@yagyeshvyas/vibeguard 1.3.0 → 1.11.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.vibeguard-mcp.example.json +51 -0
- package/CHANGELOG.md +604 -216
- package/MCP-FIREWALL.md +296 -0
- package/README.md +355 -31
- package/bin/cli.js +355 -27
- package/bin/cmd-agent-monitor.js +45 -0
- package/bin/cmd-agent-risk.js +64 -0
- package/bin/cmd-gif.js +62 -0
- package/bin/cmd-git-scan.js +74 -0
- package/bin/cmd-llm-proxy.js +164 -0
- package/bin/cmd-mcp-firewall.js +191 -0
- package/bin/cmd-pentest.js +103 -0
- package/bin/cmd-platform.js +137 -0
- package/bin/cmd-pr-scan.js +135 -0
- package/bin/cmd-sbom-diff.js +38 -0
- package/bin/cmd-skill-scan.js +35 -0
- package/docs/AISVS.md +25 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +81 -0
- package/docs/INSTALLATION.md +139 -0
- package/docs/WINDOWS.md +74 -0
- package/docs/security-policy.strict.example.json +134 -0
- package/docs/security-policy.strict.example.pub.pem +3 -0
- package/package.json +45 -7
- package/src/.vibeguard/cache/file-hashes.json +60 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/latest-snapshot.json +36 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/mcp-pins.json +1 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/mcp-server.js +2051 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-23-50-635Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/manifest.json +37 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-26-26-074Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T16-35-06-272Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/dashboard.js +279 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/hook.js +151 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/manifest.json +65 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/mcp-server.js +2054 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/repl.js +150 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/sbom.js +164 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/slopsquat.js +144 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-08-40-613Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/install.js +299 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/manifest.json +37 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/plugin.js +168 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/pre-deploy.js +362 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-11-32-644Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/auto.js +428 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/daemon.js +344 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/engine.js +297 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/manifest.json +33 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/mcp-server.js +2055 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/rules.js +1611 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/shell-guard.js +292 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard/snapshots/2026-08-05T18-16-47-635Z/trace.js +220 -0
- package/src/.vibeguard-baseline.json +5226 -0
- package/src/action-guard.js +84 -6
- package/src/agent-monitor.js +262 -0
- package/src/agent-policy.js +642 -0
- package/src/agent-risk.js +271 -0
- package/src/agentic.js +1513 -0
- package/src/ast.js +165 -7
- package/src/audit-trail.js +212 -67
- package/src/auto.js +427 -427
- package/src/autofix.js +11 -4
- package/src/bundles.js +198 -0
- package/src/daemon.js +343 -343
- package/src/dashboard.js +278 -278
- package/src/engine.js +3 -0
- package/src/entropy.js +187 -0
- package/src/firewall.js +19 -3
- package/src/gif.js +134 -0
- package/src/gitscan.js +282 -0
- package/src/hook.js +151 -151
- package/src/injection-decode.js +136 -0
- package/src/install.js +298 -280
- package/src/integrity.js +16 -1
- package/src/integrity.json +43 -13
- package/src/interceptor.js +12 -9
- package/src/llm-proxy.js +986 -0
- package/src/mcp-audit.js +61 -5
- package/src/mcp-firewall.js +971 -0
- package/src/mcp-server.js +2500 -2047
- package/src/obfuscation.js +315 -0
- package/src/owasp-agentic.js +314 -0
- package/src/pentest.js +589 -0
- package/src/pii.js +4 -0
- package/src/platform/aisvs.js +38 -0
- package/src/platform/approval.js +187 -0
- package/src/platform/canonical.js +73 -0
- package/src/platform/contracts.js +158 -0
- package/src/platform/delegation.js +73 -0
- package/src/platform/http-gateway.js +177 -0
- package/src/platform/identity.js +253 -0
- package/src/platform/jwt.js +86 -0
- package/src/platform/mcp-http-bridge.js +199 -0
- package/src/platform/memory-guard.js +64 -0
- package/src/platform/os-sandbox.js +144 -0
- package/src/platform/policy.js +332 -0
- package/src/platform/sandbox-manager.js +92 -0
- package/src/platform/signed-audit.js +357 -0
- package/src/platform/ssrf.js +129 -0
- package/src/plugin.js +182 -168
- package/src/pre-deploy.js +170 -55
- package/src/privacy-audit.js +272 -272
- package/src/repl.js +150 -150
- package/src/report.js +7 -1
- package/src/routes.js +1210 -0
- package/src/rules-2026.js +1407 -0
- package/src/rules-pack.js +3068 -3019
- package/src/rules.js +376 -60
- package/src/sandbox.js +200 -10
- package/src/sbom.js +193 -164
- package/src/scanner.js +189 -33
- package/src/shell-guard.js +11 -0
- package/src/skill-scan.js +477 -0
- package/src/slopsquat.js +144 -144
- package/src/surface.js +408 -0
- package/src/taint-ast.js +204 -37
- package/src/taint.js +15 -3
- package/src/tokenlean.js +579 -0
- package/src/trace.js +220 -220
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to VibeGuard are documented here.
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Format based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to VibeGuard are documented here.
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Format based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
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## [1.11.1] - 2026-11-22
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### Fixed
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
- Installer now pins the exact runtime package version dynamically instead of the
|
|
11
|
+
stale 1.10.0 literal.
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
## [1.11.0] - 2026-11-22
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
### Added — v2 security foundation (internal testing)
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
- Strict signed policy v2 engine (`src/platform/policy.js`) with default deny,
|
|
18
|
+
capabilities, realpath path checks, shell egress checks and deep secret
|
|
19
|
+
inspection.
|
|
20
|
+
- Ed25519 VGAT identity tokens and signed single-use approvals.
|
|
21
|
+
- Signed Ed25519 audit events with Merkle checkpoints and a verifier; strict
|
|
22
|
+
MCP gateway writes signed events by default.
|
|
23
|
+
- Offline EdDSA JWT/JWKS validation and SSRF/private-address protection.
|
|
24
|
+
- Authenticated loopback HTTP JSON-RPC + SSE MCP bridge over a stdio upstream.
|
|
25
|
+
- All-method MCP response inspection, size/depth/pending limits, deep secret
|
|
26
|
+
redaction.
|
|
27
|
+
- `--kill-on-block`/`--max-blocks` quarantine kill response.
|
|
28
|
+
- Strict-gateway audit fail-closed behavior.
|
|
29
|
+
- Linux `unshare` network/PID namespace backend + `sandbox verify`.
|
|
30
|
+
- Memory provenance guard and signed delegation graph libraries.
|
|
31
|
+
- Detection corpus runner and AISVS-style readiness mapping/CLI.
|
|
32
|
+
- New CLI: `policy validate/sign`, `audit verify`, `sandbox backends/verify`,
|
|
33
|
+
`aisvs`.
|
|
34
|
+
- 29 platform security tests; Windows/macOS CI platform jobs; dependency
|
|
35
|
+
high/critical audit gate.
|
|
36
|
+
- Windows destructive-command coverage and realpath path handling.
|
|
37
|
+
- Target-controlled scanner plugins disabled by default; explicit
|
|
38
|
+
`--trust-plugins` opt-in.
|
|
39
|
+
- Process/legacy-vm host-object escape fixes; results labeled unverified.
