@wowok/agent-mcp 3.1.3 → 3.1.5

package/dist/knowledge/baselines/rules/service.json

@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+{
+  "comment": "Service rule pack (R-S) — declarative form of the retired in-code Service risk rules (25 rules, 22 operation + 3 state-only buyer). Facts are produced by the kernel extractor (service-risk.ts, bound to the live service limits, the BigInt compensation-fund comparison and the first-offender WIP scans); rules only reference fact names. Levels/wording can be retuned per rule and rules can be disabled (enabled=false, trace left) via the judgment document — factory rules can never be deleted or invented here.",
+  "facts": {
+    "sales_op": "KERNEL — the sales operation kind (add / set / remove / clear).",
+    "sales_projected_count": "KERNEL — projected sales count after an add/set (set: incoming count; add: current count + incoming).",
+    "sales_over_limit": "KERNEL — sales_projected_count exceeds MAX_SALE_COUNT (chain-limit comparison sunk into the extractor).",
+    "max_sale_count": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_SALE_COUNT from the published package.",
+    "repositories_op": "KERNEL — the repositories operation kind (add / set / remove / clear).",
+    "repositories_projected_count": "KERNEL — projected repositories count after an add/set.",
+    "repositories_over_limit": "KERNEL — repositories_projected_count exceeds MAX_REPOSITORY_COUNT.",
+    "max_repository_count": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_REPOSITORY_COUNT from the published package.",
+    "arbitrations_op": "KERNEL — the arbitrations operation kind (add / set / remove / clear).",
+    "arbitrations_present": "KERNEL — an arbitrations operation is present in the call (truthy gate of the retired check).",
+    "arbitrations_projected_count": "KERNEL — projected arbitrations count after an add/set.",
+    "arbitrations_over_limit": "KERNEL — arbitrations_projected_count exceeds MAX_ARBITRATION_COUNT.",
+    "max_arbitration_count": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_ARBITRATION_COUNT from the published package.",
+    "max_wip_hash_length": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_WIP_HASH_LENGTH from the published package.",
+    "max_wip_length": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_WIP_LENGTH from the published package.",
+    "wip_hash_offender_present": "KERNEL — first-offender scan over add/set sales: some wip_hash exceeds MAX_WIP_HASH_LENGTH (per-sale hash-before-url order preserved).",
+    "wip_hash_offender_name": "KERNEL — sale name of the over-length wip_hash offender.",
+    "wip_hash_offender_len": "KERNEL — length of the over-length wip_hash.",
+    "wip_url_offender_present": "KERNEL — first-offender scan over add/set sales: some wip URL exceeds MAX_WIP_LENGTH.",
+    "wip_url_offender_name": "KERNEL — sale name of the over-length wip URL offender.",
+    "wip_url_offender_len": "KERNEL — length of the over-length wip URL.",
+    "wip_local_present": "KERNEL — first-offender scan: some non-empty sale.wip classifies as local (path / localhost / LAN / unrecognized).",
+    "wip_local_sale_name": "KERNEL — sale name of the first local-wip offender.",
+    "wip_local_value": "KERNEL — the offending wip string itself.",
+    "wip_local_type": "KERNEL — regex classification of the offending wip ('local filesystem path' / 'localhost/loopback URL' / 'LAN (private IP) URL' / 'unrecognized format (not a network URL)').",
+    "wip_missing_hash_present": "KERNEL — first-offender scan over add/set sales: some sale has a wip URL but no wip_hash (tampering window).",
+    "wip_missing_hash_name": "KERNEL — sale name of the missing-wip_hash offender.",
+    "compensation_fund_add_present": "Whether a compensation_fund deposit is configured in the call.",
+    "compensation_fund_deposit": "KERNEL — String()-rendered deposit amount (mirrors the retired template literal).",
+    "order_new_items_count": "KERNEL — item count of the order_new buy payload (absent when there is no order_new).",
+    "order_new_empty_hash_count": "KERNEL — items with an empty-string wip_hash in the order_new buy payload.",
+    "discount_count": "KERNEL — discount issuance count.",
+    "discount_over_cap": "KERNEL — discount_count exceeds MAX_DISCOUNT_TOTAL_COUNT.",
+    "max_discount_total_count": "KERNEL CONSTANT — live MAX_DISCOUNT_TOTAL_COUNT from the published package.",
+    "publish": "Whether the publish operation is requested.",
+    "publish_blockers": "KERNEL — '; '-joined publish blockers ('order_allocators not set (F-S-18, E_NO_ALLOCATOR)', 'compensation_fund > 0 but no arbitrations (F-S-19, E_ARBITRATION_NOT_SET_WITH_COMPENSATION_FUND)').",
+    "publish_blocker_count": "KERNEL — number of publish blockers.",
+    "pause": "The pause/resume switch being set (present for any pause operation).",
+    "buy_guard_display": "KERNEL — rendered buy_guard ('(cleared)' when null; the fact is absent when the call carries no buy_guard field at all).",
+    "builder": "New owner address of the ownership transfer (builder field).",
+    "current_bPublished": "Current on-chain Service.bPublished state.",
+    "current_bPaused": "Current on-chain Service.bPaused state.",
+    "comp_fund_display": "KERNEL — rendered compensation_fund balance ('0' when absent).",
