@winkjs/composer 0.0.2 → 0.4.1

package/src/core/emitter-manager/mqtt/emitter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+// core/emitter-manager/mqtt/emitter.js
+
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Production MQTT Emitter — Pure Transport Layer
+ *
+ * Durability class: **'in-memory'** (ADR-021). Messages buffer in the
+ * mqtt.js client's default synchronous memory store; a process crash or
+ * power cut loses at most the unacknowledged in-flight window (measured:
+ * a few hundred messages at 14k msg/s, at most one burst at edge rates)
+ * plus anything buffered during a concurrent broker outage. The
+ * disk-backed store was removed because mqtt.js loses QoS-1 messages on
+ * EVERY connection acceptance when its outgoing store is asynchronous
+ * (the erase-then-rebuild gap — ADR-021 has the full diagnosis
+ * and the measured loss-vs-latency curve). The synchronous memory store
+ * closes that gap by construction; the composer-owned WAL that restores
+ * crash durability is ADR-021's planned successor.
+ *
+ * DESIGN DECISIONS:
+ *
+ * 1. FIRE-AND-FORGET WITH QoS 1
+ *    - Never wait for PUBACK callbacks on the hot path
+ *    - QoS 1 gives at-least-once delivery while the process lives
+ *    - Callbacks drive the unacked counter, not delivery decisions
+ *
+ * 2. COMPOSER-SIDE UNACKED ACCOUNTING (ADR-021)
+ *    - One counter: +1 when a publish is accepted, -1 when its callback
+ *      fires (acknowledgment or failure).
+ *    - The counter IS the pressure gauge, the pre-flight refusal basis,
+ *      the shutdown drain condition, and the health input. Because
+ *      "unacknowledged" by definition covers every message sitting in
+ *      any client-internal queue, no accumulation can be invisible to
+ *      pressure — bounded memory is arithmetic (cap × message size),
+ *      not an assumption about library behavior. (The old design read
+ *      pressure from the LevelDB store while messages piled up unseen
+ *      inside the client — the 2026-07-08 tier-run OOM.)
+ *
+ * 3. MESSAGE EXPIRY (MQTT v5)
+ *    - Configurable per message type
+ *    - Prevents flooding backend after extended offline periods
+ *
+ * 4. NO FORCED IDENTITY / OPTIONAL WILL — unchanged transport behavior.
+ *
+ * 5. STARTUP POSTURE: RECOVERING, WITH A BOUNDED FIRST-CONNACK GRACE
+ *    - Setup never fails because the broker is unreachable. The factory
+ *      waits up to `connectGraceMs` (config → MQTT_CONNECT_GRACE_MS env
+ *      → 500 ms default; 0 disables) for the first connection
+ *      acknowledgment, then hands back the handle either way. On a
+ *      reachable broker the real wait is one connack round trip; on an
+ *      unreachable one the flow starts with `connected: false` and the
+ *      client keeps retrying in the background.
+ *    - Return shape: the handle itself at grace 0, otherwise a Promise
+ *      of it. The wiring layer awaits either (ADR-018).
+ *    - This replaced the wire-time `sleep(240)` that once papered over
+ *      the pre-connack loss ADR-021 eliminated.
+ *
+ * Adapter contract (ADR-018, stream sink):
+ * - `publishNow(topic, message, options?)` returns `{ ok: true }` on
+ *   acceptance or `{ ok: false, error: { code, message } }` on pre-flight
+ *   rejection. Sync return per ADR-013; never a Promise on the hot path.
+ * - Async publish failures route through `onDeliveryFailure(err, ctx)`
+ *   when supplied (ctx = `{ topic }`); without a handler the adapter
+ *   surfaces the failure via `Promise.reject(deliveryErr)` — loud failure
+ *   beats silent loss (parity with QuestDB). `onCritical` is
+ *   reserved for the high-pressure `QUEUE_CRITICAL` warning (no loss yet).
+ * - `getPressure()` returns unacked / maxQueueSize in `[0, 1]` (sync,
+ *   O(1), allocation-free per ADR-018).
+ * - `getHealth()` returns the ADR-018 health floor `{status, connected,
+ *   pressure}` plus this adapter's own `stats` addition; `stats.unacked`
+ *   is the live counter.
