@yahyahammad/venastine 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +14 -0
- package/LICENSE +201 -0
- package/NOTICE +14 -0
- package/PRIVACY.md +66 -0
- package/README.md +878 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +88 -0
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +100 -0
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -0
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -0
- package/agents/builtin/grill-me.md +27 -0
- package/agents/builtin/initializer.md +94 -0
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -0
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +88 -0
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -0
- package/agents/manager.py +195 -0
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +215 -0
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +136 -0
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +382 -0
- package/config.py +1198 -0
- package/core/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/core/approval.py +115 -0
- package/core/client.py +1548 -0
- package/core/compaction.py +959 -0
- package/core/config_loader.py +1563 -0
- package/core/events.py +61 -0
- package/core/interaction.py +328 -0
- package/core/loop.py +1353 -0
- package/core/memory.py +370 -0
- package/core/model_windows.py +175 -0
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +176 -0
- package/core/reasoning/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -0
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -0
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +468 -0
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -0
- package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +219 -0
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1382 -0
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +286 -0
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +398 -0
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +361 -0
- package/core/reasoning/review.py +615 -0
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +434 -0
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +327 -0
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -0
- package/core/replay.py +167 -0
- package/core/session.py +153 -0
- package/core/workspace_trust.py +207 -0
- package/credentials.py +180 -0
- package/database.py +252 -0
- package/env_secrets.py +77 -0
- package/json_store.py +123 -0
- package/logging_setup.py +185 -0
- package/main.py +1959 -0
- package/mcp_client/__init__.py +15 -0
- package/mcp_client/client.py +499 -0
- package/mcp_client/config.py +379 -0
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +182 -0
- package/memories/manager.py +132 -0
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +232 -0
- package/package.json +73 -0
- package/project_init/config_files.py +278 -0
- package/project_init/doc_sets.py +330 -0
- package/project_init/generator.py +564 -0
- package/project_init/manifest.py +406 -0
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +144 -0
- package/prompts/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/prompts/annotate.md +14 -0
- package/prompts/assumption_audit.md +27 -0
- package/prompts/claim_extraction.md +34 -0
- package/prompts/completeness.md +18 -0
- package/prompts/confidence_tiers.md +23 -0
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -0
- package/prompts/final_synthesis.md +13 -0
- package/prompts/initial_generation.md +14 -0
- package/prompts/preliminary_plan.md +23 -0
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -0
- package/prompts/revise.md +15 -0
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -0
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +262 -0
- package/prompts/universal_system_prompt +7 -0
- package/prompts/untrusted_content +1 -0
- package/providers.json.example +92 -0
- package/pyproject.toml +100 -0
- package/requirements.txt +72 -0
- package/safety/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +682 -0
- package/security/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/security/capability.py +177 -0
- package/security/permissions.py +190 -0
- package/security/posture.py +302 -0
- package/security/protected_paths.py +309 -0
- package/security/sandbox.py +985 -0
- package/skills/builtin/crypto/cryptography-verification.md +66 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/proof-writing.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/literature-review.md +65 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -0
- package/skills/builtin/security/cybersecurity-research.md +63 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -0
- package/skills/manager.py +138 -0
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +111 -0
- package/storage.py +1005 -0
- package/tools/base.py +305 -0
- package/tools/builtin/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +377 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +61 -0
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +223 -0
- package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +213 -0
- package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +134 -0
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +153 -0
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +412 -0
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +148 -0
- package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +20 -0
- package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +155 -0
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +66 -0
- package/tools/builtin/logic.py +96 -0
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +193 -0
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +228 -0
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +405 -0
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +158 -0
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +461 -0
- package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +119 -0
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +147 -0
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +151 -0
- package/tools/context.py +136 -0
- package/tools/isolation.py +314 -0
- package/tools/registry.py +897 -0
- package/tui/app.py +3423 -0
- package/tui/app.tcss +458 -0
- package/tui/commands.py +61 -0
- package/tui/diffs.py +265 -0
- package/tui/preferences.py +182 -0
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -0
- package/tui/screens.py +943 -0
- package/tui/themes.py +366 -0
- package/tui/widgets.py +1239 -0
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---
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name: review
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description: Reviews a change or a document against what it claims to do and reports defects with the evidence for each — it never rewrites the work itself
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allowed_tools:
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- read
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- read_project_doc
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- shell
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- load_skill
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use_project_context: true
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use_memory: true
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max_steps: 15
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# §32 A3/A4 (#69). "Review the diff on this branch against what the
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# commit message says it does" is a complete task string, and the
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# review reads the work itself rather than the conversation that
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# produced it -- which is what makes this one spawnable where
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# pipeline-reviewer (a finished PipelineRun) and grill-me (a live
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# thread) are not.
