@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.4 → 1.1.5

package/dist/esm/companion/provider-discovery.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Secret values never cross this companion-safe boundary.\n */\nexport const ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema = z.strictObject({\n  slug: z.string().min(1),\n  envVarName: z.string().min(1),\n  required: z.boolean(),\n  description: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ProviderSecretContractShapeEntry = z.infer<typeof ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema>;\n\n/**\n * Deterministic, values-free secret-contract shape used by provider discovery\n * and lockfile integrity checks.\n *\n * Every contribution must declare this field. `[]` means the provider is\n * authoritatively known to require no secrets; omission is rejected rather\n * than being silently interpreted as an empty contract. Entries must be\n * sorted by `slug`, and both slugs and environment-variable names are unique,\n * so independently contributed facets cannot produce order-dependent digests.\n */\nexport const ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema = z.array(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema).superRefine((entries, context) => {\n  const seenSlugs = new Set<string>();\n  const seenEnvVarNames = new Set<string>();\n\n  for (const [index, entry] of entries.entries()) {\n    if (seenSlugs.has(entry.slug)) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'slug'],\n        message: `Duplicate provider secret-contract slug \"${entry.slug}\".`,\n      });\n    }\n    seenSlugs.add(entry.slug);\n\n    if (seenEnvVarNames.has(entry.envVarName)) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'envVarName'],\n        message: `Duplicate provider secret-contract envVarName \"${entry.envVarName}\".`,\n      });\n    }\n    seenEnvVarNames.add(entry.envVarName);\n\n    if (index > 0 && entries[index - 1].slug.localeCompare(entry.slug) >= 0) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'slug'],\n        message: 'Provider secret-contract entries must be sorted by slug.',\n      });\n    }\n  }\n});\nexport type ProviderSecretContractShape = z.infer<typeof ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * A contribution is a wire record produced by one package version and read by\n * another (the CLI, the companion, a generated artifact), so it is a LOOSE\n * object: an additive field from a newer producer rides through an older\n * consumer instead of hard-failing the parse (#328 — it used to be strict,\n * which made every additive field a five-surface change and every old/new\n * mix a boot failure). Required fields stay required; only UNKNOWN keys are\n * tolerated, and they are kept rather than stripped so a re-emitting\n * consumer does not silently drop what it did not understand.\n */\nexport const ProviderCompanionContributionSchema = z.looseObject({\n  ref: z.string().min(1),\n  /**\n   * The provider's identity (package, tier, vendor, origin) as declared on\n   * its module metadata, so tooling can display tiers and group vendors\n   * without loading the runtime module. Optional on the wire for one\n   * reason only: contributions emitted before #328 carry none, and a\n   * discovery walk must still read them.\n   */\n  identity: ProviderIdentitySchema.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Stable package import path that makes the provider implementation reachable\n   * from the contributing package at runtime. This validates owner-package\n   * reachability without coupling discovery to source-file paths.\n   */\n  runtimeImportPath: z.string().min(1),\n  runtimeTargets: z.array(ProviderCompanionRuntimeTargetSchema).min(1),\n  engineCapabilities: z.array(z.enum(EngineCapability)).default([]),\n  providerCapabilities: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  protocols: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  secretsContractShape: ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema,\n  /**\n   * Optional frontend-safe provider payload for `frontendService` runtime\n   * targets. Tooling materializes this into generated runtime artifacts so the\n   * backend bootstrap endpoint can serve app-owned public providers without\n   * importing frontend packages at runtime.\n   */\n  frontendEntry: FrontendProviderEntrySchema.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Optional app module owner when the provider implementation belongs to one\n   * concrete module instead of the whole package/runtime.\n   */\n  sourceModuleId: z.string().min(1).optional(),\n});\nexport type ProviderCompanionContribution = z.infer<typeof ProviderCompanionContributionSchema>;\n\nexport interface RuntimeOwnerCompanionExports {\n  providerContributions?: ProviderCompanionContribution[];\n}\n"]}