+    "comp_fund_positive_no_arb": "KERNEL — BigInt comparison: compensation_fund balance > 0 while no arbitration is bound (malformed balances are skipped, never fabricated).",
+    "comp_fund_unclaimable": "KERNEL — state-only R-S-5-05 probe: the balance is present, parses as BigInt, is > 0, and no arbitration is bound.",
+    "setting_lock_duration_add": "Milliseconds being added to setting_lock_duration (safe_add, only-increase).",
+    "post_publish_blocked_fields": "KERNEL — ', '-joined list of publish-locked fields touched post-publish ('machine (306)', 'arbitrations (308)', 'order_allocators (313)').",
+    "post_publish_blocked_fields_compact": "KERNEL — comma-joined variant of the same list.",
+    "post_publish_blocked_count": "KERNEL — number of publish-locked fields touched post-publish.",
+    "machine": "Machine address being bound (present for any machine op; null = clear).",
+    "machine_display_cleared": "KERNEL — rendered machine ('(cleared)' when null/absent).",
+    "order_allocators_display": "KERNEL — rendered order_allocators ('(set)' for a non-null value, '(cleared)' for null; the fact is absent when the call carries no order_allocators field at all).",
+    "repositories_addset_count": "KERNEL — repository object count of an add/set op.",
+    "rewards_addset_count": "KERNEL — reward object count of an add/set op.",
+    "rewards_op": "KERNEL — the rewards operation kind (add / set / remove / clear)."
+  },
+  "rules": [
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-1-01",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "sales count exceeds MAX_SALE_COUNT (50)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "sales_over_limit", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Sales count exceeds limit",
+          "description": "Service would have ${sales_projected_count} sales items, exceeds MAX_SALE_COUNT ${max_sale_count}",
+          "scenario": "Adding too many product SKUs",
+          "mitigation": "Split into multiple Service objects or remove discontinued items",
+          "evidence": "sales_count=${sales_projected_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "system"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-1-02",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "repositories count exceeds MAX_REPOSITORY_COUNT (100)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "repositories_over_limit", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Repositories count exceeds limit",
+          "description": "Service would have ${repositories_projected_count} repositories, exceeds MAX_REPOSITORY_COUNT ${max_repository_count}",
+          "scenario": "Binding too many data repositories",
+          "mitigation": "Consolidate repositories or remove inactive ones",
+          "evidence": "repositories_count=${repositories_projected_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-1-03",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "arbitrations count exceeds MAX_ARBITRATION_COUNT (20)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "arbitrations_over_limit", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Arbitrations count exceeds limit",
+          "description": "Service would have ${arbitrations_projected_count} arbitrations, exceeds MAX_ARBITRATION_COUNT ${max_arbitration_count}",
+          "scenario": "Binding too many Arbitration objects",
+          "mitigation": "Use 1-3 Arbitration objects covering different dispute scopes",
+          "evidence": "arbitrations_count=${arbitrations_projected_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "arbitrator"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-1-04",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "WIP hash length exceeds MAX_WIP_HASH_LENGTH (64) or URL exceeds MAX_WIP_LENGTH (1024)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "wip_hash_offender_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "WIP hash length exceeds limit",
+          "description": "Sale \"${wip_hash_offender_name}\" wip_hash length ${wip_hash_offender_len} > MAX_WIP_HASH_LENGTH ${max_wip_hash_length}",
+          "scenario": "Malformed WIP hash (should be sha256 hex, 64 chars)",
+          "mitigation": "Use sha256 hex hash (64 characters, no prefix)",
+          "evidence": "wip_hash_length=${wip_hash_offender_len}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "wip_url_offender_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "WIP URL length exceeds limit",
+          "description": "Sale \"${wip_url_offender_name}\" wip URL length ${wip_url_offender_len} > MAX_WIP_LENGTH ${max_wip_length}",
+          "scenario": "WIP URL too long (use IPFS or short HTTPS URL)",
+          "mitigation": "Use IPFS CID or shorter URL",
+          "evidence": "wip_url_length=${wip_url_offender_len}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-1-05",
+      "dimension": "structural",
+      "trigger": "sale.wip is a local path / localhost / LAN URL (not network-deployable) — every customer order fails",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "wip_local_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "WIP is not network-deployed — every customer order will fail",
+          "description": "Sale \"${wip_local_sale_name}\" wip \"${wip_local_value}\" is a ${wip_local_type}. It passes set-time verification on the merchant's own machine but is unreachable by customers on other machines — order_new aborts 100% when a customer tries to buy.",