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spawnable: true
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# §32 A15. Read-only by OMISSION: no write, edit, write_project_doc or
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# remember, so a reviewer cannot start fixing what it found. `shell` is
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# here for `git diff` and `git log`, and every non-inert command still
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# reaches the human who signed off the spawn.
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---
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You are reviewing work someone else has finished. Your output is a list of
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defects with evidence. You do not rewrite the work, and you do not rewrite
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it in prose either by describing at length what you would have done.
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## Find the claim before you judge the work
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A review needs a standard to review against. Establish it first: the
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commit message, the issue, the docstring, the spec, the function's own
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name. Then read the work as an answer to that claim. Most real defects are
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disagreements between what something says it does and what it does, and
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they are invisible if you only read the code as itself.
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## Every finding carries its evidence
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For each item:
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- **Where** — file and line, or section.
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- **What is wrong** — one sentence, stated as a defect and not as a
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preference.
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- **How it fails** — the concrete input, state or sequence that produces
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the wrong result. If you cannot name one, say so, and mark the finding
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as a smell rather than a defect.
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A finding with no failure path is a hypothesis. It can still be worth
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reporting; it must not be reported in the same voice as one you can
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demonstrate.
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## Rank by consequence, not by how easy it was to spot
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Correctness first, then anything that silently produces a wrong answer
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rather than an error, then security and data loss, then maintainability.
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Naming conventions come last if they come at all. A review that opens with
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three style notes teaches the reader to skim the rest.
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## Check what is NOT there
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The defect that survives review is usually an omission: the error path
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nobody wrote, the case the tests do not distinguish, the caller that was
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not updated, the invariant that used to hold. Ask what would have to be
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added for the change to be complete, not only whether what is present is
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correct.
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For tests specifically: ask whether each one could fail. A test that
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passes against the unfixed code is not testing the fix.
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## Say when it is fine
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If the work is sound, say so plainly and stop. Manufacturing findings to
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justify the review is worse than a short review, because it costs the
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reader the ability to tell your serious findings from your filler.
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"""
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agents/manager.py
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ROADMAP_v2 §18. AgentManager discovers agent `.md` files across the three
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tiers and exposes lookup by name plus the §18 scope-composition rules.
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Thin by design: discovery, frontmatter parsing, and tier precedence
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(D29: harness > user > project) all live in core/config_loader.py, which
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runs at initialize() time. This file adds only the agent-specific policy
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composition that §18 owns and that §20 (subagent review) will call:
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* active_context() -- the ToolContext for a session-scoped active
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agent (/agent switch): the agent's own restrictions at depth 0.
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* child_context() -- the ToolContext for a spawned subagent: C6's
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intersection-with-parent (never union) plus a depth increment (C3).
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* system_prompt_for() -- base + catalogs + the agent's body + opt-in
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project context, assembled in one place so the TUI worker and
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spawn_subagent cannot drift apart.
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"""
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from typing import Optional
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from core import config_loader
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from core.config_loader import AgentDef
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from memories.manager import manager as memory_manager
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from tools.context import ToolContext
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class AgentManager:
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"""Lookup + scope composition over the loader's discovered agents."""
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def get(self, name: str) -> Optional[AgentDef]:
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return config_loader.get_agent(name)
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def names(self) -> list:
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return sorted(config_loader.get_agents())
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def all(self) -> dict:
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return config_loader.get_agents()
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@staticmethod
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def active_context(agent: AgentDef) -> ToolContext:
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"""ToolContext for running AS this agent (session-scoped /agent
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switch). The agent's own restrictions at depth 0 -- no parent to
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intersect with, no nesting."""
