@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard 1.3.0 → 1.11.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.vibeguard-mcp.example.json +51 -0
- package/CHANGELOG.md +604 -216
- package/MCP-FIREWALL.md +296 -0
- package/README.md +355 -31
- package/bin/cli.js +355 -27
- package/bin/cmd-agent-monitor.js +45 -0
- package/bin/cmd-agent-risk.js +64 -0
- package/bin/cmd-gif.js +62 -0
- package/bin/cmd-git-scan.js +74 -0
- package/bin/cmd-llm-proxy.js +164 -0
- package/bin/cmd-mcp-firewall.js +191 -0
- package/bin/cmd-pentest.js +103 -0
- package/bin/cmd-platform.js +137 -0
- package/bin/cmd-pr-scan.js +135 -0
- package/bin/cmd-sbom-diff.js +38 -0
- package/bin/cmd-skill-scan.js +35 -0
- package/docs/AISVS.md +25 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +81 -0
- package/docs/INSTALLATION.md +139 -0
- package/docs/WINDOWS.md +74 -0
- package/docs/security-policy.strict.example.json +134 -0
- package/docs/security-policy.strict.example.pub.pem +3 -0
- package/package.json +45 -7
- package/src/.vibeguard/cache/file-hashes.json +60 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/latest-snapshot.json +36 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/mcp-pins.json +1 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/mcp-server.js +2051 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/manifest.json +37 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/mcp-server.js +2054 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/manifest.json +37 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/manifest.json +33 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard-baseline.json +5226 -0
- package/src/action-guard.js +84 -6
- package/src/agent-monitor.js +262 -0
- package/src/agent-policy.js +642 -0
- package/src/agent-risk.js +271 -0
- package/src/agentic.js +1513 -0
- package/src/ast.js +165 -7
- package/src/audit-trail.js +212 -67
- package/src/auto.js +427 -427
- package/src/autofix.js +11 -4
- package/src/bundles.js +198 -0
- package/src/daemon.js +343 -343
- package/src/dashboard.js +278 -278
- package/src/engine.js +3 -0
- package/src/entropy.js +187 -0
- package/src/firewall.js +19 -3
- package/src/gif.js +134 -0
- package/src/gitscan.js +282 -0
- package/src/hook.js +151 -151
- package/src/injection-decode.js +136 -0
- package/src/install.js +298 -280
- package/src/integrity.js +16 -1
- package/src/integrity.json +43 -13
- package/src/interceptor.js +12 -9
- package/src/llm-proxy.js +986 -0
- package/src/mcp-audit.js +61 -5
- package/src/mcp-firewall.js +971 -0
- package/src/mcp-server.js +2500 -2047
- package/src/obfuscation.js +315 -0
- package/src/owasp-agentic.js +314 -0
- package/src/pentest.js +589 -0
- package/src/pii.js +4 -0
- package/src/platform/aisvs.js +38 -0
- package/src/platform/approval.js +187 -0
- package/src/platform/canonical.js +73 -0
- package/src/platform/contracts.js +158 -0
- package/src/platform/delegation.js +73 -0
- package/src/platform/http-gateway.js +177 -0
- package/src/platform/identity.js +253 -0
- package/src/platform/jwt.js +86 -0
- package/src/platform/mcp-http-bridge.js +199 -0
- package/src/platform/memory-guard.js +64 -0
- package/src/platform/os-sandbox.js +144 -0
- package/src/platform/policy.js +332 -0
- package/src/platform/sandbox-manager.js +92 -0
- package/src/platform/signed-audit.js +357 -0
- package/src/platform/ssrf.js +129 -0
- package/src/plugin.js +182 -168
- package/src/pre-deploy.js +170 -55
- package/src/privacy-audit.js +272 -272
- package/src/repl.js +150 -150
- package/src/report.js +7 -1
- package/src/routes.js +1210 -0
- package/src/rules-2026.js +1407 -0
- package/src/rules-pack.js +3068 -3019
- package/src/rules.js +376 -60
- package/src/sandbox.js +200 -10
- package/src/sbom.js +193 -164
- package/src/scanner.js +189 -33
- package/src/shell-guard.js +11 -0
- package/src/skill-scan.js +477 -0
- package/src/slopsquat.js +144 -144
- package/src/surface.js +408 -0
- package/src/taint-ast.js +204 -37
- package/src/taint.js +15 -3
- package/src/tokenlean.js +579 -0
- package/src/trace.js +220 -220
package/src/rules.js
CHANGED
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@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.github-token',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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-
title: 'GitHub token',
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+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'GitHub token',
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re: /\bgh[posur]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded GitHub token (personal access / OAuth / app token).',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and revoke it in GitHub settings.',
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@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.slack-token',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'Slack token',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Slack token',
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re: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded Slack token.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate it in the Slack app settings.',
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@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.gitlab-token',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'GitLab personal access token',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'GitLab personal access token',
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re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded GitLab personal access token.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and revoke it in GitLab.',
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@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.twilio-key',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'Twilio API key',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Twilio API key',
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re: /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded Twilio API key.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate it in the Twilio console.',
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@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.sendgrid-key',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'SendGrid API key',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'SendGrid API key',
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re: /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{16,}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded SendGrid API key.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate it in SendGrid.',
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@@ -202,25 +202,35 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.mailgun-key',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'Mailgun API key',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Mailgun API key',
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re: /\bkey-[0-9a-f]{32}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded Mailgun API key.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate it in Mailgun.',
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},
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{
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id: 'secret.telegram-bot-token',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'Telegram bot token',
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// Bot tokens: <bot_id>:<base64url body>. The body is 35 chars, but tokens
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// with hyphens/underscores quoted in code can render shorter — accept 32-35.
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re: /\b\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,35}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded Telegram bot token.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and revoke it via BotFather.',
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filter(line, m) {
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// Bot token bodies are base64url — mixed case plus digits. Requiring both
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// letter cases (and a digit) rejects look-alike timestamps (e.g.
