@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.2 → 1.1.4

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -93,8 +93,68 @@ export declare enum JwtPublicKeys {
  */
 export declare const OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
 /**
- * Authentication Method Types with Factor Classification and Categories
- * Core authentication methods - extensible at application level
+ * @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.auth.methods facet:layer:shared facet:audience:app-developer
+ *
+ * Every way a person can prove who they are. An application chooses per USER TYPE which of these are
+ * enabled, under `authMethodsEnabled` in the backend-authored config.
+ *
+ * Imported from `@wildo-ai/saas-models`.
+ *
+ * ## Enabling a method is necessary, and for four of them it is not sufficient
+ *
+ * | method | may be | also required before it works |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | `PASSWORD` | first | a `passwordPolicy` on the user type |
+ * | `MAGIC_LINK` | first | — |
+ * | `PASSKEY` | first or second | `auth.passkeyConfig` (`rpName`, `rpId`) — the app does not boot without it |
+ * | `SMS_OTP` | first or second | a verified phone number on the account |
+ * | `TOTP` | second | enrolment (authenticator app or backup codes) |
+ * | `EMAIL_OTP` | second | — |
+ * | `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` | any | a `socialOAuth2Providers` entry (client id + secret reference) AND a declared provider scope |
+ * | `ORG_SAML` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization, AND a Java runtime with the schema-validation helper compiled on every host that serves SAML |
+ * | `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization |
+ *
+ * ## ⚠️ The organization SSO methods are gated by the USER TYPE first
+ *
+ * A perfectly configured SSO connection is never offered unless the user type enables `ORG_SAML` /
+ * `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT`: the connection lookup only runs when the resolved policy already has the
+ * method, so the organization is never consulted. The symptom is a login screen that simply does not
+ * show the option, with nothing wrong on the connection and nothing in the logs. Enable the method on
+ * the user type BEFORE debugging the connection.
+ *
+ * ## Other refusals worth knowing before you pick one
+ *
+ * - **`EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` will not link or create an account from a provider that does not report the
+ *   email address as VERIFIED.** That is a refusal, not a warning — a provider whose claim mapping
+ *   does not surface a verified flag cannot be used for sign-up until the mapping is corrected.
+ * - **A missing SAML validation helper surfaces as an invalid signature**, not as a missing
+ *   dependency, which sends an operator to the certificate instead of to the host.
+ * - **A person in an actively directory-managed organization loses every LOCAL first factor**, by
+ *   design, so a credential minted before the directory took over cannot complete a session.
+ *   `EMAIL_OTP` is deliberately exempt because it is a second factor.
+ *
+ * ## ⚠️ Signing IN and signing UP are two different lists
+ *
+ * `authMethodsEnabled` decides how an EXISTING account authenticates. It does not create accounts.
+ * Public registration is gated separately by `registration.allowedMethods` on the same user type,
+ * which **defaults to `[PASSWORD]`** — so enabling `MAGIC_LINK` for sign-in and expecting people to
+ * sign up with it gets a password-only signup and no error.
+ *
+ * Only four methods have a public-signup implementation — `PASSWORD`, `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2`,
+ * `MAGIC_LINK`, `PASSKEY`. Listing any other (an SSO method, an MFA factor) is refused when the
+ * config is built, deliberately: a method advertised to a registrant that the runtime cannot execute
+ * fails them AFTER they have committed to it. Open registration also requires the list to be
+ * non-empty.
+ *
+ * ## Which methods count as a second factor is a separate question
+ *
+ * `mfaPolicy` on the user type decides whether a second factor is required and narrows which of these
+ * count. The guard that stops somebody removing their last second factor counts passkeys and a
+ * verified phone number — it does NOT count `EMAIL_OTP`, so the arithmetic differs from what a person
+ * might expect.
+ *
+ * Extensible at application level for `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` providers; the method vocabulary itself is
+ * closed.
  */
 export declare enum AuthMethod {
     PASSWORD = "PASSWORD",
@@ -107,6 +167,7 @@ export declare enum AuthMethod {
     EMAIL_OTP = "EMAIL_OTP",// Email One-Time Password
     PASSKEY = "PASSKEY"
 }
+/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.auth.methods */
 /**
  * Authentication Factor Levels
  */
@@ -131,7 +192,27 @@ export declare enum AuthNextStep {
     ONBOARDING = "onboarding",
     COMPLETE = "complete",
     EMAIL_VERIFICATION = "email_verification",
-    PASSWORD_CHANGE = "password_change"
+    PASSWORD_CHANGE = "password_change",
+    /**
+     * A password-less public registration completed and a magic link is on its way (#463). Clicking it
+     * proves the address and establishes the first session — there is nothing else for the registrant
+     * to do, and nothing to authenticate with until they do it.
+     */
+    MAGIC_LINK_SENT = "magic_link_sent",
+    /**
+     * As {@link MAGIC_LINK_SENT}, and the click leads to enrolling a passkey.
+     *
+     * A separate member rather than a flag on the one above, because the client renders different copy
+     * from the first screen onward — "check your email to finish" versus "check your email, then set up
+     * your passkey" — and a registrant told the wrong one abandons at the step they were not warned
+     * about.
+     *
+     * The magic link is not incidental here: a passkey proves possession of an authenticator and says
+     * nothing about an address, so a public passkey signup must prove the address some other way, and
+     * the link is that proof. It is also, permanently, the recovery path — see the note on
+     * `registerUser`.
+     */
+    PASSKEY_ENROLLMENT = "passkey_enrollment"
 }
 /**
  * W4.2: Session purpose — drives UI rendering and valid state transitions.
@@ -182,7 +263,6 @@ export declare enum AuthScopeType {
 export declare const AvailableMethodConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     rpName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     rpId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    registeredPasskeyCount: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
     displayName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     providerRef: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     connectionId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
@@ -206,7 +286,6 @@ export declare const AvailableMethodSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     config: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodObject<{
         rpName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
         rpId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-        registeredPasskeyCount: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
         displayName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
         providerRef: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
         connectionId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas.js

@@ -108,8 +108,68 @@ export const OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES = new Set([
     'iss', 'sub', 'aud', 'exp', 'nbf', 'iat', 'jti', 'azp', 'nonce', 'auth_time', 'at_hash', 'c_hash', 'acr', 'amr', 'sid',
 ]);
 /**
- * Authentication Method Types with Factor Classification and Categories
- * Core authentication methods - extensible at application level
+ * @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.auth.methods facet:layer:shared facet:audience:app-developer
+ *
+ * Every way a person can prove who they are. An application chooses per USER TYPE which of these are
+ * enabled, under `authMethodsEnabled` in the backend-authored config.
+ *
+ * Imported from `@wildo-ai/saas-models`.
+ *
+ * ## Enabling a method is necessary, and for four of them it is not sufficient
+ *
+ * | method | may be | also required before it works |
+ * |---|---|---|
+ * | `PASSWORD` | first | a `passwordPolicy` on the user type |
+ * | `MAGIC_LINK` | first | — |
+ * | `PASSKEY` | first or second | `auth.passkeyConfig` (`rpName`, `rpId`) — the app does not boot without it |
+ * | `SMS_OTP` | first or second | a verified phone number on the account |
+ * | `TOTP` | second | enrolment (authenticator app or backup codes) |
+ * | `EMAIL_OTP` | second | — |
+ * | `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` | any | a `socialOAuth2Providers` entry (client id + secret reference) AND a declared provider scope |
+ * | `ORG_SAML` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization, AND a Java runtime with the schema-validation helper compiled on every host that serves SAML |
+ * | `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization |
+ *
+ * ## ⚠️ The organization SSO methods are gated by the USER TYPE first
+ *
+ * A perfectly configured SSO connection is never offered unless the user type enables `ORG_SAML` /
+ * `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT`: the connection lookup only runs when the resolved policy already has the
+ * method, so the organization is never consulted. The symptom is a login screen that simply does not
+ * show the option, with nothing wrong on the connection and nothing in the logs. Enable the method on
+ * the user type BEFORE debugging the connection.
+ *
+ * ## Other refusals worth knowing before you pick one
+ *
+ * - **`EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` will not link or create an account from a provider that does not report the
+ *   email address as VERIFIED.** That is a refusal, not a warning — a provider whose claim mapping
+ *   does not surface a verified flag cannot be used for sign-up until the mapping is corrected.
+ * - **A missing SAML validation helper surfaces as an invalid signature**, not as a missing
+ *   dependency, which sends an operator to the certificate instead of to the host.
+ * - **A person in an actively directory-managed organization loses every LOCAL first factor**, by
+ *   design, so a credential minted before the directory took over cannot complete a session.
+ *   `EMAIL_OTP` is deliberately exempt because it is a second factor.
+ *
+ * ## ⚠️ Signing IN and signing UP are two different lists
+ *
+ * `authMethodsEnabled` decides how an EXISTING account authenticates. It does not create accounts.
+ * Public registration is gated separately by `registration.allowedMethods` on the same user type,
+ * which **defaults to `[PASSWORD]`** — so enabling `MAGIC_LINK` for sign-in and expecting people to
+ * sign up with it gets a password-only signup and no error.
+ *
+ * Only four methods have a public-signup implementation — `PASSWORD`, `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2`,
+ * `MAGIC_LINK`, `PASSKEY`. Listing any other (an SSO method, an MFA factor) is refused when the
+ * config is built, deliberately: a method advertised to a registrant that the runtime cannot execute
+ * fails them AFTER they have committed to it. Open registration also requires the list to be
+ * non-empty.
+ *
+ * ## Which methods count as a second factor is a separate question
+ *
+ * `mfaPolicy` on the user type decides whether a second factor is required and narrows which of these
+ * count. The guard that stops somebody removing their last second factor counts passkeys and a
+ * verified phone number — it does NOT count `EMAIL_OTP`, so the arithmetic differs from what a person
+ * might expect.
+ *
+ * Extensible at application level for `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` providers; the method vocabulary itself is
+ * closed.
  */
 export var AuthMethod;
 (function (AuthMethod) {
@@ -129,6 +189,7 @@ export var AuthMethod;
     // Biometric/Modern (First or second factor)
     AuthMethod["PASSKEY"] = "PASSKEY"; // WebAuthn/FIDO2 Passkeys
 })(AuthMethod || (AuthMethod = {}));
+/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.auth.methods */
 /**
  * Authentication Factor Levels
  */
@@ -157,6 +218,26 @@ export var AuthNextStep;
     AuthNextStep["COMPLETE"] = "complete";
     AuthNextStep["EMAIL_VERIFICATION"] = "email_verification";
     AuthNextStep["PASSWORD_CHANGE"] = "password_change";
+    /**
+     * A password-less public registration completed and a magic link is on its way (#463). Clicking it
+     * proves the address and establishes the first session — there is nothing else for the registrant
+     * to do, and nothing to authenticate with until they do it.