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allowed = (
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set(agent.allowed_tools)
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if agent.allowed_tools is not None else None
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)
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return ToolContext(
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allowed_tools=allowed,
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approval_overrides=dict(agent.approval_overrides),
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subagent_depth=0,
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)
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@staticmethod
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def child_context(
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agent: AgentDef, parent_context: Optional[ToolContext],
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) -> ToolContext:
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"""ToolContext for a subagent spawned WHILE running under
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parent_context. C6: intersection, never union -- a restricted
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parent must not escape its restriction by spawning a permissive
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child. C3: depth increments so the nesting limit is enforceable.
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An agent that declares no allowed_tools inherits the parent's
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restriction unchanged (it may not widen it either).
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APPROVAL COMPOSES THE SAME WAY (§14-§18 review f12, decision S2).
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§18's spec sketch built the child's overrides from the agent
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definition alone, which drops the parent's. C6 reasoned about
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allowed_tools and never considered the approval axis, so the same
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escalation it exists to prevent was open one field over: a parent
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declaring `approval_overrides: {web_search: true}` prompts on
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every search, then spawns a child that computes
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approval_needed(web_search) == False and runs it ungated.
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Union rather than replace. Only True entries carry -- a False is
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indistinguishable from absent under D14's OR, so unioning can
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only ever tighten, which is what makes it safe to do silently."""
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parent = parent_context or ToolContext()
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if agent.allowed_tools is not None:
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own = set(agent.allowed_tools)
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child_allowed = own & (
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parent.allowed_tools if parent.allowed_tools is not None
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else own
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)
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else:
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child_allowed = (
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set(parent.allowed_tools)
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if parent.allowed_tools is not None else None
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)
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overrides = {k: v for k, v in parent.approval_overrides.items() if v}
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overrides.update(agent.approval_overrides)
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return ToolContext(
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allowed_tools=child_allowed,
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approval_overrides=overrides,
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subagent_depth=parent.subagent_depth + 1,
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)
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@staticmethod
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def candidate_approvals(child_context: ToolContext) -> list:
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"""Tools the subagent could reach that would each need approval.
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ONE helper, TWO callers -- the sign-off prompt's notice text and
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the grant the child actually receives. Computing the list twice
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would let what the user approved drift from what the child got,
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which is the whole substance of the sign-off.
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Params are empty because there are none yet: a path-dependent
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approval_check (file_ops outside the workspace, shell on a
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non-inert command) cannot be resolved before the call exists, so
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those still prompt at call time through the inherited channel.
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§25 (R2) filters those tools OUT of the list rather than merely
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letting them re-prompt. They were never grantable by name, and the
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loop now enforces that -- so leaving them here would make the
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sign-off notice promise authority the grant does not carry, which
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is worse than not offering it. What the user reads and what the
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child receives have to be the same list; that is the whole
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substance of a sign-off, and this helper exists to keep them one.
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§25 (R13) adds the second filter, and #67 is why it is here rather
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than only in core/reasoning/authorization.py. Both functions
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answer "what may be pre-granted", both were built from
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headless_hidden + grantable, and only the pipeline's one then
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subtracted an exclusion list -- which lived in the pipeline's
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module where this one could not see it. So this list offered
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`spawn_subagent` and `remember`, the two tools R4 and M17 exist to
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keep out of a grant, and R4's argument is ABOUT this sign-off.
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Now both read one per-tool declaration.
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The LOOSE half of the pair: GRANT_SIGNOFF_ONLY passes here and is
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refused by the pipeline. A human answering in the moment, about
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one named agent, for one turn, is the consent write_project_doc's
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notice was written for; ten unattended passes on one launch-time
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tick is not.
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"""
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from tools.base import GRANT_NEVER
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from tools.registry import registry
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return sorted(
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name for name in registry.headless_hidden(child_context)
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if registry.grantable(name)
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and registry.grant_policy(name) != GRANT_NEVER
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)
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@staticmethod
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def system_prompt_for(agent: AgentDef, base_prompt: str,
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active_skills=None, context=None,
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callable_only: bool = False,
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granted=None) -> str:
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"""The full system prompt for a run AS this agent: base + skill /
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agent catalogs, then the agent's own body, then the project's
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AGENTS.md iff the agent opts in (use_project_context). One
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assembly point so every caller produces the same prompt.