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// "20240101:abcdefghijklmnop") and hex hashes that match the shape but
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// are not tokens.
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const body = m ? String(m.match).split(':')[1] || '' : line;
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return /[A-Z]/.test(body) && /[a-z]/.test(body) && /[0-9]/.test(body);
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},
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},
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{
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id: 'secret.npm-token',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'npm access token',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'npm access token',
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re: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded npm access token (also flagged in .npmrc).',
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fix: 'Remove it, use an environment variable / CI secret, and revoke it on npmjs.com.',
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@@ -229,7 +239,7 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.resend-key',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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title: 'Resend API key',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Resend API key',
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re: /\bre_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/,
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message: 'Hardcoded Resend API key.',
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fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate it in Resend.',
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@@ -242,20 +252,28 @@ const secretRules = [
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id: 'secret.connection-string',
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severity: 'critical',
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confidence: 'high',
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245
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title: 'Connection string with embedded credentials',
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cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Connection string with embedded credentials',
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re: /\b(?:mongodb(?:\+srv)?|postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mariadb|redis|amqps?):\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s:@/]+@/,
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message: 'A database/broker connection string embeds a username and password.',
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fix: 'Load the connection string from an environment variable; never commit credentials.',
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filter(line, m) {
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const url = m ? m.match : line;
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// Ignore obvious placeholders like user:pass@ / user:password@host.
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if (/:\/\/(?:user|username|root|admin):(?:pass|password|changeme|xxx+|\.\.\.)@/i.test(url)) return false;
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// The standard schemes below are already covered by the dedicated
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// secret.conn-string-password rule in the extended pack — this rule
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// deliberately stays quiet on them to avoid double-reporting the same
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// line. It keeps the schemes that rule alone handles: mariadb, amqp(s),
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// and the mongodb+srv form (the pack only matches plain mongodb://).
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+
if (/^(?:mongodb|postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|redis):\/\//i.test(url)) return false;
|
|
269
|
+
return true;
|
|
270
|
+
},
|
|
253
271
|
},
|
|
254
272
|
{
|
|
255
273
|
id: 'secret.public-llm-key',
|
|
256
274
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
257
275
|
confidence: 'high',
|
|
258
|
-
title: 'AI/secret key exposed to the browser via a public env prefix',
|
|
276
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'AI/secret key exposed to the browser via a public env prefix',
|
|
259
277
|
// NEXT_PUBLIC_/VITE_/EXPO_PUBLIC_ on an LLM provider key or anything named *SECRET*.
|
|
260
278
|
re: /\b(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|VITE_|EXPO_PUBLIC_|REACT_APP_|PUBLIC_)[A-Z0-9_]*(?:OPENAI|ANTHROPIC|GROQ|MISTRAL|COHERE|GEMINI|HUGGINGFACE|REPLICATE|TOGETHER|OPENROUTER|PERPLEXITY|DEEPSEEK)[A-Z0-9_]*|\b(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|VITE_|EXPO_PUBLIC_)[A-Z0-9_]*SECRET[A-Z0-9_]*/i,
|
|
261
279
|
message: 'A public env prefix exposes an AI provider key or a secret to the browser bundle — anyone can read it.',
|
|
@@ -264,7 +282,8 @@ const secretRules = [
|
|
|
264
282
|
{
|
|
265
283
|
id: 'secret.anthropic-key',
|
|
266
284
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
267
|
-
|
|
285
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
286
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Anthropic API key',
|
|
268
287
|
// Must be checked before the OpenAI rule (sk- prefix overlap).
|
|
269
288
|
re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}\b/,
|
|
270
289
|
message: 'Hardcoded Anthropic API key.',
|
|
@@ -273,7 +292,8 @@ const secretRules = [
|
|
|
273
292
|
{
|
|
274
293
|
id: 'secret.openai-key',
|
|
275
294
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
276
|
-
|
|
295
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
296
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'OpenAI API key',
|
|
277
297
|
// sk- or sk-proj-, but NOT sk-ant- (Anthropic) and NOT sk_live_ (Stripe uses _).
|
|
278
298
|
re: /\bsk-(?!ant-)(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}\b/,
|
|
279
299
|
message: 'Hardcoded OpenAI API key.',
|
|
@@ -282,15 +302,20 @@ const secretRules = [
|
|
|
282
302
|
{
|
|
283
303
|
id: 'secret.stripe-live-key',
|
|
284
304
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
285
|
-
|
|
286
|
-
|
|
305
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
306
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'Stripe live secret key',
|
|
307
|
+
// Live secret keys start sk_live_ (full account access). Restricted keys
|
|
308
|
+
// (rk_live_) are a separate, less-privileged class covered by
|
|
309
|
+
// secret.stripe-restricted-key — don't double-report them as full live keys.
|
|
310
|
+
re: /\bsk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\b/,
|
|
287
311
|
message: 'Hardcoded Stripe LIVE secret key. This can move real money.',
|
|
288
312
|
fix: 'Remove the key, load it from process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, and roll it in the Stripe dashboard now.',
|
|
289
313
|
},
|
|
290
314
|
{
|
|
291
315
|
id: 'secret.aws-access-key',
|
|
292
316
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
293
|
-
|
|
317
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
318
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-798', owasp: 'A07', title: 'AWS access key id',
|
|
294
319
|
re: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/,
|
|
295
320
|
message: 'Hardcoded AWS access key id.',
|
|
296
321
|
fix: 'Remove it, use an IAM role or environment variables, and deactivate/rotate the key in AWS IAM.',
|
|
@@ -606,6 +631,8 @@ const BASE_SHAPING = [
|
|
|
606
631
|
'toSafe\\w*', 'toPublic\\w*', 'serialize\\w*', 'toJSON', 'select', 'only', 'except',
|
|
607
632
|
];
|
|
608
633
|
let extraShaping = [];
|
|
634
|
+
// User-defined rules from .vibeguardrc.json { "customRules": [...] } — see configure().
