@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.1 → 1.1.3

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/m2m-webhook-delivery-contract.shared.js

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../requests/header-keys.shared.js';
+import { APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER } from '../../security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas.js';
+/**
+ * The outbound-webhook wire contract a RECEIVER can rely on.
+ *
+ * This is the single source for every number and name an integrator sees in the
+ * application's customer documentation: the retry ladder, the per-attempt
+ * timeout, the signature header, the JWT claim names and the body-hash
+ * algorithm. The delivery worker (`m2m-webhook-delivery.batch.utils.ts` in the
+ * backend library) derives its tunables from here, and the consumer-fact
+ * catalog projects the same object into the technical documentation, so a
+ * change to the worker's behaviour cannot leave the published contract behind.
+ *
+ * Nothing here is a runtime knob. A generated application does not configure
+ * these values; they describe what every application delivers.
+ */
+export const M2M_WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONTRACT = {
+    /** Total POST attempts per delivery before it is marked terminally failed. */
+    maxAttempts: 5,
+    /**
+     * Delay before each RETRY, indexed by retry number (the first retry waits
+     * `backoffScheduleSeconds[0]`). With `maxAttempts` = 5 there are four retries,
+     * so the ladder is 1 minute, 5 minutes, 30 minutes and 2 hours.
+     */
+    backoffScheduleSeconds: [60, 300, 1800, 7200],
+    /** Hard timeout applied to every outbound POST attempt. */
+    requestTimeoutMs: 30_000,
+    /** The receiver's response body is recorded on the delivery row up to this many bytes. */
+    responseBodyTruncationBytes: 4 * 1024,
+    /** `User-Agent` sent on every outbound webhook POST. */
+    userAgent: 'Wildo-Webhook/1',
+    /** Request header carrying the signature JWT. */
+    signatureHeader: WildoHeaderKeys.X_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE,
+    /** JWS algorithm the signature JWT is signed with. Receivers must pin it. */
+    signatureAlgorithm: 'ES256',
+    /**
+     * Registered-claim values every signature JWT carries. The backend's signing options for the
+     * webhook key are derived from this block, so a receiver that pins these values pins what the
+     * worker actually signs. `expiresIn` outlives the longest scheduled retry (2 hours) by a wide
+     * margin while keeping the replay window short.
+     *
+     * The JWT header's `kid` is deliberately NOT here: the signer sets it to the RFC 7638 thumbprint
+     * of the signing public key, which differs per deployment and changes on rotation. A receiver
+     * must not pin a fixed `kid`; it verifies against `applicationPublicKeyPem` from the webhook
+     * configuration and may use `kid` only to notice that the key changed.
+     */
+    signature: {
+        issuer: APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER,
+        audience: 'WEBHOOK',
+        expiresIn: '6h',
+    },
+    /** Algorithm of the `bodyHash` claim: a hex digest of the exact raw request bytes. */
+    bodyHashAlgorithm: 'sha256',
+    /** Status codes (besides 5xx and transport failures) that schedule another attempt. */
+    retryableHttpStatuses: [408, 429],
+    /**
+     * Names of the claims a receiver reads from the signature JWT. `jti` is the
+     * deduplication key and stays identical across every retry of one delivery;
+     * the registered claims (`iss`, `aud`, `iat`, `exp`) and the header `kid` are refreshed
+     * per attempt.
