actionwall 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +16 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +204 -0
- package/dist/cli/format.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/cli/format.js +74 -0
- package/dist/cli/format.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cli/index.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/cli/index.js +156 -0
- package/dist/cli/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/core/audit.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/core/audit.js +126 -0
- package/dist/core/audit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/core/engine.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/core/engine.js +140 -0
- package/dist/core/engine.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/core/policy.d.ts +307 -0
- package/dist/core/policy.js +138 -0
- package/dist/core/policy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/core/types.d.ts +147 -0
- package/dist/core/types.js +24 -0
- package/dist/core/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/demo/mockAgent.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/demo/mockAgent.js +130 -0
- package/dist/demo/mockAgent.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/index.js +26 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.js +335 -0
- package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.js +165 -0
- package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/injection.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/scanners/injection.js +111 -0
- package/dist/scanners/injection.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/secrets.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/scanners/secrets.js +102 -0
- package/dist/scanners/secrets.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.js +60 -0
- package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.js +176 -0
- package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/util/ansi.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/util/ansi.js +20 -0
- package/dist/util/ansi.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/util/entropy.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/util/entropy.js +20 -0
- package/dist/util/entropy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/util/paths.d.ts +43 -0
- package/dist/util/paths.js +192 -0
- package/dist/util/paths.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/util/secretPatterns.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/util/secretPatterns.js +93 -0
- package/dist/util/secretPatterns.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/util/shell.d.ts +31 -0
- package/dist/util/shell.js +154 -0
- package/dist/util/shell.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +115 -0
- package/docs/COMPARISON.md +99 -0
- package/docs/POLICY_REFERENCE.md +126 -0
- package/docs/REQUIREMENTS.md +87 -0
- package/docs/ROADMAP.md +36 -0
- package/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md +88 -0
- package/package.json +67 -0
- package/policies/default.yaml +70 -0
- package/policies/readonly.yaml +58 -0
- package/policies/strict.yaml +75 -0
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/**
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* Path helpers: home expansion, POSIX normalization, glob matching and a
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* bounded filesystem counter used by the bulk-delete rule.
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*
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* All matching is done on POSIX-style absolute paths with any Windows drive
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* prefix ("C:") stripped, so policies written as "/etc/**" or ".env" match
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* identically on Linux, macOS and Windows.
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*/
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import { homedir } from "node:os";
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import * as fs from "node:fs";
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import * as path from "node:path";
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/** Hard caps so a pathological glob can never make the scanner hang. */
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export const WALK_MAX_ENTRIES = 5000;
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export const WALK_MAX_DEPTH = 12;
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export function expandHome(p) {
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if (p === "~")
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return homedir();
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if (p.startsWith("~/") || p.startsWith("~\\")) {
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return path.join(homedir(), p.slice(2));
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}
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return p;
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}
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/** Absolute, normalized, POSIX-flavored path (drive prefix stripped on Windows). */
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export function normalizePath(p, cwd = process.cwd()) {
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const expanded = expandHome(p);
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const resolved = path.isAbsolute(expanded) ? expanded : path.resolve(cwd, expanded);
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return stripDrive(path.normalize(resolved).replace(/\\/g, "/"));
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}
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/** Remove a leading "C:" style drive prefix, leaving "/foo/bar". */
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export function stripDrive(p) {
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return p.replace(/^[A-Za-z]:/, "");
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}
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/**
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* Glob → RegExp. Semantics kept intentionally small:
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* `**` matches any number of path segments (including none, and `/`)
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* `*` matches any characters except `/`
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* `?` matches a single character except `/`
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* Everything else is literal.
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*/
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export function globToRegExp(pattern) {
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let re = "";
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for (let i = 0; i < pattern.length; i++) {
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const ch = pattern[i];
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if (ch === "*") {
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if (pattern[i + 1] === "*") {
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// Consume the whole "**" (or "**/") run as "any segments".