+ *
+ * Health-status semantics (uniform across sinks):
+ * - `red`    if `!state.connected`.
+ * - `yellow` if connected AND `pressure >= 0.66` (threshold shared with
+ *   ADR-020's Draft yield proposal).
+ * - `green`  otherwise.
+ *
+ * Backpressure threshold:
+ * - Pre-flight reject fires at `pressure >= STORAGE_PRESSURE_LIMIT` (0.9),
+ *   leaving 10% headroom for in-flight drain on shutdown and a clean band
+ *   between the yellow-health threshold (0.66) and exhaustion (1.0).
+ * - The cap is `maxQueueSize`, clamped to 60,000: every unacknowledged
+ *   QoS-1 message holds a 16-bit packet id, so one connection can never
+ *   carry more (see MQTT_INFLIGHT_ID_LIMIT).
+ * - The old byte-axis limit (`maxQueueBytes`) died with the disk store;
+ *   the count cap bounds memory at cap × payload size.
+ *
+ * `err.code` vocabulary (user-facing; documented in this header as
+ * ADR-018 requires):
+ * - `STORAGE_FULL`     — the unacked cap is reached; pre-flight sync
+ *   reject. The name is the cross-sink vocabulary word (ADR-018), kept
+ *   although the "storage" is now the in-memory buffer.
+ * - `ENCODE_ERROR`     — the codec could not encode the message; sync
+ *   pre-flight reject, the message was never in flight. The sink-side
+ *   mirror of the source vocabulary's `DECODE_ERROR`.
+ * - `DELIVERY_FAILED`  — publish failure. Usually async, routed through
+ *   `onDeliveryFailure` (default without a handler: `Promise.reject`,
+ *   an unhandledRejection). Rare sync face: `client.publish` rejecting
+ *   the call itself returns this code synchronously — the slot is
+ *   released, nothing is in flight.
+ * - `SHUTTING_DOWN`    — emitter is mid-shutdown; new publishes are dropped.
+ * - `INVALID_CONFIG`   — setup-time; missing or malformed config field
+ *   (brokerUrl, codec.pack, callback type, connectGraceMs). On the
+ *   thrown TypeError per ADR-018's fail-fast setup rule.
+ * - `SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` — shutdown closed with unacknowledged messages;
+ *   carries `dropped: { count }` (the exact counter value). Fires whether
+ *   connected or not: with no disk store, nothing survives the process,
+ *   so a disconnected shutdown with pending messages is a real loss and
+ *   is reported as one (this differs from the wal-backed design, which
+ *   held them for the next session).
+ *
+ * @module mqtt-emitter
+ */
+
+import mqtt from 'mqtt';
+import crypto from 'crypto';
+import { ENV_VARS } from '../../env-vars.js';
+import {
+    QOS,
+    MQTT_CONFIG,
+    WINK_NAMESPACE,
+    QUEUE_CRITICAL_THRESHOLD,
+    MESSAGE_EXPIRY,
+    DEFAULT_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE,
+    MQTT_INFLIGHT_ID_LIMIT
+} from './constants.js';
+
+/**
+ * Pre-flight reject threshold on store pressure.
+ * 0.9 = 10% headroom for in-flight drain on shutdown, plus a clean band
+ * between the yellow-health threshold (0.66, shared with the yield level the
+ * ADR-020 Draft proposes) and store exhaustion (1.0). At or above this,
+ * `publishNow` returns `STORAGE_FULL` synchronously; the message is not buffered.
+ * @type {number}
+ */
+const STORAGE_PRESSURE_LIMIT = 0.9;
+
+/**
+ * Pressure threshold above which `getHealth().status` elevates to at least
+ * 'yellow' (uniform with Terminal/QuestDB). The value matches the
+ * pressure-aware-yield design (ADR-020, still a Draft). That design
+ * proposes 0.66 as the pressure level where the flow would start yielding
+ * to let sinks drain; a benchmark still has to confirm the number. Today
+ * the yield trigger is time-only (ADR-024), so this alignment is
+ * forward-looking.
+ * @type {number}
+ */
+const HEALTH_PRESSURE_YELLOW_THRESHOLD = 0.66;
+
+/**
+ * Singleton success result reused on every successful publish. Hot-path zero
+ * allocation per ADR-013 / ADR-004. Plain literal — not frozen.
