@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.4 → 1.1.5

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* OAuth Client Shared Schemas\n *\n * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client\n * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).\n * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in\n * saas-backend-lib.\n *\n * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource\n * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace\n * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope\n * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the\n * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal\n * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)\n * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal\n * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts\n * as an api-key principal.\n *\n * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,\n * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are\n * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued\n * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';\n\n// ===============================\n// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an\n * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientStatus {\n  ACTIVE = 'active',\n  INACTIVE = 'inactive',\n  EXPIRED = 'expired',\n}\n\n/**\n * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk\n * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the\n * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can\n * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.\n */\n/**\n * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.\n *\n * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers \"which of this application's scopes\n * owns the credential\", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application\n * created it. This enum answers \"did anyone vouch for this client at all\", and the two questions\n * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,\n * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {\n  /**\n   * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator\n   * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that\n   * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.\n   */\n  OPERATOR = 'operator',\n  /**\n   * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.\n   *\n   * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,\n   * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.\n   */\n  DYNAMIC = 'dynamic',\n}\n\nexport enum OAuthGrantType {\n  CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = 'client_credentials',\n  AUTHORIZATION_CODE = 'authorization_code',\n  REFRESH_TOKEN = 'refresh_token',\n}\n\n/**\n * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC\n * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately\n * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how\n * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two\n * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered\n * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.\n *\n * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange\n *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /\n *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its\n *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.\n * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its\n *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as\n *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to \"confidential\" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body\n *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.\n */\nexport enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {\n  NONE = 'none',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = 'client_secret_basic',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_POST = 'client_secret_post',\n}\n\n/**\n * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL\n * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.\n * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this\n * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.\n */\nexport function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean {\n  return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate\n * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.\n *\n * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this\n * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation\n * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the\n * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:\n *\n *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).\n *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1\n *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network\n *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.\n *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native\n *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.\n *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a\n *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.\n *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).\n *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).\n *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a\n *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.\n *\n * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11\n *\n * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it\n * \"deliberately\" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered\n * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client\n * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own\n * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.\n *\n * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps \"MAY use whichever redirect option suits their\n * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details\", and private-use URI\n * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).\n *\n * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach\n * the wrong recipient: \"A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that\n * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app\n * will receive the authorization code.\"\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).\n *\n * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server\n * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without\n * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and\n * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.\n *\n * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's\n * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an\n * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app\n * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.\n *\n * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a\n * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS\n * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still\n * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a\n * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to\n * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.\n */\n/*\n * EXPORTED as of 2026-09-02, and the export is the point rather than a convenience.\n *\n * This is a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — the shape `CLAUDE.md` asks for — and it\n * was reachable by nothing outside this file, so the assurance authority basis could not attest\n * `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` against the set the guard actually branches on. It would\n * have had to transcribe the schemes into a second list, free to drift from this one, which is the\n * failure the single-source rule exists to prevent.\n *\n * Nothing else may BRANCH on it: the validator below is the only enforcement site. A reader is a\n * reader — the basis names the members so a programme can say which schemes are refused.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists\n  // to close.\n  'javascript:',\n  'vbscript:',\n  // Carries its own payload, so the \"redirect target\" IS attacker-authored content.\n  'data:',\n  'blob:',\n  // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.\n  'file:',\n  'filesystem:',\n  // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.\n  'about:',\n  'chrome:',\n  'chrome-extension:',\n  'moz-extension:',\n  'view-source:',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The WHATWG \"special\" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.\n *\n * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use\n * callback. Refusing them is what keeps \"private-use scheme\" meaning what it says: an app-owned\n * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before\n * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.\n */\nconst NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);\n\n/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" ), plus the WHATWG colon. */\nconst RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;\n\nexport function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim()) return false;\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (url.hash) return false;\n  if (url.username || url.password) return false;\n  if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;\n  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {\n    const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';\n  }\n  // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous\n  // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no\n  // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.\n  const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();\n  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).\n *\n * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope\n * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.