|
|
635
|
+
let customRules = [];
|
|
609
636
|
|
|
610
637
|
function buildRedactRe() {
|
|
611
638
|
return new RegExp('\\b(?:' + [...BASE_SHAPING, ...extraShaping].join('|') + ')\\s*\\(', 'i');
|
|
@@ -619,6 +646,45 @@ function configure(cfg) {
|
|
|
619
646
|
.filter((s) => typeof s === 'string' && /^[\w\\*]+$/.test(s));
|
|
620
647
|
extraShaping = fns;
|
|
621
648
|
REDACT_RE = buildRedactRe();
|
|
649
|
+
// User-defined regex rules (Semgrep-style custom rules, zero code changes):
|
|
650
|
+
// .vibeguardrc.json { "customRules": [{ "id": "mycorp.no-eval", "severity": "high",
|
|
651
|
+
// "title": "...", "re": "pattern", "message": "...", "fix": "..." }] }
|
|
652
|
+
if (customRules.length) {
|
|
653
|
+
fileRules.length -= customRules.length; // drop previous customs before re-adding
|
|
654
|
+
customRules = [];
|
|
655
|
+
}
|
|
656
|
+
if (cfg && Array.isArray(cfg.customRules)) {
|
|
657
|
+
for (const r of cfg.customRules) {
|
|
658
|
+
if (!r || typeof r.id !== 'string' || typeof r.re !== 'string' || !r.re) continue;
|
|
659
|
+
let compiled;
|
|
660
|
+
try { compiled = new RegExp(r.re, 'gi'); } catch { continue; } // bad regex = skip, never crash
|
|
661
|
+
const rule = {
|
|
662
|
+
id: String(r.id).slice(0, 64).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '-'),
|
|
663
|
+
severity: ['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low'].includes(r.severity) ? r.severity : 'high',
|
|
664
|
+
confidence: r.confidence || 'medium',
|
|
665
|
+
title: String(r.title || r.id),
|
|
666
|
+
re: compiled,
|
|
667
|
+
// The fileRules loop only executes run()/match() rules — wrap the regex
|
|
668
|
+
// so custom rules ride the same hook (no scanner changes needed).
|
|
669
|
+
match(content) {
|
|
670
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
671
|
+
compiled.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
672
|
+
let mm;
|
|
673
|
+
while ((mm = compiled.exec(content)) !== null) {
|
|
674
|
+
out.push({ index: mm.index, match: mm[0] });
|
|
675
|
+
if (mm.index === compiled.lastIndex) compiled.lastIndex++;
|
|
676
|
+
}
|
|
677
|
+
return out;
|
|
678
|
+
},
|
|
679
|
+
message: String(r.message || 'Custom rule matched.'),
|
|
680
|
+
fix: String(r.fix || 'Review this match.'),
|
|
681
|
+
cwe: String(r.cwe || 'CWE-710'), owasp: String(r.owasp || 'A09'),
|
|
682
|
+
custom: true,
|
|
683
|
+
};
|
|
684
|
+
customRules.push(rule);
|
|
685
|
+
fileRules.push(rule);
|
|
686
|
+
}
|
|
687
|
+
}
|
|
622
688
|
}
|
|
623
689
|
|
|
624
690
|
function isRedacted(line) {
|
|
@@ -673,7 +739,7 @@ const piiRules = [
|
|
|
673
739
|
id: 'pii.secret-in-log',
|
|
674
740
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
675
741
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
676
|
-
title: 'Secret written to logs',
|
|
742
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-359', owasp: 'A01', title: 'Secret written to logs',
|
|
677
743
|
re: LOG_SINK,
|
|
678
744
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
679
745
|
message: 'A secret/credential is written to logs. Logs get shipped to files, consoles, and log aggregators — this leaks it.',
|
|
@@ -684,7 +750,7 @@ const piiRules = [
|
|
|
684
750
|
id: 'pii.personal-data-in-log',
|
|
685
751
|
severity: 'medium',
|
|
686
752
|
confidence: 'low',
|
|
687
|
-
title: 'Personal data written to logs',
|
|
753
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-359', owasp: 'A01', title: 'Personal data written to logs',
|
|
688
754
|
re: LOG_SINK,
|
|
689
755
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
690
756
|
message: 'Personal data (PII) is written to logs. Confirm this is intended and compliant — logs are often less protected than your DB.',
|
|
@@ -695,7 +761,7 @@ const piiRules = [
|
|
|
695
761
|
id: 'pii.secret-in-response',
|
|
696
762
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
697
763
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
698
|
-
title: 'Secret/credential sent in an HTTP response',
|
|
764
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-359', owasp: 'A01', title: 'Secret/credential sent in an HTTP response',
|
|
699
765
|
re: RES_SINK,
|
|
700
766
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
701
767
|
message: 'A secret/credential field is included in an HTTP response body — it will be sent to the client.',
|
|
@@ -706,7 +772,7 @@ const piiRules = [
|
|
|
706
772
|
id: 'pii.request-body-echoed',
|
|
707
773
|
severity: 'medium',
|
|
708
774
|
confidence: 'low',
|
|
709
|
-
title: 'Raw request body returned to the client',
|
|
775
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-359', owasp: 'A01', title: 'Raw request body returned to the client',
|
|
710
776
|
re: /\bres\.(?:json|send)\s*\(\s*req\.body\s*\)/i,
|
|
711
777
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
712
778
|
message: 'The raw request body is echoed back in the response. Combined with mass-assignment this can reflect or expose unintended fields.',
|
|
@@ -853,7 +919,7 @@ const aiRules = [
|
|
|
853
919
|
id: 'ai.browser-api-key',
|
|
854
920
|
severity: 'critical',
|
|
855
921
|
confidence: 'high',
|
|
856
|
-
title: 'AI SDK configured to run in the browser',
|
|
922
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'AI SDK configured to run in the browser',
|
|
857
923
|
re: /dangerouslyAllowBrowser\s*:\s*true/,
|
|
858
924
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
859
925
|
message: 'dangerouslyAllowBrowser: true ships your AI provider API key to the browser, where anyone can steal it.',
