apex-code 0.0.1-alpha.0 → 0.0.1-alpha.10

package/dist/core/sandbox/cli-supervisor.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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{ rmSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { join } from \"node:path\";\nimport { parseArgs } from \"../../cli/args.ts\";\nimport { reportConcurrentSessionRefusal } from \"../../cli/concurrent-session.ts\";\nimport type { HostToolBinary } from \"../../utils/tools-manager.ts\";\nimport { acquireSessionLease, readLiveSessionLeases } from \"../session-lease.ts\";\nimport { buildSandboxedCliLaunch, getSandboxSessionDirectory, type HostSkillPaths } from \"./cli-launch.ts\";\nimport { createProjectedGitConfig, resolveHostGitIdentity } from \"./git-identity.ts\";\nimport { createLinuxSandboxBackend } from \"./linux-backend.ts\";\nimport { createMacosSandboxBackend } from \"./macos-backend.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxPolicy } from \"./policy.ts\";\nimport { createCredentialProxy, resolveCredentialChannelPaths } from \"./rpc/credential-proxy.ts\";\nimport { gitCredentialHelperCommand } from \"./rpc/git-credential-helper.ts\";\nimport { createSandboxSupervisor, type SandboxBackend, type SandboxLaunch } from \"./supervisor.ts\";\nimport { SandboxViolationStore } from \"./violations.ts\";\n\nexport interface CliSandboxDependencies {\n\tcreateBackend: (options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }) => SandboxBackend;\n\tstderr: { write(message: string): boolean };\n}\n\n/** Routes to the platform adapter for the running OS; each adapter self-reports\n * `unavailable` on any other platform, so this only needs to pick the one whose\n * enforcement is actually reachable here. */\nfunction createDefaultSandboxBackend(options: { violationStore: SandboxViolationStore }): SandboxBackend {\n\tif (process.platform === \"darwin\") return createMacosSandboxBackend(options);\n\treturn createLinuxSandboxBackend(options);\n}\n\nconst defaultDependencies: CliSandboxDependencies = {\n\tcreateBackend: createDefaultSandboxBackend,\n\tstderr: process.stderr,\n};\n\n/**\n * Start a normal CLI runtime beneath the whole-process boundary. The caller returns\n * the result directly so the outer process never continues into `main()` afterward.\n */\nexport async function launchSandboxedCli(options: {\n\tcommand: string;\n\targs: readonly string[];\n\tenvironment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\tworkspace: string;\n\tallowedHosts?: readonly string[];\n\tadditionalWritableRoots?: readonly string[];\n\treadOnlyPaths?: readonly string[];\n\tauthPath?: string;\n\ttoolBinaries?: readonly HostToolBinary[];\n\tskillPaths?: HostSkillPaths;\n\tdependencies?: Partial<CliSandboxDependencies>;\n}): Promise<number> {\n\tconst dependencies = { ...defaultDependencies, ...options.dependencies };\n\tconst policyResult = createSandboxPolicy({\n\t\tworkspace: options.workspace,\n\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\tadditionalWritableRoots: options.additionalWritableRoots,\n\t});\n\tif (policyResult.kind === \"invalid\") {\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: OS sandbox is not enforcing this agent session: ${policyResult.reason}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t}\n\tconst violationStore = new SandboxViolationStore();\n\tconst backend = dependencies.createBackend({ violationStore });\n\n\tconst supervisor = createSandboxSupervisor({ backend, policy: policyResult.policy });\n\tlet credentialProxy: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createCredentialProxy>> | undefined;\n\tlet lease: ReturnType<typeof acquireSessionLease> | undefined;\n\tlet projectedGitConfig: ReturnType<typeof createProjectedGitConfig> | undefined;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseArgs(options.args);\n\t\tconst wantsPersistentSession = !parsed.noSession && !parsed.help && parsed.listModels === undefined;\n\t\tconst sessionDirectory = getSandboxSessionDirectory(policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\tif (wantsPersistentSession && !parsed.allowConcurrent) {\n\t\t\tconst liveSessions = readLiveSessionLeases(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\tif (liveSessions.length > 0) {\n\t\t\t\treportConcurrentSessionRefusal(liveSessions, policyResult.policy.workspace);\n\t\t\t\treturn 1;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\tlease = wantsPersistentSession\n\t\t\t? acquireSessionLease(sessionDirectory, policyResult.policy.workspace, `supervisor-${process.pid}`)\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\t// Open the host-owned credential channel only after startup checks that can\n\t\t// return early. AuthStorage creates a missing canonical file as 0600, so a\n\t\t// first-run credential writes get the same channel and read-only projection as later runs.\n\t\tlet credentialChannel: SandboxLaunch[\"credentialChannel\"];\n\t\tif (options.authPath && backend.status.kind === \"enforced\") {\n\t\t\tconst paths = resolveCredentialChannelPaths();\n\t\t\tcredentialProxy = await createCredentialProxy({\n\t\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\t\tviolationStore,\n\t\t\t\tsocketPath: paths.hostSocketPath,\n\t\t\t\tcleanupDirectory: paths.hostSocketDirectory,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel = paths;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Resolved here rather than in the caller because this function owns the teardown\n\t\t// that removes the directory again. The supervisor is unsandboxed, so the host home\n\t\t// is still visible at this point; inside the child it is not.\n\t\tconst identity = resolveHostGitIdentity({ environment: options.environment });\n\t\t// The helper command is derived from the state directory rather than handed back by\n\t\t// the backend, because the config has to name it before any backend exists. Both\n\t\t// sides derive the same path, so the config never names a file nothing created.\n\t\tprojectedGitConfig = identity\n\t\t\t? createProjectedGitConfig(identity, {\n\t\t\t\t\tcredentialHelper: gitCredentialHelperCommand(\n\t\t\t\t\t\tjoin(policyResult.policy.workspace, \".apex-code\", \"sandbox-state\"),\n\t\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t\t})\n\t\t\t: undefined;\n\n\t\tconst launch = buildSandboxedCliLaunch({\n\t\t\tworkspace: policyResult.policy.workspace,\n\t\t\tcommand: options.command,\n\t\t\targs: options.args,\n\t\t\tenvironment: options.environment,\n\t\t\tallowedHosts: options.allowedHosts,\n\t\t\treadOnlyPaths: options.readOnlyPaths,\n\t\t\tauthPath: options.authPath,\n\t\t\tgitConfigPath: projectedGitConfig?.path,\n\t\t\ttoolBinaries: options.toolBinaries,\n\t\t\tskillPaths: options.skillPaths,\n\t\t\tcredentialChannel,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn await supervisor.launch(launch);\n\t} catch (error: unknown) {\n\t\tconst message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : \"Failed to start OS sandbox.\";\n\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(`Error: ${message}\\n`);\n\t\treturn 1;\n\t} finally {\n\t\tlease?.release();\n\t\tif (projectedGitConfig) rmSync(projectedGitConfig.directory, { force: true, recursive: true });\n\t\tconst cleanupResults = await Promise.allSettled([supervisor.close(), credentialProxy?.close()]);\n\t\tfor (const violation of violationStore.list()) {\n\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\n\t\t\t\t`Sandbox violation (${violation.kind}): ${violation.command} — ${violation.detail}\\n`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tfor (const result of cleanupResults) {\n\t\t\tif (result.status === \"rejected\") {\n\t\t\t\tdependencies.stderr.write(\"Warning: sandbox cleanup did not complete cleanly.\\n\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/default-hosts.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * Model-provider API hosts permitted by default inside the sandbox.