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
### Changed — security behavior
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
- Scanner plugins are not executed from target repos by default.
|
|
44
|
+
- `sandbox` results expose `isolationClass`/`verified`; process mode is
|
|
45
|
+
explicitly unverified and not an OS boundary.
|
|
46
|
+
- Invalid policy `defaultAction` values fail closed.
|
|
47
|
+
- Installer uses a pinned package/version.
|
|
48
|
+
- Tests: plugin test opts into explicit trust; firewall paraphrase test accepts
|
|
49
|
+
the deep detector finding ID.
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
### Security limitations
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
Windows/macOS OS isolation, external audit anchoring, authenticated approver
|
|
54
|
+
UI, TLS/OAuth remote deployment, runtime monitor/quarantine, and
|
|
55
|
+
memory/multi-agent runtime enforcement remain incomplete. See
|
|
56
|
+
`research/KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md` and
|
|
57
|
+
`research/RELEASE_READINESS.md`.
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
### Added — v1.10: real-time MCP firewall, agent permissions, OWASP coverage
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
- **`vibeguard mcp-firewall`** — a stdio JSON-RPC proxy between an MCP client
|
|
62
|
+
and an MCP server. Tool definitions are scanned for poisoning and hash-pinned;
|
|
63
|
+
`tools/call` requests are enforced against policy before forwarding (blocked
|
|
64
|
+
calls never reach the server); tool results are scrubbed of secrets/PII before
|
|
65
|
+
they reach the model. Modes: proxy by configured server name, ad-hoc command,
|
|
66
|
+
one-call check, offline self-test, audit status, configured-server listing.
|
|
67
|
+
- **`src/agent-policy.js`** — deterministic permission engine: tool
|
|
68
|
+
allow/deny/approval rules, capability classes, project-scoped filesystem
|
|
69
|
+
access, denied credential stores, egress and metadata-host policy, trusted
|
|
70
|
+
hosts, argument-size and per-minute call limits, fail-closed policy errors.
|
|
71
|
+
- **`src/skill-scan.js` / `vibeguard skill-scan`** — scans SKILL.md, AGENTS.md,
|
|
72
|
+
CLAUDE.md, Cursor rules, Claude agents/skills, plugin and marketplace
|
|
73
|
+
manifests and embedded MCP configs for injection, hidden Unicode,
|
|
74
|
+
exfiltration instructions, credential access, destructive commands, remote
|
|
75
|
+
code loaders, obfuscation, permission bypass, self-modification, risky
|
|
76
|
+
packages and secrets.
|
|
77
|
+
- **`src/agent-risk.js` / `vibeguard agent-risk`** — one 0-100 score and A-F
|
|
78
|
+
grade across MCP configuration, skills, runtime decisions, policy scope and
|
|
79
|
+
audit integrity.
|
|
80
|
+
- **`src/owasp-agentic.js` / `vibeguard owasp-coverage`** — maps controls to the
|
|
81
|
+
OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 and OWASP MCP Top 10 (20/20 mapped), with explicit
|
|
82
|
+
enforced/detected/monitored/advisory statuses; optional LLM Top 10.
|
|
83
|
+
- **`src/agent-monitor.js` / `vibeguard agent-monitor`** — runtime report and
|
|
84
|
+
`--watch` tail over the hash-chained firewall audit log, with behavior
|
|
85
|
+
anomalies (trust building, data gathering, slow exfiltration, privilege
|
|
86
|
+
escalation, repeated blocks, tamper).
|
|
87
|
+
- **Audit trail hardened** — correct hash-chain verification (previous
|
|
88
|
+
implementation never failed on a modified entry), JSONL persistence,
|
|
89
|
+
`createLogger(file)`, and tamper detection over long-lived logs.
|
|
90
|
+
- **Sandbox process isolation** — `runInProcess` and
|
|
91
|
+
`vibeguard sandbox --isolation process`: separate Node process, permission
|
|
92
|
+
model, blocked module loads, stripped env, memory cap, hard timeout. `auto`
|
|
93
|
+
chooses it on Node 20+; Node 18 keeps the vm sandbox.
|
|
94
|
+
- **MCP tools** — `mcp_firewall`, `scan_skills`, `agent_risk`,
|
|
95
|
+
`owasp_coverage`, `agent_monitor`; `sandbox_exec` gains `isolation`.
|
|
96
|
+
- **CLI fixes** — crashes in `dep-firewall` and `audit-trail` output paths
|
|
97
|
+
(undefined `Creset`/`C_reset`), `audit-trail export` path argument, and a PII
|
|
98
|
+
detector false positive that read IPv4 addresses as phone numbers.
|
|
99
|
+
- 26 new tests including a live stdio proxy test; docs in `MCP-FIREWALL.md`.
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
### Added — v1.9: live-code reachability, exploit chains, build-artifact scan
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
- **Reachability-native scans.** The entrypoint graph now runs on every scan and
|
|
104
|
+
annotates findings `direct` / `imported` / `dead`. `--live` drops findings in
|
|
105
|
+
code no route can reach; ordering puts live findings first at equal severity;
|
|
106
|
+
`--reachability-grade` counts dead-code findings one tier lower. Juice Shop
|
|
107
|
+
measured 306 live vs 3,157 dead findings — the noise control competitors sell
|
|
108
|
+
as "reachability", computed offline in ~0.2 s per 1,000 files.
|
|
109
|
+
- **Exploit chains.** `attack-surface` emits `precondition → entrypoint → sink →
|
|
110
|
+
impact` chains with CWE ids: unauthenticated POST → command injection → RCE;
|
|
111
|
+
`/allocations/:userId` → IDOR → cross-user access; SSRF → metadata credential
|
|
112
|
+
theft. Deterministic — no model call, no variance, no bill.
|
|
113
|
+
- **`vibeguard bundle-scan` + `scan_bundle` MCP tool.** Scans `dist/`, `build/`,
|
|
114
|
+
`out/`, `.next/static`, `static/js` for inlined secret formats (reusing all 75
|
|
115
|
+
secret rules), high-entropy tokens, and shipped source maps. Closes the
|
|
116
|
+
documented blind spot: the commit is clean, the artifact leaks.
|
|
117
|
+
- **MCP:** `scan_bundle`; `scan_project` gains `live` and `reachabilityGrade`;
|
|
118
|
+
`attack_surface` returns chains.
|
|
119
|
+
- 564 tests, 0 failures.