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re += ".*";
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i++;
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if (pattern[i + 1] === "/")
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i++; // "**/" also matches zero segments
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}
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else {
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re += "[^/]*";
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}
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}
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else if (ch === "?") {
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re += "[^/]";
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}
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else if ("\\^$.|+()[]{}".includes(ch)) {
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re += `\\${ch}`;
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}
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else {
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re += ch;
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}
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}
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return new RegExp(`^${re}$`);
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}
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/** True when `p` (already normalized) matches a policy glob pattern. */
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export function pathMatches(pattern, p) {
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const normPattern = stripDrive(expandHome(pattern).replace(/\\/g, "/"));
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if (globToRegExp(normPattern).test(p))
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return true;
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// Convenience: a pattern like ".env" or "secrets/**" written without a
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// leading "**/" should match the file at any depth.
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if (!normPattern.startsWith("/") && !normPattern.startsWith("**")) {
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return globToRegExp(`**/${normPattern}`).test(p);
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}
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return false;
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}
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const GLOB_CHARS = /[*?[\]]/;
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export function hasGlobChars(p) {
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return GLOB_CHARS.test(p);
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}
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/**
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* Count the real files a delete of `targets` would touch, expanding globs and
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* recursing into directories. Read-only and strictly bounded.
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*/
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export function countDeletableFiles(targets, cwd = process.cwd()) {
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let files = 0;
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let capped = false;
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const bump = (n) => {
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files += n;
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if (files >= WALK_MAX_ENTRIES)
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capped = true;
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files = Math.min(files, WALK_MAX_ENTRIES);
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};
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for (const raw of targets) {
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if (capped)
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break;
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const norm = expandHome(raw);
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const abs = path.isAbsolute(norm) ? norm : path.resolve(cwd, norm);
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if (hasGlobChars(abs)) {
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const dirPart = path.dirname(abs);
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const base = path.basename(abs);
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const baseRe = globToRegExp(base);
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let entries;
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try {
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entries = fs.readdirSync(dirPart, { withFileTypes: true });
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}
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catch {
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continue; // directory does not exist → glob matches nothing
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}
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for (const entry of entries) {
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if (capped)
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break;
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if (!baseRe.test(entry.name))
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continue;
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const full = path.join(dirPart, entry.name);
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if (entry.isDirectory()) {
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const sub = countDir(full, 1);
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bump(sub.files);
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capped = capped || sub.capped;
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}
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else {
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bump(1);
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}
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}
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}
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else {
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let stat;
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try {
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stat = fs.statSync(abs);
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}
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catch {
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continue; // nothing to delete
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}
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if (stat.isDirectory()) {
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const sub = countDir(abs, 1);
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bump(sub.files);
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capped = capped || sub.capped;
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}
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else {
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bump(1);
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}
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}
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}
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return { files, capped };
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}
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/** Recursively count files inside `dir`, bounded. */
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function countDir(dir, depth) {
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if (depth > WALK_MAX_DEPTH)
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return { files: 0, capped: true };
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let files = 0;
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let capped = false;
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let entries;
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try {
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entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
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}
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catch {
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return { files: 0, capped: false };
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}
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for (const entry of entries) {
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if (files >= WALK_MAX_ENTRIES) {
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capped = true;
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break;
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}
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if (entry.isDirectory()) {
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const sub = countDir(path.join(dir, entry.name), depth + 1);
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files += sub.files;
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capped = capped || sub.capped;
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}
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else {
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files += 1;
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}
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files = Math.min(files, WALK_MAX_ENTRIES);
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}
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return { files, capped };
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}
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/**
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* True for delete targets that mean "the whole machine / home / current tree":
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* "/", "/*", "~", "~/*", "$HOME", ".", "..", "*", a bare drive root, etc.
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*/
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export function isRootishTarget(target) {
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const t = target.trim();
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if (["/", "/*", ".", "..", "./*", "../*", "*", "~", "~/*", "$HOME", "$HOME/*"].includes(t)) {
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return true;
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}
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if (/^[A-Za-z]:\\?\*?$/.test(t))
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return true; // "C:\", "C:\*", "C:"
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return false;
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=paths.js.map
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
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1
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+
/**
|
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2
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+
* Built-in credential signatures. Shared by the secrets scanner (to detect)
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3
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+
* and the audit logger (to redact), so what we log can never contain what we
|
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4
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+
* would have blocked.