+     */
+    AuthNextStep["MAGIC_LINK_SENT"] = "magic_link_sent";
+    /**
+     * As {@link MAGIC_LINK_SENT}, and the click leads to enrolling a passkey.
+     *
+     * A separate member rather than a flag on the one above, because the client renders different copy
+     * from the first screen onward — "check your email to finish" versus "check your email, then set up
+     * your passkey" — and a registrant told the wrong one abandons at the step they were not warned
+     * about.
+     *
+     * The magic link is not incidental here: a passkey proves possession of an authenticator and says
+     * nothing about an address, so a public passkey signup must prove the address some other way, and
+     * the link is that proof. It is also, permanently, the recovery path — see the note on
+     * `registerUser`.
+     */
+    AuthNextStep["PASSKEY_ENROLLMENT"] = "passkey_enrollment";
 })(AuthNextStep || (AuthNextStep = {}));
 /**
  * W4.2: Session purpose — drives UI rendering and valid state transitions.
@@ -238,7 +319,6 @@ export var AuthScopeType;
 export const AvailableMethodConfigSchema = z.object({
     rpName: z.string().optional(),
     rpId: z.string().optional(),
-    registeredPasskeyCount: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
     displayName: z.string().optional(),
     providerRef: z.string().optional(),
     connectionId: z.string().optional(),

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Authentication Shared Schemas\n *\n * Core authentication schemas shared between frontend and backend\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport type { PolymorphicVariantDefinition } from '../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\n/**\n * Auth Scope Variants (Shared)\n *\n * The 2 auth scope variants — shared across all auth polymorphic resources\n * (SsoConfig, SsoConnection, SiemExportConfig, SiemDeliveryDlq,\n *  ScimTokens, ScimProvisioningConfig).\n *\n */\n\n\nexport const AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS: PolymorphicVariantDefinition[] = [\n  { parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS, parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS], isPrimaryScope: true },\n  { parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.APPLICATION,   parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION],   isPrimaryScope: true },\n];\n\n\n// ===============================\n// AUTHENTICATION METHOD DEFINITIONS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Classification\n * Defines when an authentication method can be used in the flow\n */\nexport enum AuthFactorType {\n  FIRST_ONLY = 'FIRST_ONLY',       // Can only be used as first factor (primary auth)\n  SECOND_ONLY = 'SECOND_ONLY',     // Can only be used as second factor (MFA)\n  FIRST_OR_SECOND = 'FIRST_OR_SECOND', // Can be used as either first or second factor\n  ANY = 'ANY'                      // Can be used in any context (first, second, or standalone)\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Categories\n * Separates different types of authentication methods by scope and configuration\n */\nexport enum AuthMethodCategory {\n  CREDENTIAL = 'CREDENTIAL',           // Password-based credentials\n  EXTERNAL_OAUTH2 = 'EXTERNAL_OAUTH2', // Extensible third-party SaaS OAuth2 (application-level)\n  ORG_SSO = 'ORG_SSO',                // Organization-restricted SSO (SAML/OpenID Connect)\n  MFA_TOKEN = 'MFA_TOKEN',            // Time-based or generated tokens for MFA\n  BIOMETRIC = 'BIOMETRIC'             // Modern biometric/passwordless methods\n}\n\n/**\n * The signing-key purposes an application holds, and the platform-service keys it verifies against.\n *\n * MOVED HERE FROM `saas-backend-lib` on 2026-09-02. These name identities that CROSS A PROCESS\n * BOUNDARY — the platform issues a token, the application verifies it; the application signs a\n * webhook, an integrator verifies it — and a name that crosses a boundary belongs in the shared\n * package rather than in the runtime on one side of it. The signing and verification MACHINERY did\n * not move; `jwt.backend.schemas.ts` re-exports both so no consumer changed.\n *\n * It also unblocked attesting `WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE`: the retirement guarantee is\n * per key, and the assurance layer could not name the keys it applies to from a package it must not\n * depend on.\n *\n * Storage locations (unchanged, and stated here because the names are meaningless without them):\n * - private: `wildo_application_secrets.security.jwt.privateKey[key]`\n * - public:  `wildo_application_config.jwt.publicKey[key]`, env `PLATFORM_<SERVICE_NAME>_PUBLIC_KEY`\n */\n/**\n * `iss` claim on every JWT the application signs, whichever key kind signs it. Receivers of\n * webhooks, workers and platform services pin this value; it is application-wide, not per key.\n */\nexport const APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER = 'wildo-application' as const;\n\nexport enum JwtPrivateKeys {\n    /** Application signing requests to platform services */\n    APPLICATION_PLATFORM_REQUEST = 'APPLICATION_PLATFORM_REQUEST',\n    /** Application signing requests to worker runtimes */\n    APPLICATION_WORKER_REQUEST = 'APPLICATION_WORKER_REQUEST',\n    /** Application signing webhooks */\n    APPLICATION_WEBHOOK = 'APPLICATION_WEBHOOK',\n    /** Application signing auth tokens */\n    APPLICATION_AUTH_TOKEN = 'APPLICATION_AUTH_TOKEN',\n}\n\n/**\n * Platform Service JWT Public Keys\n * \n * Used to verify JWTs from platform services.\n * Public keys are stored in apps-manager env config.\n * Env var pattern: PLATFORM_<SERVICE_NAME>_PUBLIC_KEY\n */\nexport enum JwtPublicKeys {\n    /** Platform service: apps-manager - central platform orchestrator */\n    PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER = 'PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER',\n\n    /** Platform service: crontabs-batches-manager - handles scheduled jobs */\n    PLATFORM_CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER = 'PLATFORM_CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER',\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC / RFC 7519 protocol + security claim names the ID-token builder OWNS. `extraClaims` (the\n * scope-gated IDENTITY claims from the userinfo/ID-token resolver) must carry ONLY identity claims — these\n * reserved names are stripped BEFORE `extraClaims` is spread, so a same-named entry can never ride into the\n * ID token uncontrolled: a smuggled `nbf` (which would later make the token fail verification), a forged\n * `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash`, or a spoofed `iss` / `aud` / `sub` (the last are already overridden by\n * the server-set claims below — these are the ones the builder does NOT otherwise re-set). ONE named source\n * (closed vocabulary) so the strip list can never drift from the builder's own claim set.\n * semantic-literal-boundary: OIDC Core / RFC 7519 registered claim names.\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY — an ID token's protocol/security claims are server-authored only.\n */\nexport const OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // `sid` (OIDC Session Management / Front-Channel & Back-Channel Logout) is SERVER-AUTHORED here — it is\n  // the End-User's OP session id the RP-Initiated Logout endpoint keys on (revocation-C). Reserving it bars\n  // a client from smuggling its own `sid` via `extraClaims`, exactly like `nonce`/`acr`/`azp` below.\n  'iss', 'sub', 'aud', 'exp', 'nbf', 'iat', 'jti', 'azp', 'nonce', 'auth_time', 'at_hash', 'c_hash', 'acr', 'amr', 'sid',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Types with Factor Classification and Categories\n * Core authentication methods - extensible at application level\n */\nexport enum AuthMethod {\n  // Credential-based (First factor only)\n  PASSWORD = 'PASSWORD',\n\n  // Third-party SaaS OAuth2 (Application-level, extensible, any factor)\n  EXTERNAL_OAUTH2 = 'EXTERNAL_OAUTH2', // Generic extensible OAuth2 provider\n\n  // Organization-restricted SSO (First or second factor)\n  ORG_SAML = 'ORG_SAML',                     // Organization SAML SSO\n  ORG_OPENID_CONNECT = 'ORG_OPENID_CONNECT', // Organization OpenID Connect SSO\n\n  // Passwordless (First factor only)\n  MAGIC_LINK = 'MAGIC_LINK',      // Magic Link via email\n\n  // MFA tokens (Second factor only, except SMS_OTP which is FIRST_OR_SECOND)\n  TOTP = 'TOTP',                    // Time-based One-Time Password\n  SMS_OTP = 'SMS_OTP',             // SMS One-Time Password\n  EMAIL_OTP = 'EMAIL_OTP',         // Email One-Time Password\n\n  // Biometric/Modern (First or second factor)\n  PASSKEY = 'PASSKEY'              // WebAuthn/FIDO2 Passkeys\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Levels\n */\nexport enum AuthFactor {\n  SINGLE = 'SINGLE',       // Single factor authentication\n  MULTI = 'MULTI'          // Multi-factor authentication required\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Level (First or Second Factor)\n */\nexport enum AuthFactorLevel {\n  IDENTIFICATION = 'IDENTIFICATION', // Identification only\n  FIRST = 'FIRST',         // First factor authentication\n  SECOND = 'SECOND'        // Second factor authentication (MFA)\n}\n\n/**\n * W4: Next step hint for frontend routing after auth state transitions.\n * Drives UI flow (MFA enrollment, onboarding, email verification, etc.).\n */\nexport enum AuthNextStep {\n  MFA_ENROLLMENT = 'mfa_enrollment',\n  ONBOARDING = 'onboarding',\n  COMPLETE = 'complete',\n  EMAIL_VERIFICATION = 'email_verification',\n  PASSWORD_CHANGE = 'password_change',\n}\n\n/**\n * W4.2: Session purpose — drives UI rendering and valid state transitions.\n */\nexport enum AuthSessionPurpose {\n  LOGIN = 'login',\n  REGISTRATION = 'registration',\n  INVITATION = 'invitation',\n  REAUTH = 'reauth',\n  DEVICE_AUTH = 'device_auth',\n}\n\n/**\n * W4.6: MFA enrollment lifecycle state on UserCredentials.\n * Computed at user creation and updated on enrollment completion.\n */\nexport enum MfaEnrollmentState {\n  NOT_REQUIRED = 'not_required',\n  PENDING = 'pending',\n  GRACE = 'grace',\n  ENROLLED = 'enrolled',\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// AUTHENTICATION METHOD CLASSIFICATION\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Factor Classification Map\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP: Record<AuthMethod, AuthFactorType> = {\n  // First factor only - Primary credentials\n  [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // First factor only - Passwordless via email\n  [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // First factor only - SSO redirect flows are not MFA ceremonies (B-SEC-1)\n  [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // Second factor only - MFA tokens (except SMS_OTP which can be first or second)\n  [AuthMethod.TOTP]: AuthFactorType.SECOND_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_OR_SECOND,\n  [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: AuthFactorType.SECOND_ONLY,\n\n  // First or second factor - Modern biometric\n  [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_OR_SECOND\n};\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Category Map\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_CATEGORY_MAP: Record<AuthMethod, AuthMethodCategory> = {\n  [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: AuthMethodCategory.CREDENTIAL,\n  [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: AuthMethodCategory.CREDENTIAL,\n  [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: AuthMethodCategory.