@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.2 → 1.1.4

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/audit-trail-config.shared.schemas.js

@@ -1,8 +1,24 @@
 import { z } from 'zod';
 /**
+ * @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.audit.trail-config facet:layer:shared facet:audience:app-developer
+ *
  * `AuditTrailConfig` — application-level operator-tunable configuration for the
  * compliance audit-trail subsystem.
  *
+ * ⚠️ **`archiveAfterDays` IS the opt-in, and it never deletes anything.** While it is unset the
+ * archival job still runs and does nothing, and every audit record stays in the primary store
+ * indefinitely — so an application that has never set it is accumulating, not rotating.
+ *
+ * Setting it does not shrink the primary store either. `AUDIT_LOGS` is immutable by invariant: it
+ * has no UPDATE and no DELETE, so records older than the horizon are COPIED to durable archival
+ * artifacts in file storage while the originals remain. The field is named `archiveAfterDays` rather
+ * than `retentionDays` for exactly that reason — nothing is retained-then-deleted, and an operator
+ * expecting the primary store to shrink has misread it.
+ *
+ * The decision is taken at each tick from live configuration, so changing the value takes effect
+ * without a restart, and a misconfigured value cannot orphan the schedule. An application that turns
+ * this on after it already has aged data seeds the archive with a one-off wider look-back run.
+ *
  * Phase 5 / F1 (audit-logging plan). Mirrors {@link DataSeedingConfigSchema} /
  * {@link LifecycleConfigSchema} in shape and intent: a small, OPTIONAL block on
  * the shared application configuration ({@link AppConfiguration_Shared_Schema})
@@ -10,6 +26,11 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
  * `compliance:audit-logs-archive` cron batch — without forking the factory's
  * built-in defaults.
  *
+ * It also carries the subsystem's one EGRESS posture
+ * ({@link allowPrivateNetworkSiemCollectors}), which belongs to the operator rather
+ * than to the tenant who authors a SIEM destination — see that field's own JSDoc
+ * for why the distinction is the whole control.
+ *
  * --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Archival, NOT deletion — audit logs are immutable
  * --------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -70,5 +91,40 @@ export const AuditTrailConfigSchema = z.object({
      * staging/production environment fails startup with a CONFIGURATION error.
      */
     archiveAfterDays: z.number().int().min(1).max(2555).optional(),
+    /**
+     * May a SIEM export deliver to a collector on an address the public internet cannot reach?
+     *
+     * ── What it is for ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+     * A SIEM webhook URL is TENANT-authored (`siemExportConfig.webhookUrl`, written by an organization
+     * administrator) and the delivery worker POSTs to it with the deployment's own network position.
+     * That is a server-side request forgery primitive by construction, and the classic targets are the
+     * ones every guard in `security/ssrf` names: `169.254.169.254`, loopback admin ports, RFC 1918.
+     *
+     * But one legitimate deployment shape genuinely lives there: a self-hosted collector (Splunk,
+     * QRadar, a syslog bridge) on the same private network as the application. Refusing that
+     * unconditionally would not be "safe" — it would break a supported topology and push operators to
+     * a worse workaround.
+     *
+     * ── Why it is an OPERATOR field and not a tenant field ─────────────────────
+     * It lives HERE, on the application configuration the deployment operator authors, and NOT on
+     * `SiemExportConfigBaseSchema`, which the tenant authors. A tenant-settable "allow private
+     * addresses" flag would hand the party supplying the attacker-controlled URL the switch that
+     * disarms the guard aimed at them — an SSRF bypass with a checkbox. The operator declares the
+     * network posture; the tenant chooses a destination within it.
+     *
+     * ── Why OPTIONAL rather than `.default(false)` ─────────────────────────────
+     * The reader tests for `=== true`, so absent is refuse, and the fail-closed posture is the one you
+     * get by doing nothing — the same contract `archiveAfterDays` states one field above. It is left
+     * without a Zod default so `AuditTrailConfigSchema.parse({})` still round-trips as `{}`; an
+     * always-materialised `false` would make the block non-empty for every application that never
+     * authored it, which is what the pin below this schema's tests exists to prevent.
