@yahyahammad/venastine 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +14 -0
- package/LICENSE +201 -0
- package/NOTICE +14 -0
- package/PRIVACY.md +66 -0
- package/README.md +878 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +88 -0
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +100 -0
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -0
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -0
- package/agents/builtin/grill-me.md +27 -0
- package/agents/builtin/initializer.md +94 -0
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -0
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +88 -0
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -0
- package/agents/manager.py +195 -0
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +215 -0
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +136 -0
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +382 -0
- package/config.py +1198 -0
- package/core/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/core/approval.py +115 -0
- package/core/client.py +1548 -0
- package/core/compaction.py +959 -0
- package/core/config_loader.py +1563 -0
- package/core/events.py +61 -0
- package/core/interaction.py +328 -0
- package/core/loop.py +1353 -0
- package/core/memory.py +370 -0
- package/core/model_windows.py +175 -0
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +176 -0
- package/core/reasoning/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -0
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -0
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +468 -0
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -0
- package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +219 -0
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1382 -0
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +286 -0
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +398 -0
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +361 -0
- package/core/reasoning/review.py +615 -0
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +434 -0
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +327 -0
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -0
- package/core/replay.py +167 -0
- package/core/session.py +153 -0
- package/core/workspace_trust.py +207 -0
- package/credentials.py +180 -0
- package/database.py +252 -0
- package/env_secrets.py +77 -0
- package/json_store.py +123 -0
- package/logging_setup.py +185 -0
- package/main.py +1959 -0
- package/mcp_client/__init__.py +15 -0
- package/mcp_client/client.py +499 -0
- package/mcp_client/config.py +379 -0
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +182 -0
- package/memories/manager.py +132 -0
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +232 -0
- package/package.json +73 -0
- package/project_init/config_files.py +278 -0
- package/project_init/doc_sets.py +330 -0
- package/project_init/generator.py +564 -0
- package/project_init/manifest.py +406 -0
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +144 -0
- package/prompts/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/prompts/annotate.md +14 -0
- package/prompts/assumption_audit.md +27 -0
- package/prompts/claim_extraction.md +34 -0
- package/prompts/completeness.md +18 -0
- package/prompts/confidence_tiers.md +23 -0
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -0
- package/prompts/final_synthesis.md +13 -0
- package/prompts/initial_generation.md +14 -0
- package/prompts/preliminary_plan.md +23 -0
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -0
- package/prompts/revise.md +15 -0
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -0
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +262 -0
- package/prompts/universal_system_prompt +7 -0
- package/prompts/untrusted_content +1 -0
- package/providers.json.example +92 -0
- package/pyproject.toml +100 -0
- package/requirements.txt +72 -0
- package/safety/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +682 -0
- package/security/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/security/capability.py +177 -0
- package/security/permissions.py +190 -0
- package/security/posture.py +302 -0
- package/security/protected_paths.py +309 -0
- package/security/sandbox.py +985 -0
- package/skills/builtin/crypto/cryptography-verification.md +66 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -0
- package/skills/builtin/math/proof-writing.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/literature-review.md +65 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -0
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -0
- package/skills/builtin/security/cybersecurity-research.md +63 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -0
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -0
- package/skills/manager.py +138 -0
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +111 -0
- package/storage.py +1005 -0
- package/tools/base.py +305 -0
- package/tools/builtin/__init__.py +0 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +377 -0
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +61 -0
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +223 -0
- package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +213 -0
- package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +134 -0
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +153 -0
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +412 -0
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +148 -0
- package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +20 -0
- package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +155 -0
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +66 -0
- package/tools/builtin/logic.py +96 -0
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +193 -0
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +228 -0
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +405 -0
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +158 -0
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +461 -0
- package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +119 -0
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +147 -0
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +151 -0
- package/tools/context.py +136 -0
- package/tools/isolation.py +314 -0
- package/tools/registry.py +897 -0
- package/tui/app.py +3423 -0
- package/tui/app.tcss +458 -0
- package/tui/commands.py +61 -0
- package/tui/diffs.py +265 -0
- package/tui/preferences.py +182 -0
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -0
- package/tui/screens.py +943 -0
- package/tui/themes.py +366 -0
- package/tui/widgets.py +1239 -0
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"""
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mcp_client/config.py
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Discovery and merge of `mcp.json`, plus the "seen this user-level server
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before" store. ROADMAP_v2 §17.