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+
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active_skills (§19) reaches only the catalog, where it MARKS the
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skills whose bodies the shell pins separately. Bodies are not
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added here -- see with_catalogs' K6 note.
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context (§20 review f19, generalised): the ToolContext this run
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will actually use. It reaches with_catalogs, which suppresses a
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catalog whose tool the context excludes -- otherwise a restricted
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agent is told to "call the load_skill tool" it does not have.
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Pass the SAME context the run gets: child_context() for a spawned
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subagent, so a parent's restriction suppresses the invitation too;
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active_context() for a /agent switch. None means the run is under
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global policy only, and both catalogs apply."""
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import prompts.system_prompts as system_prompts
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# callable_only / granted (#68): forwarded, not decided here.
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# This function knows which agent is running; whether anything
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# can answer an approval question is the RUN's fact, and the
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# caller is the one holding it. Defaulting to the attended
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# answer keeps both TUI call sites correct with no argument.
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prompt = system_prompts.with_catalogs(
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base_prompt, active_skills, context,
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callable_only=callable_only, granted=granted)
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prompt = f"{prompt}\n\n## Agent: {agent.name}\n\n{agent.body}"
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context = config_loader.context_for_agent(agent)
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if context:
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prompt = f"{prompt}\n\n## Project context\n\n{context}"
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# ROADMAP_v2 §21b: durable memories, the third context tier beside
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# the project's AGENTS.md and gated the same way (use_memory).
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# Appended HERE and not inside with_catalogs, which feeds
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# pass_prompt() -- injecting there would put every memory into all
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# ten research passes, which is §19's K6 trap in its second
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# instance.
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memories = memory_manager.prompt_fragment(agent)
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if memories:
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prompt = f"{prompt}\n\n{memories}"
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return prompt
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manager = AgentManager()
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"""
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agents/subagent_tool.py
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3
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+
|
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4
|
+
ROADMAP_v2 §18, D6: the model-initiated half of agent invocation. The
|
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5
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+
model spawns a named agent to handle a task; the run is scope-capped by
|
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6
|
+
the parent's ToolContext (C6), depth-limited (C3), and returns only the
|
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7
|
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subagent's final text -- distilled, matching the pipeline's own "don't
|
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8
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share raw history" principle.
|
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9
|
+
|
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10
|
+
The handler declares `parent_context` and `parent_run`, which
|
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11
|
+
tools/registry.dispatch() injects by signature inspection (§18). The
|
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12
|
+
Rev. 1 sketch's `depth: int` parameter and `allowed_tools=` kwarg are
|
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13
|
+
both gone: depth lives on ToolContext.subagent_depth, and §15 replaced
|
|
14
|
+
allowed_tools with context= everywhere.
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
core.loop is imported INSIDE run(), not at module top: tools/registry.py
|
|
17
|
+
imports this module to register it, and core.loop imports tools.registry
|
|
18
|
+
-- a top-level import here would close that cycle at import time.
|
|
19
|
+
"""
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
import config
|
|
22
|
+
from storage import THREAD_KIND_SUBAGENT
|
|
23
|
+
from tools.context import ToolContext
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
TOOL_SCHEMA = {
|
|
26
|
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"name": "spawn_subagent",
|
|
27
|
+
"description": "Spawn a named agent to handle a self-contained task "
|
|
28
|
+
"and return its final answer. The subagent runs in its "
|
|
29
|
+
"own thread with its own methodology and a tool set "
|
|
30
|
+
"capped by your current restrictions. Use it when a "
|
|
31
|
+
"task matches a listed agent's specialty; do the work "
|
|
32
|
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"yourself otherwise.",
|
|
33
|
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"input_schema": {
|
|
34
|
+
"type": "object",
|
|
35
|
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"properties": {
|
|
36
|
+
"agent_name": {
|
|
37
|
+
"type": "string",
|
|
38
|
+
"description": "Agent name exactly as listed in the "
|
|
39
|
+
"Available agents catalog.",
|
|
40
|
+
},
|
|
41
|
+
"task": {
|
|
42
|
+
"type": "string",
|
|
43
|
+
"description": "The self-contained task description the "
|
|
44
|
+
"subagent receives as its first message.",
|
|
45
|
+
},
|
|
46
|
+
},
|
|
47
|
+
"required": ["agent_name", "task"],
|
|
48
|
+
},
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
def refusal_reason(params: dict, context=None):
|
|
53
|
+
"""Why this spawn would be refused, or None (§32 A7, #70).
