@yansigit/opencodex 2.31.0

package/src/server/management/sidebar-routes.ts

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+/**
+ * /api/github/star and /api/update/badge — the two cheap polls behind the
+ * sidebar's GitHub star and update controls.
+ *
+ * Both ride the standard management gate (auth + origin check happen before
+ * dispatch), and both are scalar-only: a star state enum, a repo slug, version
+ * strings, and a fixed error code. No GitHub token, account login, or raw `gh`/npm
+ * output is ever serialized here — starring runs through the user's own `gh` CLI and
+ * this surface only learns the yes/no answer. `gh` writes the authenticated account
+ * name to stderr, so that output is discarded at the source rather than forwarded.
+ *
+ * The star POST additionally requires a dashboard session. Management auth proves
+ * the caller reached the admin token, not that a person chose to star: a coding
+ * agent runs on the user's machine and can read that token from disk, so the CLI's
+ * "ask the user" deferral would be bypassable with one `curl` here.
+ *
+ * The requirement is unconditional, and that is the point. It used to apply only
+ * when `isAgentDriven()` was true — but that function reads the SERVER's
+ * environment, not the caller's, so a proxy already running as a service (no agent
+ * markers, the normal remote setup) accepted a raw-token star from anyone who could
+ * read the token, which includes every agent on the machine. The provenance of the
+ * HTTP caller is not knowable from the server's env; only the credential is. So the
+ * mutation asks for a GUI session this process minted for a browser, which the auth
+ * gate accepts only after matching origin and the per-session CSRF token.
+ */
+import { jsonResponse } from "../auth-cors";
+import { agentDrivenMarkers } from "../../cli/agent-driven";
+import type { ManagementContext } from "./context";
+
+/**
+ * True only when a minted GUI session authorized this request.
+ *
+ * The previous version of this check looked for an `Origin` plus the CSRF headers
+ * and reasoned that the auth gate had already validated them. It had not: the gate
+ * accepts a raw admin token BEFORE it ever consults the session table, so a caller
+ * holding that token (any process running as the user, a coding agent included)
+ * could add three nonempty headers of its choosing and satisfy this check without
+ * a browser ever being involved. The credential itself is the only part of the
+ * request an agent cannot fabricate, so that is what this now reads.
+ */
+function hasBrowserSessionEvidence(ctx: ManagementContext): boolean {
+  return ctx.principal === "gui-session";
+}
+
+// Known edge, deliberately fail-closed: a non-loopback operator dashboard that signs
+// in with the raw admin token instead of a minted GUI session gets its click refused,
+// and the response names the one-line `gh` command to run by hand. That is the
+// correct trade — an endpoint reachable with a readable token cannot establish that
+// a human chose to spend their own GitHub identity.
+//
+// The honest limit of this guard: a local process running AS THE USER can mint its
+// own GUI session (the dashboard bootstrap is served to any loopback GET) and can
+// equally just run `gh api -X PUT /user/starred/...` itself, which needs no proxy at
+// all. No check inside this process can distinguish that caller from the browser,
+// because both hold every local credential. So this endpoint is not a technical
+// barrier against a determined local agent — it removes the CASUAL path (an agent
+// that would have POSTed here because the endpoint existed) and makes the refusal
+// legible. The actual boundary is normative and lives in AGENTS.md: an agent must
+// not spend the user's identity, whichever mechanism is at hand.
+
+export async function handleSidebarRoutes(ctx: ManagementContext): Promise<Response | null> {
+  const { req, url } = ctx;
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/github/star" && req.method === "GET") {
+    const { getStarStatus } = await import("../../github/star-state");
+    return jsonResponse(await getStarStatus());
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/github/star" && req.method === "POST") {
+    const { STAR_REPO, STAR_REPO_URL, starRepository } = await import("../../github/star-state");
+    // Starring uses the user's GitHub identity, so consent must come from the
+    // account owner. Only a minted dashboard session evidences that; a caller
+    // holding the admin token must relay the question instead of answering it
+    // with an HTTP call.