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
### Added — v1.8: attack surface, authorization intelligence, backdoor decoding
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
**The release that scans what AI code actually gets wrong.** Built from the
|
|
124
|
+
2025-2026 evidence base (Veracode GenAI report: 45% of generated samples ship an
|
|
125
|
+
OWASP Top-10 flaw; CSA/CodeRabbit: 1.91x IDOR in AI-co-authored PRs; GitGuardian
|
|
126
|
+
2026: AI-assisted commits leak secrets at 3.2% vs 1.5%; Escape.tech: 65% of
|
|
127
|
+
vibe-coded apps had a security issue).
|
|
128
|
+
|
|
129
|
+
- **`vibeguard attack-surface` + `attack_surface` MCP tool.** Extracts every
|
|
130
|
+
entrypoint across Next.js (App Router, Pages API, **Server Actions**), Express,
|
|
131
|
+
Fastify, Hono, NestJS, tRPC, Supabase Edge Functions, serverless handlers,
|
|
132
|
+
FastAPI/Flask/Django, Rails, Gin/Echo and MCP tool registrations. Resolves
|
|
133
|
+
router mounts and middleware chains, then joins entrypoints × findings ×
|
|
134
|
+
import reachability: which route is reachable *now*, which finding is
|
|
135
|
+
exploitable from it, and which findings sit in dead code.
|
|
136
|
+
- **Authorization intelligence** (`src/routes.js`, `src/surface.js`): handler
|
|
137
|
+
extent by brace matching, in-body guard detection (auth/getServerSession/
|
|
138
|
+
requireUser/…), IDOR detection (object fetched by `params.id` with no
|
|
139
|
+
owner/tenant predicate), unguarded state-changing routes, Server Actions that
|
|
140
|
+
are public RPC endpoints, middleware matchers that exclude `/api`.
|
|
141
|
+
- **118 new rules in the 2026 pack** (`src/rules-2026.js`): IDOR/mass-assignment,
|
|
142
|
+
Next.js public-env secrets and middleware bypass, Supabase RLS *correctness*
|
|
143
|
+
(`USING (true)`, SECURITY DEFINER without `search_path`, service_role in the
|
|
144
|
+
client), Firebase rules, JWT (decode-not-verify, alg:none, weak fallback,
|
|
145
|
+
cookies), LLM output handling (exec/SQL/HTML, system-prompt injection, no
|
|
146
|
+
max_tokens, unbounded agent loops), weak crypto (md5 passwords, Math.random
|
|
147
|
+
tokens, ECB, static IV), CWE-117 log injection, 13 new secret formats
|
|
148
|
+
(OpenRouter, Groq, HuggingFace, NVIDIA, Replicate, Supabase PAT, service_role
|
|
149
|
+
JWT, …), CI script injection, compose/Docker/Terraform exposure, SSRF, SSTI,
|
|
150
|
+
open redirect, header injection, upload limits, postMessage origin checks.
|
|
151
|
+
- **Backdoor / obfuscation engine** (`src/obfuscation.js`, `scan_backdoors` MCP
|
|
152
|
+
tool): multi-layer decode (base64/hex/unicode/fromCharCode/rot13), encoded
|
|
153
|
+
payloads in executable position, javascript-obfuscator fingerprints,
|
|
154
|
+
fetch→eval loaders, curl|sh, PowerShell `-enc`, remote imports, hidden
|
|
155
|
+
Unicode/bidi, and behavioural co-occurrence (exec + network + env = dropper).
|
|
156
|
+
Skips minified vendor bundles to stay quiet on real projects.
|
|
157
|
+
- **AST coverage fix (critical).** Every `.jsx` file failed to parse (no JSX
|
|
158
|
+
plugin) and every `.tsx` file crashed the walker
|
|
159
|
+
(`No walker function defined for node type JSXElement`), silently degrading the
|
|
160
|
+
AST/taint pass on most React/Next code. Both fixed: JSX parser + JSX walkers
|
|
161
|
+
merged into `acorn-walk`'s base. Self-scan degraded files: 27 → 0.
|
|
162
|
+
- **Route intelligence hardened on real apps.** Handler references (`profileHandler.displayProfile`, `isLoggedIn`) now resolve to their AST ranges across files and constructor instances, middleware arguments count as guards, prefix guards (`app.use("/api/X", isAuthorized())`) apply to routes beneath them, Express `app.route(...).get(...)` chains are extracted, and tests/codefix fixtures are excluded. On OWASP NodeGoat: 20/22 routes correctly guarded and the real `/allocations/:userId` IDOR detected; on Juice Shop: 149 entrypoints (was 313 with test fixtures), 145 guarded. Unresolvable Express handlers report `auth: unknown` instead of a false "unguarded" claim.
|
|
163
|
+
- **`.rules` files are now scanned** — Firebase rules were never read before.
|
|
164
|
+
- **`--version`** prints the version instead of accidentally running a scan.
|
|
165
|
+
- Rule count 743 → 861, MCP tools 85 → 87.
|
|
166
|
+
|
|
167
|
+
### Fixed — v1.7 dataflow-depth pass (a clean grade on live SQL injection)
|
|
168
|
+
- **CRITICAL: textbook SQL injection scanned as `Grade A, no issues`.**
|
|
169
|
+
`db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${req.body.id}`)` — the most common
|
|
170
|
+
shape of SQLi in AI-generated code — produced a confident all-clear on a
|
|
171
|
+
default scan. Root cause: the AST taint pass skipped any sink argument for
|
|
172
|
+
which `exprIsSource()` was true, deferring to the regex layer. That predicate
|
|
173
|
+
returns true for a TemplateLiteral or concatenation that merely *interpolates*
|
|
174
|
+
a source, so the taint pass stepped aside for constructed strings while the
|
|
175
|
+
regex layer — matching different text — either missed them or rated them below
|
|
176
|
+
the default medium-confidence floor. Nobody reported the finding.
|
|
177
|
+
Fix: new `exprIsBareSource()` limits deferral to a source used verbatim, and
|
|
178
|
+
the three code-execution-grade sinks (`taint.sql-injection`,
|
|
179
|
+
`taint.command-injection`, `taint.code-injection`) never defer at all.
|
|
180
|
+
`db.query(req.body.sql)` was invisible for the same reason and is now caught.
|
|
181
|
+
- **Laundered sources now tracked**: destructuring, reassignment chains,
|
|
182
|
+
optional chaining, nested index access, and `spawn("sh", ["-c", ...])`.
|
|
183
|
+
- **Return-value taint across function boundaries.** The engine already followed
|
|
184
|
+
taint INTO a helper (param → sink); it now follows it back OUT
|
|
185
|
+
(`function getId(r) { return r.body.id }` → `db.query(...getId(req)...)`).
|
|
186
|
+
Records only the parameter index, so it fires only when the call site passes
|
|
187
|
+
an actual source — sanitizing helpers, constant-returning helpers, and calls
|
|
188
|
+
with non-source arguments stay clean.
|
|
189
|
+
- **`process` is no longer a blanket taint source.** Only `argv`, `argv0` and
|
|
190
|
+
`env` carry outside input. Treating every `process.*` property as attacker
|
|
191
|
+
input made `spawn(process.execPath, [script])` — the standard way to launch a
|
|
192
|
+
child Node process — report as command injection. Caught by dogfooding: it was
|
|
193
|
+
the scanner's own worst false positive after the deferral fix.
|
|
194
|
+
- **The AST taint pass no longer fails open silently.** A crash there dropped
|
|
195
|
+
analysis to the weaker regex engine with no signal at all — every
|
|
196
|
+
dataflow-confirmed finding disappeared while the scan still printed a clean
|
|
197
|
+
grade. `analyzeTaint()` now takes an `onDegrade` callback and the scanner
|
|
198
|
+
records it as a `taint-ast` degraded pass, so the CLI warns and `--strict`
|
|
199
|
+
refuses to report clean. (Discovered by causing it: a temporal-dead-zone bug
|
|
200
|
+
wiped every taint finding and nothing said a word.)
|
|
201
|
+
|
|
202
|
+
### Changed
|
|
203
|
+
- `TAINT_TO_AST` → **`TAINT_SUPERSEDES`**, generalised from "taint shadows ast"
|
|
204
|
+
to "the higher-fidelity finding shadows every weaker counterpart on the same
|
|
205
|
+
line". One vulnerability now yields one finding: `taint.sql-injection` covers
|
|
206
|
+
`ast.sql-injection`, `code.sql-injection`, `db.sql-template-literal` and
|
|
207
|
+
`injection.orm-raw-user`; `taint.path-traversal` covers
|
|
208
|
+
`upload.filename-path-traversal`; and `go.sql-injection` collapses
|
|
209
|
+
`go.sql-format` + `go.sql-fmt-sprintf`, which used to triple-report a single
|
|
210
|
+
`fmt.Sprintf` injection.
|
|
211
|
+
- Exported `TAINT_SUPERSEDES` and `dedupeFindings` from `src/scanner.js`.