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Two locations, both resolved at CALL time (not import time) so tests can
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redirect them and a moved config dir is picked up without a restart --
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the same rule core/config_loader.py and core/workspace_trust.py follow:
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user ~/.config/venastine/mcp.json -- you authored it
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project <project>/.venastine/mcp.json -- trust-gated (D17)
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THE PROJECT PATH IS `.venastine/mcp.json`, NOT `<project>/mcp.json`.
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§17/D11 put it at the project root to match Claude Code's convention, but
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workspace_trust hashes only `.venastine/`, and is_trusted() returns True
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outright when that directory is absent. A root-level mcp.json would
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therefore have been ungated and its edits would never have re-prompted --
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in a file whose whole purpose is naming a local command to execute. Under
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`.venastine/` the existing hash, trust prompt and file listing cover it
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with no change to workspace_trust.py at all.
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Validation is deliberately by CONNECTION, not by schema (§17 decision G):
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unknown keys are ignored so a config pasted from Claude Desktop or Cursor
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works, and an entry we cannot make sense of becomes that one server's
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named connect failure rather than a startup error for everything else.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any, Optional
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from json_store import write_json_atomic
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Keys this harness actually reads. Anything else is ignored, not an
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# error -- see the module docstring. Kept as data so the DEBUG log can
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# name exactly what it skipped.
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_KNOWN_SERVER_KEYS = frozenset({
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"command", "args", "env", "cwd", # stdio
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"type", "url", "headers", # http
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"autoApprove", "auto_approve", # our extension (§17 D)
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"disabled",
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})
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# Declared `type` values that mean streamable HTTP. `sse` is NOT one of
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# them (#62): D4 promises SSE, the SDK v2 ships sse_client for it, and
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# aliasing it here is how a server that speaks only SSE got offered a
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# streamable handshake it could not answer.
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_STREAMABLE_TYPES = frozenset({"http", "https", "streamable-http", "streamablehttp"})
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_SSE_TYPES = frozenset({"sse"})
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@dataclass
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class ServerConfig:
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"""One entry from an mcp.json `mcpServers` object."""
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name: str
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tier: str # "user" | "project"
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path: str # the file it came from
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transport: str # "stdio" | "http" | "sse" | "unknown"
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command: Optional[str] = None
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args: list = field(default_factory=list)
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env: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
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cwd: Optional[str] = None
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url: Optional[str] = None
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headers: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
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auto_approve: bool = False
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disabled: bool = False
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raw: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
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error: Optional[str] = None # why transport == "unknown"
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def describe(self) -> str:
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"""One line naming what this server will actually DO -- shown in
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the trust prompt and the first-run warning, where 'informed' has
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to mean seeing the command, not the server's nickname.
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#60/F1: the fields that change the security posture ride along.
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`autoApprove` decides whether any later prompt ever exists, so a
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one-`y` acknowledgement that never named it consented blind to
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unprompted execution in every future session including all ten
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headless research passes. Env is disclosed by KEY NAME only --
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printing values would put a credential on the terminal, which is
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a different defect. The digest is computed from the raw entry
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(entry_digest), never from this text, so improving the disclosure
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cannot by itself re-ask an acknowledged server; F3's store bump
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is what forces the one re-consent pass.
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VENASTINE_MCP_ACK_FULL=1 (F2) appends the entry verbatim, for
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debugging and audits. Read at call time, like every other state
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path in this project: it is operator authority, deliberately not
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a settings.json key, because settings.json's precedence lets a
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project tier style a consent screen this flag renders.