\n *\n * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the\n * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,\n * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare\n * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth\n * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,\n * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.\n */\nexport const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key\n  // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the\n  // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n  // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,\n  // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /\n  // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization\n  // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty\n  // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).\n  allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.\n  allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),\n  // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure\n  // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of\n  // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.\n  // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`\n  // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a\n  // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.\n  redirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this\n    // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary\n    // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how\n    // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback\n    // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by\n    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When\n  // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these\n  // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no\n  // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather\n  // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure\n  // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by\n  // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and\n  // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.\n  // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been\n  // registered with the OP).\n  postLogoutRedirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user\n  // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use\n  // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and\n  // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted\n  // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are\n  // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore\n  // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is\n  // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot\n  // suppress its own consent prompt.\n  requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),\n  // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token\n  // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token\n  // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default\n  // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into\n  // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.\n  // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it\n  // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via\n  // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.\n  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange\n  // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every\n  // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound\n  // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-\n  // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows\n  // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client\n  // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except\n  // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates\n  // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client\n  // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.\n  hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists\n  // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the\n  // secret. Server-managed.\n  secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained\n  // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate\n  // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange\n  // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this\n  // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`\n  // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed\n  // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable\n  // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).\n  //\n  // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a\n  // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a\n  // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.\n  previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while\n  // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on\n  // the next rotation.\n  previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled\n  // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next\n  // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until\n  // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.\n  // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.\n  previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Registration access token (RFC 7592) ──────────────────────────────────\n  // The credential a DYNAMICALLY REGISTERED client uses to read, update or delete\n  // its own registration at the client configuration endpoint. Issued once, at\n  // registration, and returned exactly once in the 201 body.\n  //\n  // \"registration_access_token: REQUIRED. String containing the access token to be\n  // used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon\n  // the client registration.\" … \"The client MUST use its registration access token\n  // in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token.\"\n  // spec-cite: RFC 7592 §3 (Client Information Response) and §2 (Client Configuration Endpoint).\n  //\n  // SEPARATE FROM `hashedSecret`, deliberately, and not merely for tidiness. They\n  // authenticate different things: the client secret authenticates the CLIENT at the\n  // token endpoint, while this authenticates a caller's standing to administer the\n  // client's own REGISTRATION. A dynamically registered client is public\n  // (`token_endpoint_auth_method=none`) and never uses its secret at all, so folding\n  // the two together would give a credential two unrelated powers and make\n  // \"rotate the secret\" silently mean \"revoke management access\".\n  //\n  // ABSENT on every client that is not dynamically registered — an operator- or\n  // organization-registered client is administered through the ordinary authenticated\n  // resource surface, not through RFC 7592.\n  //\n  // `sha256` hex, matching every other token in this framework: deterministic so a\n  // presented Bearer token resolves by re-hashing and matching, and safe because the\n  // plaintext is 32 random bytes rather than a password.\n  registrationAccessTokenHash: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 characters of the plaintext, so an operator can identify which token a\n  // client holds without seeing it — the same affordance `secretPrefix` provides for\n  // the client secret. Not a secret; surfaced.\n  registrationAccessTokenPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────\n  // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.\n  //\n  // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:\n  // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an\n  // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.\n  //\n  // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically\n  // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and\n  // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means \"platform-operator first-party\", the most trusted posture\n  // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from\n  // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to\n  // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:\n  // always consent, identity scopes only.\n  //\n  // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST\n  // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the\n  // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated\n  // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that\n  // administrator vouches for the client.\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)\n    .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),\n  applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;\n"]}