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
### Added
|
|
214
|
+
- **Harder benchmark corpus** (120 → 136 files): 8 laundered-source recall cases
|
|
215
|
+
and 8 adversarial precision cases (`parseInt`, `db.escape`, allowlist
|
|
216
|
+
ternaries, parameterized queries, `spawn` arg arrays, constant table names,
|
|
217
|
+
sanitizing and constant-returning helpers) — every one puts `req.` inside or
|
|
218
|
+
beside a dangerous sink without being a bug.
|
|
219
|
+
- **Benchmark scorer now measures what users see.** It applies `dedupeFindings`
|
|
220
|
+
(previously it scored raw pre-dedupe rule hits, counting both halves of a
|
|
221
|
+
deliberately de-duplicated pair) and credits an expected rule when a rule that
|
|
222
|
+
supersedes it fired instead — which cannot excuse a real miss, since a finding
|
|
223
|
+
that is neither present nor superseded still scores FN.
|
|
224
|
+
Result: **119/119 cases, 0 FP, 0 FN** (previously 96.0% F1, 4 FP, 5 FN).
|
|
225
|
+
A saturated corpus means the corpus stopped being hard, not that the scanner
|
|
226
|
+
is complete — stated as such in the README.
|
|
227
|
+
- 11 regression tests (`test/taint-depth-tests.js`), all asserted against a
|
|
228
|
+
DEFAULT scan: a finding only visible under `--all` is not protection.
|
|
229
|
+
**508 tests total, 0 failures.**
|
|
230
|
+
- Corrected `stripe-key.js` benchmark expectation, which required
|
|
231
|
+
`secret.generic-credential` alongside `secret.stripe-live-key`.
|
|
232
|
+
`dedupeFindings` has always suppressed the generic rule when a specific one
|
|
233
|
+
covers the line; the expectation described pre-dedupe output.
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
|
|
236
|
+
### Added — v1.6 token-lean pass (TLAP: treat the agent's context window as a budget)
|
|
237
|
+
- **`src/tokenlean.js` — TLAP, the Token-Lean Agent Protocol.** Every scanner in
|
|
238
|
+
this space answers an AI agent with pretty-printed JSON: two-space indentation,
|
|
239
|
+
repeated object keys, and the same `message` + `fix` string duplicated once per
|
|
240
|
+
occurrence. TLAP encodes the same information — no findings dropped silently —
|
|
241
|
+
in a line-oriented, de-duplicated, dictionary-compressed form. Four levers:
|
|
242
|
+
no pretty JSON, cluster by rule (rule text is a property of the rule, not of
|
|
243
|
+
the occurrence), path-prefix dictionary, and a risk-ranked budget.
|
|
244
|
+
Measured on this repo: **64,076 → 5,492 estimated tokens, a 91.4% cut** on a
|
|
245
|
+
463-finding / 293-file scan. Zero new dependencies.
|
|
246
|
+
- **`vibeguard scan --lean`** — the lean dialect from the CLI.
|
|
247
|
+
- **`--budget <n>` / `VIBEGUARD_TOKEN_BUDGET`** — a hard token ceiling. The budget
|
|
248
|
+
is spent highest-risk first: severity × confidence, with dataflow-confirmed,
|
|
249
|
+
exploitable (taint/secret/idor/auth/ssrf…) and security-hotspot-path findings
|
|
250
|
+
outranking pattern-only matches at equal severity. Whatever does not fit is
|
|
251
|
+
reported as an explicit rollup with per-severity counts and the rule ids, and
|
|
252
|
+
the payload states `NOT an all-clear`. Truncation can never read as clean.
|
|
253
|
+
- **`--lean --delta`** — delta scans against a stored fingerprint snapshot
|
|
254
|
+
(`.vibeguard/tlap-snapshot.json`, shared by the CLI and the MCP server). When
|
|
255
|
+
nothing changed the whole answer is one line, ~20 tokens instead of ~5,000;
|
|
256
|
+
otherwise only new findings are listed and resolved ones are counted.
|
|
257
|
+
- **`vibeguard tokens [dir]`** (+ `token_report` MCP tool) — reproduce the savings
|
|
258
|
+
claim on any repository. `--json` for machine output.
|
|
259
|
+
- **MCP: lean is now the default dialect** for `scan_project` and `suggest_fixes`
|
|
260
|
+
(`format: "json"` restores the old payload; `budget` and `delta` are per-call
|
|
261
|
+
arguments). Lean fix plans state each remediation once per rule and drop the
|
|
262
|
+
diagnosis — when the task is "apply the fix", the diagnosis is not the payload.
|
|
263
|
+
- **Layer 14 — context-window budget guard.** Any of the 85 MCP tools is clamped
|
|
264
|
+
to the configured budget before returning, so a single large payload cannot
|
|
265
|
+
evict an agent's working memory. Truncation is always disclosed.
|
|
266
|
+
- Offline token estimator (no tokenizer dependency, ~±10% of a real BPE count).
|
|
267
|
+
Deterministic: identical input produces byte-identical output.
|
|
268
|
+
- 17 new tests covering losslessness, budget behaviour, risk ordering, delta
|
|
269
|
+
mode, determinism, and the "never silently lossy" guarantee. **497 total, 0 failures.**
|
|
270
|
+
|
|
271
|
+
### Fixed
|
|
272
|
+
- Transitive advisories cleared via `overrides`: `fast-uri` → ^4.2.1 (host
|
|
273
|
+
confusion / SSRF via IPv6 normalization), `hono` → >=4.13.8 (`toSSG()` path
|
|
274
|
+
escape, `parseBody()` memory exhaustion), `qs` → >=6.15.4 (array-limit bypass,
|
|
275
|
+
DoS). Self-scan back to **Grade A** on 293 files.
|
|
276
|
+
- `outputResult`'s lean path no longer joins a user-supplied scan root with a
|
|
277
|
+
path inside the CLI: snapshot persistence moved into `src/tokenlean.js` behind
|
|
278
|
+
a resolved-root helper, clearing 5 self-reported `taint.path-traversal`
|
|
279
|
+
findings at the source rather than suppressing them.