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Engine-shipped packages (`external-connectors-public`,\n * etc.) have no way to know app-defined service keys, so the discovery\n * contract is keyed on the type. Apps with multiple frontend services of\n * the same type currently broadcast the contribution to all of them; if\n * per-service-key targeting becomes a need, add a second variant.\n */\nexport const ProviderFrontendServiceRuntimeTargetSchema = z.strictObject({\n  kind: z.literal('frontendService'),\n  serviceType: z.enum(AppFrontendType),\n});\nexport type ProviderFrontendServiceRuntimeTarget = z.infer<typeof ProviderFrontendServiceRuntimeTargetSchema>;\n\nexport const ProviderCompanionRuntimeTargetSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('kind', [\n  z.strictObject({\n    kind: z.literal('backend'),\n  }),\n  z.strictObject({\n    kind: z.literal('companion'),\n  }),\n  ProviderFrontendServiceRuntimeTargetSchema,\n  z.strictObject({\n    kind: z.literal('minion'),\n    minionKey: z.string().min(1),\n  }),\n  z.strictObject({\n    kind: z.literal('worker'),\n    workerKey: z.string().min(1),\n  }),\n]);\nexport type ProviderCompanionRuntimeTarget = z.infer<typeof ProviderCompanionRuntimeTargetSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Values-free projection of one backend provider secret requirement.\n *\n * The stable provider-owned `slug` is preserved separately from the concrete\n * environment-variable name so a rename on either axis changes the lockfile\n * integrity digest. Secret values never cross this companion-safe boundary.\n */\nexport const ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema = z.strictObject({\n  slug: z.string().min(1),\n  envVarName: z.string().min(1),\n  required: z.boolean(),\n  description: z.string().min(1),\n});\nexport type ProviderSecretContractShapeEntry = z.infer<typeof ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema>;\n\n/**\n * Deterministic, values-free secret-contract shape used by provider discovery\n * and lockfile integrity checks.\n *\n * Every contribution must declare this field. `[]` means the provider is\n * authoritatively known to require no secrets; omission is rejected rather\n * than being silently interpreted as an empty contract. Entries must be\n * sorted by `slug`, and both slugs and environment-variable names are unique,\n * so independently contributed facets cannot produce order-dependent digests.\n */\nexport const ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema = z.array(ProviderSecretContractShapeEntrySchema).superRefine((entries, context) => {\n  const seenSlugs = new Set<string>();\n  const seenEnvVarNames = new Set<string>();\n\n  for (const [index, entry] of entries.entries()) {\n    if (seenSlugs.has(entry.slug)) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'slug'],\n        message: `Duplicate provider secret-contract slug \"${entry.slug}\".`,\n      });\n    }\n    seenSlugs.add(entry.slug);\n\n    if (seenEnvVarNames.has(entry.envVarName)) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'envVarName'],\n        message: `Duplicate provider secret-contract envVarName \"${entry.envVarName}\".`,\n      });\n    }\n    seenEnvVarNames.add(entry.envVarName);\n\n    if (index > 0 && entries[index - 1].slug.localeCompare(entry.slug) >= 0) {\n      context.addIssue({\n        code: 'custom',\n        path: [index, 'slug'],\n        message: 'Provider secret-contract entries must be sorted by slug.',\n      });\n    }\n  }\n});\nexport type ProviderSecretContractShape = z.infer<typeof ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * A contribution is a wire record produced by one package version and read by\n * another (the CLI, the companion, a generated artifact), so it is a LOOSE\n * object: an additive field from a newer producer rides through an older\n * consumer instead of hard-failing the parse (#328 — it used to be strict,\n * which made every additive field a five-surface change and every old/new\n * mix a boot failure). Required fields stay required; only UNKNOWN keys are\n * tolerated, and they are kept rather than stripped so a re-emitting\n * consumer does not silently drop what it did not understand.