|
|
@@ -863,7 +929,7 @@ const aiRules = [
|
|
|
863
929
|
id: 'ai.disabled-sandbox',
|
|
864
930
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
865
931
|
confidence: 'high',
|
|
866
|
-
title: 'AI agent sandbox / permission check disabled',
|
|
932
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'AI agent sandbox / permission check disabled',
|
|
867
933
|
re: /dangerouslyDisableSandbox\s*:\s*true|dangerouslySkipPermissions|--dangerously-skip-permissions|bypassPermissions\s*:\s*true/,
|
|
868
934
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
869
935
|
message: 'A sandbox or permission gate for an AI agent/tool is disabled — the model can run unrestricted actions.',
|
|
@@ -873,7 +939,7 @@ const aiRules = [
|
|
|
873
939
|
id: 'ai.eval-llm-output',
|
|
874
940
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
875
941
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
876
|
-
title: 'Executing LLM output as code',
|
|
942
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'Executing LLM output as code',
|
|
877
943
|
re: /\b(?:eval|Function)\s*\(\s*[^)]*(?:completion|response|llmOutput|aiResponse|message\.content|choices\[0\]|\.text\b|generatedCode)/i,
|
|
878
944
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
879
945
|
message: 'Model output is executed as code (eval/Function). A prompt-injected response becomes remote code execution.',
|
|
@@ -883,7 +949,7 @@ const aiRules = [
|
|
|
883
949
|
id: 'ai.prompt-injection-marker',
|
|
884
950
|
severity: 'medium',
|
|
885
951
|
confidence: 'low',
|
|
886
|
-
title: 'Prompt-injection phrase in code / tool description',
|
|
952
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'Prompt-injection phrase in code / tool description',
|
|
887
953
|
re: /ignore\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:previous|prior|above)\s+instructions|disregard\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:above|previous)|jailbreak\s+mode|\bDAN\s+mode\b|you\s+are\s+now\s+(?:in\s+)?developer\s+mode/i,
|
|
888
954
|
skipComments: false,
|
|
889
955
|
message: 'A classic prompt-injection phrase appears here (e.g. in an MCP tool description or system prompt). If this text can reach an LLM, it can hijack it.',
|
|
@@ -900,7 +966,7 @@ const injectionRules = [
|
|
|
900
966
|
id: 'injection.prototype-pollution',
|
|
901
967
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
902
968
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
903
|
-
title: 'Prototype pollution via deep merge of request data',
|
|
969
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'Prototype pollution via deep merge of request data',
|
|
904
970
|
re: /\b(?:_\.)?(?:merge|mergeWith|defaultsDeep|extend|set|setWith)\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b|deepmerge\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b|Object\.assign\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b/i,
|
|
905
971
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
906
972
|
message: 'A deep-merge/set of request data can set __proto__/constructor keys — prototype pollution.',
|
|
@@ -910,7 +976,7 @@ const injectionRules = [
|
|
|
910
976
|
id: 'injection.redos-user-regex',
|
|
911
977
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
912
978
|
confidence: 'high',
|
|
913
|
-
title: 'RegExp built from user input (ReDoS)',
|
|
979
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'RegExp built from user input (ReDoS)',
|
|
914
980
|
re: /new\s+RegExp\s*\(\s*[^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params)\b/,
|
|
915
981
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
916
982
|
message: 'A RegExp is constructed from user input — a crafted pattern causes catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) and can DoS the process.',
|
|
@@ -920,7 +986,7 @@ const injectionRules = [
|
|
|
920
986
|
id: 'injection.xxe',
|
|
921
987
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
922
988
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
923
|
-
title: 'XML parser with external entities enabled',
|
|
989
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'XML parser with external entities enabled',
|
|
924
990
|
re: /noent\s*:\s*true|resolveExternalEntities\s*:\s*true|expandEntities\s*:\s*true|XMLParser\([^)]*processEntities\s*:\s*true/i,
|
|
925
991
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
926
992
|
message: 'XML external entity expansion is enabled — XXE lets attackers read files and reach internal services.',
|
|
@@ -930,7 +996,7 @@ const injectionRules = [
|
|
|
930
996
|
id: 'injection.crlf',
|
|
931
997
|
severity: 'medium',
|
|
932
998
|
confidence: 'low',
|
|
933
|
-
title: 'User input written to a response header',
|
|
999
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03', title: 'User input written to a response header',
|
|
934
1000
|
re: /\bres\.(?:setHeader|writeHead|header)\s*\([^)]*\breq\.(?:body|query|params|headers)\b/,
|
|
935
1001
|
skipComments: true,
|
|
936
1002
|
message: 'User input is used in a response header — CRLF injection can split headers or set arbitrary cookies.',
|
|
@@ -972,34 +1038,52 @@ const ENTROPY_SKIP_FILE = /(?:package-lock\.json|yarn\.lock|pnpm-lock\.yaml|Carg
|
|
|
972
1038
|
// known-public tokens.
|
|
973
1039
|
const ENTROPY_SKIP_PREFIX = /^(?:sk-|sk_live_|sk_test_|rk_live_|pk_live_|pk_test_|AKIA|ASIA|AIza|eyJ|ghp_|gho_|xox[baprs]-)/;
|
|
974
1040
|
|
|
1041
|
+
// Entropy engine for the high-entropy-token rule (pure functions, see src/entropy.js).