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"""
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if self.transport == "stdio":
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argv = " ".join([self.command or ""] + [str(a) for a in self.args])
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text = f"{self.name} [{self.tier}] runs: {argv.strip()}"
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elif self.transport == "http":
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text = f"{self.name} [{self.tier}] connects to: {self.url}"
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elif self.transport == "sse":
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text = f"{self.name} [{self.tier}] connects via SSE to: {self.url}"
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else:
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return f"{self.name} [{self.tier}] UNUSABLE: {self.error}"
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notes = []
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if self.auto_approve:
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notes.append("AUTO-APPROVED: its tools will run without asking")
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if self.cwd:
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notes.append(f"working directory: {self.cwd}")
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if self.disabled:
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notes.append("disabled")
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if self.env:
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notes.append("env keys: " + ", ".join(sorted(self.env)))
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if self.headers:
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# Same class of surface as env keys, and MORE live since M19
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# stopped discarding them: Authorization is where an http/sse
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# server's credential actually rides (#60 owner follow-up).
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notes.append("header keys: " + ", ".join(sorted(self.headers)))
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lines = [text] + [f" {n}" for n in notes]
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if os.environ.get("VENASTINE_MCP_ACK_FULL") == "1":
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rendered = json.dumps(self.raw, indent=2, sort_keys=True,
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default=str)
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lines.append(" full entry:")
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lines.extend(f" {l}" for l in rendered.splitlines())
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return "\n".join(lines)
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def user_config_path() -> str:
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return os.path.expanduser("~/.config/venastine/mcp.json")
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def project_config_path(project_path: str) -> str:
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return os.path.join(os.path.realpath(project_path), ".venastine", "mcp.json")
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def _flag(server: str, key: str, value: Any) -> bool:
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"""A JSON boolean, or False with a warning.
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NOT bool(value): bool("false") is True, so `"autoApprove": "false"`
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-- a plausible hand edit, and a shape other MCP hosts tolerate --
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would turn the D28 approval gate OFF on a server the user was trying
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to keep gated. Failing closed is the only safe direction for both
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flags: an unexpectedly-gated server prompts, an unexpectedly-enabled
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one runs third-party code unannounced.
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"""
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if isinstance(value, bool):
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return value
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logger.warning(
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"mcp.json server %r: %s must be true or false, got %r; using false.",
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server, key, value)
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return False
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def _parse_entry(name: str, entry: Any, tier: str, path: str) -> ServerConfig:
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"""Turns one raw JSON value into a ServerConfig. Never raises: a bad
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entry is returned with transport == 'unknown' and an error string, so
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one malformed server cannot stop the others from connecting."""
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if not isinstance(entry, dict):
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return ServerConfig(name=name, tier=tier, path=path, transport="unknown",
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error=f"expected an object, got {type(entry).__name__}")
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unknown = set(entry) - _KNOWN_SERVER_KEYS
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if unknown:
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# DEBUG, not WARNING: configs shared with other MCP clients carry
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# keys we don't implement, and making that noisy on every startup
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# trains people to ignore the log.
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logger.debug("mcp.json server %r: ignoring unrecognized keys %s",
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name, sorted(unknown))
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cfg = ServerConfig(
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name=name, tier=tier, path=path, transport="unknown",
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env=entry.get("env") or {},
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cwd=entry.get("cwd"),
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headers=entry.get("headers") or {},
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# accept either spelling; ours is camelCase to match the file's
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# existing style, but a snake_case one shouldn't silently no-op
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auto_approve=_flag(
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name, "autoApprove",
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entry.get("autoApprove", entry.get("auto_approve", False))),
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disabled=_flag(name, "disabled", entry.get("disabled", False)),
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raw=entry,
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)
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declared = str(entry.get("type") or "").lower()
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if entry.get("command"):
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raw_args = entry.get("args") or []
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if not isinstance(raw_args, list):
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# list("--verbose") is ['-', '-', 'v', ...]. A natural hand
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# edit therefore became a per-character argv and failed at
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# connect with an opaque error naming none of the cause,
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# defeating this module's rule that a bad entry becomes that
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# one server's NAMED failure.