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
ONE function, TWO callers: the loop consults it before deciding to
|
|
56
|
+
ask, and run() below calls it before doing anything. That is the
|
|
57
|
+
point rather than a tidiness -- the sign-off shown and the error
|
|
58
|
+
returned have to be about the same refusal, and the way to
|
|
59
|
+
guarantee it is to have one place that decides.
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
THE ORDER MATCHES run()'s ORIGINAL ORDER, depth before params
|
|
62
|
+
before name, because these strings are what the model already
|
|
63
|
+
sees and reordering them would change a live contract for no
|
|
64
|
+
reason.
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
Returns None for anything it cannot settle in advance -- an agent
|
|
67
|
+
that exists and a depth that is fine can still fail once it runs,
|
|
68
|
+
and this function is deliberately not in the business of
|
|
69
|
+
predicting that.
|
|
70
|
+
"""
|
|
71
|
+
parent = context or ToolContext()
|
|
72
|
+
if parent.subagent_depth >= config.SUBAGENT_MAX_DEPTH:
|
|
73
|
+
return (f"Maximum subagent nesting depth "
|
|
74
|
+
f"({config.SUBAGENT_MAX_DEPTH}) reached")
|
|
75
|
+
name = params.get("agent_name")
|
|
76
|
+
task = params.get("task")
|
|
77
|
+
if not name or not task:
|
|
78
|
+
return ("spawn_subagent requires both 'agent_name' and "
|
|
79
|
+
"'task'.")
|
|
80
|
+
from agents.manager import manager
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
if manager.get(name) is None:
|
|
83
|
+
return (f"Unknown agent: {name!r} is not "
|
|
84
|
+
f"in the available agents catalog.")
|
|
85
|
+
return None
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
def approval_notice(params: dict, context=None) -> str:
|
|
89
|
+
"""What approving this spawn actually authorises (§18 S1).
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
The params alone say only which agent and which task. What the user
|
|
92
|
+
is really being asked is whether that agent may run a set of tools
|
|
93
|
+
without asking again -- so the prompt has to name them. Computed
|
|
94
|
+
through manager.candidate_approvals(), the SAME helper that builds
|
|
95
|
+
the grant, so the list shown and the list granted cannot drift.
|
|
96
|
+
"""
|
|
97
|
+
from agents.manager import manager
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
agent = manager.get(params.get("agent_name", ""))
|
|
100
|
+
if agent is None:
|
|
101
|
+
return ""
|
|
102
|
+
child = manager.child_context(agent, context or ToolContext())
|
|
103
|
+
candidates = manager.candidate_approvals(child)
|
|
104
|
+
if not candidates:
|
|
105
|
+
return f"{agent.name} needs no approval-gated tools."
|
|
106
|
+
listed = "\n".join(f" - {name}" for name in candidates)
|
|
107
|
+
return (f"{agent.name} may use these without asking again, for the "
|
|
108
|
+
f"rest of this turn:\n{listed}")
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
def request_payload(params: dict, context=None) -> dict:
|
|
112
|
+
"""What the sign-off question is ABOUT (§23 AC1b).
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
Carries the agent's name as the memo `subject` and the candidate tool
|
|
115
|
+
list as the options the user picks from. Computed through
|
|
116
|
+
manager.candidate_approvals(), the SAME helper approval_notice uses
|
|
117
|
+
and the same one that used to build the grant wholesale -- so the list
|
|
118
|
+
shown, the list offered and the list granted cannot drift apart.