+ * @type {{ok: true}}
+ */
+const RESULT_OK = { ok: true };
+
+/**
+ * Singleton error result for the pre-flight pressure-limit reject. Reused on
+ * every occurrence; rare in healthy operation (pressure this close to the
+ * limit means delivery has stopped draining), but a defined contract path.
+ * @type {{ok: false, error: {code: string, message: string}}}
+ */
+const ERR_STORAGE_FULL = {
+    ok: false,
+    error: {
+        code: 'STORAGE_FULL',
+        message: 'Store at or above pressure limit (0.9) — cannot accept message'
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Singleton error result for publishes attempted while shutdown is in progress.
+ * @type {{ok: false, error: {code: string, message: string}}}
+ */
+const ERR_SHUTTING_DOWN = {
+    ok: false,
+    error: {
+        code: 'SHUTTING_DOWN',
+        message: 'Emitter is shutting down — message dropped'
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Build a config-error TypeError tagged for ADR-018 fail-fast setup routing.
+ * @param {string} message
+ * @returns {TypeError}
+ */
+const invalidConfig = function ( message ) {
+    const err = new TypeError( message );
+    err.code = 'INVALID_CONFIG';
+    return err;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Throw classified when an optional callback option is set to a non-function.
+ * @param {*} value - the configured option value
+ * @param {string} name - the option name for the error message
+ */
+const assertOptionalCallback = function ( value, name ) {
+    if ( value !== undefined && typeof value !== 'function' ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( `${name} must be a function` );
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Validate and build the mqtt.js will (last-will testament) options.
+ *
+ * Direct createEmitter callers bypass the DSL schema, so the factory
+ * checks the will shape itself, and the payload encoding runs behind
+ * the same classified-throw rule as every other setup failure
+ * (ADR-018, fail-fast setup) — a raw codec TypeError would reach the
+ * caller unclassified.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} will - config.will as supplied
+ * @param {Object} codec - config.codec (pack + contentType)
+ * @returns {Object} the mqtt.js connect-options `will` object
+ */
+const buildWillOptions = function ( will, codec ) {
+    if ( typeof will.topic !== 'string' || will.topic.length === 0 ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'will.topic is required — a non-empty string' );
+    }
+    if ( will.message === undefined || will.message === null ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'will.message is required' );
+    }
+    let willPayload;
+    try {
+        willPayload = Buffer.from( codec.pack( will.message ) );
+    } catch ( packErr ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( `will.message could not be encoded by the codec: ${packErr.message}` );
+    }
+    const willOptions = {
+        topic: will.topic,
+        payload: willPayload,
+        // `??`, not `||`: 0 is a valid QoS.
+        qos: will.qos ?? QOS,
+        retain: will.retain !== false,  // Default true
+        properties: {
+            contentType: codec.contentType
+        }
+    };
+    if ( codec.payloadFormatIndicator === 1 ) {
+        willOptions.properties.payloadFormatIndicator = true;
+    }
+    return willOptions;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Bounded wait for the client's first 'connect' event (the broker's
+ * connection acknowledgment). Resolves when the event fires or when
+ * graceMs elapses, whichever comes first. Expiry is NOT an error —
+ * the startup posture stays 'recovering' (ADR-018): the caller gets
+ * a working handle that reports `connected: false` while mqtt.js
+ * retries in the background. The one-shot listener is removed on
+ * expiry so a late connack reaches only the permanent state handler;
+ * the timer is cleared on connect so nothing pins the event loop.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} client - mqtt.js client (EventEmitter surface)
+ * @param {number} graceMs - positive wait budget, milliseconds
+ * @returns {Promise<void>} resolves on first connect or expiry; never rejects
+ */
+const waitForFirstConnect = function ( client, graceMs ) {
+    return new Promise( ( resolve ) => {
+        let timer = null;
+        const onConnect = function () {
+            clearTimeout( timer );
+            resolve();
+        };
+        timer = setTimeout( () => {
+            client.removeListener( 'connect', onConnect );
+            resolve();
+        }, graceMs );
+        client.once( 'connect', onConnect );
+    } );
+}; // waitForFirstConnect()
+
+/**
+ * Create production MQTT emitter.