|
|
280
|
+
|
|
281
|
+
|
|
282
|
+
### Added — v1.5 active-security pass (beat Strix.ai on the active front)
|
|
283
|
+
- **`vibeguard pentest <url>`** — active web/API probe suite, zero deps, deterministic
|
|
284
|
+
(Strix.ai-class "autonomous pentesting" without the LLM). ~20 probe families:
|
|
285
|
+
security headers (CSP/HSTS/XFO/XCTO/RP/PP + HSTS max-age + CSP unsafe-inline),
|
|
286
|
+
CORS (reflected origin / null / wildcard+creds), open redirect (10 paths × 10
|
|
287
|
+
params × 4 payloads), exposed files (30+ paths, content-signature + 404-baseline
|
|
288
|
+
FP guards), GraphQL introspection (`__typename` gate + extended endpoints),
|
|
289
|
+
verbose errors (≥2 stack markers), rate limiting (auth endpoints, OWASP API8),
|
|
290
|
+
JWT alg:none (4 case variants) + weak-HMAC (opt-in `--token`), TLS version/cert
|
|
291
|
+
validity, cookie flags, banner disclosure. Every finding: severity + CWE +
|
|
292
|
+
evidence + curl reproduction. Exit 0/1/2.
|
|
293
|
+
- **`--verify-ssrf` — out-of-band SSRF proof-of-exploit**: local callback listener
|
|
294
|
+
+ form (action, input) harvesting + query-param fuzzing; target fetching the
|
|
295
|
+
listener URL = deterministic proof (Strix's "proof for every finding").
|
|
296
|
+
Live demo: CRITICAL web.ssrf-proof, callback observed, parameter: url.
|
|
297
|
+
- **`vibeguard pr-scan`** — PR review gate, Strix-compatible exit codes
|
|
298
|
+
(0 clean / 2 findings / 1 fatal). Added-lines-only reporting (full-file taint
|
|
299
|
+
analysis, findings filtered to changed lines); scopes: working tree, `--staged`,
|
|
300
|
+
`--base <ref>...HEAD`.
|
|
301
|
+
- **`vibeguard fix --apply --verify`** — retest loop: re-scan after applying
|
|
302
|
+
snapshot-backed fixes, report ✓/⚠ per finding ("fix verified" parity).
|
|
303
|
+
- **`vibeguard pre-deploy --pentest-url <url>`** — 14th deploy gate: live pentest;
|
|
304
|
+
critical/high fail the gate, medium warns. runPreDeployGate is now async.
|
|
305
|
+
- **Engine fixes (taint-ast.js):** process.stdout/stderr, console, logger and
|
|
306
|
+
client/transport objects (req/socket/upstreamReq) are excluded from the
|
|
307
|
+
res.send/write/end XSS sink — CLI tools logging user input are no longer FPs.
|
|
308
|
+
- Suite: 468 → **480 tests** (pentest +7 incl. pre-deploy gate E2E, pr-scan +5).
|
|
309
|
+
Self-scan Grade A on 291 files.
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
|
|
312
|
+
### Added — v1.4 power pass (git history · runtime LLM guard · evasion decoders)
|
|
313
|
+
- **`vibeguard git-scan`** — scans a repo's ENTIRE git history for leaked secrets
|
|
314
|
+
(Gitleaks/TruffleHog parity). Blob-level enumeration via `git rev-list --objects --all`
|
|
315
|
+
+ streaming `git cat-file --batch`, dedupe by blob sha, binary skip, commit attribution
|
|
316
|
+
for every finding. Flags: `--since`, `--max-commits`, `--max-blobs`, `--json`.
|
|
317
|
+
Suite: 431 → 435 tests.
|
|
318
|
+
- **`vibeguard llm-proxy`** — OpenAI-compatible local guard proxy (Lakera-class, free,
|
|
319
|
+
offline, zero deps). `POST /v1/chat/completions` (JSON + SSE streaming), `GET /v1/models`,
|
|
320
|
+
`POST /v1/completions` + `/v1/embeddings` passthrough. Scans prompts AND responses for
|
|
321
|
+
secrets (`secret.*` rules), PII (`pii.js`), prompt injection (deterministic patterns).
|
|
322
|
+
Modes: `block` (403), `redact` (in-place masking incl. streaming deltas), `report`.
|
|
323
|
+
Streaming SSE is scanned per chunk; a violating stream is destroyed mid-flight.
|
|
324
|
+
`--system-prompt-file` detects the model echoing your own system prompt.
|
|
325
|
+
Suite: +12 tests (incl. `testSystemPromptLeak`).
|
|
326
|
+
- **`src/injection-decode.js`** — deterministic evasion decoders: base64, `\xNN`/`\uNNNN`
|
|
327
|
+
escapes, ROT13 (whole-line), zero-width chars + homoglyph normalization. 4 new rules:
|
|
328
|
+
`ai.prompt-injection-encoded-base64`, `-escapes`, `-rot13`, `ai.prompt-injection-obfuscated`.
|
|
329
|
+
Phrase-gated: fires only when decoded text contains a canonical injection phrase.
|
|
330
|
+
- **Entropy upgrade** — `src/entropy.js` + `secret.high-entropy-token` rule: catches
|
|
331
|
+
unquoted `.env`-style tokens (key-like context gate, ±2 lines) and hex-charset secrets;
|
|
332
|
+
keeps the existing quoted-string `secret.high-entropy` rule; dedupes against specific
|
|
333
|
+
`secret.*` findings and excludes public BaaS keys (Firebase `AIza…`, Supabase anon).
|
|
334
|
+
Scanner fileRules loop now supports `match(content, ctx)` function rules.
|
|
335
|
+
- **Custom user rules** — `.vibeguardrc.json` → `"customRules": [{ id, severity, title, re,
|
|
336
|
+
message, fix }]`; compiled at configure() time, invalid regexes skipped (never crash),
|
|
337
|
+
re-added on every scan, cleared between scans (no config leakage).
|
|
338
|
+
- **CWE/OWASP metadata** on rules.js core groups (secret/injection/ai/pii) — SARIF parity
|
|
339
|
+
with Semgrep/Bearer metadata consumers.
|
|
340
|
+
- Suite: 435 → **468 tests** (entropy +21, llm-proxy +12, git-scan +4). Rules: 766 → **771**.
|
|
341
|
+
|
|
342
|
+
|
|
343
|
+
### Added — Keyless open GIFs (no API key)
|
|
344
|
+
- New `vibeguard gif <query>` CLI command and `gif_search` MCP tool (84th tool).
|
|
345
|
+
Fetches open GIFs with **zero API keys** using byte-verified open backends:
|
|
346
|
+
cataas cat GIFs (+ text overlay via `/cat/gif/says/<text>`), yesno.wtf
|
|
347
|
+
yes/no reactions. Dead/key-walled backends skipped: Tenor (needs key),
|
|
348
|
+
GIPHY demo key (now 401), Klipy (auth wall), Reddit JSON (IP-blocked).
|
|
349
|
+
- New `src/gif.js` engine: single-redirect HTTPS fetch, GIF magic-byte
|
|
350
|
+
verification, cataas 500-fallback, `downloadGif()` save-to-disk.
|
|
351
|
+
- Offline regression test for the routing logic (never selects a key-walled
|
|
352
|
+
backend). Suite 430 → 431 passed.
|
|
353
|
+
|
|
354
|
+
### Fixed — Dogfood + dependency hygiene
|
|
355
|
+
- **Autofix bug:** the `error.empty-catch` autofix rewrote `catch {}` as
|
|
356
|
+
`catch { console.error(err); }` — `err` is not bound in an optional catch
|
|
357
|
+
clause, so every autofixed file threw `ReferenceError: err is not defined`
|
|
358
|
+
at runtime. Now it emits `catch (err) { console.error(err); }` (or reuses an
|
|
359
|
+
existing binding: `catch (e) {}` → `catch (e) { console.error(e); }`). New
|
|
360
|
+
regression test executes the fixed output in a VM to prove no ReferenceError.