+     */
+    signatureClaims: {
+        deliveryId: 'jti',
+        bodyHash: 'bodyHash',
+        bodyHashAlgorithm: 'bodyHashAlg',
+        eventChannel: 'eventChannel',
+        resourceIdentifier: 'resourceIdentifier',
+        operationIdentifier: 'operationIdentifier',
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=m2m-webhook-delivery-contract.shared.js.map

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/m2m-webhook-delivery-contract.shared.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"m2m-webhook-delivery-contract.shared.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/notifications/m2m/m2m-webhook-delivery-contract.shared.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AACpE,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,8DAA8D,CAAC;AAEtG;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG;IAC3C,8EAA8E;IAC9E,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;IACd;;;;OAIG;IACH,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAC7C,2DAA2D;IAC3D,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM;IACxB,0FAA0F;IAC1F,2BAA2B,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI;IACrC,wDAAwD;IACxD,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC5B,iDAAiD;IACjD,eAAe,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,mBAAmB;IACpD,6EAA6E;IAC7E,kBAAkB,EAAE,OAAO;IAC3B;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;IACH,SAAS,EAAE;QACT,MAAM,EAAE,sBAAsB;QAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;KAChB;IACD,sFAAsF;IACtF,iBAAiB,EAAE,QAAQ;IAC3B,uFAAuF;IACvF,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC;IACjC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE;QACf,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK;QACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU;QACpB,iBAAiB,EAAE,aAAa;QAChC,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc;QAC5B,kBAAkB,EAAE,oBAAoB;QACxC,mBAAmB,EAAE,qBAAqB;KAC3C;CACO,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../requests/header-keys.shared';\nimport { APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER } from '../../security/authentications/authentication.shared.schemas';\n\n/**\n * The outbound-webhook wire contract a RECEIVER can rely on.\n *\n * This is the single source for every number and name an integrator sees in the\n * application's customer documentation: the retry ladder, the per-attempt\n * timeout, the signature header, the JWT claim names and the body-hash\n * algorithm. The delivery worker (`m2m-webhook-delivery.batch.utils.ts` in the\n * backend library) derives its tunables from here, and the consumer-fact\n * catalog projects the same object into the technical documentation, so a\n * change to the worker's behaviour cannot leave the published contract behind.\n *\n * Nothing here is a runtime knob. A generated application does not configure\n * these values; they describe what every application delivers.\n */\nexport const M2M_WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONTRACT = {\n  /** Total POST attempts per delivery before it is marked terminally failed. */\n  maxAttempts: 5,\n  /**\n   * Delay before each RETRY, indexed by retry number (the first retry waits\n   * `backoffScheduleSeconds[0]`). With `maxAttempts` = 5 there are four retries,\n   * so the ladder is 1 minute, 5 minutes, 30 minutes and 2 hours.\n   */\n  backoffScheduleSeconds: [60, 300, 1800, 7200],\n  /** Hard timeout applied to every outbound POST attempt. */\n  requestTimeoutMs: 30_000,\n  /** The receiver's response body is recorded on the delivery row up to this many bytes. */\n  responseBodyTruncationBytes: 4 * 1024,\n  /** `User-Agent` sent on every outbound webhook POST. */\n  userAgent: 'Wildo-Webhook/1',\n  /** Request header carrying the signature JWT. */\n  signatureHeader: WildoHeaderKeys.X_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE,\n  /** JWS algorithm the signature JWT is signed with. Receivers must pin it. */\n  signatureAlgorithm: 'ES256',\n  /**\n   * Registered-claim values every signature JWT carries. The backend's signing options for the\n   * webhook key are derived from this block, so a receiver that pins these values pins what the\n   * worker actually signs. `expiresIn` outlives the longest scheduled retry (2 hours) by a wide\n   * margin while keeping the replay window short.