+ *
+ * The boundary shipped denying every host, which meant a fresh install could not reach
+ * any model at all: the first request failed, and the user had no way to discover that
+ * `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` was the missing entry — the endpoint is an
+ * implementation detail of the provider, not something a user knows. Denying by default
+ * only protects anyone if the working configuration is reachable without it.
+ *
+ * This list is a materialised copy of what `builtinProviders()` declares. It is not
+ * derived at runtime because importing the provider registry costs roughly 190ms, and
+ * the supervisor pays that on every launch before the child even starts.
+ * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` recomputes the set from the registry and fails if
+ * this copy drifts, so adding a provider upstream cannot silently leave it unreachable.
+ *
+ * Providers whose `baseUrl` is absent or templated — Bedrock, Azure, Cloudflare, Vertex,
+ * and the self-hosted ones — resolve their endpoint from account or environment
+ * configuration the supervisor cannot see, so they are not here. Those still require an
+ * explicit `network.allowedHosts` entry, and the refusal message now names the host.
+ */
+export declare const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS: readonly string[];
+/**
+ * Hosts allowed before any user configuration: every statically known model provider,
+ * plus the update check, which is Apex Code's own outbound request and otherwise records
+ * a policy violation on every single run.
+ */
+export declare function resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(): string[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=default-hosts.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/default-hosts.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"default-hosts.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/default-hosts.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAgCnD,CAAC;AAUF;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,0BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAErD","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Model-provider API hosts permitted by default inside the sandbox.\n *\n * The boundary shipped denying every host, which meant a fresh install could not reach\n * any model at all: the first request failed, and the user had no way to discover that\n * `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` was the missing entry — the endpoint is an\n * implementation detail of the provider, not something a user knows. Denying by default\n * only protects anyone if the working configuration is reachable without it.\n *\n * This list is a materialised copy of what `builtinProviders()` declares. It is not\n * derived at runtime because importing the provider registry costs roughly 190ms, and\n * the supervisor pays that on every launch before the child even starts.\n * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` recomputes the set from the registry and fails if\n * this copy drifts, so adding a provider upstream cannot silently leave it unreachable.\n *\n * Providers whose `baseUrl` is absent or templated — Bedrock, Azure, Cloudflare, Vertex,\n * and the self-hosted ones — resolve their endpoint from account or environment\n * configuration the supervisor cannot see, so they are not here. Those still require an\n * explicit `network.allowedHosts` entry, and the refusal message now names the host.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS: readonly string[] = [\n\t\"ai-gateway.vercel.sh\",\n\t\"api.ant-ling.com\",\n\t\"api.anthropic.com\",\n\t\"api.cerebras.ai\",\n\t\"api.deepseek.com\",\n\t\"api.fireworks.ai\",\n\t\"api.groq.com\",\n\t\"api.individual.githubcopilot.com\",\n\t\"api.kimi.com\",\n\t\"api.minimax.io\",\n\t\"api.minimaxi.com\",\n\t\"api.mistral.ai\",\n\t\"api.moonshot.ai\",\n\t\"api.moonshot.cn\",\n\t\"api.openai.com\",\n\t\"api.together.ai\",\n\t\"api.x.ai\",\n\t\"api.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"api.z.ai\",\n\t\"chatgpt.com\",\n\t\"generativelanguage.googleapis.com\",\n\t\"inference.baseten.co\",\n\t\"integrate.api.nvidia.com\",\n\t\"open.bigmodel.cn\",\n\t\"openrouter.ai\",\n\t\"router.huggingface.co\",\n\t\"token-plan-ams.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan-sgp.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan.ap-southeast-1.maas.aliyuncs.com\",\n\t\"token-plan.cn-beijing.maas.aliyuncs.com\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Host of Apex Code's own update check. Duplicated from `version-check.ts` rather than\n * imported: this module is loaded by the supervisor on every launch, and pulling in that\n * module's dependency chain costs roughly 40ms to obtain a single string.\n * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` asserts the two agree.\n */\nconst UPDATE_CHECK_HOST = \"registry.npmjs.org\";\n\n/**\n * Hosts allowed before any user configuration: every statically known model provider,\n * plus the update check, which is Apex Code's own outbound request and otherwise records\n * a policy violation on every single run.\n */\nexport function resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(): string[] {\n\treturn [...new Set([...DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS, UPDATE_CHECK_HOST])];\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/default-hosts.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * Model-provider API hosts permitted by default inside the sandbox.
+ *
+ * The boundary shipped denying every host, which meant a fresh install could not reach
+ * any model at all: the first request failed, and the user had no way to discover that
+ * `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` was the missing entry — the endpoint is an
+ * implementation detail of the provider, not something a user knows. Denying by default
+ * only protects anyone if the working configuration is reachable without it.
+ *
+ * This list is a materialised copy of what `builtinProviders()` declares. It is not
+ * derived at runtime because importing the provider registry costs roughly 190ms, and
+ * the supervisor pays that on every launch before the child even starts.
+ * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` recomputes the set from the registry and fails if
+ * this copy drifts, so adding a provider upstream cannot silently leave it unreachable.
