunction waitForExit(child: ReturnType<typeof spawn>): Promise<number> {\n\treturn new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tchild.once(\"error\", reject);\n\t\tchild.once(\"exit\", (code) => resolve(code ?? 1));\n\t});\n}\n\n/**\n * Unlike Linux's bwrap (which needs each mount ancestor declared for its bind-mount\n * tree), Seatbelt's `subpath` is recursive from a single root, so only the directory\n * containing each path is needed -- no ancestor walk. Each directory is resolved to\n * its real (symlink-free) path: Seatbelt canonicalizes the path it actually checks\n * against a `subpath` rule (confirmed empirically -- a rule built from an\n * unresolved symlinked path, e.g. Homebrew's own layout, silently never matches).\n */\nfunction readOnlyDirectories(paths: readonly string[]): string[] {\n\tconst directories = paths.map((path) => dirname(resolve(path)));\n\tconst canonical = directories.map((directory) => {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\treturn realpathSync(directory);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn directory;\n\t\t}\n\t});\n\treturn [...new Set(canonical)];\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a channel socket path for a Seatbelt literal. Only the directory can be\n * resolved -- the socket file need not exist yet when the profile is written -- and the\n * same symlink rule as `readOnlyDirectories` applies: Seatbelt matches the canonical\n * path, so an unresolved one silently never matches.\n */\nfunction canonicalSocketPath(path: string): string {\n\tconst directory = dirname(resolve(path));\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn join(realpathSync(directory), basename(path));\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn join(directory, basename(path));\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Seatbelt refuses through the blocked call's own errno text, not a wrapper message. */\nconst DENIAL_EVIDENCE = /Operation not permitted|Permission denied|EPERM|EACCES/i;\n\nfunction classifySandboxFailure(stderr: string): \"filesystem\" | \"network\" | \"unknown\" | undefined {\n\t// Confirmed empirically (2b.5 prototype): unlike Linux's bwrap, macOS Seatbelt\n\t// denials surface through the launched command's own generic \"Operation not\n\t// permitted\"/EPERM text for filesystem AND network refusals alike -- there is no\n\t// macOS-specific phrase equivalent to Linux's distinct \"Network is unreachable\".\n\t// Only sandbox-exec's own wrapper-level exec refusal (a sign our own profile\n\t// forgot to allow a binary, not a policy decision) is unambiguous from stderr\n\t// text. Anything else that still shows a refusal stays \"unknown\";\n\t// network-proxy.ts's own precise per-request recording is the reliable \"network\"\n\t// signal on this platform.\n\tif (/execvp\\(\\) of .* failed: Operation not permitted/i.test(stderr)) return \"filesystem\";\n\tif (DENIAL_EVIDENCE.test(stderr)) return \"unknown\";\n\t// No refusal in evidence. The coarseness above is about telling filesystem from\n\t// network, not about telling a denial from an ordinary failure -- a non-zero exit\n\t// on its own says nothing about the boundary, and reporting it as a violation\n\t// sends the reader looking for a refusal that never happened.\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * macOS's platform adapter. Seatbelt (`sandbox-exec`) allows reads broadly except\n * the invoking account's home directory, denies writes outside the workspace, and\n * denies network outside the sandbox proxy's exact loopback port -- narrower than\n * the wildcard `localhost:*` pattern some other sandboxes use. This mirrors Linux's\n * actual posture (`--ro-bind / /` plus a hidden `/home`) rather than the narrower\n * read-allowlist this design started with, which broke ordinary process startup.\n */\nexport function createMacosSandboxBackend(options?: MacosSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend {\n\tconst platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;\n\tif (platform !== \"darwin\") {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"OS sandbox is supported on macOS only.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\tconst hasCommand = options?.commandExists ?? sandboxExecExists;\n\tconst violationStore = options?.violationStore;\n\tlet proxy: SandboxNetworkProxy | undefined;\n\tlet handoff: TerminalHandoff | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialProxy: GitCredentialProxy | undefined;\n\tlet gitCredentialDirectory: string | undefined;\n\tlet escalationProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCommandEscalationProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet escalationDirectory: string | undefined;\n\n\tif (!hasCommand(\"sandbox-exec\")) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: { kind: \"unavailable\", reason: \"sandbox-exec (Seatbelt) is required for OS sandboxing.\" },\n\t\t\tasync launch() {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new Error(\"macOS sandbox backend is unavailable.\");\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tasync close() {},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: { kind: \"enforced\" },\n\t\tasync launch(launch: SandboxLaunch): Promise<number> {\n\t\t\t// Same reasoning as readOnlyDirectories: on macOS the workspace itself can\n\t\t\t// be reached through a symlink (e.g. os.tmpdir()'s /var -> /private/var),\n\t\t\t// and Seatbelt's subpath match is against the canonical path, not the one\n\t\t\t// the caller happened to spell. Resolve once, use everywhere below.\n\t\t\tconst workspace = realpathSync(launch.