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: AuthMethodCategory.ORG_SSO,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: AuthMethodCategory.ORG_SSO,\n  [AuthMethod.TOTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: AuthMethodCategory.BIOMETRIC\n};\n\n/**\n * Scope type for auth policies — organization-level vs application-level.\n *\n * Declared before the browser-safe available-method schema because that schema\n * evaluates this enum at module initialization time.\n */\nexport enum AuthScopeType {\n  ORGANIZATION = 'organization',\n  APPLICATION = 'application',\n}\n\n/**\n * Public, browser-safe configuration attached to an available auth method.\n *\n * The fields span passkey and enterprise-SSO methods, but every field is named\n * and typed: this cross-layer contract must never collapse back to\n * `Record<string, any>`, which previously forced frontend assertions for the\n * tenant scope and connection identity.\n */\nexport const AvailableMethodConfigSchema = z.object({\n  rpName: z.string().optional(),\n  rpId: z.string().optional(),\n  registeredPasskeyCount: z.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),\n  displayName: z.string().optional(),\n  providerRef: z.string().optional(),\n  connectionId: z.string().optional(),\n  scopeType: z.enum(AuthScopeType).optional(),\n  scopeId: z.string().optional(),\n  loginUrl: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\nexport type AvailableMethodConfig = z.infer<typeof AvailableMethodConfigSchema>;\n\nexport const AvailableMethodSchema = z.object({\n  method: z.enum(AuthMethod),\n  factorType: z.enum(AuthFactorType),\n  category: z.enum(AuthMethodCategory),\n  canBeFirstFactor: z.boolean(),\n  canBeSecondFactor: z.boolean(),\n  required: z.boolean(),\n\n  // Provider-specific information\n  oauth2ProviderRefs: z.array(z.string()).optional(), // For third-party OAuth2\n  ssoIds: z.array(z.string()).optional(), // For organization SSO\n  organizationRestricted: z.boolean().default(false),\n\n  // Integration capabilities\n  supportsIntegrations: z.boolean().default(false),\n  availableIntegrations: z.array(z.string()).default([]).optional(),\n\n  // Public configuration\n  config: AvailableMethodConfigSchema.optional()\n});\n\n\nexport type AvailableMethod = z.infer<typeof AvailableMethodSchema>;\n\n// ===============================\n// CROSS-LAYER CONSTANTS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Error codes used in redirect query params (backend → frontend).\n * Backend appends `?error=<code>` to redirect URLs; frontend reads and displays.\n */\nexport enum AuthRedirectErrorCode {\n  SAML_LOGIN_FAILED = 'saml_login_failed',\n  SAML_AUTH_FAILED = 'saml_auth_failed',\n  SAML_SLO_FAILED = 'saml_slo_failed',\n  MISSING_PARAMS = 'missing_params',\n  OAUTH_FAILED = 'oauth_failed',\n}\n\n/**\n * Ownership class of an external authentication connection.\n *\n * This is intentionally independent from {@link AuthScopeType}: a social\n * connection has no enterprise tenant scope, while an enterprise connection\n * must carry one.\n */\nexport enum SsoConnectionType {\n  SOCIAL = 'social',\n  ENTERPRISE = 'enterprise',\n}\n\n/**\n * Mechanism that established an external identity.\n *\n * This is wider than the SSO protocol vocabulary because SCIM establishes and\n * maintains identity links without being an interactive SSO protocol.\n */\nexport enum ExternalIdentitySource {\n  OAUTH2 = 'oauth2',\n  OIDC = 'oidc',\n  SAML = 'saml',\n  SCIM = 'scim',\n}\n"]}
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isPrimaryScope: true },\n];\n\n\n// ===============================\n// AUTHENTICATION METHOD DEFINITIONS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Classification\n * Defines when an authentication method can be used in the flow\n */\nexport enum AuthFactorType {\n  FIRST_ONLY = 'FIRST_ONLY',       // Can only be used as first factor (primary auth)\n  SECOND_ONLY = 'SECOND_ONLY',     // Can only be used as second factor (MFA)\n  FIRST_OR_SECOND = 'FIRST_OR_SECOND', // Can be used as either first or second factor\n  ANY = 'ANY'                      // Can be used in any context (first, second, or standalone)\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Categories\n * Separates different types of authentication methods by scope and configuration\n */\nexport enum AuthMethodCategory {\n  CREDENTIAL = 'CREDENTIAL',           // Password-based credentials\n  EXTERNAL_OAUTH2 = 'EXTERNAL_OAUTH2', // Extensible third-party SaaS OAuth2 (application-level)\n  ORG_SSO = 'ORG_SSO',                // Organization-restricted SSO (SAML/OpenID Connect)\n  MFA_TOKEN = 'MFA_TOKEN',            // Time-based or generated tokens for MFA\n  BIOMETRIC = 'BIOMETRIC'             // Modern biometric/passwordless methods\n}\n\n/**\n * The signing-key purposes an application holds, and the platform-service keys it verifies against.\n *\n * MOVED HERE FROM `saas-backend-lib` on 2026-09-02. These name identities that CROSS A PROCESS\n * BOUNDARY — the platform issues a token, the application verifies it; the application signs a\n * webhook, an integrator verifies it — and a name that crosses a boundary belongs in the shared\n * package rather than in the runtime on one side of it. The signing and verification MACHINERY did\n * not move; `jwt.backend.schemas.ts` re-exports both so no consumer changed.\n *\n * It also unblocked attesting `WILDO.IDENTITY.SIGNING_KEY_LIFECYCLE`: the retirement guarantee is\n * per key, and the assurance layer could not name the keys it applies to from a package it must not\n * depend on.\n *\n * Storage locations (unchanged, and stated here because the names are meaningless without them):\n * - private: `wildo_application_secrets.security.jwt.privateKey[key]`\n * - public:  `wildo_application_config.jwt.publicKey[key]`, env `PLATFORM_<SERVICE_NAME>_PUBLIC_KEY`\n */\n/**\n * `iss` claim on every JWT the application signs, whichever key kind signs it. Receivers of\n * webhooks, workers and platform services pin this value; it is application-wide, not per key.\n */\nexport const APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER = 'wildo-application' as const;\n\nexport enum JwtPrivateKeys {\n    /** Application signing requests to platform services */\n    APPLICATION_PLATFORM_REQUEST = 'APPLICATION_PLATFORM_REQUEST',\n    /** Application signing requests to worker runtimes */\n    APPLICATION_WORKER_REQUEST = 'APPLICATION_WORKER_REQUEST',\n    /** Application signing webhooks */\n    APPLICATION_WEBHOOK = 'APPLICATION_WEBHOOK',\n    /** Application signing auth tokens */\n    APPLICATION_AUTH_TOKEN = 'APPLICATION_AUTH_TOKEN',\n}\n\n/**\n * Platform Service JWT Public Keys\n * \n * Used to verify JWTs from platform services.\n * Public keys are stored in apps-manager env config.\n * Env var pattern: PLATFORM_<SERVICE_NAME>_PUBLIC_KEY\n */\nexport enum JwtPublicKeys {\n    /** Platform service: apps-manager - central platform orchestrator */\n    PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER = 'PLATFORM_APPS_MANAGER',\n\n    /** Platform service: crontabs-batches-manager - handles scheduled jobs */\n    PLATFORM_CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER = 'PLATFORM_CRONTABS_BATCHES_MANAGER',\n}\n\n/**\n * The OIDC / RFC 7519 protocol + security claim names the ID-token builder OWNS. `extraClaims` (the\n * scope-gated IDENTITY claims from the userinfo/ID-token resolver) must carry ONLY identity claims — these\n * reserved names are stripped BEFORE `extraClaims` is spread, so a same-named entry can never ride into the\n * ID token uncontrolled: a smuggled `nbf` (which would later make the token fail verification), a forged\n * `nonce` / `acr` / `amr` / `at_hash`, or a spoofed `iss` / `aud` / `sub` (the last are already overridden by\n * the server-set claims below — these are the ones the builder does NOT otherwise re-set). ONE named source\n * (closed vocabulary) so the strip list can never drift from the builder's own claim set.\n * semantic-literal-boundary: OIDC Core / RFC 7519 registered claim names.\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.TOKEN_INTEGRITY — an ID token's protocol/security claims are server-authored only.\n */\nexport const OIDC_RESERVED_ID_TOKEN_CLAIM_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // `sid` (OIDC Session Management / Front-Channel & Back-Channel Logout) is SERVER-AUTHORED here — it is\n  // the End-User's OP session id the RP-Initiated Logout endpoint keys on (revocation-C). Reserving it bars\n  // a client from smuggling its own `sid` via `extraClaims`, exactly like `nonce`/`acr`/`azp` below.\n  'iss', 'sub', 'aud', 'exp', 'nbf', 'iat', 'jti', 'azp', 'nonce', 'auth_time', 'at_hash', 'c_hash', 'acr', 'amr', 'sid',\n]);\n\n/**\n * @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.auth.methods facet:layer:shared facet:audience:app-developer\n *\n * Every way a person can prove who they are. An application chooses per USER TYPE which of these are\n * enabled, under `authMethodsEnabled` in the backend-authored config.\n *\n * Imported from `@wildo-ai/saas-models`.\n *\n * ## Enabling a method is necessary, and for four of them it is not sufficient\n *\n * | method | may be | also required before it works |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | `PASSWORD` | first | a `passwordPolicy` on the user type |\n * | `MAGIC_LINK` | first | — |\n * | `PASSKEY` | first or second | `auth.passkeyConfig` (`rpName`, `rpId`) — the app does not boot without it |\n * | `SMS_OTP` | first or second | a verified phone number on the account |\n * | `TOTP` | second | enrolment (authenticator app or backup codes) |\n * | `EMAIL_OTP` | second | — |\n * | `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` | any | a `socialOAuth2Providers` entry (client id + secret reference) AND a declared provider scope |\n * | `ORG_SAML` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization, AND a Java runtime with the schema-validation helper compiled on every host that serves SAML |\n * | `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT` | first or second | a connection resource on the organization |\n *\n * ## ⚠️ The organization SSO methods are gated by the USER TYPE first\n *\n * A perfectly configured SSO connection is never offered unless the user type enables `ORG_SAML` /\n * `ORG_OPENID_CONNECT`: the connection lookup only runs when the resolved policy already has the\n * method, so the organization is never consulted. The symptom is a login screen that simply does not\n * show the option, with nothing wrong on the connection and nothing in the logs. Enable the method on\n * the user type BEFORE debugging the connection.