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cfg.error = "'args' must be an array of strings"
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return cfg
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cfg.transport = "stdio"
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cfg.command = str(entry["command"])
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cfg.args = list(raw_args)
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# SSE only by EXPLICIT declaration (F5): a bare "url" keeps meaning
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# streamable HTTP, because that is what every config written before
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# this branch existed assumed, and URL sniffing would be magic. The
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# aliases below stay streamable; an unsupported declared type still
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# refuses rather than falling through to HTTP (#61's M7).
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elif entry.get("url") and declared in _SSE_TYPES:
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|
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cfg.transport = "sse"
|
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|
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cfg.url = str(entry["url"])
|
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|
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elif entry.get("url") and (not declared or declared in _STREAMABLE_TYPES):
|
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|
+
cfg.transport = "http"
|
|
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|
+
cfg.url = str(entry["url"])
|
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|
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elif entry.get("url"):
|
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|
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cfg.error = f"unsupported transport type {declared!r}"
|
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|
+
else:
|
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cfg.error = "no 'command' (stdio) and no 'url' (http)"
|
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|
+
return cfg
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
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|
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def _read_file(path: str, tier: str) -> dict:
|
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|
+
"""Reads one mcp.json. A missing file is empty, not an error. A
|
|
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|
+
corrupt one is reported and treated as empty -- consistent with G:
|
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it must not take down a session over a file the user may not have
|
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+
written, and the message names the file."""
|
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|
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if not os.path.exists(path):
|
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return {}
|
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try:
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# utf-8-sig: mcp.json is commonly copied between hosts and hand
|
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|
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# edited, so a BOM is realistic and would otherwise be reported as
|
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|
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# invalid JSON at character 0.
|
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|
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with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
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|
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data = json.load(f)
|
|
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|
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except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
|
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|
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logger.warning("Could not read %s-level mcp.json at %s: %s", tier, path, e)
|
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|
+
return {}
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
servers = data.get("mcpServers") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
|
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|
+
if servers is None and isinstance(data, dict):
|
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|
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# Tolerate a bare {"name": {...}} mapping; some tools write it.
|
|
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|
+
servers = {k: v for k, v in data.items() if isinstance(v, dict)}
|
|
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|
+
if not isinstance(servers, dict):
|
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|
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logger.warning("%s-level mcp.json at %s has no 'mcpServers' object; "
|
|
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|
+
"ignoring it.", tier, path)
|
|
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|
+
return {}
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
return {name: _parse_entry(name, entry, tier, path)
|
|
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|
+
for name, entry in servers.items()}
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
def load_server_configs(project_path: str, trusted: bool) -> dict:
|
|
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|
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"""All configured servers, keyed by name.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
253
|
+
USER BEATS PROJECT on a name collision (§17 decision H), which is the
|
|
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|
+
OPPOSITE of a plain "more specific wins" rule and deliberately so:
|
|
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|
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the user tier is what you authored, the project tier is what arrived
|
|
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|
+
with a repo you cloned. A shadowed agent changes a prompt; a shadowed
|
|
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|
+
MCP server changes which local command runs under a name you already
|
|
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|
+
trust. core/config_loader.py's tier order was changed to match, so
|
|
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|
+
agents, skills and MCP servers now all resolve the same way.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
261
|
+
Non-colliding servers from BOTH tiers load -- precedence only ever
|
|
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|
+
breaks same-name ties.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
264
|
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Project entries are omitted entirely when `trusted` is False. Absent,
|
|
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|
+
not loaded-and-disabled: untrusted content should not be reachable by
|
|
266
|
+
a later bug (§14's rule, applied here).
|
|
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|
+
"""
|
|
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|
+
merged: dict = {}
|
|
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|
+
|
|
270
|
+
for cfg in _read_file(user_config_path(), "user").values():
|
|
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|
+
merged[cfg.name] = cfg
|
|
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|
+
|
|
273
|
+
if trusted:
|
|
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|
+
for cfg in _read_file(project_config_path(project_path), "project").values():
|
|
275
|
+
if cfg.name in merged:
|
|
276
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
277
|
+
"project-level MCP server %r at %s is shadowed by the "
|
|
278
|
+
"user-level definition at %s, which wins.",
|
|
279
|
+
cfg.name, cfg.path, merged[cfg.name].path,
|
|
280
|
+
)