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* OAuth Client Shared Schemas\n *\n * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client\n * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).\n * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in\n * saas-backend-lib.\n *\n * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource\n * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace\n * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope\n * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the\n * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal\n * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)\n * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal\n * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts\n * as an api-key principal.\n *\n * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,\n * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are\n * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued\n * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';\n\n// ===============================\n// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an\n * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientStatus {\n  ACTIVE = 'active',\n  INACTIVE = 'inactive',\n  EXPIRED = 'expired',\n}\n\n/**\n * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk\n * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the\n * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can\n * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.\n */\n/**\n * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.\n *\n * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers \"which of this application's scopes\n * owns the credential\", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application\n * created it. This enum answers \"did anyone vouch for this client at all\", and the two questions\n * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,\n * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {\n  /**\n   * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator\n   * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that\n   * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.\n   */\n  OPERATOR = 'operator',\n  /**\n   * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.\n   *\n   * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,\n   * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.\n   */\n  DYNAMIC = 'dynamic',\n}\n\nexport enum OAuthGrantType {\n  CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = 'client_credentials',\n  AUTHORIZATION_CODE = 'authorization_code',\n  REFRESH_TOKEN = 'refresh_token',\n}\n\n/**\n * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC\n * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately\n * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how\n * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two\n * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered\n * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.\n *\n * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange\n *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /\n *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its\n *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.\n * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its\n *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as\n *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to \"confidential\" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body\n *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.\n */\nexport enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {\n  NONE = 'none',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = 'client_secret_basic',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_POST = 'client_secret_post',\n}\n\n/**\n * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL\n * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.\n * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this\n * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.\n */\nexport function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean {\n  return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate\n * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.\n *\n * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this\n * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation\n * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the\n * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:\n *\n *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).\n *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1\n *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network\n *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.\n *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native\n *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.\n *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a\n *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.\n *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).\n *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).\n *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a\n *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.\n *\n * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11\n *\n * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it\n * \"deliberately\" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered\n * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client\n * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own\n * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.\n *\n * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps \"MAY use whichever redirect option suits their\n * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details\", and private-use URI\n * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).\n *\n * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach\n * the wrong recipient: \"A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that\n * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app\n * will receive the authorization code.\"\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).\n *\n * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server\n * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without\n * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and\n * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.\n *\n * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's\n * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an\n * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app\n * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.\n *\n * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a\n * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS\n * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still\n * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a\n * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to\n * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.\n */\n/*\n * EXPORTED as of 2026-09-02, and the export is the point rather than a convenience.\n *\n * This is a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — the shape `CLAUDE.md` asks for — and it\n * was reachable by nothing outside this file, so the assurance authority basis could not attest\n * `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` against the set the guard actually branches on. It would\n * have had to transcribe the schemes into a second list, free to drift from this one, which is the\n * failure the single-source rule exists to prevent.\n *\n * Nothing else may BRANCH on it: the validator below is the only enforcement site. A reader is a\n * reader — the basis names the members so a programme can say which schemes are refused.\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists\n  // to close.\n  'javascript:',\n  'vbscript:',\n  // Carries its own payload, so the \"redirect target\" IS attacker-authored content.\n  'data:',\n  'blob:',\n  // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.\n  'file:',\n  'filesystem:',\n  // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.\n  'about:',\n  'chrome:',\n  'chrome-extension:',\n  'moz-extension:',\n  'view-source:',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The WHATWG \"special\" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.\n *\n * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use\n * callback. Refusing them is what keeps \"private-use scheme\" meaning what it says: an app-owned\n * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before\n * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.\n */\nconst NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);\n\n/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" ), plus the WHATWG colon. */\nconst RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;\n\nexport function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim()) return false;\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (url.hash) return false;\n  if (url.username || url.password) return false;\n  if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;\n  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {\n    const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';\n  }\n  // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous\n  // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no\n  // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.\n  const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();\n  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).\n *\n * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope\n * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.\n *\n * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the\n * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,\n * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare\n * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth\n * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,\n * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.\n */\nexport const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key\n  // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the\n  // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n  // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,\n  // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /\n  // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization\n  // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty\n  // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).\n  allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.\n  allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),\n  // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure\n  // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of\n  // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.\n  // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`\n  // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a\n  // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.