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
Lives on the TOOL rather than in core/loop.py because which tools a
|
|
121
|
+
child could reach is agents/manager.py's knowledge. The loop asks the
|
|
122
|
+
registry for this the same way it asks for the notice.
|
|
123
|
+
"""
|
|
124
|
+
from agents.manager import manager
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
agent = manager.get(params.get("agent_name", ""))
|
|
127
|
+
if agent is None:
|
|
128
|
+
return {}
|
|
129
|
+
child = manager.child_context(agent, context or ToolContext())
|
|
130
|
+
return {"subject": agent.name, "agent": agent.name,
|
|
131
|
+
"candidates": manager.candidate_approvals(child)}
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
def run(params: dict, parent_context=None, parent_run=None,
|
|
135
|
+
response_channel=None, signoff=None) -> dict:
|
|
136
|
+
from core.loop import (
|
|
137
|
+
RunAgentLoop, DEFAULT_PROVIDER, DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT,
|
|
138
|
+
)
|
|
139
|
+
from agents.manager import manager
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
parent = parent_context or ToolContext()
|
|
142
|
+
# §32 A7. The SAME function the loop consulted before deciding
|
|
143
|
+
# whether to ask and dispatch() applied before its approval gate,
|
|
144
|
+
# so all three agree about what is being refused. It covers the
|
|
145
|
+
# depth limit, the missing-params case (.get not [], because no
|
|
146
|
+
# provider validates tool inputs against the schema and a bare
|
|
147
|
+
# KeyError escapes _run and takes down the turn) and the
|
|
148
|
+
# unknown-agent case.
|
|
149
|
+
#
|
|
150
|
+
# Kept here even though dispatch now short-circuits first: this is
|
|
151
|
+
# the backstop for a caller that reaches run() directly, which is
|
|
152
|
+
# every test in the suite and anything future that composes agents
|
|
153
|
+
# without going through the registry. Two layers, one predicate.
|
|
154
|
+
refusal = refusal_reason(params, parent)
|
|
155
|
+
if refusal:
|
|
156
|
+
return {"error": refusal}
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
name = params.get("agent_name")
|
|
159
|
+
task = params.get("task")
|
|
160
|
+
agent = manager.get(name)
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
child = manager.child_context(agent, parent)
|
|
163
|
+
# The channel is inherited, and it is NOT redundant with the grant.
|
|
164
|
+
# The grant covers what approval_needed(name, {}) can enumerate; a
|
|
165
|
+
# path-dependent approval_check (file_ops outside the workspace, shell
|
|
166
|
+
# on a non-inert command) only resolves once the call exists, so those
|
|
167
|
+
# still have to reach a human mid-run. Without the channel the child
|
|
168
|
+
# ran headless and lost every approval-gated tool silently.
|
|
169
|
+
#
|
|
170
|
+
# §23 AC1b: the grant is the SUBSET the user ticked, not every
|
|
171
|
+
# candidate. §18 shipped this all-or-nothing (S1) because a boolean
|
|
172
|
+
# channel could not carry a list out and a subset back; approving a
|
|
173
|
+
# spawn therefore authorised the child's entire approval-gated set.
|
|
174
|
+
# `signoff` is injected by dispatch() and is None only when nothing
|
|
175
|
+
# asked -- a headless run, where the child gets no grant anyway.
|
|
176
|
+
granted = set(signoff) if signoff else set()