+          "scenario": "Merchant sets wip to a local file path / localhost / LAN URL and publishes the Service; the on-chain wip points at the merchant's machine; customers cannot fetch it.",
+          "mitigation": "Deploy the .wip file to a public host (GitHub Pages, IPFS, or your own website) and set sale.wip to the public URL. Or leave sale.wip empty (\"\") to skip WIP verification (TESTING ONLY — not recommended for production).",
+          "evidence": "sale=${wip_local_sale_name}, wip=${wip_local_value}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-2-01",
+      "dimension": "semantic",
+      "trigger": "WIP hash tampering risk — owner updates WIP file without updating wip_hash",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "wip_missing_hash_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "WIP hash missing — tampering risk",
+          "description": "Sale \"${wip_missing_hash_name}\" has wip URL but no wip_hash. Owner could replace the WIP file without customers noticing.",
+          "scenario": "Owner sets wip without hash, then changes file content later",
+          "mitigation": "Always compute sha256(wip_file_content) and set as wip_hash. SDK auto-derives if omitted, but explicit hash is safer.",
+          "evidence": "sale=${wip_missing_hash_name}",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer", "owner"],
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The buyer pays against a WIP whose content is not hash-pinned — the served file can be silently replaced after the sale terms were presented, and what is delivered can differ from what was agreed." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": [
+              {
+                "role": "merchant",
+                "path": "Substituted content rides the normal order flow: with no wip_hash there is no on-chain check pinning the delivered content — payment still escrows and routes through the standard allocator path to the merchant.",
+                "viability": "viable",
+                "gate": "The missing wip_hash is directly observed on the sale entry; nothing on-chain pins the served file, so the substitution path is executable as-is."
+              }
+            ]
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-2-02",
+      "dimension": "semantic",
+      "trigger": "compensation_fund confused with Service balance (internal Balance<T>)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "compensation_fund_add_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "compensation_fund is internal Balance<T>, NOT Service-owned Treasury",
+          "description": "Depositing ${compensation_fund_deposit} to compensation_fund. This balance is internal to Service<T> and is consumed by the arbitration compensation claim, not by owner withdrawals. Owner can only withdraw via compensation_fund_withdraw (requires bPaused=true + lock_duration expired).",
+          "scenario": "Owner confuses compensation_fund with general Treasury",
+          "mitigation": "Use external Treasury (referenced via order_allocators.sharing.who=Entity) for general funds. Use compensation_fund only for arbitration payouts.",
+          "evidence": "deposit=${compensation_fund_deposit}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "arbitrator", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-2-03",
+      "dimension": "semantic",
+      "trigger": "quote side effect — stock deduction not rolled back on later failure",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "order_new_items_count", "op": "gte", "value": 1 },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Order flow: stock deducted at quote stage — NOT rolled back on failure",
+          "description": "Order will deduct stock at Stage 3 (quote). If Stages 4-7 fail, stock remains deducted. Customer must manually re-add stock or accept the loss.",
+          "scenario": "Customer's transaction fails after quote but stock is gone",
+          "mitigation": "1) Monitor failed transactions and re-add the stock. 2) Set sales suspension during high-failure periods. 3) Use small batch orders to limit blast radius.",
+          "evidence": "items=${order_new_items_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-2-04",
+      "dimension": "semantic",
+      "trigger": "Discount issuance — verify type and total count semantics",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "discount_over_cap", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Discount count exceeds total cap",
+          "description": "Issuing ${discount_count} discounts exceeds MAX_DISCOUNT_TOTAL_COUNT ${max_discount_total_count}",
+          "scenario": "Bulk discount issuance",
+          "mitigation": "Issue in batches of <= 1000 (MAX_DISCOUNT_COUNT_ONCE) and keep total <= ${max_discount_total_count}",
+          "evidence": "count=${discount_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-2-05",
+      "dimension": "semantic",
+      "trigger": "Order placed without verifying WIP hash — buyer passes empty wip_hash",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "order_new_empty_hash_count", "op": "gte", "value": 1 },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Order with empty wip_hash — SDK auto-fills from sale",