+    if (!hasBrowserSessionEvidence(ctx)) {
+      const markers = agentDrivenMarkers().slice(0, 3);
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: false,
+        state: "not-starred",
+        repo: STAR_REPO,
+        url: STAR_REPO_URL,
+        code: "agent_consent_required",
+        message:
+          `Refused: this request carries no dashboard session`
+          + `${markers.length ? ` (agent session detected: ${markers.join(", ")})` : ""}. `
+          + `Starring writes to the user's own GitHub account, so ask the user `
+          + `directly as a required Yes/No choice — not a soft aside, and no answer is not a No, so re-ask `
+          + `it unchanged while it is open — and only if they say yes run: `
+          + `gh api -X PUT /user/starred/${STAR_REPO}`,
+      }, 403);
+    }
+    const result = await starRepository();
+    return jsonResponse({
+      ...result.status,
+      ok: result.ok,
+      ...(result.code ? { code: result.code } : {}),
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/update/badge" && req.method === "GET") {
+    const { readUpdateBadge } = await import("../../update/badge");
+    return jsonResponse(readUpdateBadge());
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}

package/src/server/management/storage-log-guard-routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+import { resolveCodexHomeDir } from "../../codex/home";
+import {
+  compactCodexLogs,
+  type CodexLogGuardCompactionResult,
+} from "../../codex/log-guard/maintenance";
+import {
+  getCodexLogGuardProtectionStatus,
+  protectCodexLogs,
+  repairCodexLogGuardProtection,
+  unprotectCodexLogs,
+  type CodexLogGuardMutationResult,
+  type CodexLogGuardStatus,
+} from "../../codex/log-guard/protection";
+import { scanStorage } from "../../storage/scanner";
+import { jsonResponse } from "../auth-cors";
+import {
+  managementBodyTooLargeResponse,
+  readManagementJsonBody,
+} from "./body";
+import type { ManagementContext } from "./context";
+
+const INSPECTION_FAILED_MESSAGE = "Codex log inspection failed";
+
+function inspectionUnavailable(report: CodexLogGuardStatus): boolean {
+  return report.schema.state === "unavailable";
+}
+
+function mutationStatus(result: CodexLogGuardMutationResult): number {
+  if (result.ok) return 200;
+  switch (result.error) {
+    case "process_enumeration_failed":
+      return 503;
+    case "codex_running":
+    case "busy":
+    case "unsupported_schema":
+    case "trigger_collision":
+    case "unsafe_path":
+      return 409;
+    case "database_error":
+    case "config_write_failed":
+      return 500;
+  }
+}
+
+function compactStatus(result: CodexLogGuardCompactionResult): number {
+  if (result.ok) return 200;
+  switch (result.error) {
+    case "process_enumeration_failed":
+      return 503;
+    case "codex_running":
+    case "busy":
+    case "unsupported_schema":
+    case "auto_vacuum_not_incremental":
+    case "unsafe_path":
+    case "integrity_check_failed":
+      return 409;
+    case "database_error":
+      return 500;
+  }
+}
+
+function mutationResponse(
+  result: CodexLogGuardMutationResult,
+  ctx: ManagementContext,
+): Response {
+  return result.ok
+    ? jsonResponse(result.status, 200, ctx.req, ctx.config)
+    : jsonResponse({ error: result.error }, mutationStatus(result), ctx.req, ctx.config);
+}
+
+function compactResponse(
+  result: CodexLogGuardCompactionResult,
+  ctx: ManagementContext,
+): Response {
+  if (result.ok) {
+    return jsonResponse({ report: result.report }, 200, ctx.req, ctx.config);
+  }
+  return jsonResponse(
+    result.error === "integrity_check_failed"
+      ? { error: result.error, phase: result.phase }
+      : { error: result.error },
+    compactStatus(result),
+    ctx.req,
+    ctx.config,
+  );
+}
+
+async function readProtectMode(ctx: ManagementContext): Promise<"compat" | "quiet" | Response> {
+  let body: unknown;
+  try {
+    body = await readManagementJsonBody(ctx.req);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const tooLarge = managementBodyTooLargeResponse(error, ctx.req, ctx.config);
+    if (tooLarge) return tooLarge;
+    return jsonResponse({ error: "invalid_request" }, 400, ctx.req, ctx.config);
+  }
+  if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body)) {
+    return jsonResponse({ error: "invalid_request" }, 400, ctx.req, ctx.config);
+  }
+  const mode = (body as Record<string, unknown>).mode;
+  if (mode !== "compat" && mode !== "quiet") {
+    return jsonResponse({ error: "invalid_mode" }, 400, ctx.req, ctx.config);
+  }
+  return mode;
+}
+
+/** Codex Log Guard diagnostics plus explicit protection and maintenance mutations. */
+export async function handleStorageLogGuardRoutes(ctx: ManagementContext): Promise<Response | null> {
+  const { req, url, config, deps } = ctx;
+  const protectionDeps = deps.codexLogGuardProtectionDeps;
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/storage/codex-logs") {
+    if (req.method !== "GET") return null;
+    try {
+      const report = getCodexLogGuardProtectionStatus(protectionDeps);
+      if (inspectionUnavailable(report)) {
+        return jsonResponse({ error: "inspect_failed", message: INSPECTION_FAILED_MESSAGE }, 500, req, config);
+      }
+      return jsonResponse(report, 200, req, config);
+    } catch {
+      return jsonResponse({
+        error: "inspect_failed",
+        message: INSPECTION_FAILED_MESSAGE,
+      }, 500, req, config);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/storage/codex-logs/protect") {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") return null;
+    const mode = await readProtectMode(ctx);
+    if (mode instanceof Response) return mode;
+    return mutationResponse(protectCodexLogs(mode, protectionDeps), ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/storage/codex-logs/unprotect") {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") return null;
+    return mutationResponse(unprotectCodexLogs(protectionDeps), ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/storage/codex-logs/repair") {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") return null;
+    return mutationResponse(repairCodexLogGuardProtection(protectionDeps), ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname === "/api/storage/codex-logs/compact") {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") return null;
+    return compactResponse(compactCodexLogs(deps.codexLogGuardMaintenanceDeps), ctx);
+  }
+
+  if (url.pathname !== "/api/storage" || req.method !== "GET") return null;
+
+  // Keep the existing CODEX_HOME scan as the primary storage contract. The Log Guard
+  // report is attached separately so an external sqlite_home is visible without being
+  // silently folded into CODEX_HOME totals.