\n  redirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this\n    // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary\n    // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how\n    // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback\n    // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by\n    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When\n  // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these\n  // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no\n  // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather\n  // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure\n  // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by\n  // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and\n  // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.\n  // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been\n  // registered with the OP).\n  postLogoutRedirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user\n  // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use\n  // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and\n  // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted\n  // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are\n  // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore\n  // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is\n  // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot\n  // suppress its own consent prompt.\n  requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),\n  // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token\n  // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token\n  // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default\n  // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into\n  // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.\n  // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it\n  // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via\n  // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.\n  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange\n  // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every\n  // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound\n  // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-\n  // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows\n  // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client\n  // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except\n  // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates\n  // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client\n  // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.\n  hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists\n  // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the\n  // secret. Server-managed.\n  secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained\n  // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate\n  // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange\n  // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this\n  // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`\n  // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed\n  // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable\n  // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).\n  //\n  // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a\n  // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a\n  // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.\n  previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while\n  // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on\n  // the next rotation.\n  previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled\n  // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next\n  // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until\n  // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.\n  // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.\n  previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Registration access token (RFC 7592) ──────────────────────────────────\n  // The credential a DYNAMICALLY REGISTERED client uses to read, update or delete\n  // its own registration at the client configuration endpoint. Issued once, at\n  // registration, and returned exactly once in the 201 body.\n  //\n  // \"registration_access_token: REQUIRED. String containing the access token to be\n  // used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon\n  // the client registration.\" … \"The client MUST use its registration access token\n  // in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token.\"\n  // spec-cite: RFC 7592 §3 (Client Information Response) and §2 (Client Configuration Endpoint).\n  //\n  // SEPARATE FROM `hashedSecret`, deliberately, and not merely for tidiness. They\n  // authenticate different things: the client secret authenticates the CLIENT at the\n  // token endpoint, while this authenticates a caller's standing to administer the\n  // client's own REGISTRATION. A dynamically registered client is public\n  // (`token_endpoint_auth_method=none`) and never uses its secret at all, so folding\n  // the two together would give a credential two unrelated powers and make\n  // \"rotate the secret\" silently mean \"revoke management access\".\n  //\n  // ABSENT on every client that is not dynamically registered — an operator- or\n  // organization-registered client is administered through the ordinary authenticated\n  // resource surface, not through RFC 7592.\n  //\n  // `sha256` hex, matching every other token in this framework: deterministic so a\n  // presented Bearer token resolves by re-hashing and matching, and safe because the\n  // plaintext is 32 random bytes rather than a password.\n  registrationAccessTokenHash: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 characters of the plaintext, so an operator can identify which token a\n  // client holds without seeing it — the same affordance `secretPrefix` provides for\n  // the client secret. Not a secret; surfaced.\n  registrationAccessTokenPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────\n  // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.\n  //\n  // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:\n  // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an\n  // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.\n  //\n  // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically\n  // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and\n  // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means \"platform-operator first-party\", the most trusted posture\n  // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from\n  // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to\n  // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:\n  // always consent, identity scopes only.\n  //\n  // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST\n  // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the\n  // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated\n  // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that\n  // administrator vouches for the client.\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)\n    .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),\n  applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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It is\n * CREATED (via the system write primitive) when a user APPROVES an interactive-consent request AND\n * opts to remember the app, and READ at `/oauth/authorize` to SKIP re-prompting when an existing grant\n * already covers the requested scopes. The user can list their grants (\"authorized apps\") and revoke\n * one.\n *\n * USER-scoped: owned by `userId` (USER_SELF primary scope, derived from the `USERS → OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS`\n * composition relationship). One grant per `(userId, clientId, resource)` — a re-consent UPDATES the\n * granted scopes rather than creating a duplicate. `resource` participates in the grain because two\n * authorize requests from the same client for different RFC 8707 resources (distinct A2A / MCP agent\n * endpoints) are genuinely distinct delegations; an OIDC-only login carries no `resource` and yields a\n * single resource-less grant.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { PersonalDataCategory } from '../../compliance/privacy/personal-data-category.shared.schemas';\nimport { RedactionType } from '../../compliance/privacy/redaction.shared.schemas';\nimport { addImpersonalizeWith } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nexport const OAuthConsentGrantSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** FK → USERS — the user who granted consent (the USER_SELF scope owner). */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  /** The registered OAuth client (`_id`, `oc_*`) the user authorized. Part of the business key. */\n  clientId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The RFC 8707 `resource` (the target A2A / MCP agent endpoint) this grant covers. Absent for an\n   * OIDC-only login with no delegation. Part of the business key — a grant authorizes one client for\n   * one resource, so different agent endpoints require separate, explicit consent.\n   */\n  resource: z.string().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The IDENTITY scopes the user granted (e.g. `openid`, `profile`, `email`). A later authorize whose\n   * requested scopes are a SUBSET of these skips the prompt; a request for a scope NOT in the grant\n   * re-prompts (silent scope expansion is forbidden). Identity only — scopes carry no authorization\n   * weight (authorization is roles-only).\n   */\n  // USAGE — what this person authorized a third-party client to reach on their behalf, and when.\n  // A consent record is an observation of a decision they made, not an attribute of them.