\n */\nexport const ProviderCompanionContributionSchema = z.looseObject({\n  ref: z.string().min(1),\n  /**\n   * The provider's identity (package, tier, vendor, origin) as declared on\n   * its module metadata, so tooling can display tiers and group vendors\n   * without loading the runtime module. Optional on the wire for one\n   * reason only: contributions emitted before #328 carry none, and a\n   * discovery walk must still read them.\n   */\n  identity: ProviderIdentitySchema.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Stable package import path that makes the provider implementation reachable\n   * from the contributing package at runtime. This validates owner-package\n   * reachability without coupling discovery to source-file paths.\n   */\n  runtimeImportPath: z.string().min(1),\n  runtimeTargets: z.array(ProviderCompanionRuntimeTargetSchema).min(1),\n  engineCapabilities: z.array(z.enum(EngineCapability)).default([]),\n  providerCapabilities: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  protocols: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  secretsContractShape: ProviderSecretContractShapeSchema,\n  /**\n   * Optional frontend-safe provider payload for `frontendService` runtime\n   * targets. Tooling materializes this into generated runtime artifacts so the\n   * backend bootstrap endpoint can serve app-owned public providers without\n   * importing frontend packages at runtime.\n   */\n  frontendEntry: FrontendProviderEntrySchema.optional(),\n  /**\n   * Optional app module owner when the provider implementation belongs to one\n   * concrete module instead of the whole package/runtime.\n   */\n  sourceModuleId: z.string().min(1).optional(),\n});\nexport type ProviderCompanionContribution = z.infer<typeof ProviderCompanionContributionSchema>;\n\nexport interface RuntimeOwnerCompanionExports {\n  providerContributions?: ProviderCompanionContribution[];\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/companion/shared-library-companion.shared.definitions.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"shared-library-companion.shared.definitions.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/companion/shared-library-companion.shared.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AACpF,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAExF,MAAM,WAAW,6BAA6B,CAC5C,aAAa,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG,gBAAgB,CACzD,SAAQ,4BAA4B;IACpC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;CACnD"}
+{"version":3,"file":"shared-library-companion.shared.definitions.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/companion/shared-library-companion.shared.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AACpF,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAExF,MAAM,WAAW,6BAA6B,CAC5C,aAAa,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG,gBAAgB,CACzD,SAAQ,4BAA4B;IACpC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;CACnD"}

package/dist/esm/companion-exports.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"companion-exports.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/companion-exports.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,cAAc,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAClE,cAAc,+CAA+C,CAAC;AAC9D,cAAc,yDAAyD,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"companion-exports.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/companion-exports.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,cAAc,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAClE,cAAc,+CAA+C,CAAC;AAC9D,cAAc,yDAAyD,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,16 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
 import { AuditEventCategory, AuditEventSeverity } from './auditable-events.shared.schema';
 import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';
 import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';
+/**
+ * The roles the application audit door's READ, LIST and SEARCH accept — ONE list, so the three verbs
+ * cannot disagree about who may read the trail.
+ *
+ * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` for the operator who investigates and then acts; `APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER`
+ * for a party that must read and must NOT act — an assurance collector's machine credential, an
+ * external auditor. Neither is an organization role: the rows behind this door span every tenant.
+ */
+export declare const APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES: readonly CORE_APP_ROLES[];
 /**
  * The APPLICATION-scoped door onto the audit trail.