|
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5
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+
*/
|
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6
|
+
export interface SecretPattern {
|
|
7
|
+
name: string;
|
|
8
|
+
regex: RegExp;
|
|
9
|
+
severity: "MEDIUM" | "HIGH" | "CRITICAL";
|
|
10
|
+
}
|
|
11
|
+
export declare const BUILTIN_SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[];
|
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12
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+
export declare function isPlaceholderValue(value: string): boolean;
|
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13
|
+
/**
|
|
14
|
+
* Replace anything that looks like a credential with a redacted form that
|
|
15
|
+
* keeps enough prefix for debugging ("AKIA…*REDACTED*").
|
|
16
|
+
*/
|
|
17
|
+
export declare function redactText(text: string): string;
|
|
18
|
+
/** Truncate long evidence strings for reports. */
|
|
19
|
+
export declare function truncate(text: string, max?: number): string;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Built-in credential signatures. Shared by the secrets scanner (to detect)
|
|
3
|
+
* and the audit logger (to redact), so what we log can never contain what we
|
|
4
|
+
* would have blocked.
|
|
5
|
+
*/
|
|
6
|
+
export const BUILTIN_SECRET_PATTERNS = [
|
|
7
|
+
{
|
|
8
|
+
name: "aws-access-key",
|
|
9
|
+
regex: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/,
|
|
10
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
11
|
+
},
|
|
12
|
+
{
|
|
13
|
+
name: "aws-secret-key",
|
|
14
|
+
regex: /aws.{0,25}?["'][0-9a-zA-Z/+]{40}["']/i,
|
|
15
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
16
|
+
},
|
|
17
|
+
{
|
|
18
|
+
name: "github-token",
|
|
19
|
+
regex: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}\b/,
|
|
20
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
21
|
+
},
|
|
22
|
+
{
|
|
23
|
+
name: "openai-key",
|
|
24
|
+
regex: /\bsk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/,
|
|
25
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
26
|
+
},
|
|
27
|
+
{
|
|
28
|
+
name: "anthropic-key",
|
|
29
|
+
regex: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/,
|
|
30
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
31
|
+
},
|
|
32
|
+
{
|
|
33
|
+
name: "stripe-live-key",
|
|
34
|
+
regex: /\b[sr]k_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}\b/,
|
|
35
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
36
|
+
},
|
|
37
|
+
{
|
|
38
|
+
name: "slack-token",
|
|
39
|
+
regex: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}\b/,
|
|
40
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
41
|
+
},
|
|
42
|
+
{
|
|
43
|
+
name: "google-api-key",
|
|
44
|
+
regex: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/,
|
|
45
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
46
|
+
},
|
|
47
|
+
{
|
|
48
|
+
name: "private-key-block",
|
|
49
|
+
regex: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----/,
|
|
50
|
+
severity: "CRITICAL",
|
|
51
|
+
},
|
|
52
|
+
{
|
|
53
|
+
name: "jwt",
|
|
54
|
+
regex: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{5,}\b/,
|
|
55
|
+
severity: "HIGH",
|
|
56
|
+
},
|
|
57
|
+
{
|
|
58
|
+
name: "credential-assignment",
|
|
59
|
+
// password=hunter2, API_KEY: "abc123..." — value must look non-trivial.
|
|
60
|
+
regex: /\b(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|password|passwd|pwd|token|auth[_-]?token|access[_-]?token)\b["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?([A-Za-z0-9_\-./+=]{8,})/i,
|
|
61
|
+
severity: "MEDIUM",
|
|
62
|
+
},
|
|
63
|
+
];
|
|
64
|
+
/** Values that look like credentials but are obviously placeholders. */
|
|
65
|
+
const PLACEHOLDER_RE = /^(?:\$\{.*\}|\$[A-Z_]+$|<[^>]+>|\*+$|x+$|\.+$|changeme|change-me|example.*|placeholder.*|your[-_].*|dummy.*|test.*|xxxx.*)$/i;
|
|
66
|
+
export function isPlaceholderValue(value) {
|
|
67
|
+
return PLACEHOLDER_RE.test(value.trim());
|
|
68
|
+
}
|
|
69
|
+
/**
|
|
70
|
+
* Replace anything that looks like a credential with a redacted form that
|
|
71
|
+
* keeps enough prefix for debugging ("AKIA…*REDACTED*").
|
|
72
|
+
*/
|
|
73
|
+
export function redactText(text) {
|
|
74
|
+
let out = text;
|
|
75
|
+
for (const { regex } of BUILTIN_SECRET_PATTERNS) {
|
|
76
|
+
out = out.replace(regex, (match, group1) => {
|
|
77
|
+
// For credential-assignment the secret is in group 1; keep the key name.