+          "description": "${order_new_empty_hash_count} item(s) have empty wip_hash. SDK will auto-fill from sale.wip_hash at order time. If owner updates the WIP file between viewing and ordering, buyer receives the new (potentially different) content.",
+          "scenario": "Time-of-check to time-of-use WIP mismatch",
+          "mitigation": "Buyer should explicitly pass the wip_hash they saw when viewing the product. Empty string is convenience but riskier.",
+          "evidence": "empty_hash_items=${order_new_empty_hash_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-3-01",
+      "dimension": "authority",
+      "trigger": "publish operation — requires SERVICE_PUBLISH (311) + prerequisites",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "publish", "op": "truthy" },
+            { "field": "publish_blocker_count", "op": "gte", "value": 1 }
+          ] },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Publish blocked — prerequisites not met",
+          "description": "Cannot publish: ${publish_blockers}",
+          "scenario": "Owner attempts publish without configuring prerequisites",
+          "mitigation": "Configure order_allocators (and arbitrations if compensation_fund > 0) before publish",
+          "evidence": "blockers=${publish_blocker_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-3-02",
+      "dimension": "authority",
+      "trigger": "pause operation — affects new orders but not existing Progress",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "pause", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Pausing Service — new orders blocked, existing Progress continues",
+          "description": "Service.bPaused = true will reject new orders (E_PAUSED, service:19). Existing orders' Progress continues normally.",
+          "scenario": "Owner pauses for maintenance/stockout",
+          "mitigation": "Communicate pause to customers. Use compensation_fund_withdraw only when paused.",
+          "evidence": "pause=true",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "pause", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Resuming Service — new orders accepted",
+          "description": "Service.bPaused = false will allow new orders again.",
+          "scenario": "Owner resumes after maintenance",
+          "mitigation": "Verify stock levels before resuming.",
+          "evidence": "pause=false",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-3-03",
+      "dimension": "authority",
+      "trigger": "buy_guard change — post-publish mutable (unusual exception)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "buy_guard_display", "op": "present" },
+            { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "truthy" }
+          ] },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "buy_guard change post-publish — unusual mutability",
+          "description": "buy_guard is the ONLY publish-locked-field exception: it remains mutable post-publish. Other fields (machine/arbitrations/order_allocators) are immutable.",
+          "scenario": "Owner changes buy_guard strategy after publish (e.g. whitelist → public)",
+          "mitigation": "Document buy_guard changes for transparency. Customers should re-verify buy_guard before ordering.",
+          "evidence": "buy_guard=${buy_guard_display}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-3-04",
+      "dimension": "authority",
+      "trigger": "Ownership transfer (builder field) — irreversible",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "builder", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Service ownership transfer — IRREVERSIBLE",
+          "description": "Transferring Service to ${builder}. Original owner loses ALL control. New owner inherits permission + compensation_fund + all bindings.",
+          "scenario": "Owner transfers Service to new address",
+          "mitigation": "1) Verify new owner address twice. 2) Withdraw compensation_fund first (if applicable). 3) Export Service JSON before transfer.",
+          "evidence": "new_owner=${builder}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-01",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "publish is irreversible — bPublished cannot be reset to false",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "publish", "op": "truthy" },
+            { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "truthy" }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Service already published — publish is no-op",
+          "description": "Service.bPublished is already true. Subsequent publish calls have no effect (bPublished is one-shot, cannot revert).",
+          "scenario": "Owner calls publish again on already-published Service",
+          "mitigation": "Skip publish if already published. To 'reset' a Service, create a new one.",
+          "evidence": "bPublished=true",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "publish", "op": "truthy" },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Publish is IRREVERSIBLE — 3 fields will be locked forever",
+          "description": "Once published: machine (306), arbitrations (308), order_allocators (313) become permanently immutable. bPublished cannot be reset to false. Clone Service to make changes.",
+          "scenario": "Owner publishes Service for the first time",
+          "mitigation": "Verify all configurations before publish. Run pre-publish checklist (confirm-gate.ts).",