+ *
+ * Validation is synchronous — bad config throws before any side
+ * effect. The return shape depends on the effective grace:
+ * `connectGraceMs === 0` returns the handle directly (today's callers
+ * that need synchronous creation pass 0); otherwise returns a Promise
+ * resolving to the handle after the first connack or the grace budget.
+ * The wiring layer awaits either shape (ADR-018).
+ *
+ * @param {Object} config - emitter config (see configSchema in index.js)
+ * @returns {Object|Promise<Object>} the emitter handle, or a Promise of it
+ */
+export const createEmitter = function ( config ) {
+    // Per ADR-018, setup-time throws carry classified err.code.
+    //
+    // brokerUrl: `??` so explicit '' is the user's choice (not "fall back
+    // to env"); `.trim()` rejects whitespace-only. Symmetric with QuestDB,
+    // which throws on `ilpUrl: ''`.
+    const rawBrokerUrl = config.brokerUrl ?? ENV_VARS.mqttBrokerUrl;
+    const brokerUrl = typeof rawBrokerUrl === 'string' ? rawBrokerUrl.trim() : '';
+    if ( !brokerUrl ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'brokerUrl required — set a non-empty string in .emitter() config or MQTT_BROKER_URL env var' );
+    }
+    if ( !config.codec ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'config.codec is required' );
+    }
+    if ( typeof config.codec.pack !== 'function' ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'config.codec must have a pack() function' );
+    }
+    assertOptionalCallback( config.onDeliveryFailure, 'onDeliveryFailure' );
+    assertOptionalCallback( config.onCritical, 'onCritical' );
+    assertOptionalCallback( config.onBackpressure, 'onBackpressure' );
+
+    // First-connack grace: explicit config → MQTT_CONNECT_GRACE_MS env
+    // fallback → 500 ms default (ADR-018 precedence; the fallback lives
+    // here in the factory body, never as a schema sigil). `??` keeps an
+    // explicit 0 — "hand the handle back immediately" — from falling
+    // through to the env value. Number.isInteger also rejects Infinity,
+    // so the wait is bounded by construction. Validated here, before
+    // mqtt.connect opens anything (fail-fast setup per ADR-018).
+    const connectGraceMs = config.connectGraceMs ?? ENV_VARS.mqttConnectGraceMs;
+    if ( !Number.isInteger( connectGraceMs ) || connectGraceMs < 0 ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( 'connectGraceMs must be a non-negative integer (milliseconds); 0 disables the first-connect wait' );
+    }
+
+    // Core state. `unacked` is THE counter (ADR-021): +1 on accepted
+    // publish, -1 when the publish callback fires. Pressure, refusal,
+    // drain, and health all read it.
+    const state = {
+        connected: false,
+        hasConnectedOnce: false,
+        shuttingDown: false,
+        unacked: 0,
+        stats: {
+            published: 0,
+            publishErrors: 0,
+            encodeErrors: 0,
+            errors: 0,
+            reconnects: 0
+        }
+    };
+
+    // Broker URLs may carry credentials (mqtt://user:pass@host). Debug
+    // logs print this redacted form, so a debug flag flipped on in
+    // production cannot leak the password into whatever collects stdout.
+    const redactedBrokerUrl = brokerUrl.replace( /\/\/[^@/]*@/, '//***@' );
+
+    // Generate unique client ID if not provided
+    const clientId = config.clientId || `wink-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString( 36 ).slice( 2, 9 )}`;
+
+    // The unacked cap. Clamped to the 16-bit packet-id space: every
+    // unacknowledged QoS-1 message holds a packet id, so one connection
+    // can never carry more than 65,535; 60,000 leaves working headroom
+    // (same clamp the LevelDB store applied, kept with the same warning).
+    const requestedQueueSize = config.maxQueueSize || DEFAULT_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE;
+    if ( requestedQueueSize > MQTT_INFLIGHT_ID_LIMIT ) {
+        console.warn(
+            `WinkComposer/mqtt-emitter: maxQueueSize ${requestedQueueSize} exceeds the MQTT ` +
+            `packet-id ceiling — clamped to ${MQTT_INFLIGHT_ID_LIMIT}`
+        );
+    }
+    const maxQueueSize = Math.min( requestedQueueSize, MQTT_INFLIGHT_ID_LIMIT );
+
+    // Build MQTT options.