|
|
78
|
+
if (group1 !== undefined && group1.length > 0) {
|
|
79
|
+
const idx = match.lastIndexOf(group1);
|
|
80
|
+
const head = match.slice(0, idx);
|
|
81
|
+
return `${head}*REDACTED*`;
|
|
82
|
+
}
|
|
83
|
+
const keep = Math.min(4, Math.floor(match.length / 4));
|
|
84
|
+
return `${match.slice(0, keep)}*REDACTED*`;
|
|
85
|
+
});
|
|
86
|
+
}
|
|
87
|
+
return out;
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
/** Truncate long evidence strings for reports. */
|
|
90
|
+
export function truncate(text, max = 120) {
|
|
91
|
+
return text.length <= max ? text : `${text.slice(0, max - 1)}…`;
|
|
92
|
+
}
|
|
93
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=secretPatterns.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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/**
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* A small, safe shell tokenizer. ActionWall never executes commands — it only
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* needs to split them the way a POSIX shell would so risk rules can inspect
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* the pieces. Heredocs, arithmetic and process substitution are treated as
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* opaque strings (and flagged as obfuscation by the command scanner).
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*/
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export interface ParsedCommand {
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/** The program name with any leading `VAR=x` assignments removed. */
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name: string;
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/** Arguments (quotes resolved), flags included verbatim. */
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args: string[];
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/** Full raw segment, for evidence. */
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raw: string;
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}
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/** Split a command line on top-level `&&`, `||`, `;` and `|` operators,
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* respecting single/double quotes. Returns the pipeline segments in order
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* plus the operators that joined them. */
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export declare function splitSegments(command: string): {
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segments: string[];
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operators: string[];
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};
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/** Tokenize one segment into words the way a shell would (quote-aware). */
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export declare function tokenize(segment: string): string[];
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/** Parse a single segment into { name, args }, skipping `VAR=value` prefixes. */
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export declare function parseCommand(segment: string): ParsedCommand | null;
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/** True when `args[index]` is a flag (not a positional target). */
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export declare function isFlag(token: string, prev: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Positional (non-flag) tokens of an arg list — usually the file targets. */
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export declare function positionalArgs(args: string[]): string[];
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/** Extract redirect targets (`> file`, `>> file`) from a raw segment. */
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export declare function redirectTargets(segment: string): string[];
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@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
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/**
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2
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+
* A small, safe shell tokenizer. ActionWall never executes commands — it only
|
|
3
|
+
* needs to split them the way a POSIX shell would so risk rules can inspect
|
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4
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+
* the pieces. Heredocs, arithmetic and process substitution are treated as
|
|
5
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+
* opaque strings (and flagged as obfuscation by the command scanner).
|
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6
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+
*/
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7
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+
/** Split a command line on top-level `&&`, `||`, `;` and `|` operators,
|
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8
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+
* respecting single/double quotes. Returns the pipeline segments in order
|
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9
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+
* plus the operators that joined them. */
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export function splitSegments(command) {
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const segments = [];
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const operators = [];
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let current = "";
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let quote = null;
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let i = 0;
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16
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const pushSegment = () => {
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if (current.trim().length > 0)
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segments.push(current.trim());
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current = "";
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};
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const pushOperator = (op) => {
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pushSegment();
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operators.push(op);
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};
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while (i < command.length) {
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const ch = command[i];
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if (quote) {
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+
current += ch;
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if (ch === quote)
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quote = null;
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31
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+
i++;
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+
continue;
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}
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34
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+
if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
|
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35
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+
quote = ch;
|
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36
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+
current += ch;
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37
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+
i++;
|
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38
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+
continue;
|
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39
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+
}
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40
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+
if (ch === "\\" && i + 1 < command.length) {
|
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41
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current += ch + command[i + 1];
|
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42
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+
i += 2;
|
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43
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+
continue;
|
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44
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+
}
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45
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const two = command.slice(i, i + 2);
|
|
46
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+
if (two === "&&" || two === "||") {
|
