agentic-flow 1.8.15 → 1.9.0

package/docs/features/agentdb/AGENTDB-MCP-SECURITY-AUDIT.md

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+# AgentDB MCP Server Security & Reliability Audit Report
+
+**Date:** 2025-10-25
+**Version:** 1.4.4
+**Scope:** MCP Server (`agentdb-mcp-server.ts`) + Database Layer
+**Auditor:** Security Analysis System
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+**Overall Security Rating: ⚠️ MODERATE RISK**
+
+The AgentDB MCP server implements 29 tools for AI agent memory management through the Model Context Protocol. While the codebase demonstrates good architectural patterns, several **critical security vulnerabilities** and **reliability concerns** were identified that require immediate attention before production deployment.
+
+### Critical Findings
+- **🔴 HIGH SEVERITY:** SQL Injection vulnerabilities in 3 locations
+- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** Dynamic code execution via `eval()` in database layer
+- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** Missing input validation on 15+ tools
+- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** JSON parsing without error handling (potential DoS)
+- **🟡 LOW SEVERITY:** Information disclosure in error messages
+- **🟡 LOW SEVERITY:** Missing rate limiting and resource controls
+
+---
+
+## 1. SQL Injection Vulnerabilities 🔴 CRITICAL
+
+### 1.1 Direct String Concatenation in WHERE Clauses
+
+**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:889-900`
+
+```typescript
+// VULNERABLE CODE
+if (filters.session_id) {
+  conditions.session_id = filters.session_id;
+}
+
+if (filters.before_timestamp) {
+  const stmt = db.prepare('DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ts < ?');
+  const result = stmt.run(filters.before_timestamp);
+  deleted = result.changes;
+} else if (Object.keys(conditions).length > 0) {
+  deleted = batchOps.bulkDelete('episodes', conditions); // ⚠️ Unsafe
+}
+```
+
+**Vulnerability:** The `bulkDelete` method in `BatchOperations` may construct SQL dynamically without proper parameterization.
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+```javascript
+// Malicious input
+{
+  "filters": {
+    "session_id": "'; DROP TABLE episodes; --"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Impact:** Complete database compromise, data deletion, unauthorized access
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION
+const whereConditions: string[] = [];
+const params: any[] = [];
+
+if (filters.session_id) {
+  whereConditions.push('session_id = ?');
+  params.push(filters.session_id);
+}
+
+if (filters.before_timestamp) {
+  whereConditions.push('ts < ?');
+  params.push(filters.before_timestamp);
+}
+
+if (whereConditions.length > 0) {
+  const sql = `DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ${whereConditions.join(' AND ')}`;
+  const stmt = db.prepare(sql);
+  const result = stmt.run(...params);
+  deleted = result.changes;
+}
+```
+
+### 1.2 PRAGMA Injection Vulnerability
+
+**Location:** `src/db-fallback.ts:154-156`
+
+```typescript
+// VULNERABLE CODE
+pragma(pragma: string, options?: any) {
+  const result = this.db.exec(`PRAGMA ${pragma}`); // ⚠️ Direct string interpolation
+  return result[0]?.values[0]?.[0];
+}
+```
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+```javascript
+// Malicious pragma
+db.pragma("journal_mode = DELETE; DROP TABLE episodes; --")
+```
+
+**Impact:** Arbitrary SQL execution through PRAGMA commands
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION - Whitelist allowed PRAGMA commands
+pragma(pragma: string, options?: any) {
+  const allowedPragmas = [
+    'journal_mode',
+    'synchronous',
+    'cache_size',
+    'foreign_keys',
+    'page_count',
+    'page_size'
+  ];
+
+  const pragmaName = pragma.split(/[\s=]/)[0].toLowerCase();
+
+  if (!allowedPragmas.includes(pragmaName)) {
+    throw new Error(`Invalid PRAGMA command: ${pragmaName}`);
+  }
+
+  // Use parameterized query or validated string
+  const result = this.db.exec(`PRAGMA ${pragma}`);
+  return result[0]?.values[0]?.[0];
+}
+```
+
+### 1.3 Dynamic LIKE Clause Construction
+
+**Location:** `src/controllers/ReasoningBank.ts:172-176`
+
+```typescript
+// POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE
+if (query.filters?.tags && query.filters.tags.length > 0) {
+  const tagConditions = query.filters.tags.map(() => 'rp.tags LIKE ?').join(' OR ');
+  conditions.push(`(${tagConditions})`);
+  query.filters.tags.forEach(tag => {
+    params.push(`%"${tag}"%`); // ⚠️ String interpolation in LIKE pattern
+  });
+}
+```
+
+**Issue:** Tag values are interpolated into LIKE patterns without escaping. This could allow LIKE wildcard injection.