+     *
+     * ── What it does NOT relax ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+     * Not the scheme policy, not the credentials-in-URL refusal, and not the PINNING: the delivery
+     * still connects only to an address classified at the moment of connection. It widens WHICH
+     * addresses are admitted, never whether the admitted address is the one connected to.
+     */
+    allowPrivateNetworkSiemCollectors: z.boolean().optional(),
 });
+/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.audit.trail-config */
 //# sourceMappingURL=audit-trail-config.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/audit-trail-config.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"audit-trail-config.shared.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/compliance/audit-trails/audit-trail-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgBG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;IAE9D;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgCG;IACH,iCAAiC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;CAC1D,CAAC,CAAC;AAGH,4DAA4D","sourcesContent":["import { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * @wildo_source:part:start saas.models.audit.trail-config facet:layer:shared facet:audience:app-developer\n *\n * `AuditTrailConfig` — application-level operator-tunable configuration for the\n * compliance audit-trail subsystem.\n *\n * ⚠️ **`archiveAfterDays` IS the opt-in, and it never deletes anything.** While it is unset the\n * archival job still runs and does nothing, and every audit record stays in the primary store\n * indefinitely — so an application that has never set it is accumulating, not rotating.\n *\n * Setting it does not shrink the primary store either. `AUDIT_LOGS` is immutable by invariant: it\n * has no UPDATE and no DELETE, so records older than the horizon are COPIED to durable archival\n * artifacts in file storage while the originals remain. The field is named `archiveAfterDays` rather\n * than `retentionDays` for exactly that reason — nothing is retained-then-deleted, and an operator\n * expecting the primary store to shrink has misread it.\n *\n * The decision is taken at each tick from live configuration, so changing the value takes effect\n * without a restart, and a misconfigured value cannot orphan the schedule. An application that turns\n * this on after it already has aged data seeds the archive with a one-off wider look-back run.\n *\n * Phase 5 / F1 (audit-logging plan). Mirrors {@link DataSeedingConfigSchema} /\n * {@link LifecycleConfigSchema} in shape and intent: a small, OPTIONAL block on\n * the shared application configuration ({@link AppConfiguration_Shared_Schema})\n * that tunes an engine-owned background batch — here the\n * `compliance:audit-logs-archive` cron batch — without forking the factory's\n * built-in defaults.\n *\n * It also carries the subsystem's one EGRESS posture\n * ({@link allowPrivateNetworkSiemCollectors}), which belongs to the operator rather\n * than to the tenant who authors a SIEM destination — see that field's own JSDoc\n * for why the distinction is the whole control.\n *\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * Archival, NOT deletion — audit logs are immutable\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * The `AUDIT_LOGS` resource is IMMUTABLE by invariant (G5): its\n * `coreOperations` are `READ | LIST | SEARCH | CREATE` — there is NO `UPDATE`\n * and NO `DELETE`. The retention mechanism therefore NEVER removes audit\n * records from the primary store. Instead, records older than\n * {@link archiveAfterDays} are EXPORTED (copied) to durable off-DB archival\n * artifacts in file storage by the archival batch, while the original rows\n * remain in the always-on `AUDIT_LOGS` store (and, when configured, in the\n * append-only immudb tamper-proof ledger). This is why the field is named\n * `archiveAfterDays` and not `retentionDays`: nothing is retained-then-deleted;\n * the value is purely the ARCHIVAL HORIZON. (The distinction mirrors the\n * `archiveAfterDays` vs `retentionDays` split in the general\n * `DataRetentionPolicySchema`.)\n *\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * Why the config lives in `saas-models` (not next to the batch)\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * The runtime wiring (`StartApplicationBackendService.initialize`) and the\n * batch body read operator-tunable configuration EXCLUSIVELY from\n * `appConfigService.config?.