+ *
+ * Providers whose `baseUrl` is absent or templated — Bedrock, Azure, Cloudflare, Vertex,
+ * and the self-hosted ones — resolve their endpoint from account or environment
+ * configuration the supervisor cannot see, so they are not here. Those still require an
+ * explicit `network.allowedHosts` entry, and the refusal message now names the host.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS = [
+    "ai-gateway.vercel.sh",
+    "api.ant-ling.com",
+    "api.anthropic.com",
+    "api.cerebras.ai",
+    "api.deepseek.com",
+    "api.fireworks.ai",
+    "api.groq.com",
+    "api.individual.githubcopilot.com",
+    "api.kimi.com",
+    "api.minimax.io",
+    "api.minimaxi.com",
+    "api.mistral.ai",
+    "api.moonshot.ai",
+    "api.moonshot.cn",
+    "api.openai.com",
+    "api.together.ai",
+    "api.x.ai",
+    "api.xiaomimimo.com",
+    "api.z.ai",
+    "chatgpt.com",
+    "generativelanguage.googleapis.com",
+    "inference.baseten.co",
+    "integrate.api.nvidia.com",
+    "open.bigmodel.cn",
+    "openrouter.ai",
+    "router.huggingface.co",
+    "token-plan-ams.xiaomimimo.com",
+    "token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com",
+    "token-plan-sgp.xiaomimimo.com",
+    "token-plan.ap-southeast-1.maas.aliyuncs.com",
+    "token-plan.cn-beijing.maas.aliyuncs.com",
+];
+/**
+ * Host of Apex Code's own update check. Duplicated from `version-check.ts` rather than
+ * imported: this module is loaded by the supervisor on every launch, and pulling in that
+ * module's dependency chain costs roughly 40ms to obtain a single string.
+ * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` asserts the two agree.
+ */
+const UPDATE_CHECK_HOST = "registry.npmjs.org";
+/**
+ * Hosts allowed before any user configuration: every statically known model provider,
+ * plus the update check, which is Apex Code's own outbound request and otherwise records
+ * a policy violation on every single run.
+ */
+export function resolveDefaultAllowedHosts() {
+    return [...new Set([...DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS, UPDATE_CHECK_HOST])];
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=default-hosts.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/default-hosts.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"default-hosts.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/default-hosts.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAsB;IACxD,sBAAsB;IACtB,kBAAkB;IAClB,mBAAmB;IACnB,iBAAiB;IACjB,kBAAkB;IAClB,kBAAkB;IAClB,cAAc;IACd,kCAAkC;IAClC,cAAc;IACd,gBAAgB;IAChB,kBAAkB;IAClB,gBAAgB;IAChB,iBAAiB;IACjB,iBAAiB;IACjB,gBAAgB;IAChB,iBAAiB;IACjB,UAAU;IACV,oBAAoB;IACpB,UAAU;IACV,aAAa;IACb,mCAAmC;IACnC,sBAAsB;IACtB,0BAA0B;IAC1B,kBAAkB;IAClB,eAAe;IACf,uBAAuB;IACvB,+BAA+B;IAC/B,8BAA8B;IAC9B,+BAA+B;IAC/B,6CAA6C;IAC7C,yCAAyC;CACzC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAE/C;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,0BAA0B,GAAa;IACtD,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,sBAAsB,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,CACpE","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Model-provider API hosts permitted by default inside the sandbox.\n *\n * The boundary shipped denying every host, which meant a fresh install could not reach\n * any model at all: the first request failed, and the user had no way to discover that\n * `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` was the missing entry — the endpoint is an\n * implementation detail of the provider, not something a user knows. Denying by default\n * only protects anyone if the working configuration is reachable without it.\n *\n * This list is a materialised copy of what `builtinProviders()` declares. It is not\n * derived at runtime because importing the provider registry costs roughly 190ms, and\n * the supervisor pays that on every launch before the child even starts.\n * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` recomputes the set from the registry and fails if\n * this copy drifts, so adding a provider upstream cannot silently leave it unreachable.\n *\n * Providers whose `baseUrl` is absent or templated — Bedrock, Azure, Cloudflare, Vertex,\n * and the self-hosted ones — resolve their endpoint from account or environment\n * configuration the supervisor cannot see, so they are not here. Those still require an\n * explicit `network.allowedHosts` entry, and the refusal message now names the host.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS: readonly string[] = [\n\t\"ai-gateway.vercel.sh\",\n\t\"api.ant-ling.com\",\n\t\"api.anthropic.com\",\n\t\"api.cerebras.ai\",\n\t\"api.deepseek.com\",\n\t\"api.fireworks.ai\",\n\t\"api.groq.com\",\n\t\"api.individual.githubcopilot.com\",\n\t\"api.kimi.com\",\n\t\"api.minimax.io\",\n\t\"api.minimaxi.com\",\n\t\"api.mistral.ai\",\n\t\"api.moonshot.ai\",\n\t\"api.moonshot.cn\",\n\t\"api.openai.com\",\n\t\"api.together.ai\",\n\t\"api.x.ai\",\n\t\"api.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"api.z.ai\",\n\t\"chatgpt.com\",\n\t\"generativelanguage.googleapis.com\",\n\t\"inference.baseten.co\",\n\t\"integrate.api.nvidia.com\",\n\t\"open.bigmodel.cn\",\n\t\"openrouter.ai\",\n\t\"router.huggingface.co\",\n\t\"token-plan-ams.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan-cn.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan-sgp.xiaomimimo.com\",\n\t\"token-plan.ap-southeast-1.maas.aliyuncs.com\",\n\t\"token-plan.cn-beijing.maas.aliyuncs.com\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Host of Apex Code's own update check. Duplicated from `version-check.ts` rather than\n * imported: this module is loaded by the supervisor on every launch, and pulling in that\n * module's dependency chain costs roughly 40ms to obtain a single string.\n * `test/sandbox/default-hosts.test.ts` asserts the two agree.\n */\nconst UPDATE_CHECK_HOST = \"registry.npmjs.org\";\n\n/**\n * Hosts allowed before any user configuration: every statically known model provider,\n * plus the update check, which is Apex Code's own outbound request and otherwise records\n * a policy violation on every single run.\n */\nexport function resolveDefaultAllowedHosts(): string[] {\n\treturn [...new Set([...DEFAULT_PROVIDER_HOSTS, UPDATE_CHECK_HOST])];\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/full-access.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * The explicit opt-out from OS containment.
+ *
+ * ADR 0005 shipped without one on purpose, and its 2026-08-28 amendment records why that
+ * is now a flag rather than an absence: the delegation work removed the reasons people
+ * were reaching for an escape hatch, so the hatch can exist without becoming the default
+ * route around a boundary that could not otherwise be worked with.
+ *
+ * Two rules keep it honest. It is spelled out in full on the command line, never inferred
+ * from settings, so no repository and no saved configuration can turn the boundary off.
+ * And it always announces itself, because a session that silently ran unconfined is
+ * indistinguishable afterwards from one that did not.
+ */
+export declare function writeFullAccessBanner(stderr: {
+    write(message: string): boolean;
+}): void;
+/**
+ * Confirm the opt-out interactively, or accept it unprompted where no human could answer.