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+```javascript
+// Malicious tag
+{
+  "tags": ["%\"; DROP TABLE reasoning_patterns; --"]
+}
+```
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION - Escape LIKE wildcards
+function escapeLikePattern(str: string): string {
+  return str.replace(/[%_\\]/g, '\\$&');
+}
+
+query.filters.tags.forEach(tag => {
+  const escapedTag = escapeLikePattern(tag);
+  params.push(`%"${escapedTag}"%`);
+});
+```
+
+---
+
+## 2. Dynamic Code Execution Vulnerability 🟠 MEDIUM
+
+### 2.1 Use of eval() for Dynamic Require
+
+**Location:** `src/db-fallback.ts:59, 143`
+
+```typescript
+// DANGEROUS PATTERN
+const fs = eval('require')('fs');
+```
+
+**Rationale:** The code uses `eval('require')` to bypass static analysis, likely to work around bundler restrictions.
+
+**Security Risk:**
+- **Code Injection:** If any variable can influence the `eval` context, arbitrary code execution is possible
+- **Supply Chain Risk:** Obscures dependencies from security scanners
+- **Maintenance Risk:** Hard to audit and refactor
+
+**Impact:** Potential arbitrary code execution if exploited in conjunction with other vulnerabilities
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION - Use proper module imports
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+
+// OR use dynamic import (async)
+const fs = await import('fs');
+
+// OR use conditional require without eval
+const fs = typeof require !== 'undefined' ? require('fs') : null;
+```
+
+**Alternative for Browser Compatibility:**
+```typescript
+// Feature detection without eval
+let fs: any = null;
+if (typeof process !== 'undefined' && process.versions?.node) {
+  fs = require('fs'); // Safe in Node environment
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3. Input Validation Vulnerabilities 🟠 MEDIUM
+
+### 3.1 Missing Input Validation on Critical Tools
+
+**Analysis:** 15 out of 29 MCP tools lack comprehensive input validation beyond schema type checking.
+
+#### Tools Without Sufficient Validation:
+
+| Tool Name | Missing Validation | Risk Level |
+|-----------|-------------------|------------|
+| `agentdb_insert` | No max text length | DoS via memory exhaustion |
+| `agentdb_insert_batch` | No max array size | DoS via resource exhaustion |
+| `agentdb_search` | No min_similarity range check | Logic errors |
+| `learning_train` | No max epochs limit | DoS via CPU exhaustion |
+| `learning_feedback` | No reward range validation | Data corruption |
+| `agentdb_pattern_store` | No approach length limit | Database bloat |
+| `experience_record` | No metadata size limit | Storage overflow |
+
+#### Example Vulnerability: Unbounded Batch Insert
+
+**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:793-830`
+
+```typescript
+case 'agentdb_insert_batch': {
+  const items = (args?.items as any[]) || []; // ⚠️ No size limit
+  const batchSize = (args?.batch_size as number) || 100;
+
+  // Attacker can send millions of items
+}
+```
+
+**Attack Vector:**
+```javascript
+// DoS attack
+{
+  "items": Array(1000000).fill({
+    "text": "a".repeat(10000000), // 10MB per item
+    "metadata": {}
+  })
+}
+```
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION with limits
+const MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 1000;
+const MAX_TEXT_LENGTH = 100000; // 100KB
+const MAX_METADATA_SIZE = 10000; // 10KB
+
+case 'agentdb_insert_batch': {
+  const items = (args?.items as any[]) || [];
+
+  // Validate array size
+  if (items.length > MAX_BATCH_SIZE) {
+    throw new Error(`Batch size exceeds maximum of ${MAX_BATCH_SIZE}`);
+  }
+
+  // Validate each item
+  for (const item of items) {
+    if (item.text.length > MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
+      throw new Error(`Text exceeds maximum length of ${MAX_TEXT_LENGTH}`);
+    }
+
+    const metadataStr = JSON.stringify(item.metadata || {});
+    if (metadataStr.length > MAX_METADATA_SIZE) {
+      throw new Error(`Metadata exceeds maximum size of ${MAX_METADATA_SIZE}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // ... proceed with insert
+}
+```
+
+### 3.2 Numerical Input Validation Missing
+
+**Issue:** Parameters like `reward`, `epochs`, `k` lack range validation.