+    //
+    // NO outgoingStore: the client runs its default SYNCHRONOUS memory
+    // store (ADR-021). mqtt.js erases its packet-id bookkeeping on every
+    // connack and rebuilds it from a store snapshot asynchronously; with
+    // an asynchronous store, writes still in flight at that instant are
+    // invisible to the snapshot and get overwritten by id reuse — real
+    // QoS-1 loss, measured scaling with store write latency. The
+    // synchronous store makes the gap zero-width (validated 2026-07-09,
+    // nine-run matrix incl. reconnects at 45k in flight).
+    //
+    // messageIdProvider: the client's default provider cycles the 16-bit
+    // id space with NO in-use check — at 14 k msg/s it wraps every ~5 s,
+    // and an id whose PUBACK never arrived gets reassigned, overwriting
+    // the unacked packet's memory-store entry (same key). Measured at
+    // about one lost publish per 700,000 under sustained load.
+    // UniqueMessageIdProvider never reissues an in-use id.
+    const mqttOptions = {
+        ...MQTT_CONFIG,
+        clientId,
+        messageIdProvider: new mqtt.UniqueMessageIdProvider()
+    };
+
+    // Only add will if explicitly provided (validated + encoded by the
+    // helper above; classified throws per ADR-018)
+    if ( config.will ) {
+        mqttOptions.will = buildWillOptions( config.will, config.codec );
+    }
+
+    // Create MQTT client (injectable for testing). mqtt.connect throws
+    // its own raw TypeError on a malformed url; classify it like every
+    // other setup failure. The error text uses the redacted url — a
+    // malformed url can still carry credentials.
+    const connect = config.mqttConnectFn || mqtt.connect;
+    let client;
+    try {
+        client = connect( brokerUrl, mqttOptions );
+    } catch ( connectErr ) {
+        throw invalidConfig( `brokerUrl rejected by the MQTT client ('${redactedBrokerUrl}'): ${connectErr.message}` );
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Fill ratio of the unacked window: unacked / maxQueueSize, capped
+     * at 1. Sync, O(1), allocation-free (ADR-018).
+     * @returns {number}
+     */
+    const getPressure = function () {
+        const ratio = state.unacked / maxQueueSize;
+        return ratio > 1 ? 1 : ratio;
+    };
+
+    /**
+     * Check and signal backpressure
+     */
+    const checkBackpressure = function () {
+        const pressure = getPressure();
+
+        if ( ( pressure > QUEUE_CRITICAL_THRESHOLD ) && config.onCritical ) {
+            config.onCritical( 'QUEUE_CRITICAL', pressure );
+        }
+
+        if ( config.onBackpressure ) {
+            config.onBackpressure( pressure );
+        }
+    };
+
+    /**
+     * Publish message immediately (fire-and-forget).
+     *
+     * Sync return per the ADR-018 sink contract:
+     * - `{ ok: true }` on successful buffer.
+     * - `{ ok: false, error: { code: 'STORAGE_FULL', message } }` if pre-flight
+     *   pressure check rejects (pressure >= STORAGE_PRESSURE_LIMIT).
+     * - `{ ok: false, error: { code: 'SHUTTING_DOWN', message } }` if called
+     *   while shutdown is in progress.
+     *
+     * Async store-write or publish failures (after the message was buffered)
+     * route through `onDeliveryFailure(err, { topic })` when supplied; without
+     * a handler the adapter surfaces the failure via `Promise.reject`,
+     * which Node logs as unhandledRejection (and v15+ exits on). Loud failure
+     * beats silent loss.
+     *
+     * @param {string} topic - MQTT topic
+     * @param {*} message - Message payload (will be encoded via config.codec)
+     * @param {Object} [options] - Per-message options
+     * @param {string} [options.type] - Message-type key for MESSAGE_EXPIRY lookup
+     * @returns {{ok: true} | {ok: false, error: {code: string, message: string}}}
+     */
+    const publishNow = function ( topic, message, options ) {
+        if ( state.shuttingDown ) {
+            return ERR_SHUTTING_DOWN;
+        }
+
+        // Pre-flight pressure check — reject above STORAGE_PRESSURE_LIMIT to
+        // leave headroom for in-flight drain and to surface backpressure to
+        // producers before the store is literally full.