|
|
1042
|
+
const { findHighEntropyTokens } = require('./entropy');
|
|
1043
|
+
|
|
975
1044
|
const fileRules = [
|
|
976
1045
|
{
|
|
977
1046
|
id: 'secret.high-entropy',
|
|
978
1047
|
severity: 'high',
|
|
979
1048
|
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
980
1049
|
title: 'High-entropy string (possible hardcoded secret)',
|
|
981
|
-
run(content, lines, relPath) {
|
|
982
|
-
|
|
983
|
-
|
|
984
|
-
|
|
985
|
-
|
|
986
|
-
|
|
987
|
-
|
|
988
|
-
|
|
989
|
-
|
|
990
|
-
|
|
991
|
-
|
|
992
|
-
|
|
993
|
-
|
|
994
|
-
|
|
995
|
-
|
|
996
|
-
|
|
997
|
-
|
|
998
|
-
|
|
999
|
-
|
|
1000
|
-
|
|
1001
|
-
|
|
1002
|
-
|
|
1050
|
+
run(content, lines, relPath, priorFindings) {
|
|
1051
|
+
if (ENTROPY_SKIP_FILE.test(relPath || '')) return [];
|
|
1052
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
1053
|
+
// Lines already reported by a specific secret.* line rule. The
|
|
1054
|
+
// high-entropy hint is meant to catch *unclassified* tokens; firing it
|
|
1055
|
+
// again on the same line a specific rule already flagged (at any
|
|
1056
|
+
// confidence) is pure noise, e.g. AWS env keys which are 'low'.
|
|
1057
|
+
const priorSecretLines = new Set();
|
|
1058
|
+
if (Array.isArray(priorFindings)) {
|
|
1059
|
+
for (const f of priorFindings) {
|
|
1060
|
+
if (f && typeof f.ruleId === 'string' && f.ruleId.startsWith('secret.') &&
|
|
1061
|
+
typeof f.line === 'number') {
|
|
1062
|
+
priorSecretLines.add(f.line);
|
|
1063
|
+
}
|
|
1064
|
+
}
|
|
1065
|
+
}
|
|
1066
|
+
const strRe = /['"`]([A-Za-z0-9+/=_\-]{24,120})['"`]/g;
|
|
1067
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
1068
|
+
const line = lines[i];
|
|
1069
|
+
if (line.length > 2000) continue;
|
|
1070
|
+
let m;
|
|
1071
|
+
strRe.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
1072
|
+
while ((m = strRe.exec(line)) !== null) {
|
|
1073
|
+
const val = m[1];
|
|
1074
|
+
if (ENTROPY_SKIP_PREFIX.test(val)) continue;
|
|
1075
|
+
if (looksLikePlaceholder(val)) continue;
|
|
1076
|
+
if (isPublicBaaSKey(line, val)) continue;
|
|
1077
|
+
// UUID — structured, not a secret.
|
|
1078
|
+
if (/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(val)) continue;
|
|
1079
|
+
// Pure-hex of checksum lengths (md5/sha1/sha256) — usually a hash, not a secret.
|
|
1080
|
+
if (/^[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(val) && [32, 40, 64].includes(val.length)) continue;
|
|
1081
|
+
// Must have digit+letter mix (avoids long English identifiers / base64 words).
|
|
1082
|
+
if (!/[0-9]/.test(val) || !/[A-Za-z]/.test(val)) continue;
|
|
1083
|
+
if (shannonEntropy(val) < 4.0) continue;
|
|
1084
|
+
// Skip if a specific secret rule already raised this exact line.
|
|
1085
|
+
if (priorSecretLines.has(i + 1)) continue;
|
|
1086
|
+
out.push({
|
|
1003
1087
|
line: i + 1,
|
|
1004
1088
|
column: (m.index || 0) + 1,
|
|
1005
1089
|
snippet: (val.slice(0, 4) + '****' + val.slice(-2)),
|
|
@@ -1012,6 +1096,40 @@ const fileRules = [
|
|
|
1012
1096
|
return out;
|
|
1013
1097
|
},
|
|
1014
1098
|
},
|
|
1099
|
+
{
|
|
1100
|
+
id: 'secret.high-entropy-token',
|
|
1101
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1102
|
+
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
1103
|
+
title: 'High-entropy secret-like token',
|
|
1104
|
+
// Function-based rule: no `re`, a `match(content, ctx)` instead (the scanner
|
|
1105
|
+
// calls it in the fileRules loop). Catches random-looking tokens (24-80
|
|
1106
|
+
// chars, entropy >= 4.0) assigned to key-like names — schemes NO known
|
|
1107
|
+
// regex rule owns. Lines a specific secret.* rule (or the sibling
|
|
1108
|
+
// high-entropy rule) already flagged are suppressed so it never
|
|
1109
|
+
// double-reports; ctx.findings is the scanner's live accumulator.
|
|
1110
|
+
match(content, ctx) {
|
|
1111
|
+
const priorSecretLines = new Set();
|
|
1112
|
+
if (ctx && Array.isArray(ctx.findings)) {
|
|
1113
|
+
for (const f of ctx.findings) {
|
|
1114
|
+
if (f && typeof f.ruleId === 'string' && f.ruleId.startsWith('secret.') && typeof f.line === 'number') {
|
|
1115
|
+
priorSecretLines.add(f.line);
|
|
1116
|
+
}
|
|
1117
|
+
}
|
|
1118
|
+
}
|
|
1119
|
+
const hits = [];
|
|
1120
|
+
for (const t of findHighEntropyTokens(content)) {
|
|
1121
|
+
if (priorSecretLines.has(t.line)) continue;
|
|
1122
|
+
// Public-by-design BaaS keys (Firebase AIza..., anon/publishable-named)
|
|
1123
|
+
// must never fire — same FP guard the sibling rule applies.