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tconst writableRoots = launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots;\n\t\t\tconst stateDirectory = join(workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\");\n\t\t\tmkdirSync(stateDirectory, { recursive: true });\n\n\t\t\tconst violationCountBeforeLaunch = violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0;\n\n\t\t\thandoff = createTerminalHandoff(stateDirectory);\n\t\t\t// Both channels are AF_UNIX servers, which Windows has not got. Nothing is lost\n\t\t\t// by skipping them there: ADR 0005 leaves Windows unsupported and this backend\n\t\t\t// reports `unavailable` on any real Windows host. They are reachable here only\n\t\t\t// because the violation-attribution tests run this body off-macOS on purpose,\n\t\t\t// with `spawnChild` injected, and those must keep working on every runner.\n\t\t\tconst unixSocketsAvailable = process.platform !== \"win32\";\n\t\t\tconst gitCredentialPaths = unixSocketsAvailable ? resolveGitCredentialChannelPaths() : undefined;\n\t\t\tgitCredentialDirectory = gitCredentialPaths?.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\tproxy = await createSandboxNetworkProxy({\n\t\t\t\ttcpHost: \"127.0.0.1\",\n\t\t\t\tallowedHosts: launch.policy.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t// Undefined without a terminal, which leaves the proxy's own\n\t\t\t\t// deny-without-asking path in place for headless, print, JSON, and RPC.\n\t\t\t\trequestApproval: createHostApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t// After the network proxy, because reachability is its answer to give.\n\t\t\tgitCredentialProxy =\n\t\t\t\tgitCredentialPaths &&\n\t\t\t\t(await createGitCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\t\tsocketPath: gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\tisHostAllowed: (host) => proxy?.isHostReachable(host) ?? false,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestRelease: createCredentialReleaser({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t\t// The supervisor's own environment: this runs outside the boundary and must\n\t\t\t\t\t// resolve against the real host home the child cannot see.\n\t\t\t\t\tfillCredential: (request) => fillHostGitCredential(request, { environment: process.env }),\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t}));\n\t\t\twriteGitCredentialHelper(stateDirectory);\n\n\t\t\tconst escalationPaths = unixSocketsAvailable ? resolveCommandEscalationChannelPaths() : undefined;\n\t\t\tescalationDirectory = escalationPaths?.hostSocketDirectory;\n\t\t\t// Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so the child reaches this socket at its host\n\t\t\t// path, exactly as it reaches the credential channel.\n\t\t\tescalationProxy =\n\t\t\t\tescalationPaths &&\n\t\t\t\t(await createCommandEscalationProxy({\n\t\t\t\t\tsocketPath: escalationPaths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\t\trequestApproval: options?.requestCommandEscalation ?? createCommandEscalationApprover({ handoff }),\n\t\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\t\trunEscalated: async (request) => {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst escalated = createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconst code = await escalated.launch({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcommand: \"/bin/sh\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\targs: [\"-c\", request.command],\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpolicy: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.policy,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: [...launch.policy.additionalWritableRoots, request.writableRoot],\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t\t\tawait escalated.close();\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn { code, stdout: \"\", stderr: \"\" };\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t}));\n\t\t\tconst proxyPort = proxy.port as number;\n\n\t\t\t// Seatbelt cannot remap a path, so the child connects to the channel socket at\n\t\t\t// its host path, and the profile allows outbound to exactly that one socket.\n\t\t\tconst credentialChannelSocket = launch.credentialChannel\n\t\t\t\t? canonicalSocketPath(launch.credentialChannel.hostSocketPath)\n\t\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyDirs = readOnlyDirectories([process.execPath, launch.command, ...(launch.readOnlyPaths ?? [])]);\n\t\t\tconst readOnlyFiles = (launch.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((path) => {\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn realpathSync(path);\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn resolve(path);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tlet userHome: string | undefined;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = realpathSync(homedir());\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tuserHome = homedir();\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst profileLines = [\n\t\t\t\t\"(version 1)\",\n\t\t\t\t// bsd.sb's baseline is broader than Linux's opt-in bind-mount model --\n\t\t\t\t// a real gap this design accepts, documented in the spec's fourth\n\t\t\t\t// amendment -- but it is the only combination the 2b.5 prototype found\n\t\t\t\t// that lets a normal Unix child process (dyld, /bin/sh) actually start.\n\t\t\t\t'(import \"bsd.sb\")',\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-exec*)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Separate from process-exec* -- confirmed empirically: a shell that\n\t\t\t\t// forks a child shell (e.g. `sh -c 'a' && sh -c 'b'`) failed with\n\t\t\t\t// \"fork: Operation not permitted\" without this, even with exec allowed.