\n *\n * ## Other refusals worth knowing before you pick one\n *\n * - **`EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` will not link or create an account from a provider that does not report the\n *   email address as VERIFIED.** That is a refusal, not a warning — a provider whose claim mapping\n *   does not surface a verified flag cannot be used for sign-up until the mapping is corrected.\n * - **A missing SAML validation helper surfaces as an invalid signature**, not as a missing\n *   dependency, which sends an operator to the certificate instead of to the host.\n * - **A person in an actively directory-managed organization loses every LOCAL first factor**, by\n *   design, so a credential minted before the directory took over cannot complete a session.\n *   `EMAIL_OTP` is deliberately exempt because it is a second factor.\n *\n * ## ⚠️ Signing IN and signing UP are two different lists\n *\n * `authMethodsEnabled` decides how an EXISTING account authenticates. It does not create accounts.\n * Public registration is gated separately by `registration.allowedMethods` on the same user type,\n * which **defaults to `[PASSWORD]`** — so enabling `MAGIC_LINK` for sign-in and expecting people to\n * sign up with it gets a password-only signup and no error.\n *\n * Only four methods have a public-signup implementation — `PASSWORD`, `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2`,\n * `MAGIC_LINK`, `PASSKEY`. Listing any other (an SSO method, an MFA factor) is refused when the\n * config is built, deliberately: a method advertised to a registrant that the runtime cannot execute\n * fails them AFTER they have committed to it. Open registration also requires the list to be\n * non-empty.\n *\n * ## Which methods count as a second factor is a separate question\n *\n * `mfaPolicy` on the user type decides whether a second factor is required and narrows which of these\n * count. The guard that stops somebody removing their last second factor counts passkeys and a\n * verified phone number — it does NOT count `EMAIL_OTP`, so the arithmetic differs from what a person\n * might expect.\n *\n * Extensible at application level for `EXTERNAL_OAUTH2` providers; the method vocabulary itself is\n * closed.\n */\nexport enum AuthMethod {\n  // Credential-based (First factor only)\n  PASSWORD = 'PASSWORD',\n\n  // Third-party SaaS OAuth2 (Application-level, extensible, any factor)\n  EXTERNAL_OAUTH2 = 'EXTERNAL_OAUTH2', // Generic extensible OAuth2 provider\n\n  // Organization-restricted SSO (First or second factor)\n  ORG_SAML = 'ORG_SAML',                     // Organization SAML SSO\n  ORG_OPENID_CONNECT = 'ORG_OPENID_CONNECT', // Organization OpenID Connect SSO\n\n  // Passwordless (First factor only)\n  MAGIC_LINK = 'MAGIC_LINK',      // Magic Link via email\n\n  // MFA tokens (Second factor only, except SMS_OTP which is FIRST_OR_SECOND)\n  TOTP = 'TOTP',                    // Time-based One-Time Password\n  SMS_OTP = 'SMS_OTP',             // SMS One-Time Password\n  EMAIL_OTP = 'EMAIL_OTP',         // Email One-Time Password\n\n  // Biometric/Modern (First or second factor)\n  PASSKEY = 'PASSKEY'              // WebAuthn/FIDO2 Passkeys\n}\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.auth.methods */\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Levels\n */\nexport enum AuthFactor {\n  SINGLE = 'SINGLE',       // Single factor authentication\n  MULTI = 'MULTI'          // Multi-factor authentication required\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication Factor Level (First or Second Factor)\n */\nexport enum AuthFactorLevel {\n  IDENTIFICATION = 'IDENTIFICATION', // Identification only\n  FIRST = 'FIRST',         // First factor authentication\n  SECOND = 'SECOND'        // Second factor authentication (MFA)\n}\n\n/**\n * W4: Next step hint for frontend routing after auth state transitions.\n * Drives UI flow (MFA enrollment, onboarding, email verification, etc.).\n */\nexport enum AuthNextStep {\n  MFA_ENROLLMENT = 'mfa_enrollment',\n  ONBOARDING = 'onboarding',\n  COMPLETE = 'complete',\n  EMAIL_VERIFICATION = 'email_verification',\n  PASSWORD_CHANGE = 'password_change',\n  /**\n   * A password-less public registration completed and a magic link is on its way (#463). Clicking it\n   * proves the address and establishes the first session — there is nothing else for the registrant\n   * to do, and nothing to authenticate with until they do it.\n   */\n  MAGIC_LINK_SENT = 'magic_link_sent',\n  /**\n   * As {@link MAGIC_LINK_SENT}, and the click leads to enrolling a passkey.\n   *\n   * A separate member rather than a flag on the one above, because the client renders different copy\n   * from the first screen onward — \"check your email to finish\" versus \"check your email, then set up\n   * your passkey\" — and a registrant told the wrong one abandons at the step they were not warned\n   * about.\n   *\n   * The magic link is not incidental here: a passkey proves possession of an authenticator and says\n   * nothing about an address, so a public passkey signup must prove the address some other way, and\n   * the link is that proof. It is also, permanently, the recovery path — see the note on\n   * `registerUser`.\n   */\n  PASSKEY_ENROLLMENT = 'passkey_enrollment',\n}\n\n/**\n * W4.2: Session purpose — drives UI rendering and valid state transitions.\n */\nexport enum AuthSessionPurpose {\n  LOGIN = 'login',\n  REGISTRATION = 'registration',\n  INVITATION = 'invitation',\n  REAUTH = 'reauth',\n  DEVICE_AUTH = 'device_auth',\n}\n\n/**\n * W4.6: MFA enrollment lifecycle state on UserCredentials.\n * Computed at user creation and updated on enrollment completion.\n */\nexport enum MfaEnrollmentState {\n  NOT_REQUIRED = 'not_required',\n  PENDING = 'pending',\n  GRACE = 'grace',\n  ENROLLED = 'enrolled',\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// AUTHENTICATION METHOD CLASSIFICATION\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Factor Classification Map\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_FACTOR_MAP: Record<AuthMethod, AuthFactorType> = {\n  // First factor only - Primary credentials\n  [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // First factor only - Passwordless via email\n  [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // First factor only - SSO redirect flows are not MFA ceremonies (B-SEC-1)\n  [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_ONLY,\n\n  // Second factor only - MFA tokens (except SMS_OTP which can be first or second)\n  [AuthMethod.TOTP]: AuthFactorType.SECOND_ONLY,\n  [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_OR_SECOND,\n  [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: AuthFactorType.SECOND_ONLY,\n\n  // First or second factor - Modern biometric\n  [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: AuthFactorType.FIRST_OR_SECOND\n};\n\n/**\n * Authentication Method Category Map\n */\nexport const AUTH_METHOD_CATEGORY_MAP: Record<AuthMethod, AuthMethodCategory> = {\n  [AuthMethod.PASSWORD]: AuthMethodCategory.CREDENTIAL,\n  [AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK]: AuthMethodCategory.CREDENTIAL,\n  [AuthMethod.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2]: AuthMethodCategory.EXTERNAL_OAUTH2,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_SAML]: AuthMethodCategory.ORG_SSO,\n  [AuthMethod.ORG_OPENID_CONNECT]: AuthMethodCategory.ORG_SSO,\n  [AuthMethod.TOTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.SMS_OTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.EMAIL_OTP]: AuthMethodCategory.MFA_TOKEN,\n  [AuthMethod.PASSKEY]: AuthMethodCategory.BIOMETRIC\n};\n\n/**\n * Scope type for auth policies — organization-level vs application-level.\n *\n * Declared before the browser-safe available-method schema because that schema\n * evaluates this enum at module initialization time.\n */\nexport enum AuthScopeType {\n  ORGANIZATION = 'organization',\n  APPLICATION = 'application',\n}\n\n/**\n * Public, browser-safe configuration attached to an available auth method.\n *\n * The fields span passkey and enterprise-SSO methods, but every field is named\n * and typed: this cross-layer contract must never collapse back to\n * `Record<string, any>`, which previously forced frontend assertions for the\n * tenant scope and connection identity.\n */\nexport const AvailableMethodConfigSchema = z.object({\n  rpName: z.string().optional(),\n  rpId: z.string().optional(),\n  displayName: z.string().optional(),\n  providerRef: z.string().optional(),\n  connectionId: z.string().optional(),\n  scopeType: z.enum(AuthScopeType).optional(),\n  scopeId: z.string().optional(),\n  loginUrl: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\nexport type AvailableMethodConfig = z.infer<typeof AvailableMethodConfigSchema>;\n\nexport const AvailableMethodSchema = z.object({\n  method: z.enum(AuthMethod),\n  factorType: z.enum(AuthFactorType),\n  category: z.enum(AuthMethodCategory),\n  canBeFirstFactor: z.boolean(),\n  canBeSecondFactor: z.boolean(),\n  required: z.boolean(),\n\n  // Provider-specific information\n  oauth2ProviderRefs: z.array(z.string()).optional(), // For third-party OAuth2\n  ssoIds: z.array(z.string()).optional(), // For organization SSO\n  organizationRestricted: z.boolean().default(false),\n\n  // Integration capabilities\n  supportsIntegrations: z.boolean().default(false),\n  availableIntegrations: z.array(z.string()).default([]).optional(),\n\n  // Public configuration\n  config: AvailableMethodConfigSchema.optional()\n});\n\n\nexport type AvailableMethod = z.infer<typeof AvailableMethodSchema>;\n\n// ===============================\n// CROSS-LAYER CONSTANTS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Error codes used in redirect query params (backend → frontend).\n * Backend appends `?error=<code>` to redirect URLs; frontend reads and displays.\n */\nexport enum AuthRedirectErrorCode {\n  SAML_LOGIN_FAILED = 'saml_login_failed',\n  SAML_AUTH_FAILED = 'saml_auth_failed',\n  SAML_SLO_FAILED = 'saml_slo_failed',\n  MISSING_PARAMS = 'missing_params',\n  OAUTH_FAILED = 'oauth_failed',\n}\n\n/**\n * Ownership class of an external authentication connection.\n *\n * This is intentionally independent from {@link AuthScopeType}: a social\n * connection has no enterprise tenant scope, while an enterprise connection\n * must carry one.\n */\nexport enum SsoConnectionType {\n  SOCIAL = 'social',\n  ENTERPRISE = 'enterprise',\n}\n\n/**\n * Mechanism that established an external identity.\n *\n * This is wider than the SSO protocol vocabulary because SCIM establishes and\n * maintains identity links without being an interactive SSO protocol.\n */\nexport enum ExternalIdentitySource {\n  OAUTH2 = 'oauth2',\n  OIDC = 'oidc',\n  SAML = 'saml',\n  SCIM = 'scim',\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/authentication.shared.utils.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas.js.map