+ *
+ * A non-interactive session is the case the flag legitimately exists for -- CI that is
+ * already externally sandboxed -- and there is nobody there to type. Prompting anyway
+ * would hang the run rather than protect anything, so the banner carries the weight.
+ */
+export declare function confirmFullAccess(options: {
+    input?: NodeJS.ReadStream;
+    output?: NodeJS.WriteStream;
+}): Promise<boolean>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=full-access.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/full-access.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"full-access.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/full-access.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AAYH,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAEvF;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC1C,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;CAC5B,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CA4BnB","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The explicit opt-out from OS containment.\n *\n * ADR 0005 shipped without one on purpose, and its 2026-08-28 amendment records why that\n * is now a flag rather than an absence: the delegation work removed the reasons people\n * were reaching for an escape hatch, so the hatch can exist without becoming the default\n * route around a boundary that could not otherwise be worked with.\n *\n * Two rules keep it honest. It is spelled out in full on the command line, never inferred\n * from settings, so no repository and no saved configuration can turn the boundary off.\n * And it always announces itself, because a session that silently ran unconfined is\n * indistinguishable afterwards from one that did not.\n */\n\nconst BANNER = [\n\t\"\",\n\t\"  ! OS sandbox disabled for this session (--sandbox danger-full-access).\",\n\t\"\",\n\t\"    Tool calls and every process they spawn run with your full account authority:\",\n\t\"    your home directory, your credentials, and unrestricted network access.\",\n\t\"    The permission gate still applies. It is not a containment boundary.\",\n\t\"\",\n].join(\"\\n\");\n\nexport function writeFullAccessBanner(stderr: { write(message: string): boolean }): void {\n\tstderr.write(`${BANNER}\\n`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Confirm the opt-out interactively, or accept it unprompted where no human could answer.\n *\n * A non-interactive session is the case the flag legitimately exists for -- CI that is\n * already externally sandboxed -- and there is nobody there to type. Prompting anyway\n * would hang the run rather than protect anything, so the banner carries the weight.\n */\nexport function confirmFullAccess(options: {\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}): Promise<boolean> {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return Promise.resolve(true);\n\n\toutput.write(\"Run this session with no OS sandbox? [y/N] \");\n\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\tconst answer = value.trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\toutput.write(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\tresolve(answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\");\n\t\t};\n\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t};\n\t\t// Anything unreadable declines, because an unanswerable prompt must not be the way\n\t\t// containment gets switched off.\n\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\tinput.resume();\n\t});\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/full-access.js

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * The explicit opt-out from OS containment.
+ *
+ * ADR 0005 shipped without one on purpose, and its 2026-08-28 amendment records why that
+ * is now a flag rather than an absence: the delegation work removed the reasons people
+ * were reaching for an escape hatch, so the hatch can exist without becoming the default
+ * route around a boundary that could not otherwise be worked with.
+ *
+ * Two rules keep it honest. It is spelled out in full on the command line, never inferred
+ * from settings, so no repository and no saved configuration can turn the boundary off.
+ * And it always announces itself, because a session that silently ran unconfined is
+ * indistinguishable afterwards from one that did not.
+ */
+const BANNER = [
+    "",
+    "  ! OS sandbox disabled for this session (--sandbox danger-full-access).",
+    "",
+    "    Tool calls and every process they spawn run with your full account authority:",
+    "    your home directory, your credentials, and unrestricted network access.",
+    "    The permission gate still applies. It is not a containment boundary.",
+    "",
+].join("\n");
+export function writeFullAccessBanner(stderr) {
+    stderr.write(`${BANNER}\n`);
+}
+/**
+ * Confirm the opt-out interactively, or accept it unprompted where no human could answer.
+ *
+ * A non-interactive session is the case the flag legitimately exists for -- CI that is
+ * already externally sandboxed -- and there is nobody there to type. Prompting anyway
+ * would hang the run rather than protect anything, so the banner carries the weight.
+ */
+export function confirmFullAccess(options) {
+    const input = options.input ?? process.stdin;
+    const output = options.output ?? process.stdout;
+    if (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY)
+        return Promise.resolve(true);
+    output.write("Run this session with no OS sandbox? [y/N] ");
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        let buffer = "";
+        const finish = (value) => {
+            input.off("data", onData);
+            input.off("error", onError);
+            input.pause();
+            const answer = value.trim().toLowerCase();
+            output.write("\n");
+            resolve(answer === "y" || answer === "yes");
+        };
+        const onData = (chunk) => {
+            buffer += chunk.toString();
+            const newline = buffer.indexOf("\n");
+            if (newline >= 0)
+                finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));
+        };
+        // Anything unreadable declines, because an unanswerable prompt must not be the way
+        // containment gets switched off.
+        const onError = () => finish("");
+        input.on("data", onData);
+        input.on("error", onError);
+        input.resume();
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=full-access.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/full-access.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"full-access.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/full-access.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;IACd,EAAE;IACF,0EAA0E;IAC1E,EAAE;IACF,mFAAmF;IACnF,6EAA6E;IAC7E,0EAA0E;IAC1E,EAAE;CACF,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AAEb,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAA2C,EAAQ;IACxF,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,CAC5B;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAGjC,EAAoB;IACpB,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;IAC7C,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAChD,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK;QAAE,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEhE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,6CAA6C,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QAChB,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YACjC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1B,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;YAC5B,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;YACd,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YACnB,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAAA,CAC5C,CAAC;QACF,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,KAAsB,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3B,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YACrC,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;gBAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAAA,CACnD,CAAC;QACF,mFAAmF;QACnF,iCAAiC;QACjC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACjC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QACzB,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3B,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAAA,CACf,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,CACH","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The explicit opt-out from OS containment.\n *\n * ADR 0005 shipped without one on purpose, and its 2026-08-28 amendment records why that\n * is now a flag rather than an absence: the delegation work removed the reasons people\n * were reaching for an escape hatch, so the hatch can exist without becoming the default\n * route around a boundary that could not otherwise be worked with.\n *\n * Two rules keep it honest. It is spelled out in full on the command line, never inferred\n * from settings, so no repository and no saved configuration can turn the boundary off.\n * And it always announces itself, because a session that silently ran unconfined is\n * indistinguishable afterwards from one that did not.\n */\n\nconst BANNER = [\n\t\"\",\n\t\"  ! OS sandbox disabled for this session (--sandbox danger-full-access).\",\n\t\"\",\n\t\"    Tool calls and every process they spawn run with your full account authority:\",\n\t\"    your home directory, your credentials, and unrestricted network access.\",\n\t\"    The permission gate still applies. It is not a containment boundary.\",\n\t\"\",\n].join(\"\\n\");\n\nexport function writeFullAccessBanner(stderr: { write(message: string): boolean }): void {\n\tstderr.write(`${BANNER}\\n`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Confirm the opt-out interactively, or accept it unprompted where no human could answer.\n *\n * A non-interactive session is the case the flag legitimately exists for -- CI that is\n * already externally sandboxed -- and there is nobody there to type. Prompting anyway\n * would hang the run rather than protect anything, so the banner carries the weight.\n */\nexport function confirmFullAccess(options: {\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}): Promise<boolean> {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return Promise.resolve(true);\n\n\toutput.write(\"Run this session with no OS sandbox? [y/N] \");\n\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\tconst answer = value.trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\toutput.write(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\tresolve(answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\");\n\t\t};\n\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t};\n\t\t// Anything unreadable declines, because an unanswerable prompt must not be the way\n\t\t// containment gets switched off.\n\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\tinput.resume();\n\t});\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/git-identity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+export interface HostGitIdentity {
+    readonly name: string;
+    readonly email: string;
+}
+export interface ProjectedGitConfig {
+    readonly directory: string;
+    readonly path: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the host's git identity before the sandbox exists to hide it.