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47
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+
pushOperator(two);
|
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48
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+
i += 2;
|
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49
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+
continue;
|
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50
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+
}
|
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51
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+
if (ch === ";" || ch === "|") {
|
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52
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pushOperator(ch);
|
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53
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+
i++;
|
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54
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+
continue;
|
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}
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56
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current += ch;
|
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+
i++;
|
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58
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+
}
|
|
59
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+
pushSegment();
|
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60
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+
return { segments, operators };
|
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61
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+
}
|
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62
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+
/** Tokenize one segment into words the way a shell would (quote-aware). */
|
|
63
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+
export function tokenize(segment) {
|
|
64
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+
const tokens = [];
|
|
65
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+
let current = "";
|
|
66
|
+
let quote = null;
|
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67
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+
let i = 0;
|
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68
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+
let started = false;
|
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69
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+
while (i < segment.length) {
|
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70
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+
const ch = segment[i];
|
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71
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+
if (quote) {
|
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72
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+
if (ch === quote) {
|
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73
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quote = null; // closing quote: not part of the token
|
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74
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+
}
|
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75
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+
else {
|
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76
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+
current += ch;
|
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+
}
|
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78
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+
i++;
|
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79
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+
continue;
|
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80
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+
}
|
|
81
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+
if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
|
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82
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+
quote = ch;
|
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83
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+
started = true;
|
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84
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+
i++;
|
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85
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+
continue;
|
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86
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+
}
|
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87
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+
if (/\s/.test(ch)) {
|
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88
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+
if (current.length > 0 || started) {
|
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89
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+
tokens.push(current);
|
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+
current = "";
|
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91
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+
started = false;
|
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92
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+
}
|
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93
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+
i++;
|
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94
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continue;
|
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}
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96
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current += ch;
|
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+
i++;
|
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98
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+
}
|
|
99
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+
if (current.length > 0 || started)
|
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100
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+
tokens.push(current);
|
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101
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+
return tokens;
|
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102
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+
}
|
|
103
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+
/** Parse a single segment into { name, args }, skipping `VAR=value` prefixes. */
|
|
104
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+
export function parseCommand(segment) {
|
|
105
|
+
const tokens = tokenize(segment);
|
|
106
|
+
let i = 0;
|
|
107
|
+
while (i < tokens.length && /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=/.test(tokens[i])) {
|
|
108
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+
i++; // environment assignment prefix: FOO=bar cmd ...
|
|
109
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+
}
|
|
110
|
+
const rest = tokens.slice(i);
|
|
111
|
+
if (rest.length === 0)
|
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112
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+
return null;
|
|
113
|
+
return { name: rest[0], args: rest.slice(1), raw: segment };
|
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114
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+
}
|
|
115
|
+
const FLAGS_WITH_VALUES = new Set(["-o", "-exec", "-name", "-if", "-of", "-size", "-e"]);
|
|
116
|
+
/** True when `args[index]` is a flag (not a positional target). */
|
|
117
|
+
export function isFlag(token, prev) {
|
|
118
|
+
if (token.startsWith("-") && token !== "-") {
|
|
119
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+
// Long options and clustered short flags are flags; a lone "-" is stdin.
|
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120
|
+
if (FLAGS_WITH_VALUES.has(token))
|
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+
return true;
|
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+
return true;
|
|
123
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+
}
|
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124
|
+
if (prev !== undefined && FLAGS_WITH_VALUES.has(prev))
|
|
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return true;
|
|
126
|
+
return false;
|
|
127
|
+
}
|
|
128
|
+
/** Positional (non-flag) tokens of an arg list — usually the file targets. */
|
|
129
|
+
export function positionalArgs(args) {
|
|
130
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
131
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
|
|
132
|
+
const tok = args[i];
|
|
133
|
+
if (isFlag(tok, args[i - 1]))
|
|
134
|
+
continue;
|
|
135
|
+
// Skip a value that belongs to a value-taking flag.