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Single-use,\n     * short-TTL; its metadata binds the code to the authenticated `userId`, the requesting\n     * `clientId`, the granted `scope`, the `redirectUri`, the PKCE `codeChallenge`, and the\n     * optional `nonce`. Redeemed at the token endpoint for an ID token + access + refresh.\n     */\n    OIDC_AUTHORIZATION_CODE        = 'oidc_authorization_code',\n    /**\n     * OIDC interactive-consent request (Wildo-as-provider authorization_code consent gate). Minted at\n     * `/oauth/authorize` for a client whose `requiresConsent` is true, INSTEAD of auto-issuing the\n     * code. Single-use, short-TTL; its metadata carries the SAME authorization request the code would\n     * bind (`clientId`, `scope`, `redirectUri`, `codeChallenge`, `nonce?`, `resource?`, `state?`)\n     * plus the authenticated `userId`. Consumed at `/oauth/authorize/decision`: on APPROVE it mints\n     * the authorization code from the stored request; on DENY the flow ends with `access_denied`.\n     * Storing the request server-side means the consent decision cannot tamper with the parameters.\n     */\n    OIDC_CONSENT_REQUEST           = 'oidc_consent_request',\n    /**\n     * OIDC RP-Initiated Logout confirmation (revocation-C §6 — the logout-confirmation prompt that\n     * mitigates BROWSER-based logout CSRF; a cross-origin page cannot read this token from the victim's\n     * URL to complete the confirm). Minted at `GET /oauth/end-session` for any request that is NOT a\n     * trusted RP logout (no/forged `id_token_hint`, or a valid hint whose `post_logout_redirect_uri`\n     * is absent / unregistered / mismatched), INSTEAD of terminating the session inline. Single-use,\n     * short-TTL; its metadata carries the already-validated `{ userId?, sessionId? }` the confirm step\n     * acts on (storing it server-side means the confirmation cannot tamper with WHICH session ends).\n     * Consumed at `POST /oauth/end-session/confirm`: on confirm it terminates that session (if any) and\n     * lands on `/oauth/logged-out`. A trusted RP logout (valid hint + exact-match registered redirect)\n     * skips this entirely and terminates + redirects to the RP directly — the Keycloak-style posture.\n     */\n    OIDC_LOGOUT_CONFIRMATION       = 'oidc_logout_confirmation',\n    /**\n     * A single-use grant to upload ONE file into ONE resource file field, minted by a principal who\n     * could perform the target CREATE/UPDATE and redeemed by whoever holds it — an AI agent's `curl`,\n     * or a human on the drop page — without the minter's own credential ever leaving the server.\n     *\n     * Exists because MCP tool arguments are model-generated JSON and cannot carry bytes; see #312.\n     * `SINGLE_USE` only (a reusable upload credential is the presigned-URL defect rebuilt inside\n     * the API). Typed fields carry identity — `userId`/`organizationId`/`roles` snapshot of the\n     * minter, `resourceIdentifier` = target resource, `relatedId` = target row for UPDATE — and\n     * `metadata` carries the ROUTE binding (`fieldName`, `operation`, `minter`, `producedFileId`),\n     * which the upload middleware checks and the identity layer deliberately ignores. Lifetime is\n     * bounded at the mint by `FILE_UPLOAD_GRANT_ABSOLUTE_MAX_MINUTES`, rejecting rather than\n     * clamping: this credential is designed to leave the trust boundary (a transcript, a shell\n     * history), so the engine owns the bound.\n     */\n    FILE_UPLOAD_GRANT              = 'file_upload_grant',\n}\n\nexport const ConsumableTokenTypesSchema = z.union([\n    z.enum(CoreConsumableTokenTypes),\n    z.string().min(1),\n]);\n\n\nexport type ConsumableTokenTypes = z.infer<typeof ConsumableTokenTypesSchema>;\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// CONSUMPTION MODE — Three behavioral categories for token lifecycle\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Defines how a token behaves when used.\n *\n * - `SINGLE_USE`: Consumed after first successful use (password reset, invitation acceptance)\n * - `BOUNDED_REUSE`: Can be used N times or until expiry (file sharing link, meeting join link)\n * - `EPHEMERAL_STATE`: Carries state through a redirect, consumed on callback (OAuth state, payment callback)\n */\nexport enum ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode {\n    SINGLE_USE      = 'SINGLE_USE',\n    BOUNDED_REUSE   = 'BOUNDED_REUSE',\n    EPHEMERAL_STATE = 'EPHEMERAL_STATE',\n}\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// UTILITY TYPE — StaticOrDerived<T>\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * A value that can either be provided statically or derived from the operation result at runtime.\n *\n * Static:  `{ value: 7, unit: 'days' }`\n * Derived: `(currentObject) => ({ value: currentObject.shareDurationDays, unit: 'days' })`\n *\n * NOTE: This is intentionally NOT `ResourceConfiguration_FunctionWithContextNeeds` (R5).\n * `FunctionWithContextNeeds` wraps functions with metadata flags (`needsObjectContext`, `needsUserContext`)\n * for factory introspection. `StaticOrDerived<T>` is simpler — it's just \"literal value OR function from\n * currentObject\" with no metadata flags. The factory marks dynamic values as `_isDynamic` during\n * processing, which is a different mechanism entirely.\n */\nexport type StaticOrDerived<T> = T | ((currentObject: Record<string, any>) => T);\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// DECLARATIVE CONFIG TYPES — For operation variant configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.resource-config.token-generation facet:layer:shared facet:family:resource-config\n *\n * Config-declared gate deciding whether a `tokenGeneration` side-effect actually\n * mints a token, evaluated against the POST-operation row (`currentObject`).\n *\n * WHY the destructured params-object shape `({ currentObject }) => boolean` and NOT\n * the positional `StaticOrDerived` shape used by `expiresIn`/`grantedRoles` above (R5):\n * this deliberately mirrors the operation-variant `enabledCondition` predicate (see the\n * org-members REVOKE/RESEND configs) so an app author writes ONE predicate form for every\n * \"config-declared gate over currentObject\". The trade-off is worth it — cross-surface\n * authoring consistency beats intra-type consistency with the positional derivers.\n *\n * WHY the params object carries ONLY `currentObject` (unlike the notification `condition`,\n * which also gets `inputDto`/`objectContext`/`initiatorIds`): a token is a PERSISTED\n * side-effect keyed on the resulting row, so its gate must depend only on the persisted\n * result — never on raw request input. Narrowing the params to `currentObject` makes that\n * guarantee structural. (It also keeps this type free of the `resources-config` params type,\n * which would be a circular import — `resources-config.shared.schemas` imports FROM here.)\n */\nexport type TokenGenerationCondition = (params: { currentObject: Record<string, any> }) => boolean;\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.resource-config.token-generation */\n\n/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.resource-config.token-generation facet:layer:shared facet:family:resource-config\n *\n * Declarative config for automatic token generation on an operation variant.\n * Placed on CREATE/RESEND-like operations to generate a token as a side-effect.\n *\n * Import from `@wildo-ai/saas-models`; application authors normally provide\n * this shape through an API-call variant in\n * `createResourceConfiguration_Initialization(...)`.\n *\n * The operation pipeline creates the token in the same persistence transaction\n * as the resource mutation, then injects `additionalContext.tokenValue` into\n * post-commit notification dispatch.\n *\n * The contract requires one canonical persisted resource state. It cannot be\n * authored on a collection/aggregate operation, a core bulk mutation, or a\n * variant with `haveBulkOperation: true`; those operations do not expose one\n * unambiguous related resource identity for the generated token.\n *\n * @example\n * `tokenGeneration: { tokenType: MyTokenType.INVITATION, consumptionMode:\n * ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE, expiresIn: { value: 7, unit:\n * DurationUnit.DAYS }, relatedIdField: '_id' }`\n */\nexport type TokenGenerationConfig = {\n    /** Token type identifier (from CoreConsumableTokenTypes or custom app enum) */\n    tokenType: ConsumableTokenTypes;\n\n    /** How the token behaves when used */\n    consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode;\n\n    /**\n     * Expiration duration — static or derived from currentObject.\n     * Units: minutes, hours, or days only. Value must be ≥ 1.\n     * Static: `{ value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS }`\n     * Derived: `(currentObject) => ({ value: currentObject.shareDurationDays, unit: 'days' })`\n     */\n    expiresIn: StaticOrDerived<ExpiresInDuration>;\n\n    /**\n     * Optional gate — mint this token ONLY when the predicate returns truthy against the\n     * post-operation row. Absent = always mint.\n     *\n     * Canonical use: a POLYMORPHIC CREATE (org-member INVITE vs DIRECT-ADD) mints the\n     * single-use accept token ONLY for the INVITED branch. A direct-add (founder / SSO-JIT /\n     * SCIM) persists `ACTIVE` with nothing to accept, so minting a token there would leave a\n     * live single-use accept token dangling on an already-ACTIVE row (a hygiene/security\n     * hole). Keying on the resulting `status` — the semantic driver, uniformly present on\n     * every branch's `currentObject` — auto-covers any future non-INVITED direct-add path.\n     *\n     * @example `({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED`\n     */\n    condition?: TokenGenerationCondition;\n\n    /**\n     * Roles granted when the token is used for authentication.