+        if ( getPressure() >= STORAGE_PRESSURE_LIMIT ) {
+            return ERR_STORAGE_FULL;
+        }
+
+        // Encode BEFORE the counter moves. A message the codec cannot
+        // encode was never in flight, so it must not occupy a slot: a
+        // leaked slot never drains, pressure ratchets up, and the
+        // emitter ends up refusing everything. The
+        // refusal is synchronous and classified; building it allocates,
+        // which is fine on an error path this rare.
+        let payload;
+        try {
+            payload = config.codec.pack( message );
+        } catch ( packErr ) {
+            state.stats.encodeErrors += 1;
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                error: {
+                    code: 'ENCODE_ERROR',
+                    message: `Message could not be encoded (topic=${topic}): ${packErr.message}`
+                }
+            };
+        }
+
+        const dedupId = crypto.randomUUID();
+        const messageType = ( options && options.type ) || 'default';
+        const expiry = MESSAGE_EXPIRY[ messageType ] || MESSAGE_EXPIRY.default;
+
+        // Per-message allocations from here to the publish call (the
+        // uuid, the properties object, the callback closure) cannot be
+        // pre-allocated and reused: mqtt.js keeps the packet — properties
+        // included — until PUBACK so it can retransmit, and a shared
+        // mutated object would corrupt every queued retransmission (the
+        // unavoidable-residual justification ADR-018 asks for).
+        const properties = {
+            messageExpiryInterval: expiry,
+            userProperties: {
+                [ WINK_NAMESPACE.dedupId ]: dedupId,
+                [ WINK_NAMESPACE.timestamp ]: Date.now().toString(),
+                [ WINK_NAMESPACE.version ]: '1.0'
+            },
+            contentType: config.codec.contentType
+        };
+
+        if ( config.codec.payloadFormatIndicator === 1 ) {
+            properties.payloadFormatIndicator = true;
+        }
+
+        // Accept: the message is now in flight. The counter rises HERE,
+        // synchronously with the accept decision, so the very next
+        // publishNow call sees the true pressure (the old design's
+        // optimistic-increment lesson, kept).
+        state.unacked += 1;
+
+        // Fire-and-forget publish with QoS 1. Outcome of this async callback is
+        // observability-only — the publishNow caller has already received a
+        // synchronous result. The callback fires exactly once per publish
+        // (acknowledgment or failure), so the decrement below is the
+        // counter's single exit — paired with the catch, which releases
+        // the slot when the client rejects the call before accepting it.
+        try {
+            client.publish(
+                topic,
+                payload,
+                { qos: QOS, properties },
+                ( err ) => {
+                    state.unacked -= 1;
+                    if ( err ) {
+                        state.stats.publishErrors += 1;
+                        const deliveryErr = new Error(
+                            `MQTT publish failed (topic=${topic}): ${err.message || err.code || 'unknown'}`
+                        );
+                        deliveryErr.code = 'DELIVERY_FAILED';
+                        deliveryErr.cause = err;
+                        if ( config.onDeliveryFailure ) {
+                            config.onDeliveryFailure( deliveryErr, { topic } );
+                        } else {
+                            // No handler — surface as unhandledRejection so the
+                            // process logs loudly and (Node 15+) exits. Mirrors
+                            // QuestDB's persist-plan.js catch-and-throw: both
+                            // adapters route undeclared async failures
+                            // through the same Node-level escape hatch.
+                            Promise.reject( deliveryErr );
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        state.stats.published += 1;
+                    }
+                    checkBackpressure();
+                }
+            );
+        } catch ( publishErr ) {
+            // The client threw before accepting the message; its callback
+            // will never fire, so the slot is released here — the sync
+            // face of DELIVERY_FAILED (see the header vocabulary).
+            state.unacked -= 1;
+            state.stats.publishErrors += 1;
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                error: {
+                    code: 'DELIVERY_FAILED',
+                    message: `MQTT publish rejected (topic=${topic}): ${publishErr.message}`
+                }
+            };
+        }
+
+        return RESULT_OK;
+    };
+
+    // Shutdown outcome, latched on the first call. A second
+    // caller used to get an instant clean resolve — mid-drain, or even
+    // after a shutdown that recorded dropped messages. Every caller now
+    // receives the first call's promise.