|
|
1124
|
+
const line = (ctx && ctx.lines && ctx.lines[t.line - 1]) || '';
|
|
1125
|
+
if (isPublicBaaSKey(line, t.match)) continue;
|
|
1126
|
+
hits.push({ index: t.index, match: t.match });
|
|
1127
|
+
}
|
|
1128
|
+
return hits;
|
|
1129
|
+
},
|
|
1130
|
+
message: 'High-entropy string assigned to a key-like name — possible hardcoded API key or token.',
|
|
1131
|
+
fix: 'Remove it, load from an environment variable, and rotate the key if real.',
|
|
1132
|
+
},
|
|
1015
1133
|
{
|
|
1016
1134
|
id: 'pii.full-record-response',
|
|
1017
1135
|
severity: 'medium',
|
|
@@ -1285,6 +1403,12 @@ const fileRules = [
|
|
|
1285
1403
|
if (/permissions:\s*write-all/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1286
1404
|
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'permissions: write-all grants the token full write access to the repo.', fix: 'Set least-privilege permissions per job (e.g. contents: read).' });
|
|
1287
1405
|
}
|
|
1406
|
+
if (/pull_request_target/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1407
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'high', confidence: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'pull_request_target runs the target-repo workflow with a writable GITHUB_TOKEN against PR code — a classic CI take-over when combined with untrusted checkout or script injection.', fix: 'Prefer pull_request, or add an explicit environment/approval gate and never checkout the PR head with a writable token.' });
|
|
1408
|
+
}
|
|
1409
|
+
if (/curl[^|\n]*\|\s*(?:bash|sh)\b|wget[^|\n]*-O-[^|\n]*\|\s*(?:bash|sh)\b/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1410
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'Piping a remote installer into a shell executes unverifiable code on the runner (supply-chain risk).', fix: 'Download the installer to a file, verify its signature/checksum, then run it — or use a maintained package manager action.' });
|
|
1411
|
+
}
|
|
1288
1412
|
const uses = /^\s*-?\s*uses:\s*([\w.\-]+\/[\w.\-]+)@([\w.\-]+)\s*$/.exec(l);
|
|
1289
1413
|
if (uses && !/^[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(uses[2])) {
|
|
1290
1414
|
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'low', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: `Action ${uses[1]} is pinned to a tag/branch (@${uses[2]}), not a commit SHA — a moved tag can inject malicious code.`, fix: 'Pin third-party actions to a full commit SHA.' });
|
|
@@ -1316,6 +1440,63 @@ const fileRules = [
|
|
|
1316
1440
|
return out;
|
|
1317
1441
|
},
|
|
1318
1442
|
},
|
|
1443
|
+
{
|
|
1444
|
+
id: 'iac.kubernetes',
|
|
1445
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1446
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
1447
|
+
title: 'Kubernetes manifest security context',
|
|
1448
|
+
run(content, lines, relPath) {
|
|
1449
|
+
if (!/\.(?:ya?ml)$/.test(relPath || '')) return [];
|
|
1450
|
+
if (!/\b(?:apiVersion|kind):\s*(?:Deployment|Pod|StatefulSet|DaemonSet|Job|CronJob)\b/.test(content)) return [];
|
|
1451
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
1452
|
+
const blockUntil = /^\s{0,6}\S/;
|
|
1453
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
1454
|
+
const l = lines[i];
|
|
1455
|
+
if (/privileged:\s*true/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1456
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'high', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'Container runs privileged — it can escape the sandbox and touch the host kernel/devices (the classic K8s container-escape).', fix: 'Set securityContext.privileged: false (or omit it) and drop capabilities instead of running privileged.' });
|
|
1457
|
+
}
|
|
1458
|
+
if (/runAsUser:\s*0\b/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1459
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'runAsUser: 0 runs the container as root — a compromise gets immediate root in the pod.', fix: 'Use a non-zero runAsUser plus runAsNonRoot: true to force a non-root container UID.' });
|
|
1460
|
+
}
|
|
1461
|
+
if (/hostNetwork:\s*true|hostPID:\s*true|hostIPC:\s*true/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1462
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'hostNetwork/hostPID/hostIPC: true shares the host network/process/IPC namespace — the pod can sniff traffic and see host processes.', fix: 'Remove these unless the workload truly needs host namespaces (most do not).' });
|
|
1463
|
+
}
|
|
1464
|
+
if (/allowPrivilegeEscalation:\s*true/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1465
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'allowPrivilegeEscalation: true lets a setuid binary inside the container gain more privileges than its parent.', fix: 'Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false.' });
|
|
1466
|
+
}
|
|
1467
|
+
if (/default-token|automountServiceAccountToken:\s*true/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1468