\n     * Static: `[{ roles: ['ORG_MEMBER'], relatedPrimaryScope: 'ORGANIZATIONS' }]`\n     * Derived: `(currentObject) => [{ roles: [currentObject.assignedRole], relatedPrimaryScope: 'ORGANIZATIONS' }]`\n     */\n    grantedRoles?: StaticOrDerived<ExecutionContext_RoleInfo[]>;\n\n    /** Max uses for BOUNDED_REUSE mode. Required when consumptionMode is BOUNDED_REUSE. */\n    maxUses?: number;\n\n    /** Revoke existing tokens of same type for same relatedId before creating new one (e.g., RESEND) */\n    revokeExistingForSameRelated?: boolean;\n\n    /** Field in currentState to use as relatedId. Defaults to '_id' (the resource's own ID). */\n    relatedIdField?: string;\n\n    /**\n     * Field in currentState to capture as the token's userId (user_self pattern).\n     * e.g., 'invitedUserId' — if not set, no userId stored on token.\n     */\n    userIdField?: string;\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: Marks the generated token as exchangeable for a one-off session JWT.\n     * When true, the token can be used via POST /auth/one-off-session/exchange.\n     */\n    createsOneOffSession?: boolean;\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: When the token is consumed — at exchange time or at target operation time.\n     * Required when `createsOneOffSession` is true.\n     * - `EXCHANGE`: consumed immediately when exchanged for a JWT (no token carried into session)\n     * - `TARGET_OPERATION`: carried through the session, consumed when the target operation executes\n     */\n    consumeAt?: 'EXCHANGE' | 'TARGET_OPERATION';\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: Builds targeting.initiatorIds for frontend URL resolution.\n     * Maps field identifier names to field paths in currentState.\n     * organizationId is auto-included from execution context if not specified.\n     *\n     * Example: `{ taskId: '_id' }` → on a Tasks resource, reads `currentState._id` as the taskId.\n     * The frontend uses these to resolve the target URL after session exchange.\n     */\n    targetingFields?: Record<string, string>;\n\n    /**\n     * Public path of the frontend page that consumes this token (e.g. `/invitation`).\n     * When set, the notification dispatcher builds\n     * `additionalContext.acceptUrl = <frontendPublicUrl><emailLinkPath>?token=<tokenValue>`\n     * for the token-bearing notification email, so the recipient can act on the\n     * token straight from the email. Without it, only the raw `tokenValue` is\n     * exposed and the email falls back to its generic (sign-in) CTA. Use a stable\n     * framework route — the backend cannot import frontend route constants.\n     */\n    emailLinkPath?: string;\n};\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.resource-config.token-generation */\n\n/**\n * Declarative config for automatic token revocation on an operation variant.\n * Placed on DELETE-like operations to revoke associated tokens before the resource is removed.\n *\n * Pipeline placement: BEFORE the core operation (pre-operation step).\n * Like token generation, revocation requires one canonical current resource\n * state and cannot be combined with collection/aggregate or authored/generated\n * bulk mutation semantics. It also cannot run on CREATE because no current\n * resource exists before persistence.\n */\nexport type TokenRevocationConfig = {\n    /** Which token types to revoke when this operation executes */\n    tokenTypes: ConsumableTokenTypes[];\n\n    /** Field in currentState to use as relatedId for revocation lookup. Defaults to '_id'. */\n    relatedIdField?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * How a consumable token interacts with JWT/API-key authentication on an operation.\n * ALTERNATIVE: token alone is sufficient (replaces JWT). Used by PASSWORD_RESET, MAGIC_LINK, etc.\n * ADDITIVE: token is required ON TOP of JWT auth. Used by one-off session target operations.\n */\nexport enum TokenAuthenticationPolicy {\n    ALTERNATIVE = 'ALTERNATIVE',\n    ADDITIVE = 'ADDITIVE',\n}\n\n/**\n * Declarative config declaring that an operation accepts consumable tokens for authentication.\n * Replaces the old `ResourceConfiguration_OperationVariant_ApiCall_ConsumableToken`.\n *\n * NOTE: No `isConsumed` field — consumption is controlled by the token user's `consumptionMode`\n * (set at creation time), not by the operation config. This avoids contradictions between config\n * and entity state (Trap 5).\n */\nexport type TokenAuthenticationConfig = {\n    /** Which token types this operation accepts for authentication */\n    types: ConsumableTokenTypes[];\n    policy: TokenAuthenticationPolicy;\n};\n"]}
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Single-use,\n     * short-TTL; its metadata binds the code to the authenticated `userId`, the requesting\n     * `clientId`, the granted `scope`, the `redirectUri`, the PKCE `codeChallenge`, and the\n     * optional `nonce`. Redeemed at the token endpoint for an ID token + access + refresh.\n     */\n    OIDC_AUTHORIZATION_CODE        = 'oidc_authorization_code',\n    /**\n     * OIDC interactive-consent request (Wildo-as-provider authorization_code consent gate). Minted at\n     * `/oauth/authorize` for a client whose `requiresConsent` is true, INSTEAD of auto-issuing the\n     * code. Single-use, short-TTL; its metadata carries the SAME authorization request the code would\n     * bind (`clientId`, `scope`, `redirectUri`, `codeChallenge`, `nonce?`, `resource?`, `state?`)\n     * plus the authenticated `userId`. Consumed at `/oauth/authorize/decision`: on APPROVE it mints\n     * the authorization code from the stored request; on DENY the flow ends with `access_denied`.\n     * Storing the request server-side means the consent decision cannot tamper with the parameters.\n     */\n    OIDC_CONSENT_REQUEST           = 'oidc_consent_request',\n    /**\n     * OIDC RP-Initiated Logout confirmation (revocation-C §6 — the logout-confirmation prompt that\n     * mitigates BROWSER-based logout CSRF; a cross-origin page cannot read this token from the victim's\n     * URL to complete the confirm). Minted at `GET /oauth/end-session` for any request that is NOT a\n     * trusted RP logout (no/forged `id_token_hint`, or a valid hint whose `post_logout_redirect_uri`\n     * is absent / unregistered / mismatched), INSTEAD of terminating the session inline. Single-use,\n     * short-TTL; its metadata carries the already-validated `{ userId?, sessionId? }` the confirm step\n     * acts on (storing it server-side means the confirmation cannot tamper with WHICH session ends).\n     * Consumed at `POST /oauth/end-session/confirm`: on confirm it terminates that session (if any) and\n     * lands on `/oauth/logged-out`. A trusted RP logout (valid hint + exact-match registered redirect)\n     * skips this entirely and terminates + redirects to the RP directly — the Keycloak-style posture.\n     */\n    OIDC_LOGOUT_CONFIRMATION       = 'oidc_logout_confirmation',\n    /**\n     * A single-use grant to upload ONE file into ONE resource file field, minted by a principal who\n     * could perform the target CREATE/UPDATE and redeemed by whoever holds it — an AI agent's `curl`,\n     * or a human on the drop page — without the minter's own credential ever leaving the server.\n     *\n     * Exists because MCP tool arguments are model-generated JSON and cannot carry bytes; see #312.\n     * `SINGLE_USE` only (a reusable upload credential is the presigned-URL defect rebuilt inside\n     * the API). Typed fields carry identity — `userId`/`organizationId`/`roles` snapshot of the\n     * minter, `resourceIdentifier` = target resource, `relatedId` = target row for UPDATE — and\n     * `metadata` carries the ROUTE binding (`fieldName`, `operation`, `minter`, `producedFileId`),\n     * which the upload middleware checks and the identity layer deliberately ignores. Lifetime is\n     * bounded at the mint by `FILE_UPLOAD_GRANT_ABSOLUTE_MAX_MINUTES`, rejecting rather than\n     * clamping: this credential is designed to leave the trust boundary (a transcript, a shell\n     * history), so the engine owns the bound.\n     */\n    FILE_UPLOAD_GRANT              = 'file_upload_grant',\n}\n\nexport const ConsumableTokenTypesSchema = z.union([\n    z.enum(CoreConsumableTokenTypes),\n    z.string().min(1),\n]);\n\n\nexport type ConsumableTokenTypes = z.infer<typeof ConsumableTokenTypesSchema>;\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// CONSUMPTION MODE — Three behavioral categories for token lifecycle\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Defines how a token behaves when used.\n *\n * - `SINGLE_USE`: Consumed after first successful use (password reset, invitation acceptance)\n * - `BOUNDED_REUSE`: Can be used N times or until expiry (file sharing link, meeting join link)\n * - `EPHEMERAL_STATE`: Carries state through a redirect, consumed on callback (OAuth state, payment callback)\n */\nexport enum ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode {\n    SINGLE_USE      = 'SINGLE_USE',\n    BOUNDED_REUSE   = 'BOUNDED_REUSE',\n    EPHEMERAL_STATE = 'EPHEMERAL_STATE',\n}\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// UTILITY TYPE — StaticOrDerived<T>\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * A value that can either be provided statically or derived from the operation result at runtime.\n *\n * Static:  `{ value: 7, unit: 'days' }`\n * Derived: `(currentObject) => ({ value: currentObject.shareDurationDays, unit: 'days' })`\n *\n * NOTE: This is intentionally NOT `ResourceConfiguration_FunctionWithContextNeeds` (R5).\n * `FunctionWithContextNeeds` wraps functions with metadata flags (`needsObjectContext`, `needsUserContext`)\n * for factory introspection. `StaticOrDerived<T>` is simpler — it's just \"literal value OR function from\n * currentObject\" with no metadata flags. The factory marks dynamic values as `_isDynamic` during\n * processing, which is a different mechanism entirely.\n */\nexport type StaticOrDerived<T> = T | ((currentObject: Record<string, any>) => T);\n\n\n// ============================================================================\n// DECLARATIVE CONFIG TYPES — For operation variant configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.resource-config.token-generation facet:layer:shared facet:family:resource-config\n *\n * Config-declared gate deciding whether a `tokenGeneration` side-effect actually\n * mints a token, evaluated against the POST-operation row (`currentObject`).\n *\n * WHY the destructured params-object shape `({ currentObject }) => boolean` and NOT\n * the positional `StaticOrDerived` shape used by `expiresIn`/`grantedRoles` above (R5):\n * this deliberately mirrors the operation-variant `enabledCondition` predicate (see the\n * org-members REVOKE/RESEND configs) so an app author writes ONE predicate form for every\n * \"config-declared gate over currentObject\". The trade-off is worth it — cross-surface\n * authoring consistency beats intra-type consistency with the positional derivers.