|
|
361
|
+
- **Demo site false positive:** `website/index.html` demo placeholder contained
|
|
362
|
+
a hardcoded `sk-proj-…` string (example text), which the scanner correctly
|
|
363
|
+
flagged as `secret.openai-key`. Replaced with inert `<KEY>` placeholders —
|
|
364
|
+
VibeGuard's own repo scan went from **Grade F → Grade A** (0 findings / 275
|
|
365
|
+
files).
|
|
366
|
+
- **Dependency vulnerabilities (npm audit → 0):** `@hono/node-server`
|
|
367
|
+
(1.19.14 → 2.1.0, path traversal), `ip-address` (10.2.0 → 10.4.0, SSRF
|
|
368
|
+
class), `brace-expansion` (5.0.9), `fast-uri` (4.1.2), `hono` (≥4.12.34) —
|
|
369
|
+
all transitive via `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`, pinned through
|
|
370
|
+
`package.json` `overrides`. The SDK's own range permits these versions.
|
|
371
|
+
- **Lint hygiene:** eslint now ignores `**/.vibeguard/` (autofix snapshot
|
|
372
|
+
store) — `no-unused-vars` warnings back to the 120s, still 0 errors.
|
|
373
|
+
- **MCP robustness:** `scan_secrets_history` handler tolerates both a bare
|
|
374
|
+
array and the `{ findings, … }` shape from `history.scanHistory()` (was
|
|
375
|
+
`findings.map is not a function`).
|
|
376
|
+
|
|
377
|
+
### Fixed — Agent interop (MCP)
|
|
378
|
+
- **Critical:** the MCP `tools/call` handler read the tool name from the request
|
|
379
|
+
object instead of `req.params`, so every agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf,
|
|
380
|
+
Codex, Hermes, …) got `Unknown tool: undefined` on ANY of the 82 tools. Now
|
|
381
|
+
reads `req.params` per the SDK contract; verified with a live JSON-RPC stdio
|
|
382
|
+
handshake and a new regression test (`mcp: full stdio handshake —
|
|
383
|
+
initialize, tools/list, tools/call`) that speaks the protocol like a real
|
|
384
|
+
client, so this class of bug cannot ship again.
|
|
385
|
+
- Added `scripts/live-mcp-check.js` — standalone MCP health check that boots the
|
|
386
|
+
server, handshakes, lists tools, calls `scan_project` + `check_code`, and
|
|
387
|
+
verifies unknown-tool errors name the tool.
|
|
388
|
+
- Lint hygiene: removed dead code + unused vars in `src/taint-ast.js`
|
|
389
|
+
(warnings 125 → 121). Benchmark unchanged: 96.0% F1, 428/428 tests.
|
|
390
|
+
- `src/install.js`: added a **Hermes Agent** installer (16th client). Detects
|
|
391
|
+
`$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml` and emits safe `hermes config set` instructions for
|
|
392
|
+
the `mcp_servers.vibeguard` entry — it never hand-edits the YAML. README count
|
|
393
|
+
updated to 16 AI clients.
|
|
394
|
+
|
|
395
|
+
### Added — Phase 1: Compliance + MCP Tools + Breadth
|
|
396
|
+
- 4 new MCP tools (82 total): `generate_sbom`, `dep_reachability`,
|
|
397
|
+
`scan_container_image`, `license_compliance`.
|
|
398
|
+
- `vibeguard sbom [dir]` — CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM from `package-lock.json` +
|
|
399
|
+
source import graph. Marks which deps are actually imported in code.
|
|
400
|
+
`src/sbom.js`.
|
|
401
|
+
- `vibeguard reachability [dir]` — cross-references CVE results against
|
|
402
|
+
the actual import graph. Separates reachable vulns (imported — fix first)
|
|
403
|
+
from transitive-only (lower priority).
|
|
404
|
+
- `vibeguard container-scan <image>` — shells out to `trivy` for container
|
|
405
|
+
image vulnerability scanning. Graceful fallback when trivy absent.
|
|
406
|
+
- `vibeguard license [dir]` — checks `package.json` licenses against an
|
|
407
|
+
allowlist (MIT/ISC/BSD/Apache/0BSD). `--allow GPL-3.0` adds custom
|
|
408
|
+
licenses. Flags GPL/AGPL/unlicensed.
|
|
409
|
+
- 4 new compliance frameworks (10 total): NIST CSF 2.0, OWASP ASVS L1/L2/L3,
|
|
410
|
+
CIS Controls v8, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5. `src/compliance.js`,
|
|
411
|
+
`src/rules-pack.js` `COMPLIANCE_MAP`.
|
|
412
|
+
- Fixed PCI-DSS from 3.2.1 control IDs to actual v4.0 IDs (6.2.4, 8.3.2, etc.).
|
|
413
|
+
- 3 new AI client installers (15 total): Copilot CLI, Amazon Q Developer,
|
|
414
|
+
Sourcegraph Cody. `src/install.js`.
|
|
415
|
+
- 3 new CI templates (7 total): Bitbucket Pipelines, Travis CI, Buildkite.
|
|
416
|
+
`ci-templates/`.
|
|
417
|
+
|
|
418
|
+
### Changed — Phase 0: Honesty Fixes
|
|
419
|
+
- `deep_scan` reframed from "LLM-powered deep review" (overclaim) to
|
|
420
|
+
"agentic deep review" — emits structured review contracts for the
|
|
421
|
+
consuming AI client. VibeGuard never calls an LLM. `src/mcp-server.js`.
|
|
422
|
+
- Sandbox `vm` limits documented honestly: Node `vm` is not a security
|
|
423
|
+
boundary, memory cap is unenforced. `src/sandbox.js`, `README.md`.
|
|
424
|
+
- Stale test floors bumped: 200+ → 500+ rules, 40/54 → 78+ MCP tools.
|
|
425
|
+
- README honest-scope expanded: sandbox vm, AI-safety recall 57%, taint
|
|
426
|
+
JS/TS-only, VibeGuard never calls LLM.
|
|
427
|
+
|
|
428
|
+
### Added
|
|
429
|
+
- Self-integrity verification. `vibeguard self-check` now cryptographically
|
|
430
|
+
verifies the CONTENT of its critical security modules (action-guard,
|
|
431
|
+
shell-guard, interceptor, firewall, rules, scanner, taint, mcp-audit, …)
|
|
432
|
+
against a shipped SHA-256 manifest (`src/integrity.json`), not just that they
|
|
433
|
+
load. Detects a patched/neutered guard — e.g. `inspectAction` rewritten to
|
|
434
|
+
always allow, or a rule file gutted — which a load-only check missed. Manifest
|
|
435
|
+
is regenerated on `prepublishOnly` (and via `npm run integrity`). Honest limit:
|
|
436
|
+
detects source tampering, not a full chain of trust; verify npm provenance for
|
|
437
|
+
the trust anchor. `src/integrity.js`, `scripts/gen-integrity.js`.