\n  // RESET on erasure — returns this field to its schema default. It holds which scopes this person authorized a third-party client to reach,\n  // which the category above correctly declares as personal data. RESET rather than REMOVE or MASK\n  // because the field is non-nullable WITH a `.default()`: REMOVE needs a clearable field and MASK\n  // needs a string. The value comes from the schema, so there is no second copy to drift.\n  scopes: addImpersonalizeWith(\n  z.array(z.string()).default([]).dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.USAGE),\n    RedactionType.RESET,\n  ),\n\n  /**\n   * Expiry. The authorize lookup ignores a grant past this instant, fail-closed to a fresh consent\n   * prompt.\n   *\n   * SET ON EVERY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT since 2026-09-08 (#465) — on creation and again on every widen,\n   * because a widen is the user approving again and a re-affirmation should restart the clock. It\n   * was declared here with a reader and NO WRITER before that, so a remembered approval lived until\n   * the person revoked it while the field read to an operator as a policy knob that existed.\n   *\n   * Still optional on the SCHEMA, for two reasons that are not the same: grants created before that\n   * date carry none and must keep working (an absent expiry means \"never\", which is what they were\n   * granted under), and a resource may be written by a path that has no operator policy in hand.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'clientId',\n  'resource',\n]);\n\n/**\n * How long a remembered consent lasts when the application authors no policy of its own.\n *\n * **180 days**, and the reasoning matters more than the number. A remembered consent is a standing\n * delegation of authority to a third party, so it should lapse on its own if nobody re-affirms it —\n * but a prompt the user meets every few weeks trains them to click through, which makes the consent\n * screen worth less rather than more. Half a year is long enough not to nag and short enough that an\n * authorization the user has forgotten about does not outlive their interest in the client by years.\n *\n * An application overrides it with `auth.consentGrantLifetimeDays`. There is deliberately no way to\n * express \"never expires\": that was the state this default replaced, and it was not chosen.\n */\nexport const OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_DEFAULT_LIFETIME_DAYS = 180;\n\nexport type OAuthConsentGrant = z.infer<typeof OAuthConsentGrantSchema>;\n"]}
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One grant per `(userId, clientId, resource)` — a re-consent UPDATES the\n * granted scopes rather than creating a duplicate. `resource` participates in the grain because two\n * authorize requests from the same client for different RFC 8707 resources (distinct A2A / MCP agent\n * endpoints) are genuinely distinct delegations; an OIDC-only login carries no `resource` and yields a\n * single resource-less grant.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { PersonalDataCategory } from '../../compliance/privacy/personal-data-category.shared.schemas';\nimport { RedactionType } from '../../compliance/privacy/redaction.shared.schemas';\nimport { addImpersonalizeWith } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nexport const OAuthConsentGrantSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** FK → USERS — the user who granted consent (the USER_SELF scope owner). */\n  userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  /** The registered OAuth client (`_id`, `oc_*`) the user authorized. Part of the business key. */\n  clientId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The RFC 8707 `resource` (the target A2A / MCP agent endpoint) this grant covers. Absent for an\n   * OIDC-only login with no delegation. Part of the business key — a grant authorizes one client for\n   * one resource, so different agent endpoints require separate, explicit consent.\n   */\n  resource: z.string().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /**\n   * The IDENTITY scopes the user granted (e.g. `openid`, `profile`, `email`). A later authorize whose\n   * requested scopes are a SUBSET of these skips the prompt; a request for a scope NOT in the grant\n   * re-prompts (silent scope expansion is forbidden). Identity only — scopes carry no authorization\n   * weight (authorization is roles-only).\n   */\n  // USAGE — what this person authorized a third-party client to reach on their behalf, and when.\n  // A consent record is an observation of a decision they made, not an attribute of them.\n  // RESET on erasure — returns this field to its schema default. It holds which scopes this person authorized a third-party client to reach,\n  // which the category above correctly declares as personal data. RESET rather than REMOVE or MASK\n  // because the field is non-nullable WITH a `.default()`: REMOVE needs a clearable field and MASK\n  // needs a string. The value comes from the schema, so there is no second copy to drift.\n  scopes: addImpersonalizeWith(\n  z.array(z.string()).default([]).dataCategories(PersonalDataCategory.USAGE),\n    RedactionType.RESET,\n  ),\n\n  /**\n   * Expiry. The authorize lookup ignores a grant past this instant, fail-closed to a fresh consent\n   * prompt.\n   *\n   * SET ON EVERY AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT since 2026-09-08 (#465) — on creation and again on every widen,\n   * because a widen is the user approving again and a re-affirmation should restart the clock. It\n   * was declared here with a reader and NO WRITER before that, so a remembered approval lived until\n   * the person revoked it while the field read to an operator as a policy knob that existed.\n   *\n   * Still optional on the SCHEMA, for two reasons that are not the same: grants created before that\n   * date carry none and must keep working (an absent expiry means \"never\", which is what they were\n   * granted under), and a resource may be written by a path that has no operator policy in hand.\n   */\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'userId',\n  'clientId',\n  'resource',\n]);\n\n/**\n * How long a remembered consent lasts when the application authors no policy of its own.\n *\n * **180 days**, and the reasoning matters more than the number. A remembered consent is a standing\n * delegation of authority to a third party, so it should lapse on its own if nobody re-affirms it —\n * but a prompt the user meets every few weeks trains them to click through, which makes the consent\n * screen worth less rather than more. Half a year is long enough not to nag and short enough that an\n * authorization the user has forgotten about does not outlive their interest in the client by years.\n *\n * An application overrides it with `auth.consentGrantLifetimeDays`. There is deliberately no way to\n * express \"never expires\": that was the state this default replaced, and it was not chosen.\n */\nexport const OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_DEFAULT_LIFETIME_DAYS = 180;\n\nexport type OAuthConsentGrant = z.infer<typeof OAuthConsentGrantSchema>;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-resource-server.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * The classes of server-side request whose DESTINATION is chosen by somebody other than the
+ * deployment that makes the request — and how much of the private network each may reach.
+ *
+ * ## Why the class, and not the call site, is the unit
+ *
+ * The request-forgery question is never "is this URL safe?" in the abstract. It is "who picked this
+ * destination, and are they allowed to point this server at its own network?". An organization
+ * administrator who authors a webhook endpoint, an A2A client registering a push target, and an
+ * unauthenticated stranger presenting an OAuth `client_id` URL all answer it differently — and the
+ * application developer who writes a provider endpoint into the backend's own configuration is not a
+ * request-forgery threat at all, because they already own the server.
+ *
+ * So the vocabulary names the CLASS of destination, by who authors it. Every engine site that issues
+ * such a request declares which class it is serving, and the admission follows from the class plus
+ * the operator-declared runtime environment — never from anything the destination's author can set.
+ *
+ * ## What is deliberately NOT a class
+ *
+ * Destinations the application's own code declares — a provider API endpoint, an `httpApiBinding`
+ * base URL — are trusted as authored. What those sites must still refuse is a REMOTE server
+ * re-pointing the request (a redirect), which is a property of the transport, not an admission.
+ * Platform topology (the apps-manager, the module registry, infrastructure sidecars) is operator
+ * configuration and private by design.
+ */
+export declare enum OutboundTargetClass {
+    /** An M2M webhook endpoint. Authored by an organization administrator. */
+    M2M_WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT = "m2m_webhook_endpoint",
+    /** An A2A push-notification target. Supplied by the external A2A client that registered it. */
+    A2A_PUSH_NOTIFICATION_ENDPOINT = "a2a_push_notification_endpoint",
+    /**
+     * A SIEM collector. Authored by an organization administrator; the one class the operator may
+     * admit onto a private network, because a self-hosted collector on the same network is a supported
+     * deployment shape.
+     */
+    SIEM_COLLECTOR = "siem_collector",
+    /** An OAuth client metadata document. Its URL is presented by an UNAUTHENTICATED stranger. */
+    OAUTH_CLIENT_METADATA_DOCUMENT = "oauth_client_metadata_document",
+    /**
+     * A federated identity provider's endpoints — OIDC discovery, token, userinfo, profile extension,
+     * JWKS, SAML metadata and the SAML SSO/SLO reachability checks. Authored by an organization
+     * administrator on an SSO connection, or discovered from a document that administrator's IdP serves.