+    let shutdownPromise = null;
+
+    const DEFAULT_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+
+    /**
+     * The real shutdown body. `shutdown` below latches its promise so
+     * every caller receives this one outcome.
+     *
+     * **Drain-then-close** (a sustained-load finding, kept through the
+     * ADR-021 rework): mqtt.js's own `end()` does not reliably drain
+     * in-flight publishes, so the emitter waits on its own counter.
+     *
+     *  1. Sets `state.shuttingDown` so `publishNow` rejects new work
+     *     (returns `SHUTTING_DOWN` immediately).
+     *  2. **Polls the unacked counter until zero**, using the whole
+     *     `timeout` budget — no early give-up. The wait runs whether or
+     *     not the connection is up at the moment of the call: mqtt.js
+     *     auto-reconnects, so a mid-drain reconnect can still deliver
+     *     the backlog inside the budget.
+     *  3. Once drained (or budget expired), calls `client.end(...)`
+     *     with the remaining time as the broker-DISCONNECT budget.
+     *  4. Force-closes if the broker hangs the DISCONNECT.
+     *
+     * The old design's shutdown re-drive (re-sending stragglers through
+     * a store stream scan) died with the disk store: with the memory
+     * store there is no store to scan, and a message whose PUBACK was
+     * lost in-session is re-sent by the client itself on the next
+     * reconnect. If it is still unacknowledged at the deadline, the
+     * loss report counts it.
+     *
+     * A clean resolve is a delivery statement (ADR-018). When the
+     * drain could not complete, shutdown rejects with classified
+     * `SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT` and `dropped: { count }` — the counter's exact
+     * value — after the close has already happened (teardown first,
+     * then the report). This fires CONNECTED OR NOT: with no disk
+     * store, nothing survives the process, so a disconnected shutdown
+     * with pending messages is a real loss and is reported as one. (The
+     * wal-backed design resolved that case clean on purpose — its disk
+     * store held the messages for the next session. ADR-021 traded that
+     * away and says so.)
+     */
+    const doShutdown = async function ( timeout ) {
+        state.shuttingDown = true;
+
+        // A non-finite or non-positive timeout collapses the drain
+        // (Infinity overflows setTimeout, which clamps it to ~1 ms;
+        // NaN fails every deadline comparison), so it falls back to
+        // the default budget.
+        const budget = ( Number.isFinite( timeout ) && timeout > 0 ) ? timeout : DEFAULT_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS;
+        const deadline = Date.now() + budget;
+        const drainPollIntervalMs = 25;
+
+        // Drain wait — one cheap counter read per tick; sequential
+        // awaits are the wait-for-condition pattern.
+        while ( Date.now() < deadline && state.unacked > 0 ) {
+            // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+            await new Promise( ( r ) => setTimeout( r, drainPollIntervalMs ) );
+        }
+
+        // Whatever is still unacknowledged goes undelivered — publishNow
+        // stopped accepting work at step 1, so the counter has settled
+        // into its final value. It becomes the `dropped` payload below.
+        const undeliveredCount = state.unacked;
+        const remaining = Date.now() - deadline;
+        const closeBudget = remaining < 0 ? Math.abs( remaining ) : 1;
+
+        await new Promise( ( resolve ) => {
+            const forceTimer = setTimeout( () => {
+                client.end( true );
+                resolve();
+            }, closeBudget );
+
+            if ( state.connected ) {
+                client.end( false, {}, () => {
+                    clearTimeout( forceTimer );
+                    resolve();
+                } );
+            } else {
+                clearTimeout( forceTimer );
+                client.end( true );
+                resolve();
+            }
+        } );
+
+        // Teardown first, then the report: the close has already happened;
+        // an incomplete drain must not read as a clean one (ADR-018).
+        if ( undeliveredCount > 0 ) {
+            const err = new Error(
+                `WinkComposer/mqtt-emitter: shutdown closed with ${undeliveredCount} message(s) unacknowledged`
+            );
+            err.code = 'SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT';
+            err.dropped = { count: undeliveredCount };
+            throw err;
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }; // doShutdown()
+
+    /**
+     * Graceful shutdown — drain semantics with a timeout floor.