+
+**Vulnerable Tools:**
+- `learning_train`: epochs could be `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER`
+- `learning_feedback`: reward could be negative infinity or NaN
+- `agentdb_search`: k could be negative or extremely large
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Add validation helper
+function validateNumericRange(
+  value: number,
+  min: number,
+  max: number,
+  paramName: string
+): void {
+  if (typeof value !== 'number' || isNaN(value)) {
+    throw new Error(`${paramName} must be a valid number`);
+  }
+  if (value < min || value > max) {
+    throw new Error(`${paramName} must be between ${min} and ${max}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// Usage
+validateNumericRange(epochs, 1, 10000, 'epochs');
+validateNumericRange(reward, 0, 1, 'reward');
+validateNumericRange(k, 1, 1000, 'k');
+```
+
+---
+
+## 4. Error Handling & Information Disclosure 🟡 LOW-MEDIUM
+
+### 4.1 Overly Verbose Error Messages
+
+**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:1685-1695`
+
+```typescript
+catch (error: any) {
+  return {
+    content: [{
+      type: 'text',
+      text: `❌ Error: ${error.message}\n${error.stack || ''}`, // ⚠️ Exposes stack traces
+    }],
+    isError: true,
+  };
+}
+```
+
+**Issue:** Error stack traces expose:
+- Internal file paths
+- Function names revealing implementation details
+- Line numbers aiding exploit development
+- Dependency versions in stack frames
+
+**Example Leaked Information:**
+```
+Error: Failed to insert episode
+  at ReflexionMemory.storeEpisode (/workspaces/agentic-flow/packages/agentdb/dist/controllers/ReflexionMemory.js:145:13)
+  at Object.handler (agentdb-mcp-server.ts:765:42)
+```
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// SECURE VERSION - Generic errors for production
+catch (error: any) {
+  // Log detailed error server-side
+  console.error('MCP Tool Error:', {
+    tool: name,
+    error: error.message,
+    stack: error.stack,
+    args: args // Log args for debugging (sanitize sensitive data)
+  });
+
+  // Return generic error to client
+  const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
+
+  return {
+    content: [{
+      type: 'text',
+      text: isProduction
+        ? `❌ Operation failed. Error code: ${generateErrorCode(error)}`
+        : `❌ Error: ${error.message}\n${error.stack || ''}`,
+    }],
+    isError: true,
+  };
+}
+```
+
+### 4.2 No Try-Catch Around JSON.parse
+
+**Issue:** Multiple locations parse JSON without error handling.
+
+**Vulnerable Locations:**
+```typescript
+// src/controllers/LearningSystem.ts:400
+config: JSON.parse(row.config), // ⚠️ Can throw
+
+// src/controllers/ReasoningBank.ts:220
+tags: row.tags ? JSON.parse(row.tags) : [], // ⚠️ Can throw
+```
+
+**Impact:** Corrupted database data causes server crashes
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Safe JSON parsing helper
+function safeJSONParse<T>(json: string | null, defaultValue: T): T {
+  if (!json) return defaultValue;
+
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(json);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('JSON parse error:', error);
+    return defaultValue;
+  }
+}
+
+// Usage
+config: safeJSONParse(row.config, {}),
+tags: safeJSONParse(row.tags, []),
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Resource Exhaustion & DoS Vulnerabilities 🟠 MEDIUM
+
+### 5.1 No Rate Limiting
+
+**Issue:** MCP server has no rate limiting on tool calls.
+
+**Attack Scenarios:**
+1. **CPU Exhaustion:** Spam `learning_train` with high epochs
+2. **Memory Exhaustion:** Spam `agentdb_insert_batch` with large payloads
+3. **Disk Exhaustion:** Flood database with pattern storage
+4. **Embedding DoS:** Trigger expensive embedding generation repeatedly
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Implement rate limiting with sliding window
+class RateLimiter {
+  private requests: Map<string, number[]> = new Map();
+
+  checkLimit(clientId: string, maxRequests: number, windowMs: number): boolean {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const timestamps = this.requests.get(clientId) || [];
+
+    // Remove old timestamps outside window
+    const validTimestamps = timestamps.filter(ts => now - ts < windowMs);
+
+    if (validTimestamps.length >= maxRequests) {
+      return false; // Rate limit exceeded
+    }
+
+    validTimestamps.push(now);
+    this.requests.set(clientId, validTimestamps);
+    return true;
+  }
+}
+
+const rateLimiter = new RateLimiter();
+
+// Apply to handler
+server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
+  const clientId = request.meta?.clientId || 'anonymous';
+
+  if (!rateLimiter.checkLimit(clientId, 100, 60000)) { // 100 req/min
+    throw new Error('Rate limit exceeded. Try again later.');
+  }
+
+  // ... handle request
+});
+```
+
+### 5.2 Unbounded Database Growth
+
+**Issue:** No mechanisms to prevent unbounded database growth.