\n *\n * WHY the params object carries ONLY `currentObject` (unlike the notification `condition`,\n * which also gets `inputDto`/`objectContext`/`initiatorIds`): a token is a PERSISTED\n * side-effect keyed on the resulting row, so its gate must depend only on the persisted\n * result — never on raw request input. Narrowing the params to `currentObject` makes that\n * guarantee structural. (It also keeps this type free of the `resources-config` params type,\n * which would be a circular import — `resources-config.shared.schemas` imports FROM here.)\n */\nexport type TokenGenerationCondition = (params: { currentObject: Record<string, any> }) => boolean;\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.resource-config.token-generation */\n\n/** @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.resource-config.token-generation facet:layer:shared facet:family:resource-config\n *\n * Declarative config for automatic token generation on an operation variant.\n * Placed on CREATE/RESEND-like operations to generate a token as a side-effect.\n *\n * Import from `@wildo-ai/saas-models`; application authors normally provide\n * this shape through an API-call variant in\n * `createResourceConfiguration_Initialization(...)`.\n *\n * The operation pipeline creates the token in the same persistence transaction\n * as the resource mutation, then injects `additionalContext.tokenValue` into\n * post-commit notification dispatch.\n *\n * The contract requires one canonical persisted resource state. It cannot be\n * authored on a collection/aggregate operation, a core bulk mutation, or a\n * variant with `haveBulkOperation: true`; those operations do not expose one\n * unambiguous related resource identity for the generated token.\n *\n * @example\n * `tokenGeneration: { tokenType: MyTokenType.INVITATION, consumptionMode:\n * ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE, expiresIn: { value: 7, unit:\n * DurationUnit.DAYS }, relatedIdField: '_id' }`\n */\nexport type TokenGenerationConfig = {\n    /** Token type identifier (from CoreConsumableTokenTypes or custom app enum) */\n    tokenType: ConsumableTokenTypes;\n\n    /** How the token behaves when used */\n    consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode;\n\n    /**\n     * Expiration duration — static or derived from currentObject.\n     * Units: minutes, hours, or days only. Value must be ≥ 1.\n     * Static: `{ value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS }`\n     * Derived: `(currentObject) => ({ value: currentObject.shareDurationDays, unit: 'days' })`\n     */\n    expiresIn: StaticOrDerived<ExpiresInDuration>;\n\n    /**\n     * Optional gate — mint this token ONLY when the predicate returns truthy against the\n     * post-operation row. Absent = always mint.\n     *\n     * Canonical use: a POLYMORPHIC CREATE (org-member INVITE vs DIRECT-ADD) mints the\n     * single-use accept token ONLY for the INVITED branch. A direct-add (founder / SSO-JIT /\n     * SCIM) persists `ACTIVE` with nothing to accept, so minting a token there would leave a\n     * live single-use accept token dangling on an already-ACTIVE row (a hygiene/security\n     * hole). Keying on the resulting `status` — the semantic driver, uniformly present on\n     * every branch's `currentObject` — auto-covers any future non-INVITED direct-add path.\n     *\n     * @example `({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED`\n     */\n    condition?: TokenGenerationCondition;\n\n    /**\n     * Roles granted when the token is used for authentication.\n     * Static: `[{ roles: ['ORG_MEMBER'], relatedPrimaryScope: 'ORGANIZATIONS' }]`\n     * Derived: `(currentObject) => [{ roles: [currentObject.assignedRole], relatedPrimaryScope: 'ORGANIZATIONS' }]`\n     */\n    grantedRoles?: StaticOrDerived<ExecutionContext_RoleInfo[]>;\n\n    /** Max uses for BOUNDED_REUSE mode. Required when consumptionMode is BOUNDED_REUSE. */\n    maxUses?: number;\n\n    /** Revoke existing tokens of same type for same relatedId before creating new one (e.g., RESEND) */\n    revokeExistingForSameRelated?: boolean;\n\n    /** Field in currentState to use as relatedId. Defaults to '_id' (the resource's own ID). */\n    relatedIdField?: string;\n\n    /**\n     * Field in currentState to capture as the token's userId (user_self pattern).\n     * e.g., 'invitedUserId' — if not set, no userId stored on token.\n     */\n    userIdField?: string;\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: Marks the generated token as exchangeable for a one-off session JWT.\n     * When true, the token can be used via POST /auth/one-off-session/exchange.\n     */\n    createsOneOffSession?: boolean;\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: When the token is consumed — at exchange time or at target operation time.\n     * Required when `createsOneOffSession` is true.\n     * - `EXCHANGE`: consumed immediately when exchanged for a JWT (no token carried into session)\n     * - `TARGET_OPERATION`: carried through the session, consumed when the target operation executes\n     */\n    consumeAt?: 'EXCHANGE' | 'TARGET_OPERATION';\n\n    /**\n     * W7.3b: Builds targeting.initiatorIds for frontend URL resolution.\n     * Maps field identifier names to field paths in currentState.\n     * organizationId is auto-included from execution context if not specified.\n     *\n     * Example: `{ taskId: '_id' }` → on a Tasks resource, reads `currentState._id` as the taskId.\n     * The frontend uses these to resolve the target URL after session exchange.\n     */\n    targetingFields?: Record<string, string>;\n\n    /**\n     * Public path of the frontend page that consumes this token (e.g. `/invitation`).\n     * When set, the notification dispatcher builds\n     * `additionalContext.acceptUrl = <frontendPublicUrl><emailLinkPath>?token=<tokenValue>`\n     * for the token-bearing notification email, so the recipient can act on the\n     * token straight from the email. Without it, only the raw `tokenValue` is\n     * exposed and the email falls back to its generic (sign-in) CTA. Use a stable\n     * framework route — the backend cannot import frontend route constants.\n     */\n    emailLinkPath?: string;\n};\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.resource-config.token-generation */\n\n/**\n * Declarative config for automatic token revocation on an operation variant.\n * Placed on DELETE-like operations to revoke associated tokens before the resource is removed.\n *\n * Pipeline placement: BEFORE the core operation (pre-operation step).\n * Like token generation, revocation requires one canonical current resource\n * state and cannot be combined with collection/aggregate or authored/generated\n * bulk mutation semantics. It also cannot run on CREATE because no current\n * resource exists before persistence.\n */\nexport type TokenRevocationConfig = {\n    /** Which token types to revoke when this operation executes */\n    tokenTypes: ConsumableTokenTypes[];\n\n    /** Field in currentState to use as relatedId for revocation lookup. Defaults to '_id'. */\n    relatedIdField?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * How a consumable token interacts with JWT/API-key authentication on an operation.\n * ALTERNATIVE: token alone is sufficient (replaces JWT). Used by PASSWORD_RESET, MAGIC_LINK, etc.\n * ADDITIVE: token is required ON TOP of JWT auth. Used by one-off session target operations.\n */\nexport enum TokenAuthenticationPolicy {\n    ALTERNATIVE = 'ALTERNATIVE',\n    ADDITIVE = 'ADDITIVE',\n}\n\n/**\n * Declarative config declaring that an operation accepts consumable tokens for authentication.\n * Replaces the old `ResourceConfiguration_OperationVariant_ApiCall_ConsumableToken`.\n *\n * NOTE: No `isConsumed` field — consumption is controlled by the token user's `consumptionMode`\n * (set at creation time), not by the operation config. This avoids contradictions between config\n * and entity state (Trap 5).\n */\nexport type TokenAuthenticationConfig = {\n    /** Which token types this operation accepts for authentication */\n    types: ConsumableTokenTypes[];\n    policy: TokenAuthenticationPolicy;\n};\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/cross-frontend-handoff.shared.dto.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/password-reset.shared.dto.schemas.d.ts.map

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+{"version":3,"file":"password-reset.shared.dto.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/security/authentications/password-reset.shared.dto.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAOxB;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B;;iBAIxC,CAAC;AAGH,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC;AAEpF;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B;;;iBAGzC,CAAC;AAGH,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC;AAMtF;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,kCAAkC;;;iBAO7C,CAAC;AAGH,MAAM,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,kCAAkC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/registration.shared.dto.schemas.d.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ export declare const UserRegisterApiDtoSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     lastName: z.ZodString;
     password: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     organizationName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    method: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodEnum<typeof AuthMethod>>;
 }, z.core.$strip>;
 export type UserRegisterApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserRegisterApiDtoSchema>;
 /**

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/registration.shared.dto.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/security/authentications/registration.shared.dto.schemas.js

@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ export const UserRegisterApiDtoSchema = z.object({
     password: z.string().min(1).optional(),
     /** W6.2: Org name when orgNameSource is 'ask'. */
     organizationName: z.string().min(1).max(200).optional(),
+    /**
+     * How the registrant will authenticate afterwards (#463). Absent ⇒ PASSWORD, so a client that
+     * predates password-less signup keeps working unchanged.
+     *
+     * Typed as the whole `AuthMethod` vocabulary rather than a narrowed subset, deliberately: the set
+     * a given application accepts is `registration.allowedMethods`, which is per user type and
+     * authored, and duplicating a narrower list here would be a second place for it to drift. A method
+     * this application does not allow is refused by the service with the allowed set in the message,
+     * which is a better answer than a schema rejection that cannot say what IS allowed.