\n   *\n   * The JWT header's `kid` is deliberately NOT here: the signer sets it to the RFC 7638 thumbprint\n   * of the signing public key, which differs per deployment and changes on rotation. A receiver\n   * must not pin a fixed `kid`; it verifies against `applicationPublicKeyPem` from the webhook\n   * configuration and may use `kid` only to notice that the key changed.\n   */\n  signature: {\n    issuer: APPLICATION_JWT_ISSUER,\n    audience: 'WEBHOOK',\n    expiresIn: '6h',\n  },\n  /** Algorithm of the `bodyHash` claim: a hex digest of the exact raw request bytes. */\n  bodyHashAlgorithm: 'sha256',\n  /** Status codes (besides 5xx and transport failures) that schedule another attempt. */\n  retryableHttpStatuses: [408, 429],\n  /**\n   * Names of the claims a receiver reads from the signature JWT. `jti` is the\n   * deduplication key and stays identical across every retry of one delivery;\n   * the registered claims (`iss`, `aud`, `iat`, `exp`) and the header `kid` are refreshed\n   * per attempt.\n   */\n  signatureClaims: {\n    deliveryId: 'jti',\n    bodyHash: 'bodyHash',\n    bodyHashAlgorithm: 'bodyHashAlg',\n    eventChannel: 'eventChannel',\n    resourceIdentifier: 'resourceIdentifier',\n    operationIdentifier: 'operationIdentifier',\n  },\n} as const;\n\nexport type M2MWebhookDeliveryContract = typeof M2M_WEBHOOK_DELIVERY_CONTRACT;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ export declare const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointRequestDto: z.ZodObject<{
 export declare const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto: z.ZodObject<{
     endpointId: z.ZodString;
     url: z.ZodString;
+    transportIsPlaintext: z.ZodBoolean;
     outcome: z.ZodEnum<typeof WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome>;
     responseStatus: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
     responseBodyTruncated: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,EAEtB,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAQ3D,OAAO,EAAuC,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AAMnH,oBAAY,wBAAwB;IAClC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAeG;IACH,aAAa,iBAAiB;CAC/B;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,oCAAoC;;iBAE/C,CAAC;AAMH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qCAAqC;;;;;;;;;;iBAmBhD,CAAC;AAMH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC,4OAkG7C,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,EAEtB,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAQ3D,OAAO,EAAuC,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AAMnH,oBAAY,wBAAwB;IAClC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAeG;IACH,aAAa,iBAAiB;CAC/B;AAMD,eAAO,MAAM,oCAAoC;;iBAE/C,CAAC;AAMH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qCAAqC;;;;;;;;;;;iBAsChD,CAAC;AAMH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC,4OAkG7C,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -65,6 +65,25 @@ export const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto = z.object({
     endpointId: z.string(),
     /** Destination actually contacted, echoed so the admin can confirm the stored URL. */
     url: z.string(),
+    /**
+     * True when that destination is plaintext `http://`, so the signature JWT travelled in the clear.
+     *
+     * ## Why the exposure is reported HERE (#492)
+     *
+     * Plaintext endpoints are admitted, deliberately, and the reasoning is recorded on
+     * `WebhookEndpointSchema.url`. The cost of admitting them is that the decision becomes invisible:
+     * a documented exposure nobody encounters is the same as an undocumented one, and the JSDoc
+     * reaches only someone reading the schema.
+     *
+     * This probe is the one place an admin acts on a SINGLE endpoint and reads a per-endpoint answer,
+     * so it is where the exposure can actually be met. It rides beside `outcome` rather than replacing
+     * it, because the two say different things: `ACCEPTED` over `http://` is a working endpoint AND a
+     * credential on the wire, and collapsing that into a failure would be false.
+     *
+     * Reported for every outcome, including `NOT_SENT` — the scheme is a property of the stored
+     * destination, not of the attempt, and an admin fixing a signing fault should still be told.