|
|
136
|
+
if (args[i - 1] !== undefined && FLAGS_WITH_VALUES.has(args[i - 1]))
|
|
137
|
+
continue;
|
|
138
|
+
out.push(tok);
|
|
139
|
+
}
|
|
140
|
+
return out;
|
|
141
|
+
}
|
|
142
|
+
/** Extract redirect targets (`> file`, `>> file`) from a raw segment. */
|
|
143
|
+
export function redirectTargets(segment) {
|
|
144
|
+
const tokens = tokenize(segment);
|
|
145
|
+
const targets = [];
|
|
146
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
|
|
147
|
+
const tok = tokens[i];
|
|
148
|
+
if (/^\d*>>?$/.test(tok) && tokens[i + 1] !== undefined) {
|
|
149
|
+
targets.push(tokens[i + 1]);
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
|
151
|
+
}
|
|
152
|
+
return targets;
|
|
153
|
+
}
|
|
154
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=shell.js.map
|
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
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# ActionWall — Architecture
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## 1. Bird's-eye view
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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A[AI Agent] -->|Action| E[ShieldEngine]
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P[(Policy YAML)] -->|loadPolicy + zod| E
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E --> S1[toolPermissions]
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E --> S2[commandRisk]
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E --> S3[filePolicy]
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E --> S4[secrets]
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E --> S5[urlPolicy]
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E --> S6[injection]
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S1 & S2 & S3 & S4 & S5 & S6 -->|Finding[]| AGG[Aggregate + thresholds]
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AGG -->|Decision| D[ALLOW / BLOCK / ASK_HUMAN]
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AGG -->|append| L[(Audit JSONL\nhash chain)]
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D --> T[Tool executor\nonly if not BLOCK]
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```
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ActionWall is a **library first**. The engine is a pure(ish) function: `(Action, Policy) → Decision`, plus an audit side-effect. The CLI and demo are thin layers on the same API.
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## 2. Data model (src/core/types.ts)
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- **Action** — what the agent wants: `{ id, timestamp, agentId, tool, params, context }`.
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`tool` is a canonical name (`shell`, `file.read`, `http.request`, …). `context.toolOutput` carries untrusted external content for injection scanning.
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- **Finding** — one violation: `{ scanner, ruleId, severity, title, reason, policyRef, evidence }`. Evidence is always redacted and truncated.
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- **Decision** — `{ verdict, risk, findings, summary, latencyMs, timestamp }`.
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- **Verdict mapping** — policy `risk_thresholds`: severities in `block` → BLOCK, in `ask` → ASK_HUMAN, otherwise ALLOW.
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## 3. The pipeline (src/core/engine.ts)
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1. Run every scanner in order: toolPermissions → commandRisk → filePolicy → secrets → urlPolicy → injection. (Permissions first — the cheap coarse gate; content scanners next.)
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2. Aggregate: decision risk = max finding severity (LOW if none).
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3. Map through `risk_thresholds`.
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4. Append to the audit log (unless disabled or ALLOW with `log_allowed: false`).
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**Failure semantics.** A scanner that throws produces a synthetic finding `SCANNER-FAILURE` — CRITICAL (block) when `fail_closed: true` (default), LOW when fail-open. An audit write failure does not lose the decision; it appends an `AUDIT-WRITE-FAILURE` finding. Rationale: a firewall that crashes open is worse than no firewall, but operators must be able to opt out explicitly for availability-critical paths.
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## 4. Scanner contract
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```ts
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interface Scanner {
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name: string;
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scan(action: Action, policy: PolicyDoc): Finding[];
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}
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```
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Rules for implementations:
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- **Pure** — no command execution, no network. Read-only filesystem access is allowed where the scanner's purpose demands it (bulk-delete counting) and must be bounded.
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- **Return []** for anything not applicable (e.g. commandRisk on an http.request).
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- **Redact evidence** — anything resembling a credential passes through `redactText()`.
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- **Cite policy** — findings set `policyRef` so the report can point at the exact knob.
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### Adding a scanner
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1. Implement the contract (drop it in `src/scanners/`).
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2. Add it to `DEFAULT_SCANNERS` in `src/core/engine.ts` (or inject via `new ShieldEngine(policy, { scanners })`).
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3. Add tests + a row in REQUIREMENTS/README.
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This is also the extension seam for ML-based classifiers (e.g. a small model scoring injection likelihood) — they return findings like any rule-based scanner.
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## 5. Key design decisions
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### D1 — Rule-based first, ML later
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Rules are deterministic, testable, fast (~1–5 ms), auditable, and explainable. For a *firewall* (a control-plane component), "why was this blocked?" must have an exact answer. ML classifiers are a great **addition** (pluggable scanner) but a poor foundation: non-deterministic, unexplainable, and gameable.