  *
@@ -36,8 +46,9 @@ import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resource
  * per-DOOR obligation rather than a property of the rows:
  *
  * - the organization door keeps its tenant filter and its organization roles, unchanged;
- * - this door is `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`-ONLY on every operation. An organization role must never
- *   reach it — the rows behind it span every tenant;
+ * - this door accepts {@link APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES} and nothing else — `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`
+ *   or the read-only `APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER`. An organization role must never reach it — the rows
+ *   behind it span every tenant;
  * - a read here that touches a tenant-attributed row is a CROSS-TENANT read and OWES an audit
  *   emission. **It is wired**, by the two halves below acting together, and neither is optional:
  *   each read variant declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and
@@ -67,7 +78,7 @@ import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resource
  */
 export declare const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory: (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => import("../..").ResourceConfiguration<undefined, CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH, z.ZodObject<{
     _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
-    eventId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>;
+    eventId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
     userId: z.ZodOptional<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
     organizationId: z.ZodOptional<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
     applicationId: z.ZodOptional<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAA6B,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAErH,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAwD,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAChJ,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAgC,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAI1I;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8DG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,+DAA+D,GAC1E,wBAAwB,oBAAoB,EAAE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBA8F9C,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAA6B,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAErH,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAwD,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAChJ,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAgC,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAC1I,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,oDAAoD,CAAC;AAGpF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAGpE,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA+DG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,+DAA+D,GAC1E,wBAAwB,oBAAoB,EAAE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBA+F9C,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -5,6 +5,18 @@ import { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdenti
 import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
 import { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
 import { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas.js';
+/**
+ * The roles the application audit door's READ, LIST and SEARCH accept — ONE list, so the three verbs
+ * cannot disagree about who may read the trail.
+ *
+ * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` for the operator who investigates and then acts; `APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER`
+ * for a party that must read and must NOT act — an assurance collector's machine credential, an
+ * external auditor. Neither is an organization role: the rows behind this door span every tenant.
+ */
+export const APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES = Object.freeze([
+    CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN,
+    CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER,
+]);
 /**
  * The APPLICATION-scoped door onto the audit trail.
  *
@@ -39,8 +51,9 @@ import { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.share
  * per-DOOR obligation rather than a property of the rows:
  *
  * - the organization door keeps its tenant filter and its organization roles, unchanged;
- * - this door is `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`-ONLY on every operation. An organization role must never
- *   reach it — the rows behind it span every tenant;
+ * - this door accepts {@link APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES} and nothing else — `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`
+ *   or the read-only `APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER`. An organization role must never reach it — the rows
+ *   behind it span every tenant;
  * - a read here that touches a tenant-attributed row is a CROSS-TENANT read and OWES an audit
  *   emission. **It is wired**, by the two halves below acting together, and neither is optional:
  *   each read variant declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and
@@ -86,8 +99,7 @@ export const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (
             variants: [{
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    /** APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN ONLY — never an organization role. The rows behind this door span every tenant. */
-                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     /**
                      * Reading ONE tenant's audit row through the application door IS a crossing, so the cheapest
@@ -103,11 +115,12 @@ export const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (
             variants: [{
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */
                     admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,
                     filterFields: {
+                        applicationId: z.string(),
                         eventType: z.string(),
                         eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),
                         severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),
@@ -132,13 +145,14 @@ export const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (
             variants: [{
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */
                     admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,
-                    isSearchable: false,
+                    isSearchable: true,
                     searchableFields: [],
                     filterFields: {
+                        applicationId: z.string(),
                         eventType: z.string(),
                         eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),
                         severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/application-audit-logs.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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A large share of security events carry NO organization by design — `logUserLogin` takes\n * `organizationId` as optional because no organization is selected at login, and the same is true\n * of session eviction, token refresh and application-wide authentication-policy changes. Measured\n * on a dogfood application (#317): **94 of 127 rows had no organization**, and were reachable\n * through no API. An operator could see 26% of the trail and could not attest the rest, while a\n * reader querying the only available surface saw `user_login: 0` for a control that had emitted 21.\n *\n * ## Why a SEPARATE resource type rather than a second route\n *\n * `generateParentCombinations` composes every URL as\n * `[...primaryScope, ...mandatoryContext, ...optionalCombo]`, so a routed application edge on\n * `AUDIT_LOGS` would appear in EVERY combination and rewrite the organization route to\n * `/applications/{applicationId}/organizations/{organizationId}/audit-logs` — breaking all eight of\n * its documented paths and their consumers. Making the organization edge optional does not help:\n * the empty combination is skipped whenever any parent exists, so no bare route is emitted either.\n * A sibling type carrying ONE application parent takes the route it needs and leaves the existing\n * door byte-identical. The pattern is the engine's own: notification badges are dual-scope with a\n * type per scope, `APPLICATION_API_KEYS` shows the application routing shape, and `USER_SELF`\n * shows a distinct type addressing another's rows.\n *\n * ## Two doors, ONE record set — the security contract\n *\n * Both types resolve to the `auditLogs` collection through\n * `RESOURCE_SHARED_PERSISTENCE_COLLECTION_ALIASES`. That makes the isolation properties a\n * per-DOOR obligation rather than a property of the rows:\n *\n * - the organization door keeps its tenant filter and its organization roles, unchanged;\n * - this door is `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`-ONLY on every operation. An organization role must never\n *   reach it — the rows behind it span every tenant;\n * - a read here that touches a tenant-attributed row is a CROSS-TENANT read and OWES an audit\n *   emission. **It is wired**, by the two halves below acting together, and neither is optional:\n *   each read variant declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and\n *   `ServicesRegistryHandler.recordCrossTenantReadAccess` observes every enrolled read and emits\n *   `CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS` once per TENANT the returned rows belong to. The\n *   declaration is what enrols the read: `authorizeOrganizations` — where that event is otherwise\n *   emitted — runs only for ORGANIZATIONS-scoped resources and decides on ONE fetched row, so it\n *   never sees this door at all. Grouping per tenant is what makes the crossing visible to the\n *   REACHED tenant, in its own organization-scoped viewer, rather than only to the operator.\n *   `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` requires every crossing to be named in the\n *   trail, and the trail is the worst possible surface on which to make an operator read invisible.\n *   See `security/authorizations/cross-tenant-read-observation.backend.ts` for why an UNDECLARED\n *   door is deliberately not observed instead of being observed with a false `admissionDeclared`.\n *\n * ## Deliberately mirrored from the organization resource\n *\n * `isSystemResource`, `systemAccessPolicy.exportSubject: FORBIDDEN` and the ABSENCE of a\n * `retentionPolicy` are copied ON PURPOSE. They are properties of the ROWS, and the rows are the\n * same ones — a second door that disagreed about whether the audit trail is subject-exportable, or\n * about how long it is kept, would be a policy fork over one record set. See the organization\n * config for the reasoning behind each; do not change one without the other.\n *\n * ## Deliberately NOT mirrored\n *\n * There is no CREATE. The organization resource carries a `REPOSITORY_ONLY` CREATE because that is\n * how audit rows are written; writing is not a scope question and must keep exactly one door.