+  let storage;
+  try {
+    storage = scanStorage();
+  } catch {
+    const fallback = {
+      codexHome: resolveCodexHomeDir(),
+      generatedAt: Date.now(),
+      total: { bytes: 0, fileCount: 0 },
+      buckets: [],
+      error: "scan_failed",
+    };
+    try {
+      const report = getCodexLogGuardProtectionStatus(protectionDeps);
+      return inspectionUnavailable(report)
+        ? jsonResponse({ ...fallback, codexLogs: null, codexLogsError: "inspect_failed" }, 200, req, config)
+        : jsonResponse({ ...fallback, codexLogs: report }, 200, req, config);
+    } catch {
+      return jsonResponse({ ...fallback, codexLogs: null, codexLogsError: "inspect_failed" }, 200, req, config);
+    }
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const report = getCodexLogGuardProtectionStatus(protectionDeps);
+    return inspectionUnavailable(report)
+      ? jsonResponse({ ...storage, codexLogs: null, codexLogsError: "inspect_failed" }, 200, req, config)
+      : jsonResponse({ ...storage, codexLogs: report }, 200, req, config);
+  } catch {
+    // Log Guard inspection is auxiliary to the existing Storage page. A config/path
+    // resolution failure must not take the legacy read-only storage report down with it.
+    return jsonResponse({ ...storage, codexLogs: null, codexLogsError: "inspect_failed" }, 200, req, config);
+  }
+}

package/src/server/management/sync-response.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * The single HTTP projection of ConvergeOutcome.
+ *
+ * Three phase documents once mapped /api/sync independently and one silently
+ * dropped Retry-After. Keeping the exhaustive switch here makes a new domain
+ * outcome a compile error until its management contract is chosen explicitly.
+ */
+import type { ConvergeOutcome } from "../../codex/convergence-types";
+import { jsonResponse } from "../auth-cors";
+
+export function toSyncResponse(outcome: ConvergeOutcome): Response {
+  switch (outcome.kind) {
+    case "catalog-only":
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: true,
+        changed: outcome.changed,
+        observed: outcome.observed,
+        catalogRefresh: outcome.catalogRefresh,
+        history: outcome.history,
+      });
+    case "converged":
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: true,
+        changed: outcome.changed,
+        observed: outcome.observed,
+        catalogRefresh: outcome.catalogRefresh,
+        history: outcome.history,
+      });
+    case "skipped":
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: true,
+        changed: false,
+        observed: outcome.observed,
+        catalogRefresh: outcome.catalogRefresh,
+        history: outcome.history,
+      });
+    case "refused":
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: false,
+        authority: outcome.authority,
+        message: outcome.message,
+        observed: outcome.observed,
+      }, 409);
+    case "busy": {
+      const response = jsonResponse({
+        ok: false,
+        surface: outcome.surface,
+        retryAfterMs: outcome.retryAfterMs,
+      }, 503);
+      response.headers.set("Retry-After", String(Math.ceil(outcome.retryAfterMs / 1_000)));
+      return response;
+    }
+    case "deferred":
+      return jsonResponse({
+        ok: true,
+        changed: outcome.changed,
+        unresolved: outcome.unresolved,
+        observed: outcome.observed,
+        catalogRefresh: outcome.catalogRefresh,
+        history: outcome.history,
+      });
+    case "failed":
+      return jsonResponse({ error: outcome.message, surface: outcome.surface }, 500);
+    default: {
+      const exhaustive: never = outcome;
+      return exhaustive;
+    }
+  }
+}