+ *
+ * `--global` rather than a plain lookup, because the scope flag is what excludes the
+ * workspace's own `.git/config` by construction rather than by choosing a lucky working
+ * directory. A repository must not be able to decide what the supervisor projects, the
+ * same rule ADR 0016 applies to the network allowlist. Repository scope still works
+ * normally inside the child: the workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so git reads
+ * `.git/config` there itself and it wins over this projection, exactly as it would on the
+ * host.
+ *
+ * System scope (`/etc/gitconfig`) is deliberately not consulted. A machine-wide commit
+ * identity is not a real configuration, and a second `spawnSync` to find one would cost
+ * every launch what it saves nobody.
+ *
+ * Returns undefined unless both keys are present. A name without an email still fails to
+ * author a commit, so projecting half an identity would replace one confusing error with
+ * another.
+ */
+export declare function resolveHostGitIdentity(options?: {
+    /** Injectable only for tests; production uses the supervisor's own environment. */
+    environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    /**
+     * Injectable only for tests, so one can prove repository scope stays excluded even
+     * when the lookup runs from inside a repository.
+     */
+    cwd?: string;
+}): HostGitIdentity | undefined;
+/**
+ * Write a two-key config the child can be pointed at through `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`.
+ *
+ * Synthesized rather than copied. A real `~/.gitconfig` can carry a `credential.helper`
+ * that runs a command, or an `insteadOf` rule rewriting a remote to one carrying a token;
+ * projecting the host file would hand both to the child along with the name we wanted.
+ * Building the file from a resolved identity means it cannot contain anything else.
+ *
+ * The directory is its own, not shared with the credential projection, and `0700` for the
+ * same reason `resolveCredentialChannelPaths` uses one. TMPDIR is deliberately not
+ * honoured: it can point inside the workspace on macOS, which the sandbox may write.
+ */
+export declare function createProjectedGitConfig(identity: HostGitIdentity, options?: {
+    /**
+     * A `credential.helper` value for the child. It names the supervisor-mediated
+     * helper, never a host one: the point is that the child asks over the channel
+     * rather than reading any store itself.
+     */
+    credentialHelper?: string;
+}): ProjectedGitConfig;
+//# sourceMappingURL=git-identity.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/git-identity.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"git-identity.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/sandbox/git-identity.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAKA,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC/B,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACvB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IAClC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACtB;AAKD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;IAChD,mFAAmF;IACnF,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IAChC;;;OAGG;IACH,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACb,GAAG,eAAe,GAAG,SAAS,CAoB9B;AAOD;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACvC,QAAQ,EAAE,eAAe,EACzB,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;IACT;;;;OAIG;IACH,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC1B,GACC,kBAAkB,CAUpB","sourcesContent":["import { spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { chmodSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { join } from \"node:path\";\nimport { supervisorTempDirectory } from \"./supervisor-temp.ts\";\n\nexport interface HostGitIdentity {\n\treadonly name: string;\n\treadonly email: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProjectedGitConfig {\n\treadonly directory: string;\n\treadonly path: string;\n}\n\n/** Long enough for a cold `git` on a slow disk, short enough not to stall every launch. */\nconst RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS = 2_000;\n\n/**\n * Read the host's git identity before the sandbox exists to hide it.\n *\n * `--global` rather than a plain lookup, because the scope flag is what excludes the\n * workspace's own `.git/config` by construction rather than by choosing a lucky working\n * directory. A repository must not be able to decide what the supervisor projects, the\n * same rule ADR 0016 applies to the network allowlist. Repository scope still works\n * normally inside the child: the workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so git reads\n * `.git/config` there itself and it wins over this projection, exactly as it would on the\n * host.\n *\n * System scope (`/etc/gitconfig`) is deliberately not consulted. A machine-wide commit\n * identity is not a real configuration, and a second `spawnSync` to find one would cost\n * every launch what it saves nobody.\n *\n * Returns undefined unless both keys are present. A name without an email still fails to\n * author a commit, so projecting half an identity would replace one confusing error with\n * another.\n */\nexport function resolveHostGitIdentity(options?: {\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production uses the supervisor's own environment. */\n\tenvironment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only for tests, so one can prove repository scope stays excluded even\n\t * when the lookup runs from inside a repository.\n\t */\n\tcwd?: string;\n}): HostGitIdentity | undefined {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(\"git\", [\"config\", \"--global\", \"--get-regexp\", \"^user\\\\.(name|email)$\"], {\n\t\tcwd: options?.cwd,\n\t\tencoding: \"utf8\",\n\t\tenv: options?.environment ?? process.env,\n\t\ttimeout: RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS,\n\t});\n\tif (result.status !== 0 || typeof result.stdout !== \"string\") return undefined;\n\n\tlet name: string | undefined;\n\tlet email: string | undefined;\n\tfor (const line of result.stdout.split(\"\\n\")) {\n\t\tconst separator = line.indexOf(\" \");\n\t\tif (separator < 0) continue;\n\t\tconst value = line.slice(separator + 1).trim();\n\t\tif (value.length === 0) continue;\n\t\tif (line.slice(0, separator) === \"user.name\") name = value;\n\t\tif (line.slice(0, separator) === \"user.email\") email = value;\n\t}\n\treturn name && email ? { name, email } : undefined;\n}\n\n/** Escape a value for git's config syntax, which reads a quoted string with backslash escapes. */\nfunction quote(value: string): string {\n\treturn `\"${value.replace(/\\\\/g, \"\\\\\\\\\").replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write a two-key config the child can be pointed at through `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`.\n *\n * Synthesized rather than copied. A real `~/.gitconfig` can carry a `credential.helper`\n * that runs a command, or an `insteadOf` rule rewriting a remote to one carrying a token;\n * projecting the host file would hand both to the child along with the name we wanted.\n * Building the file from a resolved identity means it cannot contain anything else.\n *\n * The directory is its own, not shared with the credential projection, and `0700` for the\n * same reason `resolveCredentialChannelPaths` uses one. TMPDIR is deliberately not\n * honoured: it can point inside the workspace on macOS, which the sandbox may write.\n */\nexport function createProjectedGitConfig(\n\tidentity: HostGitIdentity,\n\toptions?: {\n\t\t/**\n\t\t * A `credential.helper` value for the child. It names the supervisor-mediated\n\t\t * helper, never a host one: the point is that the child asks over the channel\n\t\t * rather than reading any store itself.\n\t\t */\n\t\tcredentialHelper?: string;\n\t},\n): ProjectedGitConfig {\n\tconst directory = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-git-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n\tchmodSync(directory, 0o700);\n\tconst path = join(directory, \"config\");\n\tconst sections = [`[user]\\n\\tname = ${quote(identity.name)}\\n\\temail = ${quote(identity.email)}\\n`];\n\tif (options?.credentialHelper) {\n\t\tsections.push(`[credential]\\n\\thelper = ${quote(options.credentialHelper)}\\n`);\n\t}\n\twriteFileSync(path, sections.join(\"\"), { mode: 0o600 });\n\treturn { directory, path };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/git-identity.js