*` — i.e. the {@link AppConfiguration_Shared_Schema}\n * aggregate. Placing the schema here (rather than in `saas-backend-lib` next to\n * the batch) keeps every operator-tunable engine batch symmetric with\n * `dataSeeding` / `lifecycle` and gives one source of truth the batch factory\n * and the startup validator can both import (`saas-models` cannot depend on\n * `saas-backend-lib` — the dependency arrow points the other way).\n *\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * Bounds + production floor\n * --------------------------------------------------------------------------\n * {@link archiveAfterDays} bounds mirror the SSO `auditConfig.retentionDays`\n * precedent (min 1 day, max 2555 ≈ 7 years). A stricter PRODUCTION FLOOR (365\n * days) is enforced at boot by\n * `ApplicationStartupConfigValidatorService.validate()` — NOT by a schema-level\n * `.min()` and NOT by a Zod `.superRefine()`, because the environment\n * (development vs staging/production) is a RUNTIME signal\n * (`process.env.APPLICATION_ENV`) that a pure, environment-agnostic shared\n * schema must not read. The schema `.min(1)` is the absolute floor; the runtime\n * validator raises it to 365 outside development.\n */\nexport const AuditTrailConfigSchema = z.object({\n  /**\n   * Age (in days) beyond which audit records are EXPORTED to durable archival\n   * file-storage artifacts by the `compliance:audit-logs-archive` cron batch.\n   *\n   * Records are NEVER deleted from the primary `AUDIT_LOGS` store — this is the\n   * archival horizon only (see the block-level JSDoc on why the field is\n   * `archiveAfterDays`, not `retentionDays`).\n   *\n   * OPTIONAL — when omitted (`undefined`), NO archival runs and audit records\n   * are retained in the primary store indefinitely. This is the compliance-safe\n   * default: an operator must explicitly opt in before any archival happens.\n   *\n   * Bounds: min 1 / max 2555 (≈ 7 years), mirroring the SSO\n   * `auditConfig.retentionDays` precedent. A production floor of 365 days is\n   * enforced at boot (see block-level JSDoc) — setting a value below 365 in a\n   * staging/production environment fails startup with a CONFIGURATION error.\n   */\n  archiveAfterDays: z.number().int().min(1).max(2555).optional(),\n\n  /**\n   * May a SIEM export deliver to a collector on an address the public internet cannot reach?\n   *\n   * ── What it is for ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n   * A SIEM webhook URL is TENANT-authored (`siemExportConfig.webhookUrl`, written by an organization\n   * administrator) and the delivery worker POSTs to it with the deployment's own network position.\n   * That is a server-side request forgery primitive by construction, and the classic targets are the\n   * ones every guard in `security/ssrf` names: `169.254.169.254`, loopback admin ports, RFC 1918.\n   *\n   * But one legitimate deployment shape genuinely lives there: a self-hosted collector (Splunk,\n   * QRadar, a syslog bridge) on the same private network as the application. Refusing that\n   * unconditionally would not be \"safe\" — it would break a supported topology and push operators to\n   * a worse workaround.\n   *\n   * ── Why it is an OPERATOR field and not a tenant field ─────────────────────\n   * It lives HERE, on the application configuration the deployment operator authors, and NOT on\n   * `SiemExportConfigBaseSchema`, which the tenant authors. A tenant-settable \"allow private\n   * addresses\" flag would hand the party supplying the attacker-controlled URL the switch that\n   * disarms the guard aimed at them — an SSRF bypass with a checkbox. The operator declares the\n   * network posture; the tenant chooses a destination within it.\n   *\n   * ── Why OPTIONAL rather than `.default(false)` ─────────────────────────────\n   * The reader tests for `=== true`, so absent is refuse, and the fail-closed posture is the one you\n   * get by doing nothing — the same contract `archiveAfterDays` states one field above. It is left\n   * without a Zod default so `AuditTrailConfigSchema.parse({})` still round-trips as `{}`; an\n   * always-materialised `false` would make the block non-empty for every application that never\n   * authored it, which is what the pin below this schema's tests exists to prevent.\n   *\n   * ── What it does NOT relax ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n   * Not the scheme policy, not the credentials-in-URL refusal, and not the PINNING: the delivery\n   * still connects only to an address classified at the moment of connection. It widens WHICH\n   * addresses are admitted, never whether the admitted address is the one connected to.\n   */\n  allowPrivateNetworkSiemCollectors: z.boolean().optional(),\n});\n\nexport type AuditTrailConfig = z.infer<typeof AuditTrailConfigSchema>;\n/** @wildo_source:part:end saas.models.audit.trail-config */\n"]}