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'A service-account token is auto-mounted into the pod — code in the pod can talk to the K8s API as that account.', fix: 'Set automountServiceAccountToken: false unless the pod really needs API access, and use a minimal RBAC role.' });
|
|
1469
|
+
}
|
|
1470
|
+
if (/capabilities:[\s\S]{0,80}?add:[\s\S]{0,40}?(?:ALL|SYS_ADMIN|NET_ADMIN)/.test(l) || /add:\s*\[\s*(?:ALL|SYS_ADMIN|NET_ADMIN)/.test(l)) {
|
|
1471
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'A dangerous Linux capability (ALL / SYS_ADMIN / NET_ADMIN) is added — near-privileged without the flag.', fix: 'Drop all capabilities and add back only the specific ones the workload needs.' });
|
|
1472
|
+
}
|
|
1473
|
+
}
|
|
1474
|
+
return out;
|
|
1475
|
+
},
|
|
1476
|
+
},
|
|
1477
|
+
{
|
|
1478
|
+
id: 'iac.docker-compose',
|
|
1479
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1480
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
1481
|
+
title: 'Docker Compose security misconfiguration',
|
|
1482
|
+
run(content, lines, relPath) {
|
|
1483
|
+
if (!/(?:^|\/)(?:docker-)?compose\.(?:ya?ml)$/.test(relPath || '') && !/docker-compose\.(?:ya?ml|yml)/.test(relPath || '')) return [];
|
|
1484
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
1485
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
1486
|
+
const l = lines[i];
|
|
1487
|
+
if (/(?:^|[\s"':])v[^\s"']*\/var\/run\/docker\.sock|docker\.sock/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1488
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'high', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'Mounting /var/run/docker.sock gives the container full root control of the Docker daemon (host take-over).', fix: 'Do not mount the Docker socket into containers; use a rootless builder or a dedicated, least-privileged service.' });
|
|
1489
|
+
}
|
|
1490
|
+
if (/network_mode:\s*["']?host["']?/i.test(l)) {
|
|
1491
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'medium', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'network_mode: host removes network isolation — the container shares the host network stack and can sniff host traffic.', fix: 'Use a bridge or overlay network unless the workload truly needs host networking.' });
|
|
1492
|
+
}
|
|
1493
|
+
if (/\b(?:[A-Z_]*?(?:PASSWORD|SECRET|TOKEN|API_?KEY|PRIVATE_?KEY|CREDENTIAL)[A-Z_]*?)\s*[:=]\s*[^$"'*\s]/.test(l) && !/^\s*#/.test(l)) {
|
|
1494
|
+
out.push({ line: i + 1, column: 1, severity: 'high', snippet: l.trim().slice(0, 100), message: 'A hardcoded secret/credential sits in docker-compose — it ends up in the image, the Compose spec, and often version control.', fix: 'Move secrets to an env_file, Docker secrets, or a .env file that is gitignored.' });
|
|
1495
|
+
}
|
|
1496
|
+
}
|
|
1497
|
+
return out;
|
|
1498
|
+
},
|
|
1499
|
+
},
|
|
1319
1500
|
{
|
|
1320
1501
|
id: 'nextjs.missing-security-headers',
|
|
1321
1502
|
severity: 'low',
|
|
@@ -1393,6 +1574,116 @@ const fileRules = [
|
|
|
1393
1574
|
return out;
|
|
1394
1575
|
},
|
|
1395
1576
|
},
|
|
1577
|
+
{
|
|
1578
|
+
id: 'injection.xss-vue-v-html',
|
|
1579
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1580
|
+
confidence: 'high',
|
|
1581
|
+
title: 'Vue v-html with user data — XSS',
|
|
1582
|
+
run(content, lines, relPath) {
|
|
1583
|
+
const ext = (relPath || '').toLowerCase();
|
|
1584
|
+
if (!/\.(?:vue|js|jsx|ts|tsx|html|mjs|cjs)$/.test(ext)) return [];
|
|
1585
|
+
const REQ_SRC = /\b(?:req|request|event|ctx)\s*\.\s*[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*|\b(?:location\.search|location\.hash|window\.location|document\.URL|document\.location)\b|\b(?:searchParams|URLSearchParams)\b/i;
|
|
1586
|
+
const ASSIGN = /(?:const|let|var)\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*=\s*(.+?)\s*;?\s*$/;
|
|
1587
|
+
const derived = new Set();
|
|
1588
|
+
let changed = true;
|
|
1589
|
+
for (let pass = 0; pass < 6 && changed; pass++) {
|
|
1590
|
+
changed = false;
|
|
1591
|
+
for (const line of lines) {
|
|
1592
|
+
const m = ASSIGN.exec(line);
|
|
1593
|
+
if (!m || derived.has(m[1])) continue;
|
|
1594
|
+
const rhs = m[2];
|
|
1595
|
+
if (REQ_SRC.test(rhs)) { derived.add(m[1]); changed = true; continue; }
|
|
1596
|
+
for (const v of derived) {
|
|
1597
|
+
if (new RegExp(`\\b${v.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\b`).test(rhs)) {
|
|
1598
|
+
derived.add(m[1]); changed = true; break;
|
|
1599
|
+
}
|
|
1600
|
+
}
|
|
1601
|
+
}
|
|
1602
|
+
}
|
|
1603
|
+
const VHTML = /v-html\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
|
|
1604
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
1605
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
1606
|
+
const line = lines[i];
|
|
1607
|
+
let m;
|
|
1608
|
+
VHTML.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
1609
|
+
while ((m = VHTML.exec(line)) !== null) {
|
|
1610
|
+
const bound = m[1];
|
|
1611
|
+
// Collect identifiers bound into v-html — supports `${var}` (ES template),
|
|
1612
|
+
// `{{ var }}` (Vue interpolation), and a bare `var` — then check whether any
|
|
1613
|
+
// is a request-derived variable, or the binding itself references a source.