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow process-fork)\",\n\t\t\t\t// Matches Linux's actual posture (bwrap's `--ro-bind / /`): broad read,\n\t\t\t\t// narrow write. A read-only allowlist alone (this design's first cut)\n\t\t\t\t// breaks ordinary process startup -- confirmed empirically, getcwd()\n\t\t\t\t// itself needs to traverse the workspace's ancestor directories, which\n\t\t\t\t// no read rule scoped only to the workspace or runtime paths covers.\n\t\t\t\t\"(allow file-read*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(deny file-read* (subpath (param \"USER_HOME\")))',\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyDirs.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t...readOnlyFiles.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RO_FILE_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny file-write*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow file-write* (subpath (param \"WORKSPACE\")))',\n\t\t\t\t// Each extra root is allowed exactly as the workspace is, and only ever from\n\t\t\t\t// an argv-parsed flag: a repository that could name its own writable root\n\t\t\t\t// would be granting itself authority (ADR 0016).\n\t\t\t\t...writableRoots.map((_, index) => `(allow file-read* (subpath (param \"RW_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t...writableRoots.map((_, index) => `(allow file-write* (subpath (param \"RW_${index}\")))`),\n\t\t\t\t\"(deny network*)\",\n\t\t\t\t'(allow network-outbound (remote ip (param \"PROXY_ADDR\")))',\n\t\t\t\t...(credentialChannelSocket\n\t\t\t\t\t? [`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (literal \"${credentialChannelSocket}\")))`]\n\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t...(gitCredentialPaths\n\t\t\t\t\t? [`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (literal \"${gitCredentialPaths.hostSocketPath}\")))`]\n\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t\t...(escalationPaths\n\t\t\t\t\t? [`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (literal \"${escalationPaths.hostSocketPath}\")))`]\n\t\t\t\t\t: []),\n\t\t\t];\n\t\t\tconst profilePath = join(stateDirectory, \"profile.sb\");\n\t\t\twriteFileSync(profilePath, profileLines.join(\"\\n\"));\n\n\t\t\tconst params: string[] = [\"-D\", `USER_HOME=${userHome}`];\n\t\t\treadOnlyDirs.forEach((dir, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_${index}=${dir}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\treadOnlyFiles.forEach((file, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RO_FILE_${index}=${file}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `WORKSPACE=${workspace}`);\n\t\t\twritableRoots.forEach((root, index) => {\n\t\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `RW_${index}=${root}`);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tparams.push(\"-D\", `PROXY_ADDR=localhost:${proxyPort}`);\n\n\t\t\tconst spawnSandboxExec = options?.spawnChild ?? spawn;\n\t\t\tconst child = spawnSandboxExec(\n\t\t\t\t\"sandbox-exec\",\n\t\t\t\t[\"-f\", profilePath, ...params, \"--\", launch.command, ...launch.args],\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tcwd: workspace,\n\t\t\t\t\tenv: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...launch.environment,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHOME: launch.environment?.HOME ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTMPDIR: launch.environment?.TMPDIR ?? stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTP_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHTTPS_PROXY: `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t[TERMINAL_HANDOFF_PATH_VARIABLE]: stateDirectory,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(gitCredentialPaths\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? { [GIT_CREDENTIAL_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: gitCredentialPaths.childSocketPath }\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t\t\t\t...(escalationPaths ? { [COMMAND_ESCALATION_SOCKET_VARIABLE]: escalationPaths.childSocketPath } : {}),\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t\tstdio: [\"inherit\", \"inherit\", \"pipe\"],\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tlet stderr = \"\";\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.setEncoding(\"utf8\");\n\t\t\tchild.stderr?.on(\"data\", (chunk: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tstderr += chunk;\n\t\t\t\tprocess.stderr.write(chunk);\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tconst exitCode = await waitForExit(child);\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t\tconst proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation = (violationStore?.totalCount ?? 0) > violationCountBeforeLaunch;\n\t\t\tconst kind = exitCode !== 0 && !proxyAlreadyRecordedAViolation ? classifySandboxFailure(stderr) : undefined;\n\t\t\tif (kind) {\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore?.add({\n\t\t\t\t\tkind,\n\t\t\t\t\tcommand: [launch.command, ...launch.args].join(\" \"),\n\t\t\t\t\tdetail: stderr.trim(),\n\t\t\t\t\ttimestamp: new Date(),\n\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn exitCode;\n\t\t},\n\t\tasync close() {\n\t\t\thandoff?.stop();\n\t\t\tawait escalationProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (escalationDirectory) rmSync(escalationDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait gitCredentialProxy?.close();\n\t\t\tif (gitCredentialDirectory) rmSync(gitCredentialDirectory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\t\tawait proxy?.close();\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n"]}