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
# Inherit the parent run's identity only where the agent definition
|
|
179
|
+
# is silent -- an agent's declared model/provider is its identity.
|
|
180
|
+
model = agent.model or (parent_run.model if parent_run else None) \
|
|
181
|
+
or config.MODEL_NAME
|
|
182
|
+
provider = agent.provider \
|
|
183
|
+
or (parent_run.provider_name if parent_run else None) \
|
|
184
|
+
or DEFAULT_PROVIDER
|
|
185
|
+
effort = parent_run.effort if parent_run else None
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
response = RunAgentLoop.run_agent_conversation(
|
|
188
|
+
user_goal=task,
|
|
189
|
+
model=model,
|
|
190
|
+
provider_name=provider,
|
|
191
|
+
max_steps=agent.max_steps or config.MAX_ITERATIONS,
|
|
192
|
+
context=child,
|
|
193
|
+
effort=effort,
|
|
194
|
+
# `child`, not the agent's own context: C6 intersects with the
|
|
195
|
+
# parent, so a parent that excluded spawn_subagent must not have
|
|
196
|
+
# the catalog re-invite its child to spawn one (review f19).
|
|
197
|
+
# #68: the child's own facts, not the parent's. A subagent
|
|
198
|
+
# spawned from a headless run inherits no channel, so its
|
|
199
|
+
# catalogs must be decided by what IT can call -- the same
|
|
200
|
+
# values handed to run_agent_conversation two lines below.
|
|
201
|
+
system_prompt=manager.system_prompt_for(
|
|
202
|
+
agent, DEFAULT_SYSTEM_PROMPT, context=child,
|
|
203
|
+
callable_only=response_channel is None,
|
|
204
|
+
granted=granted),
|
|
205
|
+
response_channel=response_channel,
|
|
206
|
+
granted_tools=granted if (response_channel is not None
|
|
207
|
+
and granted) else None,
|
|
208
|
+
# §27 AC1. A spawned agent's thread is not a conversation anyone
|
|
209
|
+
# will resume, and one goal-mode turn can spawn several.
|
|
210
|
+
thread_kind=THREAD_KIND_SUBAGENT,
|
|
211
|
+
)
|
|
212
|
+
return {
|
|
213
|
+
"result": response.text,
|
|
214
|
+
"subagent_thread_id": str(response.thread_id),
|
|
215
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""
|
|
2
|
+
agents/tui_commands.py
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
ROADMAP_v2 §18, D6 user-initiated half: /agent, /goal and /grill-me
|
|
5
|
+
register into §16's slash registry. The shell hosts the commands; this
|
|
6
|
+
section owns them -- the same mechanism-vs-policy split tools/registry.py
|
|
7
|
+
uses for tools. TUI-only for now (CLI stays unchanged per the §18 scope
|
|
8
|
+
decision); the model-initiated half lives in subagent_tool.py and works
|
|
9
|
+
in every shell.
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
Handlers receive the app object from tui.commands.dispatch(); this module
|
|
12
|
+
deliberately does NOT import tui.app, so app.py can import it without a
|
|
13
|
+
cycle.
|
|
14
|
+
"""
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
from tui.commands import SlashCommand, registry as commands
|
|
17
|
+
from agents.manager import manager
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
def _cmd_agent(app, args: str) -> None:
|
|
21
|
+
"""Session-scoped active agent: subsequent turns run under the
|
|
22
|
+
agent's body, model/provider/max_steps overrides, and ToolContext,
|
|
23
|
+
until /agent default or another switch."""
|
|
24
|
+
if not args:
|
|
25
|
+
current = app.active_agent.name if app.active_agent else "default"
|
|
26
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(
|
|
27
|
+
f"Active agent: {current}. "
|
|
28
|
+
f"Available: {', '.join(manager.names()) or 'none'}. "
|
|
29
|
+
"/agent <name> to switch, /agent default to clear."
|
|
30
|
+
)
|
|
31
|
+
return
|
|
32
|
+
if args == "default":
|
|
33
|
+
app.active_agent = None
|
|
34
|
+
app._transcript.write_system("Active agent cleared — default harness.")
|
|
35
|
+
_note_skills_under_new_context(app)
|
|
36
|
+
return
|
|
37
|
+
agent = manager.get(args)
|
|
38
|
+
if agent is None:
|
|
39
|
+
app._transcript.write_error(
|
|
40
|
+
f"Unknown agent {args!r}. "
|
|
41
|
+
f"Available: {', '.join(manager.names()) or 'none'}."
|
|
42
|
+
)
|
|
43
|
+
return
|
|
44
|
+
app.active_agent = agent
|
|
45
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(
|
|
46
|
+
f"Active agent: {agent.name} — {agent.description}")
|
|
47
|
+
_note_skills_under_new_context(app)
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
def _note_skills_under_new_context(app) -> None:
|
|
51
|
+
"""K2's activation note is computed against the context active at
|
|
52
|
+
activation time; an /agent switch changes the context for every
|
|
53
|
+
subsequent turn, so re-check active skills and say what is now
|
|
54
|
+
denied (review §19-20 f21). Advisory only -- enforcement still
|
|
55
|
+
happens per call via is_tool_allowed."""
|
|
56
|
+
from skills.manager import manager as skill_manager
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
context = (manager.active_context(app.active_agent)
|
|
59
|
+
if app.active_agent is not None else None)
|
|
60
|
+
label = app.active_agent.name if app.active_agent is not None else "default"
|
|
61
|
+
for name in app.active_skills:
|
|
62
|
+
skill = skill_manager.get(name)
|
|
63
|
+
if skill is None:
|
|
64
|
+
continue
|
|
65
|
+
missing = skill_manager.missing_tools(skill, context)
|
|
66
|
+
if missing:
|
|
67
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(
|
|
68
|
+
f"Note: {name} expects {', '.join(missing)}, which are "
|
|
69
|
+
f"not available under agent {label}.")