|
|
1614
|
+
const ids = [];
|
|
1615
|
+
let mm;
|
|
1616
|
+
const tRe = /\$\{([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\}/g;
|
|
1617
|
+
while ((mm = tRe.exec(bound))) ids.push(mm[1]);
|
|
1618
|
+
const vRe = /\{\{\s*([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)/g;
|
|
1619
|
+
while ((mm = vRe.exec(bound))) ids.push(mm[1]);
|
|
1620
|
+
const bare = /^([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)$/.exec(bound);
|
|
1621
|
+
if (bare) ids.push(bare[1]);
|
|
1622
|
+
const dangerous =
|
|
1623
|
+
REQ_SRC.test(bound) ||
|
|
1624
|
+
ids.some((id) => derived.has(id.split('.')[0]));
|
|
1625
|
+
if (dangerous) {
|
|
1626
|
+
out.push({
|
|
1627
|
+
ruleId: 'injection.xss-vue-v-html', severity: 'high', confidence: 'high',
|
|
1628
|
+
title: 'Vue v-html with user data — XSS',
|
|
1629
|
+
message: 'v-html is bound to request-derived data — XSS.',
|
|
1630
|
+
fix: 'Never use v-html with user input. Use v-text or sanitize with DOMPurify.',
|
|
1631
|
+
line: i + 1, column: (m.index || 0) + 1,
|
|
1632
|
+
snippet: line.trim().slice(0, 120),
|
|
1633
|
+
});
|
|
1634
|
+
}
|
|
1635
|
+
}
|
|
1636
|
+
}
|
|
1637
|
+
return out;
|
|
1638
|
+
},
|
|
1639
|
+
},
|
|
1640
|
+
{
|
|
1641
|
+
id: 'ai.prompt-injection-encoded-base64',
|
|
1642
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1643
|
+
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
1644
|
+
title: 'Base64-encoded prompt-injection payload',
|
|
1645
|
+
match(content) {
|
|
1646
|
+
return require('./injection-decode').matchBase64Encoded(content);
|
|
1647
|
+
},
|
|
1648
|
+
message: 'A base64-encoded prompt-injection payload is hidden here — the decoded text contains a classic instruction-override phrase. If this text can reach an LLM, the decode defeats naive filters.',
|
|
1649
|
+
fix: 'Remove the encoded payload; treat tool descriptions and external content as data, not instructions.',
|
|
1650
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03',
|
|
1651
|
+
},
|
|
1652
|
+
{
|
|
1653
|
+
id: 'ai.prompt-injection-encoded-escapes',
|
|
1654
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1655
|
+
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
1656
|
+
title: 'Hex/unicode-escaped prompt-injection payload',
|
|
1657
|
+
match(content) {
|
|
1658
|
+
return require('./injection-decode').matchEscapedEncoded(content);
|
|
1659
|
+
},
|
|
1660
|
+
message: 'A \\xNN / \\uNNNN-escaped prompt-injection phrase is hidden here. Escapes are a classic evasion against plain-text filters.',
|
|
1661
|
+
fix: 'Remove the escaped payload; treat tool descriptions and external content as data, not instructions.',
|
|
1662
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03',
|
|
1663
|
+
},
|
|
1664
|
+
{
|
|
1665
|
+
id: 'ai.prompt-injection-encoded-rot13',
|
|
1666
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1667
|
+
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
1668
|
+
title: 'ROT13-obfuscated prompt-injection payload',
|
|
1669
|
+
match(content) {
|
|
1670
|
+
return require('./injection-decode').matchRot13Encoded(content);
|
|
1671
|
+
},
|
|
1672
|
+
message: 'A ROT13-obfuscated prompt-injection payload is hidden here — the rotated text contains a classic instruction-override phrase.',
|
|
1673
|
+
fix: 'Remove the obfuscated payload; treat tool descriptions and external content as data, not instructions.',
|
|
1674
|
+
cwe: 'CWE-94', owasp: 'A03',
|
|
1675
|
+
},
|
|
1676
|
+
{
|
|
1677
|
+
id: 'ai.prompt-injection-obfuscated',
|
|
1678
|
+
severity: 'high',
|
|
1679
|
+
confidence: 'medium',
|
|
1680
|
+
title: 'Obfuscated prompt-injection (zero-width/homoglyph)',
|
|
1681
|
+
match(content, ctx) {
|
|
1682
|
+
return require('./injection-decode').matchObfuscated(content, ctx);
|
|
1683
|
+
},
|
|
1684
|
+
message: 'A prompt-injection payload obfuscated with zero-width characters or homoglyphs (digit-substituted words) appears here.',
|
|
1685
|
+
fix: 'Remove the obfuscated payload; treat tool descriptions and external content as data, not instructions.',
|
|
1686
|
+
},
|
|
1396
1687
|
];
|
|
1397
1688
|
|
|
1398
1689
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
@@ -1452,7 +1743,32 @@ const crossFileRules = [
|
|
|
1452
1743
|
},
|
|
1453
1744
|
];
|
|
1454
1745
|
|
|
1746
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
1747
|
+
// 2026 pack — the AI-code-specific classes (authz/IDOR, Next.js, RLS
|
|
1748
|
+
// correctness, LLM output handling, crypto, log injection, supply chain, MCP).
|
|
1749
|
+
// Kept in its own module: it is the research-driven layer and grows fastest.
|
|
1750
|
+
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
1751
|
+
try {
|
|
1752
|
+
const pack2026 = require('./rules-2026');
|
|
1753
|
+
const seenIds = new Set([...lineRules, ...fileRules, ...crossFileRules].map((r) => r.id));
|
|
1754
|
+
for (const r of pack2026.lineRules || []) {
|
|
1755
|
+
if (r && r.id && !seenIds.has(r.id)) { lineRules.push(r); seenIds.add(r.id); }
|
|
1756
|
+
}
|
|
1757
|
+
for (const r of pack2026.fileRules || []) {
|
|
1758
|
+
if (r && r.id && !seenIds.has(r.id)) { fileRules.push(r); seenIds.add(r.id); }
|
|
1759
|
+
}
|
|
1760
|
+
for (const r of pack2026.crossFileRules || []) {
|
|
1761
|
+
if (r && r.id && !seenIds.has(r.id)) { crossFileRules.push(r); seenIds.add(r.id); }
|
|
1762
|
+
}
|
|
1763
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
1764
|
+
// A broken optional pack must never take the scanner down; it simply does not
|
|
1765
|
+
// load, and VIBEGUARD_DEBUG_RULES surfaces why during development.
|
|
1766
|
+
if (process.env.VIBEGUARD_DEBUG_RULES) process.stderr.write(`rules-2026 load failed: ${err.message}\n`);
|
|
1767
|
+
}
|
|
1768
|
+
|
|
1455
1769
|
// Flat registry of every rule (for `vibeguard rules` / `explain`). File/cross
|
|
1770
|
+
|
|
1771
|
+
// Flat registry of every rule (for `vibeguard rules` / `explain`). File/cross
|
|
1456
1772
|
// rules carry dynamic messages, so message/fix may be empty there — title covers it.
|
|
1457
1773
|
function allRules() {
|
|
1458
1774
|
const out = [];
|