+     */
+    FEDERATED_IDENTITY_PROVIDER = "federated_identity_provider",
+    /**
+     * A remote MCP server an agent calls. Declared by the application, but it is a THIRD PARTY's
+     * service, reached with the agent's delegated credentials, and its answers can re-point a request.
+     */
+    MCP_SERVER = "mcp_server"
+}
+/**
+ * How much of the network an outbound request may reach beyond the public internet.
+ *
+ * Three members rather than a boolean, because the useful middle is not "private" and not "public":
+ * local development and automated test runs legitimately reach doubles on LOOPBACK, and nothing about
+ * that justifies reaching the cloud instance-metadata address (link-local) or a cluster-internal
+ * service (RFC 1918), which are the addresses a request-forgery attack actually wants.
+ */
+export declare enum OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission {
+    /** Public addresses only. The default, and the only posture a stranger-supplied destination ever gets. */
+    NONE = "none",
+    /** Public addresses plus loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, `localhost`). Never link-local, never RFC 1918. */
+    LOOPBACK_ONLY = "loopback_only",
+    /** Any address. Only by an explicit operator declaration, and only for a class the operator may admit. */
+    PRIVATE_NETWORK = "private_network"
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/security/outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * The classes of server-side request whose DESTINATION is chosen by somebody other than the
+ * deployment that makes the request — and how much of the private network each may reach.
+ *
+ * ## Why the class, and not the call site, is the unit
+ *
+ * The request-forgery question is never "is this URL safe?" in the abstract. It is "who picked this
+ * destination, and are they allowed to point this server at its own network?". An organization
+ * administrator who authors a webhook endpoint, an A2A client registering a push target, and an
+ * unauthenticated stranger presenting an OAuth `client_id` URL all answer it differently — and the
+ * application developer who writes a provider endpoint into the backend's own configuration is not a
+ * request-forgery threat at all, because they already own the server.
+ *
+ * So the vocabulary names the CLASS of destination, by who authors it. Every engine site that issues
+ * such a request declares which class it is serving, and the admission follows from the class plus
+ * the operator-declared runtime environment — never from anything the destination's author can set.
+ *
+ * ## What is deliberately NOT a class
+ *
+ * Destinations the application's own code declares — a provider API endpoint, an `httpApiBinding`
+ * base URL — are trusted as authored. What those sites must still refuse is a REMOTE server
+ * re-pointing the request (a redirect), which is a property of the transport, not an admission.
+ * Platform topology (the apps-manager, the module registry, infrastructure sidecars) is operator
+ * configuration and private by design.
+ */
+export var OutboundTargetClass;
+(function (OutboundTargetClass) {
+    /** An M2M webhook endpoint. Authored by an organization administrator. */
+    OutboundTargetClass["M2M_WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT"] = "m2m_webhook_endpoint";
+    /** An A2A push-notification target. Supplied by the external A2A client that registered it. */
+    OutboundTargetClass["A2A_PUSH_NOTIFICATION_ENDPOINT"] = "a2a_push_notification_endpoint";
+    /**
+     * A SIEM collector. Authored by an organization administrator; the one class the operator may
+     * admit onto a private network, because a self-hosted collector on the same network is a supported
+     * deployment shape.
+     */
+    OutboundTargetClass["SIEM_COLLECTOR"] = "siem_collector";
+    /** An OAuth client metadata document. Its URL is presented by an UNAUTHENTICATED stranger. */
+    OutboundTargetClass["OAUTH_CLIENT_METADATA_DOCUMENT"] = "oauth_client_metadata_document";
+    /**
+     * A federated identity provider's endpoints — OIDC discovery, token, userinfo, profile extension,
+     * JWKS, SAML metadata and the SAML SSO/SLO reachability checks. Authored by an organization
+     * administrator on an SSO connection, or discovered from a document that administrator's IdP serves.
+     */
+    OutboundTargetClass["FEDERATED_IDENTITY_PROVIDER"] = "federated_identity_provider";
+    /**
+     * A remote MCP server an agent calls. Declared by the application, but it is a THIRD PARTY's
+     * service, reached with the agent's delegated credentials, and its answers can re-point a request.
+     */
+    OutboundTargetClass["MCP_SERVER"] = "mcp_server";
+})(OutboundTargetClass || (OutboundTargetClass = {}));
+/**
+ * How much of the network an outbound request may reach beyond the public internet.
+ *
+ * Three members rather than a boolean, because the useful middle is not "private" and not "public":
+ * local development and automated test runs legitimately reach doubles on LOOPBACK, and nothing about
+ * that justifies reaching the cloud instance-metadata address (link-local) or a cluster-internal
+ * service (RFC 1918), which are the addresses a request-forgery attack actually wants.