|
|
438
|
+
- Agent Action Firewall — `vibeguard guard-action` + `guard_action` MCP tool +
|
|
439
|
+
`src/action-guard.js` (`inspectAction`). Real-time exfiltration guard:
|
|
440
|
+
inspect any agent action (shell / network / file-write / prompt / MCP call)
|
|
441
|
+
BEFORE it runs and block secret or personal-data exfiltration. Hard rule — an
|
|
442
|
+
API key or PII (email, SSN, credit card, phone) should not leave to an external
|
|
443
|
+
host: secrets blocked unconditionally, PII blocked (or warn), local/allowlisted
|
|
444
|
+
hosts permitted. Also blocks cloud-metadata credential theft, secrets written
|
|
445
|
+
to web-served paths, and secrets in LLM prompts. `sanitizeOutbound()` redacts
|
|
446
|
+
instead of dropping. 100% offline, fail-closed on the block path. A guard, not
|
|
447
|
+
a sandbox.
|
|
448
|
+
- `vibeguard agent-scan` — AI Agent Security Posture (new `agent_scan` MCP tool
|
|
449
|
+
too). One graded verdict — "is my AI-agent setup safe?" — aggregating every
|
|
450
|
+
agent-era check into threat categories: MCP-server trust, PII/secret leakage
|
|
451
|
+
to LLM providers, LLM output reaching exec/eval/SQL/DOM, prompt injection,
|
|
452
|
+
agent capability/loop safety, and hallucinated dependencies. Pure offline
|
|
453
|
+
orchestration of already-tested modules (mcp-audit + ai-guard + the `ai.*`
|
|
454
|
+
rule family). `--fail-on <level>` to gate CI.
|
|
455
|
+
- `vibeguard mcp-audit` — MCP server security audit (new `mcp_audit` MCP tool
|
|
456
|
+
too). Audits the MCP servers an agent is configured to trust
|
|
457
|
+
(`.mcp.json` / `.cursor/mcp.json` / `.vscode/mcp.json`) for tool poisoning
|
|
458
|
+
(prompt injection in server args/descriptions), unpinned auto-install
|
|
459
|
+
(`npx -y` rug-pull surface), remote-code / shell commands, hardcoded secrets
|
|
460
|
+
in `env`, over-broad filesystem grants, and **definition drift** — a server
|
|
461
|
+
whose config changed since you approved it (classic MCP rug-pull). 100%
|
|
462
|
+
offline: reads config only, never runs a server. Pins server-definition
|
|
463
|
+
hashes under `.vibeguard/mcp-pins.json`; `--pin` re-baselines after review.
|
|
464
|
+
- `vibeguard scan --staged` — scan only git-staged files. Ideal for a
|
|
465
|
+
pre-commit hook: fast and scoped to exactly what's being committed. Per-file
|
|
466
|
+
only (cross-file analysis skipped, and the CLI says so).
|
|
467
|
+
- `vibeguard scan --no-suppress` — CI trust mode. Ignores inline
|
|
468
|
+
`vibeguard-ignore` comments and the heuristic false-positive filter so a
|
|
469
|
+
careless or hostile inline comment in a PR cannot silence a gate. Deliberate
|
|
470
|
+
project config (ignoreRules/ignorePaths) is still honored.
|
|
471
|
+
- Fail-loud coverage tracking. Every analysis pass (taint, python-taint, AST,
|
|
472
|
+
file-rules) that errors is now recorded instead of silently swallowed. Scan
|
|
473
|
+
results carry `engine` (`ast` | `regex-only`) and `diagnostics`
|
|
474
|
+
(degraded passes, parse-failed files, degraded file count). The CLI prints a
|
|
475
|
+
loud banner when running `regex-only` (acorn missing) or when any file was
|
|
476
|
+
only partially analyzed — a degraded scan no longer masquerades as clean.
|
|
477
|
+
- `vibeguard scan --strict` — exit code 3 when any file scanned degraded, so CI
|
|
478
|
+
never trusts an incomplete result. **Note:** existing CI configs that add
|
|
479
|
+
`--strict` will now hard-fail on degraded scans (intended).
|
|
480
|
+
- Benchmark quality gate: `node test/benchmark/run.js --gate` fails (exit 2) if
|
|
481
|
+
overall precision/recall/F1 regress below a floor (P≥80% / R≥78% / F1≥80%;
|
|
482
|
+
override via `VIBEGUARD_BENCH_MIN_*`). Wired into CI so detection quality
|
|
483
|
+
regressions block merges.
|
|
484
|
+
- ReDoS / pathological-input regression tests + coverage-transparency tests.
|
|
485
|
+
- Engine mode + degraded-coverage now surfaced in JSON output and the MCP
|
|
486
|
+
`scan` tool (payload + summary) so agents don't treat a degraded scan as an
|
|
487
|
+
all-clear.
|
|
488
|
+
- `VIBEGUARD_NO_POSTINSTALL=1` (and CI auto-detect) to silence the install
|
|
489
|
+
message.
|
|
490
|
+
- README `Coverage & Limits` section: honest per-language detection-depth
|
|
491
|
+
matrix, engine-mode explainer, fail-loud explainer, and an explicit "the
|
|
492
|
+
shell guard is a mistake-catcher, not a sandbox" statement.
|
|
493
|
+
- `vibeguard auto` — one-command full autonomous protection. Activates
|
|
494
|
+
daemon (file watcher), pre-commit hook, post-edit hook, and shell guard.
|
|
495
|
+
Idempotent. `--stop` reverses everything and restores backups. `--status`
|
|
496
|
+
shows what's active. `--ci` for pipeline mode. `--fix` for safe auto-fixes.
|
|
497
|
+
`--no-shell` to skip shell hook. `--strict` to block on HIGH too.
|
|
498
|
+
- `src/auto.js` orchestrator composing existing modules (scanner, daemon,
|
|
499
|
+
hook, shell-guard). All state under `.vibeguard/auto.json`.
|
|
500
|
+
- Shell hook FP fix: default-allow policy. Unknown commands are allowed.
|
|
501
|
+
Only block on known dangerous patterns. Fail-open on module load errors.
|
|
502
|
+
Both `shell-hook.sh` and `shell-hook.ps1` now try multiple module paths
|
|
503
|
+
and never block when VibeGuard can't load.
|
|
504
|
+
|
|
505
|
+
### Performance
|
|
506
|
+
- Incremental scanning: `vibeguard scan --changed` only rescans files whose
|
|
507
|
+
content changed since the last scan (SHA-256 hash cache under
|
|
508
|
+
`.vibeguard/cache`). Warm re-scan of an unchanged tree drops from ~600ms to
|
|
509
|
+
~5ms in local testing (~100×+). Per-file only — cross-file taint/rules are
|
|
510
|
+
skipped in this mode and the CLI says so; run a full scan for those. Intended
|
|
511
|
+
for pre-commit and watch loops.
|
|
512
|
+
- Fixed: the scanner no longer walks its own `.vibeguard/` cache/baseline
|
|
513
|
+
artifacts (added to the skip-dirs list).
|
|
514
|
+
- Scanner ~50% faster (108ms → 54ms/file on the repo's own source). Three
|
|
515
|
+
behavior-preserving changes, verified identical findings + unchanged benchmark
|
|
516
|
+
(95 TP / 15 FP / 16 FN):
|
|
517
|
+
1. Memoize the global-flag regex per rule — the hot path was recompiling a
|
|
518
|
+
fresh `RegExp` per rule *per line* (~64% of scan time).