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
def _cmd_goal(app, args: str) -> None:
|
|
73
|
+
"""Persistent per-thread objective (extra_data). Injected into every
|
|
74
|
+
turn's system prompt in ANY shell; the banner mirrors it here.
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
#113: the read and clear paths go through `app._memory`, NOT
|
|
77
|
+
`app.memory` -- same rule refresh_goal_banner's comment states.
|
|
78
|
+
Constructing a ConversationMemory persists a thread row, so answering
|
|
79
|
+
"there is no goal" (or clearing one on a session that has none) must
|
|
80
|
+
not be what creates the thread. Only SETTING a goal touches
|
|
81
|
+
app.memory: the user is putting state on a thread, so a thread is
|
|
82
|
+
warranted."""
|
|
83
|
+
if args == "clear":
|
|
84
|
+
if app._memory is None:
|
|
85
|
+
app._transcript.write_system("No goal set.")
|
|
86
|
+
else:
|
|
87
|
+
app.memory.set_extra("goal", None)
|
|
88
|
+
app._transcript.write_system("Goal cleared.")
|
|
89
|
+
elif args:
|
|
90
|
+
app.memory.set_extra("goal", args)
|
|
91
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(f"Goal set: {args}")
|
|
92
|
+
else:
|
|
93
|
+
goal = app._memory.extra.get("goal") if app._memory else None
|
|
94
|
+
if goal:
|
|
95
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(f"Current goal: {goal}")
|
|
96
|
+
else:
|
|
97
|
+
app._transcript.write_system(
|
|
98
|
+
"No goal set. /goal <text> to set one, /goal clear to remove.")
|
|
99
|
+
app.refresh_goal_banner()
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
def _cmd_grill(app, args: str) -> None:
|
|
103
|
+
"""One turn in the CURRENT thread under the grill-me agent's system
|
|
104
|
+
prompt -- it reads the live history directly (no digest loss)."""
|
|
105
|
+
if app._busy:
|
|
106
|
+
app._transcript.write_error(
|
|
107
|
+
"Still working — wait for this turn to finish.")
|
|
108
|
+
return
|
|
109
|
+
agent = manager.get("grill-me")
|
|
110
|
+
if agent is None:
|
|
111
|
+
app._transcript.write_error("grill-me agent not found.")
|
|
112
|
+
return
|
|
113
|
+
app._transcript.write_user("/grill-me")
|
|
114
|
+
# run_one_shot owns the WHOLE assembly (#170): the channel, the
|
|
115
|
+
# catalog facts and the run must come from one answer, so nothing is
|
|
116
|
+
# decided here. (Review f19's "no context, deliberately" answered a
|
|
117
|
+
# question §25 R15 replaced -- what matters now is not which policy
|
|
118
|
+
# governs but whether anything can answer, and only the run knows.)
|
|
119
|
+
app.run_one_shot(
|
|
120
|
+
agent,
|
|
121
|
+
"Grill this thread: surface what still needs a decision.",
|
|
122
|
+
)
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
def register_agent_commands() -> None:
|
|
126
|
+
"""Idempotent — registering by name overwrites, matching §16's
|
|
127
|
+
register_builtin_commands()."""
|
|
128
|
+
for command in (
|
|
129
|
+
SlashCommand("agent", "switch the active agent", _cmd_agent,
|
|
130
|
+
"[name|default]"),
|
|
131
|
+
SlashCommand("goal", "set the thread's persistent objective",
|
|
132
|
+
_cmd_goal, "[text|clear]"),
|
|
133
|
+
SlashCommand("grill-me", "surface what still needs a decision",
|
|
134
|
+
_cmd_grill),
|
|
135
|
+
):
|
|
136
|
+
commands.register(command)
|