|
|
281
|
+
continue
|
|
282
|
+
merged[cfg.name] = cfg
|
|
283
|
+
|
|
284
|
+
return merged
|
|
285
|
+
|
|
286
|
+
|
|
287
|
+
# --- first-run acknowledgement for user-level servers (§17 decision I) ----
|
|
288
|
+
#
|
|
289
|
+
# Project-level servers are covered by D17's trust prompt. User-level ones
|
|
290
|
+
# have no gate at all, on the assumption you authored them -- which is
|
|
291
|
+
# exactly wrong when an installer or another tool appended to the file.
|
|
292
|
+
# Same content-hash keying as workspace_trust, so an edited command
|
|
293
|
+
# re-asks rather than inheriting an old acknowledgement.
|
|
294
|
+
|
|
295
|
+
def known_servers_path() -> str:
|
|
296
|
+
return os.path.expanduser("~/.config/venastine/known_mcp_servers.json")
|
|
297
|
+
|
|
298
|
+
|
|
299
|
+
def entry_digest(cfg: ServerConfig) -> str:
|
|
300
|
+
"""Hash of what the entry will DO. sort_keys so key order in the file
|
|
301
|
+
can't produce a different digest for identical configuration."""
|
|
302
|
+
return hashlib.sha256(
|
|
303
|
+
json.dumps(cfg.raw, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode("utf-8")
|
|
304
|
+
).hexdigest()
|
|
305
|
+
|
|
306
|
+
|
|
307
|
+
# v2 (#60/F3): the acknowledgement prompt used to omit autoApprove -- the
|
|
308
|
+
# one field that decides whether any future prompt exists -- so consents
|
|
309
|
+
# recorded under v1 were given blind. The store carries a version; a
|
|
310
|
+
# legacy store's entries are treated as UNKNOWN (one re-ask each, under
|
|
311
|
+
# the improved disclosure) and a blind consent never survives the bump.
|
|
312
|
+
KNOWN_STORE_VERSION = 2
|
|
313
|
+
|
|
314
|
+
|
|
315
|
+
def _read_store() -> tuple:
|
|
316
|
+
"""(name -> digest mapping, is_legacy). A missing file is empty and
|
|
317
|
+
current. An unreadable one fails CLOSED as empty-and-current: every
|
|
318
|
+
server then looks new and gets re-confirmed, which is the safe
|
|
319
|
+
direction. A readable store in the OLD flat shape is NOT corrupt --
|
|
320
|
+
it is valid v1, and comes back marked legacy."""
|
|
321
|
+
path = known_servers_path()
|
|
322
|
+
if not os.path.exists(path):
|
|
323
|
+
return {}, False
|
|
324
|
+
try:
|
|
325
|
+
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
|
|
326
|
+
data = json.load(f)
|
|
327
|
+
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
|
328
|
+
logger.warning("Could not read %s; re-confirming every user-level "
|
|
329
|
+
"MCP server.", path)
|
|
330
|
+
return {}, False
|
|
331
|
+
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
|
332
|
+
logger.warning("%s is not an object; re-confirming every "
|
|
333
|
+
"user-level MCP server.", path)
|
|
334
|
+
return {}, False
|
|
335
|
+
if data.get("version") == KNOWN_STORE_VERSION \
|
|
336
|
+
and isinstance(data.get("servers"), dict):
|
|
337
|
+
return dict(data["servers"]), False
|
|
338
|
+
return {k: v for k, v in data.items()
|
|
339
|
+
if isinstance(k, str)}, True
|
|
340
|
+
|
|
341
|
+
|
|
342
|
+
def is_known(cfg: ServerConfig) -> bool:
|
|
343
|
+
"""Whether this exact server entry has already been acknowledged.
