@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.1 → 1.1.3

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY\n * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The\n * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are\n * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients\nexport enum AppOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n}\n\ntype AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/*\nApplication OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n  AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  /**\n   * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n   * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the\n   * ordinary API_CALL path.\n   *\n   * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows\n   * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into\n   * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a\n   * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in\n   * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this\n   * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that\n   * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this\n   * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.\n   */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws\n    // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: false,\n          searchableFields: [],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n    // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application\n    // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}
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* Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY\n * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The\n * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are\n * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients\nexport enum AppOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/*\nApplication OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n  AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  /**\n   * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n   * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the\n   * ordinary API_CALL path.\n   *\n   * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows\n   * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into\n   * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a\n   * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in\n   * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this\n   * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that\n   * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this\n   * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.\n   */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws\n    // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: false,\n          searchableFields: [],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n    // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application\n    // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ import { ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
 import { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';
 export declare enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {
     ROTATE = "rotate",// Generate new secret and invalidate old one
-    REGENERATE = "regenerate"
+    REGENERATE = "regenerate",// Generate new secret without invalidating old one
+    EXPIRE = "expire"
 }
 type OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations = CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;
 export declare const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory: (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => import("../..").ResourceConfiguration<typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations, OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations, z.ZodObject<{
@@ -38,6 +39,8 @@ export declare const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory:
     previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
     previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenHash: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("./oauth-clients.shared.schemas").OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
     scope: z.ZodLiteral<import("../..").ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION>;
     organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAEL,iBAAiB,EAClB,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAC1F,OAAO,EAAoD,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAMlI,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,wCAAwC,CAAC;AA0BxF,oBAAY,0BAA0B;IACpC,MAAM,WAAW,CAAE,6CAA6C;IAChE,UAAU,eAAe;CAC1B;AAED,KAAK,6BAA6B,GAC9B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,GAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,GAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;AAKhC,eAAO,MAAM,0DAA0D,GAAI,wBAAwB,oBAAoB,EAAE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBA2UvH,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAEL,iBAAiB,EAClB,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAExC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAC1F,OAAO,EAAoD,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAMlI,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,wCAAwC,CAAC;AA0BxF,oBAAY,0BAA0B;IACpC,MAAM,WAAW,CAAE,6CAA6C;IAChE,UAAU,eAAe,CAAE,mDAAmD;IAC9E,MAAM,WAAW;CAClB;AAED,KAAK,6BAA6B,GAC9B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,GAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,GAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,GAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;AAKhC,eAAO,MAAM,0DAA0D,GAAI,wBAAwB,oBAAoB,EAAE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAwWvH,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export var OrgOAuthClients_Operations;
 (function (OrgOAuthClients_Operations) {
     OrgOAuthClients_Operations["ROTATE"] = "rotate";
     OrgOAuthClients_Operations["REGENERATE"] = "regenerate";
+    OrgOAuthClients_Operations["EXPIRE"] = "expire";
 })(OrgOAuthClients_Operations || (OrgOAuthClients_Operations = {}));
 /*
 Organization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory
@@ -176,6 +177,34 @@ export const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resou
                 }
             ]
         },
+        /**
+         * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed
+         * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:
+         * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has
+         * passed.
+         *
+         * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.
+         * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation
+         * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an
+         * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.
+         */
+        [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`
+                    // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field
+                    // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without
+                    // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL
+                    // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.