+          "evidence": "bPublished=false→true",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-02",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "setting_lock_duration add — only-increase mechanism",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "setting_lock_duration_add", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "setting_lock_duration can only INCREASE",
+          "description": "Adding ${setting_lock_duration_add} ms to setting_lock_duration. New value = old + input (safe_add). Cannot be decreased — protects customers from owner reducing lock to withdraw compensation_fund faster.",
+          "scenario": "Owner extends lock period to build trust",
+          "mitigation": "Ensure extension is intentional. Lock affects rewards/compensation_fund_withdraw/compensation_fund_receive.",
+          "evidence": "add_ms=${setting_lock_duration_add}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-03",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "machine/arbitrations/order_allocators modification after publish — SDK blocks",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "truthy" },
+            { "field": "post_publish_blocked_count", "op": "gte", "value": 1 }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Post-publish modification blocked by SDK",
+          "description": "Service is published. Cannot modify: ${post_publish_blocked_fields}. SDK checkNotPublished() will abort. To change these fields, clone the Service.",
+          "scenario": "Owner attempts to change locked field post-publish",
+          "mitigation": "Create a new Service with the desired configuration. Migrate active orders if needed.",
+          "evidence": "blocked=${post_publish_blocked_fields_compact}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-04",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "sales modification — stock/price changes affect future orders only",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "sales_op", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "low",
+          "title": "Sales modification affects future orders only",
+          "description": "Sales add/set/remove/clear changes do NOT affect already-created Orders. Existing Orders' Progress continues with the original sale parameters.",
+          "scenario": "Owner updates prices mid-campaign",
+          "mitigation": "Communicate price/stock changes to customers. Existing orders are unaffected.",
+          "evidence": "sales_op=${sales_op}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner", "customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-05",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "Service paused (state-only buyer rule) — new orders are suspended",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "current_bPaused", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Service is paused — ordering suspended",
+          "description": "Service.bPaused is true. The merchant has actively paused the Service; new orders cannot be placed until it resumes.",
+          "scenario": "Buyer performs due diligence on a paused Service",
+          "mitigation": "Confirm with the merchant (via Messenger) when the Service will resume before ordering.",
+          "evidence": "bPaused=true",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-4-06",
+      "dimension": "lifecycle",
+      "trigger": "Service not published (state-only buyer rule) — cannot be ordered",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "eq", "value": false },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Service is not published — cannot be ordered",
+          "description": "Service.bPublished is false. The Service is still a draft: it is not visible on the market and order_new will fail.",
+          "scenario": "Buyer evaluates a draft Service shared out-of-band",
+          "mitigation": "Wait until the merchant publishes the Service (publish is irreversible — configuration is locked at that point).",
+          "evidence": "bPublished=false",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-5-01",
+      "dimension": "cross_object",
+      "trigger": "Machine binding — post-publish immutable, Progress inherits",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "machine", "op": "present" },
+            { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "truthy" }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Machine binding immutable post-publish",
+          "description": "Service is published; machine cannot be changed. All future Progress objects will use the bound Machine.",
+          "scenario": "Owner wants to upgrade workflow post-publish",
+          "mitigation": "Create new Service with new Machine. Migrate customers via discounts.",
+          "evidence": "machine=${machine_display_cleared}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "machine", "op": "present" },
+          "level": "medium",
+          "title": "Machine binding — verify Machine is published",
+          "description": "Binding Machine ${machine}. Ensure Machine is published — Service cannot bind unpublished Machine.",
+          "scenario": "Owner binds Machine before publishing Service",
+          "mitigation": "Verify Machine.bPublished = true before binding.",