\n */\nexport const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (\n  resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]\n) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  undefined,\n  CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n  typeof AuditableEvent_BaseSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: AuditableEvent_BaseSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOGS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOGS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n  /** Mirrored from the organization door — the same rows, so the same answer. Disclosing the monitoring trail to its own subject is self-defeating and out of Art. 20 scope. */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.FORBIDDEN },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n  ],\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        /** APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN ONLY — never an organization role. The rows behind this door span every tenant. */\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /**\n         * Reading ONE tenant's audit row through the application door IS a crossing, so the cheapest\n         * reach — fetch by id — is declared and audited exactly like the collection verbs. Declaring\n         * it is also what stops `assignInitiatorOrganizationConfinementToFilter` silently narrowing\n         * this door to an operator who happens to carry an ambient organization, which would make a\n         * surface documented as spanning every tenant return one tenant and report success.\n         */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n      }],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n        filterFields: {\n          eventType: z.string(),\n          eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),\n          severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),\n          userId: z.string(),\n          /**\n           * Filterable so an operator can narrow to one tenant THROUGH this door, which is the\n           * cross-tenant investigation this surface exists for. It is a FILTER, never the isolation\n           * boundary: isolation on this door is the role gate above, and narrowing to a tenant does\n           * not make the read any less cross-tenant for audit purposes.\n           */\n          organizationId: z.string(),\n          correlationId: z.string(),\n          clientInstanceId: z.string(),\n          createdAt: z.date(),\n        },\n        /** `eventId` last, as the keyset tie-breaker — `createdAt` is not unique under boot/seed bursts. Mirrors the organization door; removing it reintroduces a paging data-loss path. */\n        sortFields: ['createdAt', 'severity', 'eventType', 'eventId'] as const,\n        maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n      }],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n        isSearchable: false,\n        searchableFields: [],\n        filterFields: {\n          eventType: z.string(),\n          eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),\n          severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),\n          userId: z.string(),\n          organizationId: z.string(),\n          correlationId: z.string(),\n          clientInstanceId: z.string(),\n          createdAt: z.date(),\n        },\n        sortFields: ['createdAt', 'severity', 'eventType'] as const,\n        maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n      }],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}
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Neither is an organization role: the rows behind this door span every tenant.\n */\nexport const APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES: readonly CORE_APP_ROLES[] = Object.freeze([\n  CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN,\n  CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER,\n]);\n\n/**\n * The APPLICATION-scoped door onto the audit trail.\n *\n * ## Why this exists at all\n *\n * `AUDIT_LOGS` is organization-scoped and its only route is\n * `/organizations/{organizationId}/audit-logs`, so it returns exactly the rows carrying that\n * tenant. A large share of security events carry NO organization by design — `logUserLogin` takes\n * `organizationId` as optional because no organization is selected at login, and the same is true\n * of session eviction, token refresh and application-wide authentication-policy changes. Measured\n * on a dogfood application (#317): **94 of 127 rows had no organization**, and were reachable\n * through no API. An operator could see 26% of the trail and could not attest the rest, while a\n * reader querying the only available surface saw `user_login: 0` for a control that had emitted 21.\n *\n * ## Why a SEPARATE resource type rather than a second route\n *\n * `generateParentCombinations` composes every URL as\n * `[...primaryScope, ...mandatoryContext, ...optionalCombo]`, so a routed application edge on\n * `AUDIT_LOGS` would appear in EVERY combination and rewrite the organization route to\n * `/applications/{applicationId}/organizations/{organizationId}/audit-logs` — breaking all eight of\n * its documented paths and their consumers. Making the organization edge optional does not help:\n * the empty combination is skipped whenever any parent exists, so no bare route is emitted either.\n * A sibling type carrying ONE application parent takes the route it needs and leaves the existing\n * door byte-identical. The pattern is the engine's own: notification badges are dual-scope with a\n * type per scope, `APPLICATION_API_KEYS` shows the application routing shape, and `USER_SELF`\n * shows a distinct type addressing another's rows.