+                    requestDto: z.object({}),
+                }
+            ],
+        },
         [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {
             variants: [
                 {

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus\n * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS\n * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'] as const;\n\n// Org members get basic filter fields\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  name: z.string(),\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n};\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n  createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date\n  updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients\nexport enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n}\n\ntype OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n  OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the\n          // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists\n          // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).\n          // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org\n          // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of\n          // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin\n          // default:\n          //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future\n          //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the\n          //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only\n          //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window\n          //    capability the default variant exposes.\n          //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to\n          //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the\n          //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an\n          //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the\n          //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.\n          // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security\n          // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES\n          // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the\n          // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the\n          // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through \"regenerate\".\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}
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* Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus\n * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS\n * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for organization OAuth clients\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'name', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt'] as const;\n\n// Org members get basic filter fields\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  name: z.string(),\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n};\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  ...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n  createdAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by creation date\n  updatedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by update date\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = [...ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS, 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization OAuth clients\nexport enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n  EXPIRE = 'expire', // ACTIVE → EXPIRED once `expiresAt` has passed (dispatched by the sweep, not by an operator)\n}\n\ntype OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n  OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_ORGANIZATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Organization OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrgOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          // Feature usage accounting counts org OAuth clients through the\n          // repository layer. This operation does not need public HTTP exposure.\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Organization admins can view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also view\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list to see clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can also list\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can create clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can create for any org\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (it exists\n          // nowhere else after this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted).\n          // Security decision: an app-super-admin creating a client for another org\n          // DOES receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of\n          // the default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can delete clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can delete any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          haveBulkOperation: true,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * ACTIVE → EXPIRED, dispatched by the credential-expiry sweep once `expiresAt` has passed\n     * (#413). INTERNAL_CALL, so no HTTP route is mounted and no frontend affordance is offered:\n     * the sweep is the only caller, and there is no reason for a human to declare that a date has\n     * passed.\n     *\n     * It exists so the sweep writes through a guarded door rather than setting `status` directly.\n     * The ACTIVE-only precondition lives in the paired prefix implementation\n     * (`oauth-clients.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`) — an INACTIVE client was retired by an\n     * administrator, and relabelling it EXPIRED would erase who ended it.\n     */\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.EXPIRE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // EMPTY BY CONTRACT, not by omission. The credential-expiry sweep dispatches this verb with `{}`\n          // and the paired prefix implementation forces the status transition itself, so there is no field\n          // a caller may supply. Declaring nothing is NOT the same as declaring this: an operation without\n          // a `requestDto` inherits the resource's ENTIRE update contract, which would let an INTERNAL_CALL\n          // that accepts nothing advertise every field — `status` included, the one field this verb owns.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can rotate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can rotate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Request AND response both MIRROR the org-admin\n          // default:\n          //  - requestDto: an app-super-admin can choose the same future\n          //    `oldSecretInvalidationDate` window as an org admin. Without it the\n          //    admin variant would build no request DTO and the impl could only\n          //    default the invalidation to now — silently denying the future-window\n          //    capability the default variant exposes.\n          //  - customResponseDto: without it the admin response falls back to\n          //    `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret` (plus the\n          //    rotated-out client's id + invalidation date). Security decision: an\n          //    app-super-admin rotating another org's client DOES receive the\n          //    plaintext so they can relay it to the org.\n          // Keep both in sync with the default variant above.\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.FRONT_END_SUCCESS,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrgOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only org admins can regenerate secrets\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // App admins can regenerate any org clients\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // Per-variant DTOs are NOT inherited from the default variant — each\n          // variant builds its own. Without this, the admin response falls back to\n          // `mainSchema` and silently strips the one-time `plainSecret`. Security\n          // decision: an app-super-admin regenerating another org's client DOES\n          // receive the plaintext so they can relay it to the org. Mirror of the\n          // default variant's `customResponseDto` above — keep in sync.\n          // `requestDto` mirrors the default variant too: no caller input, so the\n          // cross-tenant variant cannot rewrite `redirectUris` / `roles` through \"regenerate\".\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientOrganizationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_ADMINISTRATIVE,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        },\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: false,\n          variantKey: \"admin\",\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          searchableFields: ['name', 'description', 'clientId'],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORG_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -98,6 +98,67 @@ export declare enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {
  * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.
  */
 export declare function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean;
+/**
+ * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate
+ * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.
+ *
+ * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this
+ * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation
+ * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the
+ * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:
+ *
+ *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).
+ *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1
+ *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network
+ *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.
+ *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native
+ *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.
+ *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a
+ *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.
+ *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).
+ *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).
+ *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a
+ *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.
+ *
+ * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11
+ *
+ * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it
+ * "deliberately" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered
+ * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client
+ * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own
+ * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.
+ *
+ * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps "MAY use whichever redirect option suits their
+ * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details", and private-use URI
+ * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.
+ * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).
+ *
+ * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach
+ * the wrong recipient: "A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that
+ * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app
+ * will receive the authorization code."
+ * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).
+ *
+ * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server
+ * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without
+ * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and
+ * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.
+ *
+ * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's
+ * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an
+ * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app
+ * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.