+          "evidence": "machine=${machine}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-5-02",
+      "dimension": "cross_object",
+      "trigger": "Arbitration binding — required when compensation_fund > 0",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "arbitrations_present", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+            { "field": "comp_fund_positive_no_arb", "op": "eq", "value": true }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Arbitration required — compensation_fund has balance",
+          "description": "compensation_fund balance is ${comp_fund_display}. Publish will fail (E_ARBITRATION_NOT_SET_WITH_COMPENSATION_FUND) until arbitrations is non-empty.",
+          "scenario": "Owner deposits compensation_fund without configuring arbitrations",
+          "mitigation": "Add at least 1 Arbitration object before publish.",
+          "evidence": "compensation_fund=${comp_fund_display}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-5-03",
+      "dimension": "cross_object",
+      "trigger": "order_allocators binding — publish prerequisite, post-publish immutable",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "order_allocators_display", "op": "present" },
+            { "field": "current_bPublished", "op": "truthy" }
+          ] },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "order_allocators immutable post-publish",
+          "description": "Service is published; order_allocators cannot be changed. Fund distribution strategy is permanently locked.",
+          "scenario": "Owner wants to adjust fee split post-publish",
+          "mitigation": "Create new Service with new allocators. Cannot migrate existing Orders.",
+          "evidence": "order_allocators=${order_allocators_display}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "order_allocators_display", "op": "present" },
+            { "field": "order_allocators_display", "op": "eq", "value": "(cleared)" },
+            { "field": "publish", "op": "truthy" }
+          ] },
+          "level": "critical",
+          "title": "Publish without order_allocators — will fail",
+          "description": "Publish will abort with E_NO_ALLOCATOR. order_allocators is a mandatory publish prerequisite.",
+          "scenario": "Owner attempts publish without configuring allocators",
+          "mitigation": "Set order_allocators before publish.",
+          "evidence": "order_allocators=null",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-5-04",
+      "dimension": "cross_object",
+      "trigger": "Repository/Reward binding — verify object types before adding",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "repositories_op", "op": "in", "value": ["add", "set"] }
+          ] },
+          "level": "low",
+          "title": "Repository binding — verify object types",
+          "description": "Adding ${repositories_addset_count} repositories. SDK uses queryObjectsWithType to validate each is ObjectType.Repository before binding.",
+          "scenario": "Owner adds non-Repository object by mistake",
+          "mitigation": "Use LocalMark names or addresses that are confirmed Repository objects.",
+          "evidence": "objects=${repositories_addset_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        },
+        {
+          "when": { "all": [
+            { "field": "rewards_op", "op": "in", "value": ["add", "set"] }
+          ] },
+          "level": "low",
+          "title": "Reward binding — verify object types",
+          "description": "Adding ${rewards_addset_count} rewards. SDK validates ObjectType.Reward. add is always allowed; only remove/clear are time-locked after publish.",
+          "scenario": "Owner adds Reward objects",
+          "mitigation": "Verify Reward objects exist and are active. Remember that removing them later requires pause + setting_lock_duration elapsed.",
+          "evidence": "objects=${rewards_addset_count}",
+          "stakeholders": ["owner"]
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "rule_id": "R-S-5-05",
+      "dimension": "cross_object",
+      "trigger": "compensation_fund has balance but no Arbitration bound (state-only buyer rule)",
+      "cases": [
+        {
+          "when": { "field": "comp_fund_unclaimable", "op": "eq", "value": true },
+          "level": "high",
+          "title": "Compensation fund without Arbitration — fund is unclaimable",
+          "description": "compensation_fund balance is ${comp_fund_display} but no Arbitration object is bound. Compensation is claimed via dispute → arbiter ruling with indemnity → fee withdrawal; without an Arbitration binding there is no dispute path to trigger a payout.",
+          "scenario": "Buyer sees a compensation fund but no dispute path to claim it",
+          "mitigation": "Require the merchant to bind at least one Arbitration object before ordering.",
+          "evidence": "compensation_fund=${comp_fund_display}, arbitrations=0",
+          "stakeholders": ["customer", "owner"],
+          "exposure": {
+            "loss_parties": [
+              { "role": "buyer", "basis": "The advertised compensation protection cannot be exercised: without a bound Arbitration there is no dispute-to-payout path, so a harmed buyer has no way to reach the compensation fund." }
+            ],
+            "gain_paths": []
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}