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### D2 — Analyze, never execute
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The shell tokenizer (`util/shell.ts`) is quote-aware and handles chains (`&&`, `;`, `||`, `|`) so each segment is inspected; a fork bomb is matched on the full command because it spans operators. We deliberately do not resolve commands "the way bash would" beyond tokenization — deeper emulation adds complexity and new bypasses; the residual ambiguity is handled by conservative rules (e.g. command substitution = MEDIUM, eval = HIGH).
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### D3 — Count, don't guess, for bulk deletes
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The headline policy ("no more than 10 automatic deletions") is enforced by **actually counting** the files a glob would remove via a bounded, read-only walk (`util/paths.ts`: 5000-entry cap, depth 12, glob expansion). Severity escalates to CRITICAL when the count exceeds the limit. This turns an intention-based rule ("destructive") into a measurable one ("12 > 10").
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### D4 — Path normalization against traversal & platform drift
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All paths are home-expanded, resolved, and normalized to POSIX form with any Windows drive prefix stripped before matching (`/etc/**` and `~/.ssh/**` work everywhere). Because matching happens on the *resolved* path, `../../` traversal is defeated by construction — the resolved location is what gets policy-checked. Protected-path rules are first-match-wins so ordering is explicit in the policy file.
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### D5 — Secrets: signatures + entropy + redaction everywhere
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Well-known formats (AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, Stripe, Slack, JWT, PEM blocks) are regex signatures; unknown formats are covered by a Shannon-entropy heuristic (≥ 32 chars, entropy ≥ 4.0 → MEDIUM). Placeholder values (`changeme`, `${DB_PASS}`) are filtered to avoid alert fatigue. Critically, the same pattern set drives **log redaction** — the audit trail can't store what the scanner would have blocked.
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### D6 — SSRF guard with a metadata-endpoint special case
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`169.254.169.254` (and GCP/Aliyun equivalents) get CRITICAL because that's the canonical cloud-credential-theft path for compromised agents; the rest of RFC1918/loopback/link-local gets HIGH. Domain allow/deny lists support `*.example.com` wildcards; an empty allowlist means "any public domain".
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### D7 — Tamper-evident audit, not tamper-proof
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JSONL records hash-chain to their predecessor (`hash = sha256(prevHash + record)`); `log --verify` re-walks the chain and names the first broken entry. A local attacker with filesystem write access can still rewrite the *whole* file consistently (they'd need to recompute every hash — feasible), so this is **tamper-evident**, not tamper-proof. Full integrity would need an external anchor (append-only remote sink, signing key in an HSM) — see ROADMAP.
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### D8 — Fail-closed defaults, explicit escapes
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Deny wins over allow in tool permissions; deny-by-default is one flag away; scanner crashes block. Everything that opens the firewall (`fail_open`, `allow_outside_workspace`, `log_allowed: false`) is an explicit, greppable policy decision.
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## 6. Latency budget
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| Stage | Typical |
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|---|---|
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| Scanner runs (6) | 0.7–5 ms |
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| Bulk-delete counting | bounded walk; skipped when a rootish target already blocks |
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| Audit append | ~0.1–1 ms (sync appendFile, one line) |
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| **Total** | **< 10 ms typical, < 50 ms p95 budget (NFR-1)** |
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## 7. Module map
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| Module | Responsibility |
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| `core/types.ts` | Data model + severity aggregation |
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| `core/policy.ts` | YAML/JSON loading, zod validation, safe defaults |
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| `core/engine.ts` | Pipeline, thresholds, fail-closed, audit wiring |
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| `core/audit.ts` | JSONL append, hash chain, verify, tail |
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| `scanners/*` | One file per scanner, contract above |
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| `util/shell.ts` | Quote-aware tokenizer, segment splitter, redirect parsing |
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| `util/paths.ts` | Home expansion, POSIX normalization, glob→regex, bounded counting |
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| `util/secretPatterns.ts` | Signature table + redaction (shared by scanner and logger) |
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| `cli/*` | Commander wiring + colored report formatting |
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| `demo/mockAgent.ts` | Scripted 9-step agent used by `demo` |
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## 8. What v1 does *not* do (pointers)
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See THREAT_MODEL.md for the honest limits (obfuscated payloads, homoglyph attacks, shell emulation depth, whole-file rewriting of the audit chain) and ROADMAP.md for where those get addressed.
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