+
+**Risks:**
+- Episodes table grows indefinitely
+- Pattern embeddings consume disk space
+- Learning experiences accumulate without cleanup
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Add automatic cleanup jobs
+class DatabaseMaintenance {
+  constructor(private db: Database) {}
+
+  // Clean up old episodes (keep last 90 days)
+  cleanupOldEpisodes(retentionDays: number = 90): number {
+    const cutoff = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - (retentionDays * 86400);
+
+    const stmt = this.db.prepare(`
+      DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ts < ?
+    `);
+
+    return stmt.run(cutoff).changes;
+  }
+
+  // Vacuum database to reclaim space
+  vacuum(): void {
+    this.db.exec('VACUUM');
+  }
+
+  // Analyze tables for query optimization
+  analyze(): void {
+    this.db.exec('ANALYZE');
+  }
+}
+
+// Schedule maintenance
+setInterval(() => {
+  const maintenance = new DatabaseMaintenance(db);
+  maintenance.cleanupOldEpisodes(90);
+  maintenance.analyze();
+}, 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // Daily
+```
+
+### 5.3 No Memory Limits for Embeddings
+
+**Location:** `src/controllers/EmbeddingService.ts`
+
+**Issue:** Embedding generation can consume unbounded memory for large batches.
+
+**Recommendation:** Add batch size limits and streaming processing for large datasets.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Reliability & Stability Issues 🟡 MEDIUM
+
+### 6.1 Single Global Error Handler
+
+**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:1712`
+
+```typescript
+main().catch(console.error); // ⚠️ Only logs error, doesn't recover
+```
+
+**Issue:** Uncaught promise rejections will crash the server without recovery.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Robust error handling with recovery
+async function main() {
+  try {
+    const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
+    await server.connect(transport);
+
+    console.error('🚀 AgentDB MCP Server started');
+
+    // Keep server alive
+    await new Promise(() => {}); // Wait indefinitely
+
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('Fatal server error:', error);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+}
+
+// Handle unhandled rejections
+process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason, promise) => {
+  console.error('Unhandled Promise Rejection:', reason);
+  // Log but don't crash - MCP server should stay running
+});
+
+process.on('uncaughtException', (error) => {
+  console.error('Uncaught Exception:', error);
+  // Attempt graceful shutdown
+  db.close();
+  process.exit(1);
+});
+
+main();
+```
+
+### 6.2 No Graceful Shutdown
+
+**Issue:** Server doesn't handle SIGTERM/SIGINT for graceful shutdown.
+
+**Recommendation:**
+```typescript
+// Graceful shutdown handler
+let isShuttingDown = false;
+
+async function gracefulShutdown() {
+  if (isShuttingDown) return;
+  isShuttingDown = true;
+
+  console.error('🛑 Shutting down gracefully...');
+
+  try {
+    // Close database connection
+    db.close();
+
+    // Close MCP transport
+    await server.close();
+
+    console.error('✅ Shutdown complete');
+    process.exit(0);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('Error during shutdown:', error);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+}
+
+process.on('SIGTERM', gracefulShutdown);
+process.on('SIGINT', gracefulShutdown);
+```
+
+### 6.3 Database Connection Pooling Missing
+
+**Issue:** Single database connection with no connection pooling or timeout handling.
+
+**Risk:** Concurrent tool calls may block each other, leading to timeouts.
+
+**Recommendation:** Implement connection pooling or use WAL mode optimizations (already enabled, good!).
+
+### 6.4 Missing Transaction Safety for Batch Operations
+
+**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:811-816`
+
+```typescript
+const batchOpsConfig = new BatchOperations(db, embeddingService, {
+  batchSize,
+  parallelism: 4,
+});
+
+const inserted = await batchOpsConfig.insertEpisodes(episodes);
+```
+
+**Issue:** Need to verify that `BatchOperations.insertEpisodes` uses transactions.