\n *\n * ## Two doors, ONE record set — the security contract\n *\n * Both types resolve to the `auditLogs` collection through\n * `RESOURCE_SHARED_PERSISTENCE_COLLECTION_ALIASES`. That makes the isolation properties a\n * per-DOOR obligation rather than a property of the rows:\n *\n * - the organization door keeps its tenant filter and its organization roles, unchanged;\n * - this door accepts {@link APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES} and nothing else — `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN`\n *   or the read-only `APP_AUDIT_EVIDENCE_READER`. An organization role must never reach it — the rows\n *   behind it span every tenant;\n * - a read here that touches a tenant-attributed row is a CROSS-TENANT read and OWES an audit\n *   emission. **It is wired**, by the two halves below acting together, and neither is optional:\n *   each read variant declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and\n *   `ServicesRegistryHandler.recordCrossTenantReadAccess` observes every enrolled read and emits\n *   `CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS` once per TENANT the returned rows belong to. The\n *   declaration is what enrols the read: `authorizeOrganizations` — where that event is otherwise\n *   emitted — runs only for ORGANIZATIONS-scoped resources and decides on ONE fetched row, so it\n *   never sees this door at all. Grouping per tenant is what makes the crossing visible to the\n *   REACHED tenant, in its own organization-scoped viewer, rather than only to the operator.\n *   `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` requires every crossing to be named in the\n *   trail, and the trail is the worst possible surface on which to make an operator read invisible.\n *   See `security/authorizations/cross-tenant-read-observation.backend.ts` for why an UNDECLARED\n *   door is deliberately not observed instead of being observed with a false `admissionDeclared`.\n *\n * ## Deliberately mirrored from the organization resource\n *\n * `isSystemResource`, `systemAccessPolicy.exportSubject: FORBIDDEN` and the ABSENCE of a\n * `retentionPolicy` are copied ON PURPOSE. They are properties of the ROWS, and the rows are the\n * same ones — a second door that disagreed about whether the audit trail is subject-exportable, or\n * about how long it is kept, would be a policy fork over one record set. See the organization\n * config for the reasoning behind each; do not change one without the other.\n *\n * ## Deliberately NOT mirrored\n *\n * There is no CREATE. The organization resource carries a `REPOSITORY_ONLY` CREATE because that is\n * how audit rows are written; writing is not a scope question and must keep exactly one door.\n */\nexport const applicationAuditLogsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (\n  resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]\n) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  undefined,\n  CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n  typeof AuditableEvent_BaseSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: AuditableEvent_BaseSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOGS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOGS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n  /** Mirrored from the organization door — the same rows, so the same answer. Disclosing the monitoring trail to its own subject is self-defeating and out of Art. 20 scope. */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.FORBIDDEN },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n  ],\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /**\n         * Reading ONE tenant's audit row through the application door IS a crossing, so the cheapest\n         * reach — fetch by id — is declared and audited exactly like the collection verbs. Declaring\n         * it is also what stops `assignInitiatorOrganizationConfinementToFilter` silently narrowing\n         * this door to an operator who happens to carry an ambient organization, which would make a\n         * surface documented as spanning every tenant return one tenant and report success.\n         */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n      }],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n        filterFields: {\n          applicationId: z.string(),\n          eventType: z.string(),\n          eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),\n          severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),\n          userId: z.string(),\n          /**\n           * Filterable so an operator can narrow to one tenant THROUGH this door, which is the\n           * cross-tenant investigation this surface exists for. It is a FILTER, never the isolation\n           * boundary: isolation on this door is the role gate above, and narrowing to a tenant does\n           * not make the read any less cross-tenant for audit purposes.\n           */\n          organizationId: z.string(),\n          correlationId: z.string(),\n          clientInstanceId: z.string(),\n          createdAt: z.date(),\n        },\n        /** `eventId` last, as the keyset tie-breaker — `createdAt` is not unique under boot/seed bursts. Mirrors the organization door; removing it reintroduces a paging data-loss path. */\n        sortFields: ['createdAt', 'severity', 'eventType', 'eventId'] as const,\n        maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n      }],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [{\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n        isDefault: true,\n        roles: [...APPLICATION_AUDIT_LOG_READ_ROLES],\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        /** The declared crossing — see READ. Every enrolled read emits one crossing per tenant reached. */\n        admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n        isSearchable: true,\n        searchableFields: [],\n        filterFields: {\n          applicationId: z.string(),\n          eventType: z.string(),\n          eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),\n          severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),\n          userId: z.string(),\n          organizationId: z.string(),\n          correlationId: z.string(),\n          clientInstanceId: z.string(),\n          createdAt: z.date(),\n        },\n        sortFields: ['createdAt', 'severity', 'eventType'] as const,\n        maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n      }],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}