+     */
+    transportIsPlaintext: z.boolean(),
     outcome: z.enum(WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome),
     /** HTTP status returned by the endpoint. Absent for `UNREACHABLE` / `NOT_SENT`. */
     responseStatus: z.number().int().optional(),

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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not externally callable\n *   - UPDATE (REPOSITORY_ONLY)  : admin edits via dedicated endpoint flow (not a public REST PUT)\n *   - TEST_ENDPOINT (custom)    : fires a synthetic delivery to verify URL reachability\n *\n * @see m2m-webhook-organization-delivery.md — Phase 2 / Step 5\n * @see security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  CoreResourceOperation,\n  CoreResourceType,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration, WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome } from './webhook-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// CUSTOM OPERATIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport enum WebhookConfig_Operations {\n  /**\n   * Synthetic delivery to verify URL reachability + signature\n   * verification on the consumer side. Targets a single endpoint\n   * (selected by `endpointId` in the request body); does not write to\n   * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog` (test deliveries are excluded from the user\n   * event log to keep the log clean).\n   *\n   * The probe is `resourceOperationLike: UPDATE`, NOT `READ`. It performs no\n   * database write, but it DOES have an external side effect — a live signed\n   * POST leaves the platform and arrives at a customer-controlled URL. Borrowing\n   * READ made this a `GET` whose OpenAPI entry had to declare `x-idempotent: false`,\n   * a self-contradiction, and pushed `endpointId` into a query string. Borrowing\n   * UPDATE yields a `PUT` on the same custom-op sub-path, matching the\n   * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog.retry` precedent (also a no-DB-write-of-its-own verb\n   * that triggers a delivery).\n   */\n  TEST_ENDPOINT = 'testEndpoint',\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REQUEST DTOs\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointRequestDto = z.object({\n  endpointId: z.string().min(1),\n});\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RESPONSE DTOs\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Diagnostic returned synchronously by `testEndpoint`.\n *\n * A transport-level failure at the customer endpoint is a successful PROBE and\n * therefore answers HTTP 200 carrying `outcome: UNREACHABLE` — it is not an API\n * error. API errors are reserved for faults in the request itself (unknown\n * `endpointId`, no config row, rate limit exceeded).\n */\nexport const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto = z.object({\n  endpointId: z.string(),\n  /** Destination actually contacted, echoed so the admin can confirm the stored URL. */\n  url: z.string(),\n  outcome: z.enum(WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome),\n  /** HTTP status returned by the endpoint. Absent for `UNREACHABLE` / `NOT_SENT`. */\n  responseStatus: z.number().int().optional(),\n  /** Truncated response body, to let an admin read the consumer's own error text. */\n  responseBodyTruncated: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Network / timeout / signing failure detail. Absent when the endpoint answered. */\n  failureReason: z.string().optional(),\n  durationMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  /**\n   * `jti` of the signed probe. Stated so an admin can correlate this attempt with\n   * the entry in their own consumer's logs — the same dedup key a real delivery\n   * carries.\n   */\n  signatureJti: z.string(),\n  attemptedAt: z.date(),\n});\n\n// =============================================================================\n// POLYMORPHIC FACTORY\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const webhookConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    // Server-internal webhook delivery loads the (org/app) endpoint config via\n    // `readAsSystem`, independent of the triggering user's roles — the config\n    // governs runtime delivery behaviour, not user-facing data. READ-only.\n    systemAccessPolicy: { read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n    customOperation: WebhookConfig_Operations,\n    coreOperations: [\n      CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n      CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n      CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n      CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    ],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope webhook-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [WebhookConfig_Operations.TEST_ENDPOINT]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n            // UPDATE-like, not READ-like — see the JSDoc on `TEST_ENDPOINT`. The\n            // operation writes nothing, but it emits a live outbound request.\n            resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n            requestDto: WebhookConfig_TestEndpointRequestDto,\n            // Implemented by `createWebhookConfigTestEndpointFactories()` in\n            // saas-backend-lib (REPLACE_CORE_OPERATIONS): the core write is\n            // replaced by the synthetic delivery, and this diagnostic — NOT the\n            // config row — is what the caller receives. Keep this contract in\n            // lockstep with that implementation.\n            customResponseDto: WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}