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { chmodSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { supervisorTempDirectory } from "./supervisor-temp.js";
+/** Long enough for a cold `git` on a slow disk, short enough not to stall every launch. */
+const RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS = 2_000;
+/**
+ * Read the host's git identity before the sandbox exists to hide it.
+ *
+ * `--global` rather than a plain lookup, because the scope flag is what excludes the
+ * workspace's own `.git/config` by construction rather than by choosing a lucky working
+ * directory. A repository must not be able to decide what the supervisor projects, the
+ * same rule ADR 0016 applies to the network allowlist. Repository scope still works
+ * normally inside the child: the workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so git reads
+ * `.git/config` there itself and it wins over this projection, exactly as it would on the
+ * host.
+ *
+ * System scope (`/etc/gitconfig`) is deliberately not consulted. A machine-wide commit
+ * identity is not a real configuration, and a second `spawnSync` to find one would cost
+ * every launch what it saves nobody.
+ *
+ * Returns undefined unless both keys are present. A name without an email still fails to
+ * author a commit, so projecting half an identity would replace one confusing error with
+ * another.
+ */
+export function resolveHostGitIdentity(options) {
+    const result = spawnSync("git", ["config", "--global", "--get-regexp", "^user\\.(name|email)$"], {
+        cwd: options?.cwd,
+        encoding: "utf8",
+        env: options?.environment ?? process.env,
+        timeout: RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS,
+    });
+    if (result.status !== 0 || typeof result.stdout !== "string")
+        return undefined;
+    let name;
+    let email;
+    for (const line of result.stdout.split("\n")) {
+        const separator = line.indexOf(" ");
+        if (separator < 0)
+            continue;
+        const value = line.slice(separator + 1).trim();
+        if (value.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        if (line.slice(0, separator) === "user.name")
+            name = value;
+        if (line.slice(0, separator) === "user.email")
+            email = value;
+    }
+    return name && email ? { name, email } : undefined;
+}
+/** Escape a value for git's config syntax, which reads a quoted string with backslash escapes. */
+function quote(value) {
+    return `"${value.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`;
+}
+/**
+ * Write a two-key config the child can be pointed at through `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`.
+ *
+ * Synthesized rather than copied. A real `~/.gitconfig` can carry a `credential.helper`
+ * that runs a command, or an `insteadOf` rule rewriting a remote to one carrying a token;
+ * projecting the host file would hand both to the child along with the name we wanted.
+ * Building the file from a resolved identity means it cannot contain anything else.
+ *
+ * The directory is its own, not shared with the credential projection, and `0700` for the
+ * same reason `resolveCredentialChannelPaths` uses one. TMPDIR is deliberately not
+ * honoured: it can point inside the workspace on macOS, which the sandbox may write.
+ */
+export function createProjectedGitConfig(identity, options) {
+    const directory = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-git-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: "utf8" });
+    chmodSync(directory, 0o700);
+    const path = join(directory, "config");
+    const sections = [`[user]\n\tname = ${quote(identity.name)}\n\temail = ${quote(identity.email)}\n`];
+    if (options?.credentialHelper) {
+        sections.push(`[credential]\n\thelper = ${quote(options.credentialHelper)}\n`);
+    }
+    writeFileSync(path, sections.join(""), { mode: 0o600 });
+    return { directory, path };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=git-identity.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/git-identity.js.map

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A repository must not be able to decide what the supervisor projects, the\n * same rule ADR 0016 applies to the network allowlist. Repository scope still works\n * normally inside the child: the workspace is bind-mounted read-write, so git reads\n * `.git/config` there itself and it wins over this projection, exactly as it would on the\n * host.\n *\n * System scope (`/etc/gitconfig`) is deliberately not consulted. A machine-wide commit\n * identity is not a real configuration, and a second `spawnSync` to find one would cost\n * every launch what it saves nobody.\n *\n * Returns undefined unless both keys are present. A name without an email still fails to\n * author a commit, so projecting half an identity would replace one confusing error with\n * another.\n */\nexport function resolveHostGitIdentity(options?: {\n\t/** Injectable only for tests; production uses the supervisor's own environment. */\n\tenvironment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n\t/**\n\t * Injectable only for tests, so one can prove repository scope stays excluded even\n\t * when the lookup runs from inside a repository.\n\t */\n\tcwd?: string;\n}): HostGitIdentity | undefined {\n\tconst result = spawnSync(\"git\", [\"config\", \"--global\", \"--get-regexp\", \"^user\\\\.(name|email)$\"], {\n\t\tcwd: options?.cwd,\n\t\tencoding: \"utf8\",\n\t\tenv: options?.environment ?? process.env,\n\t\ttimeout: RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT_MILLISECONDS,\n\t});\n\tif (result.status !== 0 || typeof result.stdout !== \"string\") return undefined;\n\n\tlet name: string | undefined;\n\tlet email: string | undefined;\n\tfor (const line of result.stdout.split(\"\\n\")) {\n\t\tconst separator = line.indexOf(\" \");\n\t\tif (separator < 0) continue;\n\t\tconst value = line.slice(separator + 1).trim();\n\t\tif (value.length === 0) continue;\n\t\tif (line.slice(0, separator) === \"user.name\") name = value;\n\t\tif (line.slice(0, separator) === \"user.email\") email = value;\n\t}\n\treturn name && email ? { name, email } : undefined;\n}\n\n/** Escape a value for git's config syntax, which reads a quoted string with backslash escapes. */\nfunction quote(value: string): string {\n\treturn `\"${value.replace(/\\\\/g, \"\\\\\\\\\").replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write a two-key config the child can be pointed at through `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`.\n *\n * Synthesized rather than copied. A real `~/.gitconfig` can carry a `credential.helper`\n * that runs a command, or an `insteadOf` rule rewriting a remote to one carrying a token;\n * projecting the host file would hand both to the child along with the name we wanted.\n * Building the file from a resolved identity means it cannot contain anything else.\n *\n * The directory is its own, not shared with the credential projection, and `0700` for the\n * same reason `resolveCredentialChannelPaths` uses one. TMPDIR is deliberately not\n * honoured: it can point inside the workspace on macOS, which the sandbox may write.\n */\nexport function createProjectedGitConfig(\n\tidentity: HostGitIdentity,\n\toptions?: {\n\t\t/**\n\t\t * A `credential.helper` value for the child. It names the supervisor-mediated\n\t\t * helper, never a host one: the point is that the child asks over the channel\n\t\t * rather than reading any store itself.\n\t\t */\n\t\tcredentialHelper?: string;\n\t},\n): ProjectedGitConfig {\n\tconst directory = mkdtempSync(join(supervisorTempDirectory(), `apex-git-${process.pid}-`), { encoding: \"utf8\" });\n\tchmodSync(directory, 0o700);\n\tconst path = join(directory, \"config\");\n\tconst sections = [`[user]\\n\\tname = ${quote(identity.name)}\\n\\temail = ${quote(identity.email)}\\n`];\n\tif (options?.credentialHelper) {\n\t\tsections.push(`[credential]\\n\\thelper = ${quote(options.credentialHelper)}\\n`);\n\t}\n\twriteFileSync(path, sections.join(\"\"), { mode: 0o600 });\n\treturn { directory, path };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import type { TerminalHandoff } from "./terminal-handoff.ts";