+     *
+     * Accepts the ADR-018 shutdown-contract shape `{ timeout }` (defaults to
+     * 5000ms). The destructure with `= {}` lets callers invoke
+     * `shutdown()` with no argument, `shutdown( {} )`, or
+     * `shutdown( { timeout: N } )`.
+     *
+     * The outcome is latched: the first call runs the shutdown, every
+     * later call returns the same promise. A caller
+     * arriving mid-drain waits for the real teardown; a caller arriving
+     * after a lossy shutdown sees the same classified rejection, never
+     * a contradicting clean resolve. One consequence: the first
+     * caller's `{ timeout }` governs; a later caller's is ignored.
+     *
+     * @param {{timeout?: number}} [options]
+     * @returns {Promise<void>}
+     */
+    const shutdown = function ( { timeout = DEFAULT_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS } = {} ) {
+        if ( !shutdownPromise ) {
+            shutdownPromise = doShutdown( timeout );
+        }
+        return shutdownPromise;
+    }; // shutdown()
+
+    // Connection handlers - minimal, no automatic status
+    client.on( 'connect', () => {
+        state.connected = true;
+        // mqtt.js fires 'connect' on every connack, including mid-run
+        // reconnects. Counting the later ones gives operators — and the
+        // release-soak signature policy — an observable "a reconnect
+        // happened during this run" fact via getHealth().stats.
+        if ( state.hasConnectedOnce ) {
+            state.stats.reconnects += 1;
+        }
+        state.hasConnectedOnce = true;
+        if ( config.debug ) {
+            console.log( `Connected to ${redactedBrokerUrl}` );
+        }
+    } );
+
+    client.on( 'offline', () => {
+        state.connected = false;
+        if ( config.debug ) {
+            console.log( `Offline - ${state.unacked} messages in flight` );
+        }
+    } );
+
+    client.on( 'error', ( err ) => {
+        state.stats.errors += 1;
+        if ( config.debug ) {
+            console.error( `MQTT error: ${err.message}` );
+        }
+    } );
+
+    /**
+     * Health snapshot for operator monitoring (uniform across sinks).
+     *
+     * Returns the ADR-018 health floor `{status, connected, pressure}` plus
+     * this adapter's own `stats` addition. `stats.unacked` is the live
+     * counter — the number of messages
+     * accepted but not yet acknowledged by the broker; exactly what a
+     * process crash at this instant would cost (ADR-021).
+     *
+     * Status derivation (uniform with Terminal/QuestDB; see file header):
+     * - `red`    when `!connected`
+     * - `yellow` when connected AND `pressure >= HEALTH_PRESSURE_YELLOW_THRESHOLD`
+     * - `green`  otherwise
+     *
+     * The wal-backed design's `storeHealth`, `circuitState`, and `metrics`
+     * diagnostics died with the LevelDB store (ADR-021).
+     *
+     * @returns {Object} Health snapshot — required floor + live counter
+     */
+    const getHealth = function () {
+        const pressure = getPressure();
+
+        let status;
+        if ( !state.connected ) {
+            status = 'red';
+        } else if ( pressure >= HEALTH_PRESSURE_YELLOW_THRESHOLD ) {
+            status = 'yellow';
+        } else {
+            status = 'green';
+        }
+
+        return {
+            // Required floor (ADR-018)
+            status,
+            connected: state.connected,
+            pressure,
+            // This adapter's addition beyond the floor
+            stats: { ...state.stats, unacked: state.unacked }
+        };
+    };
+
+    const handle = {
+        publishNow,
+        getHealth,
+        shutdown,
+        getPressure
+    };
+
+    // First-connack grace (bounded). With a grace, the return is a
+    // Promise the wiring layer awaits (ADR-018 allows sync or async
+    // factories): by the time wire() hands the emitter to the flow,
+    // the client has either seen its first connack or spent the
+    // budget. Expiry is not an error — the posture stays 'recovering'.
+    // With connectGraceMs 0 the handle returns synchronously, exactly
+    // the pre-grace behavior. The permanent 'connect' handler above is
+    // attached before the wait's one-shot listener, so a handle
+    // resolved via connack already reports `connected: true`.
+    if ( connectGraceMs === 0 ) {
+        return handle;
+    }
+    return waitForFirstConnect( client, connectGraceMs ).then( () => handle );
+}; // createMQTTEmitter()