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not externally callable\n *   - UPDATE (REPOSITORY_ONLY)  : admin edits via dedicated endpoint flow (not a public REST PUT)\n *   - TEST_ENDPOINT (custom)    : fires a synthetic delivery to verify URL reachability\n *\n * @see m2m-webhook-organization-delivery.md — Phase 2 / Step 5\n * @see security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  CoreResourceOperation,\n  CoreResourceType,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration, WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome } from './webhook-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// CUSTOM OPERATIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport enum WebhookConfig_Operations {\n  /**\n   * Synthetic delivery to verify URL reachability + signature\n   * verification on the consumer side. Targets a single endpoint\n   * (selected by `endpointId` in the request body); does not write to\n   * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog` (test deliveries are excluded from the user\n   * event log to keep the log clean).\n   *\n   * The probe is `resourceOperationLike: UPDATE`, NOT `READ`. It performs no\n   * database write, but it DOES have an external side effect — a live signed\n   * POST leaves the platform and arrives at a customer-controlled URL. Borrowing\n   * READ made this a `GET` whose OpenAPI entry had to declare `x-idempotent: false`,\n   * a self-contradiction, and pushed `endpointId` into a query string. Borrowing\n   * UPDATE yields a `PUT` on the same custom-op sub-path, matching the\n   * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog.retry` precedent (also a no-DB-write-of-its-own verb\n   * that triggers a delivery).\n   */\n  TEST_ENDPOINT = 'testEndpoint',\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REQUEST DTOs\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointRequestDto = z.object({\n  endpointId: z.string().min(1),\n});\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RESPONSE DTOs\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Diagnostic returned synchronously by `testEndpoint`.\n *\n * A transport-level failure at the customer endpoint is a successful PROBE and\n * therefore answers HTTP 200 carrying `outcome: UNREACHABLE` — it is not an API\n * error. API errors are reserved for faults in the request itself (unknown\n * `endpointId`, no config row, rate limit exceeded).\n */\nexport const WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto = z.object({\n  endpointId: z.string(),\n  /** Destination actually contacted, echoed so the admin can confirm the stored URL. */\n  url: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * True when that destination is plaintext `http://`, so the signature JWT travelled in the clear.\n   *\n   * ## Why the exposure is reported HERE (#492)\n   *\n   * Plaintext endpoints are admitted, deliberately, and the reasoning is recorded on\n   * `WebhookEndpointSchema.url`. The cost of admitting them is that the decision becomes invisible:\n   * a documented exposure nobody encounters is the same as an undocumented one, and the JSDoc\n   * reaches only someone reading the schema.\n   *\n   * This probe is the one place an admin acts on a SINGLE endpoint and reads a per-endpoint answer,\n   * so it is where the exposure can actually be met. It rides beside `outcome` rather than replacing\n   * it, because the two say different things: `ACCEPTED` over `http://` is a working endpoint AND a\n   * credential on the wire, and collapsing that into a failure would be false.\n   *\n   * Reported for every outcome, including `NOT_SENT` — the scheme is a property of the stored\n   * destination, not of the attempt, and an admin fixing a signing fault should still be told.\n   */\n  transportIsPlaintext: z.boolean(),\n  outcome: z.enum(WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome),\n  /** HTTP status returned by the endpoint. Absent for `UNREACHABLE` / `NOT_SENT`. */\n  responseStatus: z.number().int().optional(),\n  /** Truncated response body, to let an admin read the consumer's own error text. */\n  responseBodyTruncated: z.string().optional(),\n  /** Network / timeout / signing failure detail. Absent when the endpoint answered. */\n  failureReason: z.string().optional(),\n  durationMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  /**\n   * `jti` of the signed probe. Stated so an admin can correlate this attempt with\n   * the entry in their own consumer's logs — the same dedup key a real delivery\n   * carries.\n   */\n  signatureJti: z.string(),\n  attemptedAt: z.date(),\n});\n\n// =============================================================================\n// POLYMORPHIC FACTORY\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const webhookConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    // Server-internal webhook delivery loads the (org/app) endpoint config via\n    // `readAsSystem`, independent of the triggering user's roles — the config\n    // governs runtime delivery behaviour, not user-facing data. READ-only.