+/**
+ * The supervisor's own approval prompt for one refused host.
+ *
+ * ADR 0023 puts the decision here rather than in the child. An approval asserted from
+ * inside the boundary is indistinguishable, at the supervisor, from one forged by a
+ * postinstall script or a git hook -- the code the boundary exists to contain -- so the
+ * human's answer is read by the side that owns the decision, on a terminal borrowed back
+ * from the child for the duration.
+ *
+ * Returning undefined when there is no terminal is the mechanism, not a fallback. The
+ * proxy's own deny-without-asking path then runs unchanged, so ADR 0005's headless, print,
+ * JSON, and RPC behaviour holds by construction rather than by a mode check that a later
+ * change could forget to make.
+ */
+export interface TerminalPromptOptions {
+    handoff: TerminalHandoff;
+    input?: NodeJS.ReadStream;
+    output?: NodeJS.WriteStream;
+}
+/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */
+export declare function createHostApprover(options: TerminalPromptOptions): ((hostname: string, port: number) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined;
+/**
+ * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.
+ *
+ * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are
+ * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to
+ * everything else the session later contacts.
+ */
+export declare function createCredentialReleaser(options: TerminalPromptOptions): ((host: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined;
+/**
+ * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.
+ *
+ * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject
+ * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that
+ * happened to name the same root.
+ */
+export declare function createCommandEscalationApprover(options: TerminalPromptOptions): ((request: {
+    command: string;
+    writableRoot: string;
+}) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined;
+//# sourceMappingURL=host-approval.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.d.ts.map

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The\n * proxy's own deny-without-asking path then runs unchanged, so ADR 0005's headless, print,\n * JSON, and RPC behaviour holds by construction rather than by a mode check that a later\n * change could forget to make.\n */\nexport interface TerminalPromptOptions {\n\thandoff: TerminalHandoff;\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.\n *\n * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same\n * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a\n * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,\n * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.\n */\nfunction createTerminalPrompt(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n\tcompose: (subject: string) => { question: string; granted: string; refused: string },\n): ((subject: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return undefined;\n\n\tfunction readAnswer(): Promise<string> {\n\t\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\t\t// The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the\n\t\t\t\t// supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.\n\t\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t// Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would\n\t\t\t// hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.\n\t\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\t\tconst onEnd = () => finish(buffer);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\tinput.resume();\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn (subject: string): Promise<boolean> =>\n\t\toptions.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {\n\t\t\tconst text = compose(subject);\n\t\t\toutput.write(`\\n${text.question}`);\n\t\t\tconst answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\tconst approved = answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\";\n\t\t\toutput.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\\n\\n`);\n\t\t\treturn approved;\n\t\t});\n}\n\n/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */\nexport function createHostApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((hostname: string, port: number) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to \"network.allowedHosts\" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused ${subject}.`,\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (hostname: string, port: number) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.\n *\n * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are\n * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to\n * everything else the session later contacts.\n */\nexport function createCredentialReleaser(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((host: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\treturn createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,\n\t}));\n}\n\n/**\n * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject\n * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that\n * happened to name the same root.\n */\nexport function createCommandEscalationApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((request: { command: string; writableRoot: string }) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`  ${subject}\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: \"Ran the command once with that root writable.\",\n\t\trefused: \"Refused.\",\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.js

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/**
+ * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.
+ *
+ * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same
+ * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a
+ * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,
+ * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.
+ */
+function createTerminalPrompt(options, compose) {
+    const input = options.input ?? process.stdin;
+    const output = options.output ?? process.stdout;
+    if (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY)
+        return undefined;
+    function readAnswer() {
+        return new Promise((resolve) => {
+            let buffer = "";
+            const finish = (value) => {
+                input.off("data", onData);
+                input.off("error", onError);
+                input.off("end", onEnd);
+                // The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the
+                // supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.
+                input.pause();
+                resolve(value);
+            };
+            const onData = (chunk) => {
+                buffer += chunk.toString();
+                const newline = buffer.indexOf("\n");
+                if (newline >= 0)
+                    finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));
+            };
+            // Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would
+            // hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.