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
345
|
+
Reads the store itself rather than taking one. It used to accept a
|
|
346
|
+
pre-read `store=` for callers batching several checks, and no caller
|
|
347
|
+
ever passed one -- so the branch was dead while the parameter went on
|
|
348
|
+
advertising an optimisation nobody could see was unused.
|
|
349
|
+
"""
|
|
350
|
+
servers, legacy = _read_store()
|
|
351
|
+
# F3: a v1 consent was given under a prompt that never named the
|
|
352
|
+
# field it most needed to name. It does not count.
|
|
353
|
+
if legacy:
|
|
354
|
+
return False
|
|
355
|
+
return servers.get(cfg.name) == entry_digest(cfg)
|
|
356
|
+
|
|
357
|
+
|
|
358
|
+
def remember_server(cfg: ServerConfig) -> None:
|
|
359
|
+
path = known_servers_path()
|
|
360
|
+
servers, legacy = _read_store()
|
|
361
|
+
if legacy:
|
|
362
|
+
# Carrying the old digests forward would silently convert blind
|
|
363
|
+
# consents into disclosed ones for servers this session never
|
|
364
|
+
# re-asked. They start over; answering y here records THIS server
|
|
365
|
+
# only, and the others keep asking until they are answered.
|
|
366
|
+
servers = {}
|
|
367
|
+
servers[cfg.name] = entry_digest(cfg)
|
|
368
|
+
# ATOMIC since batch 45, and this was the odd one out. Its three
|
|
369
|
+
# sibling stores each wrote through a temp file and os.replace, and
|
|
370
|
+
# each spent four to eight docstring lines on why -- a
|
|
371
|
+
# truncate-then-write leaves the file empty for the length of the
|
|
372
|
+
# write and permanently damaged if the process dies inside it. This
|
|
373
|
+
# one used a bare open(path, "w") and said nothing, for a file that
|
|
374
|
+
# records CONSENT: the same class of data as the trust store, which
|
|
375
|
+
# is the sibling that argues hardest for the guarantee. Sharing the
|
|
376
|
+
# write is what stops a convention four comments long from having a
|
|
377
|
+
# fourth copy that does not follow it.
|
|
378
|
+
write_json_atomic(path, {"version": KNOWN_STORE_VERSION,
|
|
379
|
+
"servers": servers})
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""
|
|
2
|
+
mcp_client/registration.py
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
Turns connected MCP servers' tools into ToolSpecs and puts them in the
|
|
5
|
+
registry at runtime (D15). ROADMAP_v2 §17.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
Naming is `mcp__<server>__<tool>`, which is what makes the rest of the
|
|
8
|
+
system work without special cases:
|
|
9
|
+
* security.permissions._default_for_unknown_tool() allows the prefix,
|
|
10
|
+
* _default_for_unknown_approval() requires approval for it (§17 D),
|
|
11
|
+
* assert_permissions_declared() exempts it (D24),
|
|
12
|
+
* tui/ravens.py maps unknown tool names to a generic working state, so
|
|
13
|
+
MCP tools animate with no table edit.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
Tool SCHEMAS are authored in Anthropic's native shape everywhere in this
|
|
16
|
+
project and translated per-provider at the boundary in core/client.py.
|
|
17
|
+
MCP's Tool is already almost that shape, so this is a rename rather than
|
|
18
|
+
a translation -- but it is still done HERE, once, rather than teaching
|
|
19
|
+
core/client.py about MCP types.
|
|
20
|
+
"""
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
import logging
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
from security import permissions
|
|
25
|
+
from tools.base import BUDGET_IO, GRANT_ANYWHERE, ToolSpec
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
NAME_PREFIX = "mcp__"