+ */
+export var OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission;
+(function (OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission) {
+    /** Public addresses only. The default, and the only posture a stranger-supplied destination ever gets. */
+    OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission["NONE"] = "none";
+    /** Public addresses plus loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, `localhost`). Never link-local, never RFC 1918. */
+    OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission["LOOPBACK_ONLY"] = "loopback_only";
+    /** Any address. Only by an explicit operator declaration, and only for a class the operator may admit. */
+    OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission["PRIVATE_NETWORK"] = "private_network";
+})(OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission || (OutboundPrivateAddressAdmission = {}));
+//# sourceMappingURL=outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/security/outbound-target-control.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/systems-of-record/system-of-record-credential-kind.shared.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * `SystemOfRecordCredentialKind` — HOW the engine authenticates to a system of record.
+ *
+ * A root-exported boundary module, for the same package-contract reason as its sibling
+ * `HttpApiTransportDialect` (#1055 R3): the ROOT-exported application-configuration contract
+ * (`systemsOfRecord.<name>.credential.kind`) names this vocabulary, and a TypeScript `enum` is
+ * NOMINAL — a root-only consumer that cannot reach the declaring module through a public specifier
+ * gets `TS2742`/`TS2883`. `.claude/rules/package-public-entrypoints.md` prescribes moving the
+ * boundary rather than re-exporting across it, so the `external-data` subpath does NOT re-export
+ * this module.
+ *
+ * ## Why it is a separate vocabulary from the dialect
+ *
+ * A dialect says how to SPEAK (query protocol, envelope, filter language); a credential kind says
+ * how to PROVE WHO YOU ARE. Odoo happens to pair one with the other today, and that coincidence is
+ * exactly what `CLAUDE.md` forbids merging on: an OData v4 service reached with a bearer token and
+ * the same service reached with client-credentials OAuth2 differ in the second axis and not the
+ * first. Keeping them apart costs one enum and stops the pairing from being baked into the model.
+ *
+ * ## What a kind OWNS (#1055 R15, the slot-ownership decision)
+ *
+ * The kind owns the inputs IT needs — its secret slots, and any address slot that exists only
+ * because of the kind. `OAUTH2_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_SECRET` owns `tokenUrl`, which no vendor would
+ * declare if it were reached with a static key. The FACET owns the vendor's own address slots and
+ * the OFFERS it makes (a kind plus that vendor's policy for it); the INSTANCE chooses one offer.
+ *
+ * A third owner arrived with #1056 and is worth naming, because two of the three are easy to
+ * confuse: the FACET also owns everything about a kind that varies BY VENDOR but not by deployment —
+ * which header carries a static key, whether a token answer omits `expires_in`, whether an assertion
+ * header needs a supplied `kid` or a derived `x5t`. Those are not slots: nobody types them per
+ * environment, and asking an operator for them would be asking a question the facet already holds
+ * the answer to (`derive-before-you-ask.md`).
+ * The contracts themselves live beside the facet schema, on the `external-data` subpath, because
+ * nothing root-exported needs to name a slot SHAPE — only the kind's NAME.
+ *
+ * ## How the catalogue grew, and what is still missing from it
+ *
+ * #1055 shipped ONE member, the one kind its one facet offered. #1056 added the six a service
+ * identity actually needs across the vendors epic #1049 §4.6 surveyed — two static-key placements,
+ * HTTP Basic, and three OAuth2 shapes. A member here with no entry in
+ * `SYSTEM_OF_RECORD_CREDENTIAL_KIND_CONTRACTS` is a compile error, so the two cannot drift.
+ *
+ * `MTLS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` is deliberately ABSENT and is #1263. It is not a seventh variation on
+ * composing a request: every kind here decides what to put IN a request, and mTLS decides how the
+ * CONNECTION is made, which `HttpApiFetchLike` has no channel for (its `init` carries no
+ * dispatcher). Adding it means widening the one outbound seam both this lane and the connector lane
+ * run on — a different blast radius, and the reason SAP is declared unsupported-by-kind in #1057
+ * rather than every other vendor waiting behind it.
+ *
+ * ## The root-only probe, measured 2026-09-15
+ *
+ * `package-public-entrypoints.md` asks for a measurement rather than a category judgement. A
+ * consumer importing ONLY the package root, deriving values from this enum and emitting with
+ * `declaration: true`:
+ *
+ * ```
+ * export declare const declaredKind = SystemOfRecordCredentialKind.ODOO_API_KEY_IN_ARGS;
+ * export declare function pickInstance(): { kind: SystemOfRecordCredentialKind; dialect: HttpApiTransportDialect };
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Zero errors, and the emitted declaration NAMES the enum through the root specifier rather than a
+ * `node_modules/.../dist/esm/...` path. The probe's negative control — importing
+ * `SystemOfRecordVendorFacetSchema`, which is deliberately subpath-only — fails with `TS2305`, so
+ * the probe discriminates rather than passing everything.
+ */
+/**
+ * How the engine proves its identity to a system of record. Closed vocabulary — a system of record
+ * spends the APPLICATION's own service identity (D12), so nothing here is ever a person's lent
+ * credential; those live on the connected-accounts lane and are deliberately not reachable from
+ * this one (`pnpm check:systems-of-record-separation`).