\n    systemAccessPolicy: { read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n    customOperation: WebhookConfig_Operations,\n    coreOperations: [\n      CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n      CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n      CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n      CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    ],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope webhook-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      [WebhookConfig_Operations.TEST_ENDPOINT]: {\n        variants: [\n          {\n            variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n            isDefault: true,\n            polymorphicRole: {\n              [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n              [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n            },\n            riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n            // UPDATE-like, not READ-like — see the JSDoc on `TEST_ENDPOINT`. The\n            // operation writes nothing, but it emits a live outbound request.\n            resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n            requestDto: WebhookConfig_TestEndpointRequestDto,\n            // Implemented by `createWebhookConfigTestEndpointFactories()` in\n            // saas-backend-lib (REPLACE_CORE_OPERATIONS): the core write is\n            // replaced by the synthetic delivery, and this diagnostic — NOT the\n            // config row — is what the caller receives. Keep this contract in\n            // lockstep with that implementation.\n            customResponseDto: WebhookConfig_TestEndpointResponseDto,\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -91,6 +91,36 @@ export declare const WebhookEndpointSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     updatedAt: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>;
 }, z.core.$strip>;
 export type WebhookEndpoint = z.infer<typeof WebhookEndpointSchema>;
+/**
+ * Whether a destination is reached over PLAINTEXT HTTP, so the signature JWT travels in the clear.
+ *
+ * ## One definition, because two would eventually disagree (#492)
+ *
+ * Plaintext is ADMITTED here — a deliberate commercial accommodation recorded on
+ * {@link WebhookEndpointSchema.url} — which is exactly why the condition needs a single named home
+ * rather than an inline `startsWith('http://')` at each surface that wants to say something about
+ * it. A refusal can live in one place because it stops the request; a TOLERATED condition is
+ * observed by several, and those several must agree.
+ *
+ * Read by the write path (which warns and audits) and by the endpoint probe (which reports it to
+ * the admin who pressed "test"). Both are listed here so the next reader can tell whether adding a
+ * third is joining a mechanism or starting a second one.
+ *
+ * Scheme comparison, not a `startsWith`: `WHATWG` lowercases the scheme during parsing, so
+ * `HTTP://example.test` and `http://example.test` are the same destination and a prefix test would
+ * disagree with the URL the delivery actually opens. An unparseable value answers `false` — it is
+ * not a plaintext destination, it is not a destination at all, and `z.url()` refuses it upstream.
+ */
+export declare function webhookEndpointTransportIsPlaintext(url: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * The host of a webhook destination, for an audit row or a log line — never the full URL.
+ *
+ * Mirrors `AuditableEvent_Webhook_EndpointTestDispatchedEventDataSchema.destinationHost` and the
+ * reasoning recorded there: paths and query strings on customer endpoints routinely embed
+ * per-tenant tokens, and these rows are replicated to the organisation's SIEM and to the immutable
+ * store. The host answers "which of my endpoints" without carrying a credential into a log.
+ */
+export declare function webhookEndpointDestinationHost(url: string): string;
 export declare const WebhookConfigBaseSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
     enabled: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>>;

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.schemas.js

@@ -107,7 +107,27 @@ export const M2M_WEBHOOK_SCOPE_VARIANTS = [
 export const WebhookEndpointSchema = z.object({
     /** Stable per-endpoint identifier (ULID). Used as the `endpointId` FK on every delivery log row. */
     id: z.string().min(1),
-    /** Destination URL receiving POST deliveries. */
+    /**
+     * Destination URL receiving POST deliveries.
+     *
+     * ## `http://` IS ACCEPTED, AND WHAT THAT COSTS YOU (#492, decided 2026-09-08)
+     *
+     * Every delivery carries a **signature JWT in the request**. That JWT is a credential: it is what
+     * proves to your endpoint that the delivery came from this application. Over plaintext it is
+     * readable by anyone on the network path between us and you, and replayable against your endpoint
+     * until it expires — so an observer of one delivery can forge the next one.