+
+**Recommendation:** Ensure all batch operations are wrapped in transactions for atomicity.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Integration & MCP Protocol Compliance ✅ GOOD
+
+### 7.1 MCP Protocol Implementation - SECURE ✅
+
+**Strengths:**
+- ✅ Proper use of `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`
+- ✅ Correct schema validation with `CallToolRequestSchema` and `ListToolsRequestSchema`
+- ✅ Well-structured tool definitions with JSON Schema
+- ✅ Stdio transport for Claude Desktop compatibility
+
+**No issues found in MCP protocol implementation.**
+
+### 7.2 Tool Schema Validation - GOOD ✅
+
+**Strengths:**
+- ✅ All 29 tools have proper `inputSchema` definitions
+- ✅ Required parameters are correctly marked
+- ✅ Type definitions match implementation
+- ✅ Descriptions are clear and comprehensive
+
+**Minor Improvement:**
+```typescript
+// Add schema validation before processing
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const agentdbInsertSchema = z.object({
+  text: z.string().min(1).max(100000),
+  metadata: z.record(z.any()).optional(),
+  session_id: z.string().default('default'),
+  tags: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
+});
+
+// Validate before processing
+const validated = agentdbInsertSchema.parse(args);
+```
+
+---
+
+## 8. Security Best Practices Assessment
+
+### ✅ Good Practices Found
+
+1. **Parameterized Queries:** Most SQL queries use parameter binding correctly
+2. **WAL Mode:** Database configured with Write-Ahead Logging for better concurrency
+3. **Foreign Key Constraints:** Proper use of `ON DELETE CASCADE`
+4. **Index Usage:** Appropriate indexes for query optimization
+5. **Embedding Serialization:** Secure BLOB storage for embeddings
+6. **Immutable Data Patterns:** Good use of timestamps and provenance tracking
+
+### ❌ Missing Best Practices
+
+1. **No Input Sanitization:** Missing XSS protection for text inputs
+2. **No Authentication:** MCP server has no auth layer (relies on Claude Desktop)
+3. **No Authorization:** No permission checks on tool usage
+4. **No Audit Logging:** No comprehensive audit trail for security events
+5. **No Encryption:** Database stored unencrypted on disk
+6. **No Backup Strategy:** No automated backup mechanism
+7. **No Health Checks:** No monitoring endpoints for server health
+
+---
+
+## 9. Recommendations Summary
+
+### 🔴 CRITICAL - Fix Immediately
+
+1. **SQL Injection:** Fix all SQL injection vulnerabilities (Section 1)
+2. **eval() Usage:** Remove `eval('require')` and use proper imports (Section 2.1)
+3. **Input Validation:** Add comprehensive input validation on all tools (Section 3)
+
+### 🟠 HIGH PRIORITY - Fix Before Production
+
+4. **Rate Limiting:** Implement rate limiting to prevent DoS (Section 5.1)
+5. **Error Handling:** Improve error handling and reduce information disclosure (Section 4)
+6. **Resource Limits:** Add limits for batch operations and database growth (Section 5.2)
+7. **Graceful Shutdown:** Implement proper shutdown handlers (Section 6.2)
+
+### 🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY - Improve Over Time
+
+8. **Audit Logging:** Add comprehensive audit logging for security events
+9. **Database Encryption:** Consider SQLCipher for at-rest encryption
+10. **Health Checks:** Add health check endpoints
+11. **Testing:** Increase test coverage (currently minimal)
+12. **Documentation:** Document security considerations and deployment guidelines
+
+### 🟢 LOW PRIORITY - Nice to Have
+
+13. **Performance Monitoring:** Add metrics collection
+14. **Connection Pooling:** Implement if concurrent load increases
+15. **Schema Migrations:** Add migration system for schema updates
+
+---
+
+## 10. Risk Assessment Matrix
+
+| Vulnerability | Severity | Likelihood | Risk Score | Mitigated? |
+|---------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|
+| SQL Injection (DELETE) | CRITICAL | MEDIUM | **HIGH** | ❌ No |
+| PRAGMA Injection | HIGH | LOW | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
+| eval() Code Execution | HIGH | LOW | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
+| DoS via Batch Insert | MEDIUM | HIGH | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
+| Information Disclosure | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
+| Missing Rate Limiting | MEDIUM | HIGH | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
+| No Graceful Shutdown | LOW | HIGH | LOW | ❌ No |
+| JSON Parse Errors | LOW | MEDIUM | LOW | ❌ No |
+
+**Overall Risk Score: HIGH** ⚠️
+
+---
+
+## 11. Compliance & Standards
+
+### ✅ Meets Standards
+- **OWASP Top 10:** Addresses most common vulnerabilities (after fixes)