+            const onError = () => finish("");
+            const onEnd = () => finish(buffer);
+            input.on("data", onData);
+            input.on("error", onError);
+            input.on("end", onEnd);
+            input.resume();
+        });
+    }
+    return (subject) => options.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {
+        const text = compose(subject);
+        output.write(`\n${text.question}`);
+        const answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();
+        const approved = answer === "y" || answer === "yes";
+        output.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\n\n`);
+        return approved;
+    });
+}
+/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */
+export function createHostApprover(options) {
+    const prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
+        question: `The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\n` +
+            `Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,
+        granted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to "network.allowedHosts" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,
+        refused: `Refused ${subject}.`,
+    }));
+    if (!prompt)
+        return undefined;
+    return (hostname, port) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);
+}
+/**
+ * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.
+ *
+ * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are
+ * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to
+ * everything else the session later contacts.
+ */
+export function createCredentialReleaser(options) {
+    return createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
+        question: `The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\n` +
+            `It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\n` +
+            `Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,
+        granted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,
+        refused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,
+    }));
+}
+/**
+ * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.
+ *
+ * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject
+ * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that
+ * happened to name the same root.
+ */
+export function createCommandEscalationApprover(options) {
+    const prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({
+        question: `The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\n\n` +
+            `  ${subject}\n\n` +
+            `It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\n` +
+            `Allow it? [y/N] `,
+        granted: "Ran the command once with that root writable.",
+        refused: "Refused.",
+    }));
+    if (!prompt)
+        return undefined;
+    return (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=host-approval.js.map

package/dist/core/sandbox/host-approval.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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An approval asserted from\n * inside the boundary is indistinguishable, at the supervisor, from one forged by a\n * postinstall script or a git hook -- the code the boundary exists to contain -- so the\n * human's answer is read by the side that owns the decision, on a terminal borrowed back\n * from the child for the duration.\n *\n * Returning undefined when there is no terminal is the mechanism, not a fallback. The\n * proxy's own deny-without-asking path then runs unchanged, so ADR 0005's headless, print,\n * JSON, and RPC behaviour holds by construction rather than by a mode check that a later\n * change could forget to make.\n */\nexport interface TerminalPromptOptions {\n\thandoff: TerminalHandoff;\n\tinput?: NodeJS.ReadStream;\n\toutput?: NodeJS.WriteStream;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a yes/no prompt the supervisor owns, or nothing at all when there is no terminal.\n *\n * Both sandbox escalations ask the same shape of question and must fail closed the same\n * way, so they share one implementation. Returning undefined rather than a\n * function-that-says-no is deliberate: the caller's own refuse path then runs untouched,\n * which is how ADR 0005's headless behaviour stays correct without a mode check.\n */\nfunction createTerminalPrompt(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n\tcompose: (subject: string) => { question: string; granted: string; refused: string },\n): ((subject: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst input = options.input ?? process.stdin;\n\tconst output = options.output ?? process.stdout;\n\tif (!input.isTTY || !output.isTTY) return undefined;\n\n\tfunction readAnswer(): Promise<string> {\n\t\treturn new Promise((resolve) => {\n\t\t\tlet buffer = \"\";\n\t\t\tconst finish = (value: string) => {\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\t\tinput.off(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\t\t// The child had stdin in raw mode and takes it back on resume, so the\n\t\t\t\t// supervisor leaves the stream paused rather than owning it past the answer.\n\t\t\t\tinput.pause();\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\tconst onData = (chunk: Buffer | string) => {\n\t\t\t\tbuffer += chunk.toString();\n\t\t\t\tconst newline = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\");\n\t\t\t\tif (newline >= 0) finish(buffer.slice(0, newline));\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t// Anything unreadable declines. Treating an unanswerable prompt as consent would\n\t\t\t// hand the grant to whatever broke the terminal.\n\t\t\tconst onError = () => finish(\"\");\n\t\t\tconst onEnd = () => finish(buffer);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"data\", onData);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"error\", onError);\n\t\t\tinput.on(\"end\", onEnd);\n\t\t\tinput.resume();\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\treturn (subject: string): Promise<boolean> =>\n\t\toptions.handoff.borrowTerminal(async () => {\n\t\t\tconst text = compose(subject);\n\t\t\toutput.write(`\\n${text.question}`);\n\t\t\tconst answer = (await readAnswer()).trim().toLowerCase();\n\t\t\tconst approved = answer === \"y\" || answer === \"yes\";\n\t\t\toutput.write(`${approved ? text.granted : text.refused}\\n\\n`);\n\t\t\treturn approved;\n\t\t});\n}\n\n/** Approve one refused host for the rest of the session. */\nexport function createHostApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((hostname: string, port: number) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to reach ${subject}, which is not on the network allowlist.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Allowed ${subject} for this session. Add it to \"network.allowedHosts\" in your global settings to make it permanent.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused ${subject}.`,\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (hostname: string, port: number) => prompt(`${hostname}:${port}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Release the host's own git credential for one host, for the rest of the session.\n *\n * Separate from the host approval above even though both are yes/no, because they are\n * different grants and conflating them would let approving a push also release a token to\n * everything else the session later contacts.\n */\nexport function createCredentialReleaser(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((host: string) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\treturn createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked for your git credential for ${subject}.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It is read from your host credential store and never written into the workspace.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Release it for this session only? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: `Released the ${subject} credential for this session.`,\n\t\trefused: `Refused the ${subject} credential.`,\n\t}));\n}\n\n/**\n * Approve one command to run in a separate child with one extra writable root.\n *\n * Unlike a host or a credential, nothing is remembered. A command is not a stable subject\n * to grant against, and a remembered approval would silently cover the next command that\n * happened to name the same root.\n */\nexport function createCommandEscalationApprover(\n\toptions: TerminalPromptOptions,\n): ((request: { command: string; writableRoot: string }) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined {\n\tconst prompt = createTerminalPrompt(options, (subject) => ({\n\t\tquestion:\n\t\t\t`The sandboxed session asked to run a command with write access outside its workspace.\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`  ${subject}\\n\\n` +\n\t\t\t`It runs once, in a separate sandbox. The session's own boundary does not change.\\n` +\n\t\t\t`Allow it? [y/N] `,\n\t\tgranted: \"Ran the command once with that root writable.\",\n\t\trefused: \"Refused.\",\n\t}));\n\tif (!prompt) return undefined;\n\treturn (request) => prompt(`${request.command}\\n  (writable: ${request.writableRoot})`);\n}\n"]}