+     */
+    method: z.enum(AuthMethod).optional(),
 });
 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 // Invitation Acceptance DTOs

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/registration.shared.dto.schemas.js.map

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Frontend: AutomatedForm schema (all 5 fields rendered)\n * - Backend: req.body parsing (minus confirmPassword)\n *\n * confirmPassword is a frontend-only field for client-side match validation.\n * The .refine() for password match is applied at the component level\n * (not here) because the error message needs i18n.\n * The .isPassword() decorator tells FormField to render password inputs.\n */\nexport const UserRegisterFormDtoSchema = z.object({\n  email: z.email().toLowerCase().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.EMAIL },\n  }),\n  firstName: z.string().min(1).max(50).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.GIVEN_NAME },\n  }),\n  lastName: z.string().min(1).max(50).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.FAMILY_NAME },\n  }),\n  /** W6.2: Org name when orgNameSource is 'ask'. 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Name/password fields are optional\n * because an existing invited user may only need to confirm the invitation, while a new\n * invited user can provide profile/password data in the same flow.\n *\n * confirmPassword is frontend-only and excluded from the API DTO.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationFormDtoSchema = z.object({\n  // Required, mirroring registration: the invitee establishes their identity at acceptance, and\n  // the profile seed keys on non-empty first+last (UserProfileSchema requires both).\n  // `.regex(/\\S/)` rejects a WHITESPACE-ONLY name client-side — which `.min(1)` alone would PASS\n  // (\"  \" has length 2), then the frontend `normalizeText`/`.trim()` collapses it to `undefined`\n  // and the required API DTO 400s AFTER the form said the field was valid. It is a CHECK,\n  // deliberately NOT a `.trim()` TRANSFORM: a transform ahead of `.stringUI()` disrupts the\n  // decorator's introspection surface (`getFieldUIEditConfig`). 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When both `credentialMethod` and\n *   `password` are omitted, intentionally activate with no local credential;\n *   another configured authentication method can establish later sessions.\n * - `MAGIC_LINK` — activate with no local credential; a magic link is emailed and the\n *   session is established when the invitee clicks it.\n * - `PASSKEY` — enroll a NEW WebAuthn credential at accept; the invitation token bootstraps\n *   the session and the passkey is registered as the go-forward credential.\n */\nexport const INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS = [\n  AuthMethod.PASSWORD,\n  AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK,\n  AuthMethod.PASSKEY,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * The subset of {@link AuthMethod} an invitee may establish at accept time. Enterprise-SSO / social-\n * OAuth invitees are routed to the IdP authorize flow, NOT the accept endpoint, so those members are\n * intentionally absent. Single source of truth for BOTH the request DTO (`credentialMethod` enum) and\n * the backend `AcceptInvitationParams.credentialMethod` — so the service signature can never drift\n * wider than the wire contract it is fed from.\n */\nexport type InvitationAcceptCredentialMethod = (typeof INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS)[number];\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/invitation/accept — API contract.\n *\n * `credentialMethod` is optional by design. When absent, a provided `password`\n * establishes a password credential; without one, acceptance activates the\n * membership without a local credential. `MAGIC_LINK` and `PASSKEY` are\n * explicit because they initiate method-specific work.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationApiDtoSchema = z.object({\n  invitationToken: z.string().min(1),\n  // Required (min 1), mirroring registration — see UserInvitationFormDtoSchema.\n  // `.trim()` before `.min(1)` fail-closes a whitespace-only name at the boundary\n  // (a direct API caller can't seed a blank profile name).\n  firstName: z.string().trim().min(1).max(50),\n  lastName: z.string().trim().min(1).max(50),\n  password: z.string().optional(),\n  credentialMethod: z.enum(INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type UserInvitationApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserInvitationApiDtoSchema>;\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/invitation/reject — API contract.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationRejectApiDtoSchema = z.object({\n  invitationToken: z.string().min(1),\n  rejectionReason: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type UserInvitationRejectApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserInvitationRejectApiDtoSchema>;\n\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n// Email Verification API DTO\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/verify-email — API contract.\n * Token and email are extracted from URL query parameters on the frontend.\n * Email is required for defense-in-depth constant-time comparison against token metadata.\n */\nexport const EmailVerifyDtoSchema = z.object({\n  token: z.string().min(1),\n  email: z.email().toLowerCase(),\n});\n\nexport type EmailVerifyDto = z.infer<typeof EmailVerifyDtoSchema>;\n"]}
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Frontend: AutomatedForm schema (all 5 fields rendered)\n * - Backend: req.body parsing (minus confirmPassword)\n *\n * confirmPassword is a frontend-only field for client-side match validation.\n * The .refine() for password match is applied at the component level\n * (not here) because the error message needs i18n.\n * The .isPassword() decorator tells FormField to render password inputs.\n */\nexport const UserRegisterFormDtoSchema = z.object({\n  email: z.email().toLowerCase().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.EMAIL },\n  }),\n  firstName: z.string().min(1).max(50).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.GIVEN_NAME },\n  }),\n  lastName: z.string().min(1).max(50).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.FAMILY_NAME },\n  }),\n  /** W6.2: Org name when orgNameSource is 'ask'. Conditionally shown on frontend. */\n  organizationName: z.string().min(1).max(200).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.ORGANIZATION },\n  }).optional(),\n  password: z.string().min(1).isPassword().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.NEW_PASSWORD },\n  }).optional(),\n  confirmPassword: z.string().min(1).isPassword().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.NEW_PASSWORD },\n  }).optional(),\n});\n\n\nexport type UserRegisterFormDto = z.infer<typeof UserRegisterFormDtoSchema>;\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/register — API contract (what goes over the wire).\n * Backend uses this for req.body parsing.\n * confirmPassword is NOT sent to the backend.\n */\nexport const UserRegisterApiDtoSchema = z.object({\n  email: z.email().toLowerCase(),\n  firstName: z.string().min(1).max(50),\n  lastName: z.string().min(1).max(50),\n  password: z.string().min(1).optional(),\n  /** W6.2: Org name when orgNameSource is 'ask'. */\n  organizationName: z.string().min(1).max(200).optional(),\n  /**\n   * How the registrant will authenticate afterwards (#463). Absent ⇒ PASSWORD, so a client that\n   * predates password-less signup keeps working unchanged.\n   *\n   * Typed as the whole `AuthMethod` vocabulary rather than a narrowed subset, deliberately: the set\n   * a given application accepts is `registration.allowedMethods`, which is per user type and\n   * authored, and duplicating a narrower list here would be a second place for it to drift. A method\n   * this application does not allow is refused by the service with the allowed set in the message,\n   * which is a better answer than a schema rejection that cannot say what IS allowed.\n   */\n  method: z.enum(AuthMethod).optional(),\n});\n\n\nexport type UserRegisterApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserRegisterApiDtoSchema>;\n\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n// Invitation Acceptance DTOs\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/invitation/accept — public invitation-acceptance form fields.\n *\n * The invitation token identifies the target invitation. Name/password fields are optional\n * because an existing invited user may only need to confirm the invitation, while a new\n * invited user can provide profile/password data in the same flow.\n *\n * confirmPassword is frontend-only and excluded from the API DTO.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationFormDtoSchema = z.object({\n  // Required, mirroring registration: the invitee establishes their identity at acceptance, and\n  // the profile seed keys on non-empty first+last (UserProfileSchema requires both).\n  // `.regex(/\\S/)` rejects a WHITESPACE-ONLY name client-side — which `.min(1)` alone would PASS\n  // (\"  \" has length 2), then the frontend `normalizeText`/`.trim()` collapses it to `undefined`\n  // and the required API DTO 400s AFTER the form said the field was valid. It is a CHECK,\n  // deliberately NOT a `.trim()` TRANSFORM: a transform ahead of `.stringUI()` disrupts the\n  // decorator's introspection surface (`getFieldUIEditConfig`). Trailing/leading whitespace is\n  // normalized at the authoritative boundary (`UserInvitationApiDtoSchema`, `.trim().min(1)`).\n  firstName: z.string().min(1).max(50).regex(/\\S/).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.GIVEN_NAME },\n  }),\n  lastName: z.string().min(1).max(50).regex(/\\S/).stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.FAMILY_NAME },\n  }),\n  password: z.string().isPassword().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.NEW_PASSWORD },\n  }).optional(),\n  confirmPassword: z.string().isPassword().stringUI({\n    edit: { autoComplete: AutocompleteFieldIdentifier.NEW_PASSWORD },\n  }).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type UserInvitationFormDto = z.infer<typeof UserInvitationFormDtoSchema>;\n\n/**\n * The first-factor credential the invitee chooses to establish at acceptance.\n *\n * The invitation-accept endpoint supports exactly three establishment paths (SSO-managed\n * invitees are routed to the IdP's enterprise-authorize flow, NOT this endpoint):\n * - `PASSWORD` — set a password now. When both `credentialMethod` and\n *   `password` are omitted, intentionally activate with no local credential;\n *   another configured authentication method can establish later sessions.\n * - `MAGIC_LINK` — activate with no local credential; a magic link is emailed and the\n *   session is established when the invitee clicks it.\n * - `PASSKEY` — enroll a NEW WebAuthn credential at accept; the invitation token bootstraps\n *   the session and the passkey is registered as the go-forward credential.\n */\nexport const INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS = [\n  AuthMethod.PASSWORD,\n  AuthMethod.MAGIC_LINK,\n  AuthMethod.PASSKEY,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * The subset of {@link AuthMethod} an invitee may establish at accept time. Enterprise-SSO / social-\n * OAuth invitees are routed to the IdP authorize flow, NOT the accept endpoint, so those members are\n * intentionally absent. Single source of truth for BOTH the request DTO (`credentialMethod` enum) and\n * the backend `AcceptInvitationParams.credentialMethod` — so the service signature can never drift\n * wider than the wire contract it is fed from.\n */\nexport type InvitationAcceptCredentialMethod = (typeof INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS)[number];\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/invitation/accept — API contract.\n *\n * `credentialMethod` is optional by design. When absent, a provided `password`\n * establishes a password credential; without one, acceptance activates the\n * membership without a local credential. `MAGIC_LINK` and `PASSKEY` are\n * explicit because they initiate method-specific work.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationApiDtoSchema = z.object({\n  invitationToken: z.string().min(1),\n  // Required (min 1), mirroring registration — see UserInvitationFormDtoSchema.\n  // `.trim()` before `.min(1)` fail-closes a whitespace-only name at the boundary\n  // (a direct API caller can't seed a blank profile name).\n  firstName: z.string().trim().min(1).max(50),\n  lastName: z.string().trim().min(1).max(50),\n  password: z.string().optional(),\n  credentialMethod: z.enum(INVITATION_ACCEPT_CREDENTIAL_METHODS).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type UserInvitationApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserInvitationApiDtoSchema>;\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/invitation/reject — API contract.\n */\nexport const UserInvitationRejectApiDtoSchema = z.object({\n  invitationToken: z.string().min(1),\n  rejectionReason: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type UserInvitationRejectApiDto = z.infer<typeof UserInvitationRejectApiDtoSchema>;\n\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n// Email Verification API DTO\n// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n\n/**\n * POST /auth/verify-email — API contract.\n * Token and email are extracted from URL query parameters on the frontend.\n * Email is required for defense-in-depth constant-time comparison against token metadata.\n */\nexport const EmailVerifyDtoSchema = z.object({\n  token: z.string().min(1),\n  email: z.email().toLowerCase(),\n});\n\nexport type EmailVerifyDto = z.infer<typeof EmailVerifyDtoSchema>;\n"]}