|
|
519
|
+
2. Hoist the `fileFilter` check out of the per-line loop (it depends only on
|
|
520
|
+
the path) and cache the compiled filter.
|
|
521
|
+
3. Provably-safe literal prefilter: skip a rule when a mandatory literal from
|
|
522
|
+
its regex is absent from the line, avoiding the regex entirely. Never
|
|
523
|
+
introduces a false negative (bails on alternation, ignores optional/grouped
|
|
524
|
+
literals). Guarded by unit tests + a throughput regression test.
|
|
525
|
+
|
|
526
|
+
### Fixed
|
|
527
|
+
- Interceptor: wrapped `fs.readFileSync` called itself instead of the saved
|
|
528
|
+
original, causing infinite recursion / stack overflow on any uncached file
|
|
529
|
+
read after activation. Now calls the original. Regression test added.
|
|
530
|
+
|
|
531
|
+
### Changed
|
|
532
|
+
- Agent Action Firewall now blocks UNKNOWN-format secrets, not just known vendor
|
|
533
|
+
patterns. An outbound field named like a credential (`apiKey`, `secret`,
|
|
534
|
+
`password`, `client_secret`, `private_key`, `access_key`, …) carrying a
|
|
535
|
+
high-entropy value is blocked from leaving to an external host — so a custom
|
|
536
|
+
API key or session secret that matches no known regex can't exfiltrate either.
|
|
537
|
+
Precise by design: the credential NAME plus real entropy avoids false
|
|
538
|
+
positives on content hashes, UUIDs, ids, env-var references, and low-entropy
|
|
539
|
+
placeholders (all verified). Ambiguous names (token/bearer/session) are
|
|
540
|
+
intentionally excluded to avoid breaking legitimate auth traffic.
|
|
541
|
+
- Runtime interceptor now delegates to the unified Agent Action Firewall
|
|
542
|
+
(`action-guard.inspectAction`). Every wrapped `fetch` / `http` / `exec` /
|
|
543
|
+
`execSync` call is checked with the hardened, shared logic — so obfuscated
|
|
544
|
+
commands (base64, `$IFS`, variable indirection) and secrets embedded in a
|
|
545
|
+
request URL are now blocked at runtime, which the interceptor's old naive
|
|
546
|
+
`.includes()` check missed. `CONFIG.allowDomains` are honored as trusted
|
|
547
|
+
destinations. Protection is automatic once the interceptor is active — no
|
|
548
|
+
per-call `guard_action` needed.
|
|
549
|
+
- Python taint analysis rewritten as single-pass taint propagation (still pure
|
|
550
|
+
JS — no external parser, keeps VibeGuard zero-dependency and offline). Tracks
|
|
551
|
+
tainted variables through intermediate assignments (`q = "..." + data` →
|
|
552
|
+
`execute(q)`) and clears taint on clean reassignment. Fixes false positives
|
|
553
|
+
where a tainted name merely appeared near an unrelated sink. Parameterized SQL
|
|
554
|
+
(`execute("... %s ...", (params,))`) and inline-sanitized sinks
|
|
555
|
+
(`eval(int(x))`, `os.system(shlex.quote(x))`) are not flagged; unsafe
|
|
556
|
+
concatenation / f-string flows still fire.
|
|
557
|
+
- Shell guard normalizer hardened. Now substitutes ALL variable assignments
|
|
558
|
+
(previously only the first, a real bypass: `A=rm; B=-rf; $A $B /`), handles
|
|
559
|
+
`$IFS` word-splitting and `/usr/bin/rm`, and iterates to a fixpoint so layered
|
|
560
|
+
obfuscation unwinds. Still, by design, a mistake-catcher — not a sandbox.
|
|
561
|
+
- CI workflow renamed `test.yml` → `ci.yml` to match the README status badge.
|
|
562
|
+
- Taint analysis upgraded from regex-only to scope-aware, AST-based dataflow
|
|
563
|
+
(`taint-ast.js`). Sources/sinks matched on AST nodes (MemberExpression /
|
|
564
|
+
CallExpression), not text. Respects block/function scope with shadowing,
|
|
565
|
+
clears taint on clean reassignment, recognizes sanitizers (parseInt,
|
|
566
|
+
path.basename, DOMPurify.sanitize, etc. — configurable array). Tracks
|
|
567
|
+
cross-function taint within a file via intra-function fixpoint. All
|
|
568
|
+
AST-confirmed findings carry `confidence: "high"` and `dataflow: true`.
|
|
569
|
+
Regex taint retained as fallback for unparseable files. Finding object
|
|
570
|
+
shape unchanged (ruleId/severity/title/message/fix preserved).
|
|
571
|
+
|
|
572
|
+
### Added
|
|
573
|
+
- Cross-file taint analysis via import/export graph (`crosstaint.js`)
|
|
574
|
+
- Optional AST mode with acorn + acorn-typescript (`ast.js`)
|
|
575
|
+
- `vibeguard doctor` — AI host security audit (hook injection, base URL hijack, MCP config)
|
|
576
|
+
- `vibeguard history` — git history secret scan
|
|
577
|
+
- `vibeguard watch` — re-scan on file change
|
|
578
|
+
- `vibeguard rules` / `vibeguard explain` — rule listing and documentation
|
|
579
|
+
- Live key verification (`--verify-keys`) for OpenAI + Stripe
|
|
580
|
+
- Inline suppressions (`vibeguard-ignore-line` / `vibeguard-ignore-next-line`)
|
|
581
|
+
- Project config (`.vibeguardrc.json`) with ignoreRules, ignorePaths, severityOverrides
|
|
582
|
+
- .gitignore-aware secret scanning
|
|
583
|
+
- Stable finding fingerprints for SARIF + baseline diffing
|
|
584
|
+
- External scanner support: semgrep, gitleaks, bandit
|
|
585
|
+
- 15 secret types (GitHub, Slack, GitLab, Twilio, SendGrid, Mailgun, Telegram, npm, Resend, connection strings, public-LLM-key)
|
|
586
|
+
- AI security rules (browser-api-key, disabled-sandbox, eval-llm-output, prompt-injection-marker)
|
|
587
|
+
- Injection rules (prototype pollution, ReDoS, XXE, CRLF)
|
|
588
|
+
- Framework rules (Prisma raw, React dangerous HTML, reflected XSS)
|
|
589
|
+
- IaC rules (Dockerfile, GitHub Actions, Terraform)
|
|
590
|
+
- Package hygiene (unpinned deps, dangerous scripts, no lockfile)
|
|
591
|
+
- 63 tests, all passing
|
|
592
|
+
|
|
593
|
+
## [0.1.0] - Initial release
|
|
594
|
+
- Core scanner with secrets, injection, auth, config, PII rules
|
|
595
|
+
- Fix → verify loop with baseline + rollback
|
|
596
|
+
- MCP server (5 tools)
|
|
597
|
+
- Live URL scan
|
|
598
|
+
- Badge generation
|
|
599
|
+
- One-command multi-client installer
|
|
600
|
+
- Pre-commit hook
|
|
601
|
+
- GitHub Actions CI template
|
|
602
|
+
- SARIF 2.1.0 output
|
|
603
|
+
- Zero runtime dependencies (scanner)
|
|
604
|
+
|