+ *
+ * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a
+ * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS
+ * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still
+ * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a
+ * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to
+ * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.
+ */
+export declare const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
 export declare function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean;
 /**
  * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).
@@ -134,6 +195,8 @@ export declare const OAuthClientSchemaBase: z.ZodObject<{
     previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
     previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenHash: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
 }, z.core.$strip>;
 export type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;
@@ -158,6 +221,8 @@ export declare const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
     previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenHash: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
     scope: z.ZodLiteral<ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION>;
     organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
@@ -184,6 +249,8 @@ export declare const OAuthClientApplicationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
     previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenHash: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    registrationAccessTokenPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
     registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
     scope: z.ZodLiteral<ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION>;
     applicationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAMlE;;;GAGG;AACH,oBAAY,iBAAiB;IAC3B,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB,OAAO,YAAY;CACpB;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,oBAAY,6BAA6B;IACvC;;;;OAIG;IACH,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB;;;;;OAKG;IACH,OAAO,YAAY;CACpB;AAED,oBAAY,cAAc;IACxB,kBAAkB,uBAAuB;IACzC,kBAAkB,uBAAuB;IACzC,aAAa,kBAAkB;CAChC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,oBAAY,4BAA4B;IACtC,IAAI,SAAS;IACb,mBAAmB,wBAAwB;IAC3C,kBAAkB,uBAAuB;CAC1C;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,qCAAqC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,4BAA4B,GAAG,OAAO,CAEnG;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2DG;AAaH,eAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAiB7D,CAAC;AAeH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAsB7D;AAMD;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBA0LhC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AAEpE,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAGxC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC;AAEpF,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAGvC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js

@@ -168,7 +168,19 @@ export function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method) {
  * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to
  * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.
  */
-const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES = new Set([
+/*
+ * EXPORTED as of 2026-09-02, and the export is the point rather than a convenience.
+ *
+ * This is a closed vocabulary with one named runtime source — the shape `CLAUDE.md` asks for — and it
+ * was reachable by nothing outside this file, so the assurance authority basis could not attest
+ * `WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION` against the set the guard actually branches on. It would
+ * have had to transcribe the schemes into a second list, free to drift from this one, which is the
+ * failure the single-source rule exists to prevent.
+ *
+ * Nothing else may BRANCH on it: the validator below is the only enforcement site. A reader is a
+ * reader — the basis names the members so a programme can say which schemes are refused.
+ */
+export const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES = new Set([
     // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists
     // to close.
     'javascript:',
@@ -360,6 +372,37 @@ export const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({
     // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.
     // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.
     previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // ── Registration access token (RFC 7592) ──────────────────────────────────
+    // The credential a DYNAMICALLY REGISTERED client uses to read, update or delete
+    // its own registration at the client configuration endpoint. Issued once, at
+    // registration, and returned exactly once in the 201 body.
+    //
+    // "registration_access_token: REQUIRED. String containing the access token to be
+    // used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon
+    // the client registration." … "The client MUST use its registration access token
+    // in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token."
+    // spec-cite: RFC 7592 §3 (Client Information Response) and §2 (Client Configuration Endpoint).
+    //
+    // SEPARATE FROM `hashedSecret`, deliberately, and not merely for tidiness. They
+    // authenticate different things: the client secret authenticates the CLIENT at the
+    // token endpoint, while this authenticates a caller's standing to administer the
+    // client's own REGISTRATION. A dynamically registered client is public
+    // (`token_endpoint_auth_method=none`) and never uses its secret at all, so folding
+    // the two together would give a credential two unrelated powers and make
+    // "rotate the secret" silently mean "revoke management access".
+    //
+    // ABSENT on every client that is not dynamically registered — an operator- or
+    // organization-registered client is administered through the ordinary authenticated
+    // resource surface, not through RFC 7592.
+    //
+    // `sha256` hex, matching every other token in this framework: deterministic so a
+    // presented Bearer token resolves by re-hashing and matching, and safe because the
+    // plaintext is 32 random bytes rather than a password.
+    registrationAccessTokenHash: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // First 8 characters of the plaintext, so an operator can identify which token a
+    // client holds without seeing it — the same affordance `secretPrefix` provides for
+    // the client secret. Not a secret; surfaced.
+    registrationAccessTokenPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────
     // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.
     //