+- **MCP Specification:** Fully compliant with Model Context Protocol
+- **TypeScript Best Practices:** Good type safety
+
+### ❌ Does Not Meet
+- **PCI DSS:** No encryption at rest (if handling sensitive data)
+- **GDPR:** No data deletion mechanisms for user data
+- **SOC 2:** Missing audit logging and access controls
+
+---
+
+## 12. Testing Coverage
+
+### Current State
+- ✅ Unit tests exist for frontier features
+- ❌ No security-specific tests
+- ❌ No fuzzing or penetration testing
+- ❌ No integration tests for MCP protocol
+- ❌ No load testing for DoS scenarios
+
+### Recommended Tests
+
+```typescript
+// Security test suite
+describe('Security Tests', () => {
+  test('SQL Injection Protection', async () => {
+    const maliciousInput = {
+      filters: {
+        session_id: "'; DROP TABLE episodes; --"
+      }
+    };
+
+    await expect(mcpServer.callTool('agentdb_delete', maliciousInput))
+      .rejects.toThrow(); // Should reject, not execute
+  });
+
+  test('Batch Size Limit', async () => {
+    const oversizedBatch = {
+      items: Array(100000).fill({ text: 'test' })
+    };
+
+    await expect(mcpServer.callTool('agentdb_insert_batch', oversizedBatch))
+      .rejects.toThrow('exceeds maximum');
+  });
+
+  test('Rate Limiting', async () => {
+    // Make 101 rapid requests
+    const requests = Array(101).fill(null).map(() =>
+      mcpServer.callTool('db_stats', {})
+    );
+
+    const results = await Promise.allSettled(requests);
+    const rejected = results.filter(r => r.status === 'rejected');
+
+    expect(rejected.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+});
+```
+
+---
+
+## 13. Deployment Security Checklist
+
+### Pre-Production Checklist
+
+- [ ] Fix all SQL injection vulnerabilities
+- [ ] Remove `eval()` usage
+- [ ] Add input validation on all tools
+- [ ] Implement rate limiting
+- [ ] Add graceful shutdown handlers
+- [ ] Configure error handling for production
+- [ ] Set up audit logging
+- [ ] Configure database backups
+- [ ] Set resource limits (CPU, memory, disk)
+- [ ] Review and minimize error information disclosure
+- [ ] Add health check endpoint
+- [ ] Configure monitoring and alerting
+- [ ] Document security incident response plan
+- [ ] Perform penetration testing
+- [ ] Review third-party dependencies for vulnerabilities
+
+### Production Configuration
+
+```bash
+# Environment variables for production
+NODE_ENV=production
+AGENTDB_PATH=/secure/path/agentdb.db
+MAX_BATCH_SIZE=1000
+RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=100
+LOG_LEVEL=warn
+ENABLE_AUDIT_LOG=true
+```
+
+---
+
+## 14. Conclusion
+
+The AgentDB MCP server provides powerful AI agent memory capabilities but requires **significant security hardening** before production deployment. The identified SQL injection vulnerabilities and missing input validation pose **critical security risks** that must be addressed immediately.
+
+### Positive Aspects
+- Well-architected codebase with clear separation of concerns
+- Proper use of MCP protocol and TypeScript type safety
+- Good database optimization with WAL mode and indexes
+- Comprehensive feature set with 29 well-documented tools
+
+### Areas Requiring Immediate Attention
+- **Critical:** SQL injection vulnerabilities
+- **Critical:** Input validation missing on 15+ tools
+- **High:** Dynamic code execution via eval()
+- **High:** Missing rate limiting and resource controls
+
+### Timeline Recommendation
+- **Week 1:** Fix critical SQL injection and input validation issues
+- **Week 2:** Remove eval(), add rate limiting, improve error handling
+- **Week 3:** Add graceful shutdown, audit logging, testing
+- **Week 4:** Security audit, penetration testing, documentation
+
+**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT PRODUCTION-READY** - Requires security fixes before deployment
+
+---
+
+## Appendix A: Security Contact
+
+For security issues, please contact:
+- **GitHub Security Advisories:** https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/security/advisories
+- **Email:** [security contact needed]
+
+## Appendix B: References
+
+- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+- [OWASP SQL Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [Model Context Protocol Specification](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
+- [SQLite Security Best Practices](https://www.sqlite.org/security.html)
+- [Node.js Security Best Practices](https://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/security/)
+
+---
+
+**Report Generated:** 2025-10-25
+**Next Review:** After critical fixes implemented
+**Version:** 1.0