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
# server name -> the exact tool names registered for it.
|
|
32
|
+
#
|
|
33
|
+
# THE PREFIX IS NOT A PARSER. `mcp__<server>__<tool>` cannot be taken
|
|
34
|
+
# apart again: neither `__` in a server name nor `__` in a tool name is
|
|
35
|
+
# illegal anywhere, and both occur. Two consequences, both silent:
|
|
36
|
+
#
|
|
37
|
+
# * teardown by prefix over-matches. Disconnecting server "fs" scans for
|
|
38
|
+
# "mcp__fs__", which also matches every tool of a still-connected
|
|
39
|
+
# server named "fs__legacy" -- unregistering live tools and dropping
|
|
40
|
+
# their approval defaults.
|
|
41
|
+
# * names collide. tool_name_for("a", "b__c") and
|
|
42
|
+
# tool_name_for("a__b", "c") are the same string, so registry.register
|
|
43
|
+
# silently overwrites: a tool the user believes is approval-gated on
|
|
44
|
+
# server `a` runs server `a__b`'s handler under a__b's autoApprove.
|
|
45
|
+
#
|
|
46
|
+
# A trusted project's .venastine/mcp.json can choose the colliding server
|
|
47
|
+
# name -- the D29 impersonation threat, one separator away.
|
|
48
|
+
#
|
|
49
|
+
# Recording what was actually registered fixes both without rejecting any
|
|
50
|
+
# mcp.json content, which decision G rules out: validation here is by
|
|
51
|
+
# CONNECTING, not by schema.
|
|
52
|
+
_registered: dict = {}
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
def tool_name_for(server_name: str, tool_name: str) -> str:
|
|
56
|
+
return f"{NAME_PREFIX}{server_name}__{tool_name}"
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
def schema_for(server_name: str, tool) -> dict:
|
|
60
|
+
"""MCP Tool -> the Anthropic-native schema shape every TOOL_SCHEMA in
|
|
61
|
+
tools/builtin/ uses.
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
v2 spells these snake_case (.input_schema); v1 used .inputSchema. The
|
|
64
|
+
getattr fallback covers both rather than breaking on a pin move --
|
|
65
|
+
a stray empty schema here would be advertised to the model as a tool
|
|
66
|
+
that takes no arguments, which fails at call time instead of load
|
|
67
|
+
time and is the harder failure to trace.
|
|
68
|
+
"""
|
|
69
|
+
input_schema = (
|
|
70
|
+
getattr(tool, "input_schema", None)
|
|
71
|
+
or getattr(tool, "inputSchema", None)
|
|
72
|
+
or {"type": "object", "properties": {}}
|
|
73
|
+
)
|
|
74
|
+
description = getattr(tool, "description", None) or ""
|
|
75
|
+
title = getattr(tool, "title", None)
|
|
76
|
+
if title and title not in description:
|
|
77
|
+
description = f"{title}. {description}".strip()
|
|
78
|
+
return {
|
|
79
|
+
"name": tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name),
|
|
80
|
+
"description": f"[MCP: {server_name}] {description}".strip(),
|
|
81
|
+
"input_schema": input_schema,
|
|
82
|
+
}
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
def _make_handler(client, server_name: str, tool_name: str):
|
|
86
|
+
"""A genuinely plain synchronous function -- no bridging logic leaks
|
|
87
|
+
into the tool layer. client.call_tool() does the crossing (D2a) and
|
|
88
|
+
returns an already-normalized dict (D23)."""
|
|
89
|
+
def handler(params: dict) -> dict:
|
|
90
|
+
return client.call_tool(server_name, tool_name, params)
|
|
91
|
+
return handler
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
def register_all(client, registry) -> list:
|
|
95
|
+
"""Register every tool from every connected server. Returns the tool
|
|
96
|
+
names registered, so a caller can report what became available."""
|
|
97
|
+
registered = []
|
|
98
|
+
for server_name in sorted(client.clients):
|
|
99
|
+
cfg = client.server_configs.get(server_name)
|
|
100
|
+
auto_approve = bool(getattr(cfg, "auto_approve", False))
|
|
101
|
+
try:
|
|
102
|
+
tools = client.list_tools(server_name)
|
|
103
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
|
104
|
+
logger.warning("Could not list tools for MCP server %r: %s",
|
|
105
|
+
server_name, e)
|
|
106
|
+
continue
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
for tool in tools:
|
|
109
|
+
name = tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name)
|
|
110
|
+
if name in registry._tools:
|
|
111
|
+
# Never overwrite. The colliding registration would replace
|
|
112
|
+
# BOTH the handler and (via set_dynamic_approval_default
|
|
113
|
+
# below) the approval policy of a tool already in place --
|
|
114
|
+
# so refusing loudly is the only outcome that can't be
|
|
115
|
+
# mistaken for the tool the user thinks they are calling.
|
|
116
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
117
|
+
"MCP tool name collision: %r from server %r is already "
|
|
118
|
+
"registered; skipping it. Rename one of the servers or "
|
|
119
|
+
"tools -- '__' in a name makes these ambiguous.",
|
|
120
|
+
name, server_name)
|
|
121
|
+
continue
|
|
122
|
+
# Base approval default BEFORE registering, so there is no
|
|
123
|
+
# window in which the tool is callable without its policy set.
|
|
124
|
+
permissions.set_dynamic_approval_default(name, not auto_approve)
|
|
125
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
126
|
+
name=name,
|
|
127
|
+
schema=schema_for(server_name, tool),
|
|
128
|
+
handler=_make_handler(client, server_name, tool.name),
|
|
129
|
+
# §25 R13. Stated here rather than left to
|
|
130
|
+
# registry.grant_policy's mcp__* fallback: this is the
|
|
131
|
+
# site that makes the decision, and MCP tools are the
|
|
132
|
+
# grant picker's real population -- R1's argument that
|
|
133
|
+
# the tool's own description is the whole of informed
|
|
134
|
+
# consent was written about exactly these, because MCP
|
|
135
|
+
# exposes no read-only/write metadata for anything to
|
|
136
|
+
# reason from. The fallback stays as documentation for
|
|
137
|
+
# any other dynamic registrant.
|
|
138
|
+
grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE,
|
|
139
|
+
# H1. Exempt from assert_budget_declared for the reason
|
|
140
|
+
# R13 exempts them -- named at connection time, so no
|
|
141
|
+
# static declaration can exist -- and declared anyway,
|
|
142
|
+
# because these tools DO have a bound and it is worth
|
|
143
|
+
# naming which: client.call_tool wraps every call in the
|
|
144
|
+
# two-layer clock DEFAULT_CALL_TIMEOUT_S backstops. That
|
|
145
|
+
# is BUDGET_IO exactly, and it is the mechanism H2 was
|
|
146
|
+
# modelled on.
|
|
147
|
+
budget=BUDGET_IO,
|
|
148
|
+
))
|
|
149
|
+
_registered.setdefault(server_name, []).append(name)
|
|
150
|
+
registered.append(name)
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
152
|
+
if auto_approve:
|
|
153
|
+
# WARNING, not INFO (F4): TranscriptLogHandler forwards
|
|
154
|
+
# WARNING+ into the TUI transcript, and on that path stderr is
|
|
155
|
+
# already closed -- at INFO this reached nothing but app.log,
|
|
156
|
+
# so the shell where approval prompts are MODALS was exactly
|
|
157
|
+
# the one never told some tools would not prompt. Fires every
|
|
158
|
+
# launch per auto-approved server, deliberately (#60): worst
|
|
159
|
+
# case it trains people past it, which equals today's silence;
|
|
160
|
+
# best case it is read once and someone catches a flag they
|
|
161
|
+
# did not knowingly set.
|
|
162
|
+
logger.warning("MCP server %r is auto-approved; its tools will "
|
|
163
|
+
"not prompt before running.", server_name)
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
logger.info("Registered %d MCP tool(s).", len(registered))
|
|
166
|
+
return registered
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
|
|
169
|
+
def unregister_all(registry, server_name: str = None) -> None:
|
|
170
|
+
"""Remove MCP tools from the registry and drop their approval
|
|
171
|
+
defaults. Idempotent -- disconnect handling can run more than once
|
|
172
|
+
for the same server, which is why registry.unregister() is too.
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
Removes exactly what register_all() put in, by name. A prefix scan
|
|
175
|
+
would take a sibling server's tools with it whenever one server's
|
|
176
|
+
name is a `__`-prefix of another's (see _registered above).
|
|
177
|
+
"""
|
|
178
|
+
servers = [server_name] if server_name is not None else list(_registered)
|
|
179
|
+
for server in servers:
|
|
180
|
+
for name in _registered.pop(server, []):
|
|
181
|
+
registry.unregister(name)
|
|
182
|
+
permissions.clear_dynamic_approval_defaults(name)
|