+ */
+export declare enum SystemOfRecordCredentialKind {
+    /**
+     * Odoo's classic external API: the credential travels INSIDE the RPC arguments rather than in an
+     * HTTP header. The adapter performs `common.authenticate(db, login, apiKey, {})` for a uid and
+     * then passes `(db, uid, apiKey, …)` as the leading positional arguments of every `execute_kw`.
+     *
+     * Its inputs are the API key (a secret slot, owned here) plus the database and login (vendor
+     * address slots, owned by the Odoo facet — they identify WHICH Odoo and WHICH user, and would
+     * still be needed by a hypothetical second Odoo credential kind).
+     */
+    ODOO_API_KEY_IN_ARGS = "odoo-api-key-in-args",
+    /**
+     * A static key presented in an HTTP request header.
+     *
+     * The SECRET is the key; WHICH header carries it and what prefixes it (`Bearer `, `ApiKey `, or
+     * nothing at all) are the VENDOR's facts, so they are declared on the facet's offer rather than
+     * asked of the operator who authors an instance. An operator who has to be told their vendor's
+     * header name is being asked a question the facet already holds the answer to
+     * (`derive-before-you-ask.md`).
+     */
+    API_KEY_HEADER = "api-key-header",
+    /**
+     * A static key presented as a query-string parameter.
+     *
+     * Weaker than a header by construction — a URL reaches access logs, proxy logs and `Referer`
+     * headers — and offered only because some vendors accept nothing else. The parameter NAME is the
+     * vendor's fact, like the header name above.
+     *
+     * The key is appended by the transport at dispatch, never baked into a stored `baseUrl`: a base
+     * URL is printed in diagnostics and a credential must not ride in it.
+     */
+    API_KEY_QUERY = "api-key-query",
+    /**
+     * HTTP Basic (RFC 7617): `Authorization: Basic base64(username ":" password)`.
+     *
+     * SAP's communication user is the case this exists for. The username is a SECRET slot rather than
+     * an address slot even though it is not confidential on its own — it is half of one credential,
+     * it is rotated with the other half, and splitting a credential across the address channel and
+     * the secret channel makes rotation two operations that can disagree.
+     *
+     * A username containing `:` is unrepresentable in this scheme (the colon is the delimiter and the
+     * RFC forbids it), so it is refused where it is authored rather than producing a credential that
+     * decodes to a different pair than the one typed.
+     */
+    BASIC = "basic",
+    /**
+     * OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4) with a shared secret: `grant_type=client_credentials`
+     * plus `client_id` and `client_secret`.
+     *
+     * An APP-ONLY identity — no person, no consent screen, no refresh token. That is the whole of D12:
+     * a system of record is the operator's own deployment, reached as the application, so a
+     * user-delegated flow would be authenticating the wrong party. The connector lane owns the
+     * authorization-code exchange and is not reachable from here.
+     */
+    OAUTH2_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_SECRET = "oauth2-client-credentials-secret",
+    /**
+     * OAuth 2.0 client credentials with a CLIENT ASSERTION signed by a private key (RFC 7523 §2.2):
+     * `grant_type=client_credentials` with
+     * `client_assertion_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer`.
+     *
+     * NetSuite and Microsoft Entra's certificate credential are both this, and NetSuite is the reason
+     * it is separate from {@link OAUTH2_JWT_BEARER}: its documentation states the grant type is
+     * *always* `client_credentials`, so it is client AUTHENTICATION by assertion rather than the
+     * assertion GRANT (#1056 R1 corrected an earlier reading that had NetSuite under the grant).
+     *
+     * spec-cite: RFC 7523 §2.2 (Using JWTs for Client Authentication); NetSuite OAuth 2.0
+     * client-credentials help, https://docs.oracle.com/en/cloud/saas/netsuite/ns-online-help/section_162755359851.html
+     *
+     * The assertion's protected HEADER differs by vendor — NetSuite carries a vendor-assigned `kid`,
+     * Entra wants an `x5t` thumbprint — so the header policy is declared on the facet's offer (R2). A
+     * generic "sign it with the private key" is rejected by both.
+     */
+    OAUTH2_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_CERTIFICATE = "oauth2-client-credentials-certificate",
+    /**
+     * The OAuth 2.0 JWT BEARER GRANT (RFC 7523 §2.1):
+     * `grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer` with a signed `assertion`.
+     *
+     * Salesforce only, among the vendors surveyed. Distinct from the kind above in the one field that
+     * decides how the token endpoint reads the request — the grant type — which is exactly the kind of
+     * distinction `CLAUDE.md` forbids collapsing because two shapes look similar.
+     *
+     * spec-cite: RFC 7523 §2.1 (Using JWTs as Authorization Grants).
+     */
+    OAUTH2_JWT_BEARER = "oauth2-jwt-bearer"
+}
+/** Whether a kind obtains a token from a token endpoint — the three that need a minter and a cache. */
+export declare function systemOfRecordCredentialKindMintsToken(kind: SystemOfRecordCredentialKind): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=system-of-record-credential-kind.shared.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/systems-of-record/system-of-record-credential-kind.shared.d.ts.map

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