+     *
+     * **Use `https://`.** Plaintext is admitted because refusing it would break endpoints already
+     * configured under a framework that accepted them, not because it is safe. That is a commercial
+     * accommodation, deliberately taken, and it is not an assessment that `http://` is fine here.
+     *
+     * The sibling agent push-notification caller requires HTTPS unconditionally, and the same argument
+     * applies to this field; the two differ only in whether anyone has already authored against them.
+     *
+     * Note the URL is also SSRF-guarded at delivery time — a destination resolving to a private or
+     * link-local address is refused regardless of scheme, because a signed POST to an instance-metadata
+     * service is a read primitive rather than a delivery.
+     */
     url: z.url(),
     /** Free-form admin label (visible in the management UI). */
     description: z.string().max(500).default(''),
@@ -116,6 +136,50 @@ export const WebhookEndpointSchema = z.object({
     createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),
     updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),
 });
+/**
+ * Whether a destination is reached over PLAINTEXT HTTP, so the signature JWT travels in the clear.
+ *
+ * ## One definition, because two would eventually disagree (#492)
+ *
+ * Plaintext is ADMITTED here — a deliberate commercial accommodation recorded on
+ * {@link WebhookEndpointSchema.url} — which is exactly why the condition needs a single named home
+ * rather than an inline `startsWith('http://')` at each surface that wants to say something about
+ * it. A refusal can live in one place because it stops the request; a TOLERATED condition is
+ * observed by several, and those several must agree.
+ *
+ * Read by the write path (which warns and audits) and by the endpoint probe (which reports it to
+ * the admin who pressed "test"). Both are listed here so the next reader can tell whether adding a
+ * third is joining a mechanism or starting a second one.
+ *
+ * Scheme comparison, not a `startsWith`: `WHATWG` lowercases the scheme during parsing, so
+ * `HTTP://example.test` and `http://example.test` are the same destination and a prefix test would
+ * disagree with the URL the delivery actually opens. An unparseable value answers `false` — it is
+ * not a plaintext destination, it is not a destination at all, and `z.url()` refuses it upstream.
+ */
+export function webhookEndpointTransportIsPlaintext(url) {
+    try {
+        return new URL(url).protocol === 'http:';
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The host of a webhook destination, for an audit row or a log line — never the full URL.
+ *
+ * Mirrors `AuditableEvent_Webhook_EndpointTestDispatchedEventDataSchema.destinationHost` and the
+ * reasoning recorded there: paths and query strings on customer endpoints routinely embed
+ * per-tenant tokens, and these rows are replicated to the organisation's SIEM and to the immutable
+ * store. The host answers "which of my endpoints" without carrying a credential into a log.
+ */
+export function webhookEndpointDestinationHost(url) {
+    try {
+        return new URL(url).host;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 'unparseable';
+    }
+}
 // =============================================================================
 // BASE CONFIG SCHEMA (polymorphism injects the scope FK at variant time)
 // =============================================================================

package/dist/esm/notifications/m2m/webhook-config.shared.schemas.js.map

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Holds:\n *   - a master `enabled` switch\n *   - an array of admin-managed endpoints (URL + description + per-endpoint enabled flag)\n *   - a derived `applicationPublicKeyPem` (READ-only, populated by a\n *     postfix hook from `JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK` so external\n *     consumers can verify our JWT-signed deliveries)\n *\n * Scope FK (`organizationId` / `applicationId`) is injected by the\n * polymorphism engine — NOT declared on the base schema.\n *\n * @see m2m-webhook-organization-delivery.md — Phase 2 / Step 3\n * @see security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.ts\n *   for the dual-scope polymorphic precedent this mirrors.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  CoreResourceType,\n  coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  declarePolymorphicSchemas,\n  type PolymorphicVariantDefinition,\n} from '../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENDPOINT PROBE VOCABULARY\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Verdict of a single synthetic delivery fired by `webhookConfig.testEndpoint`.\n * A probe that cannot fail is worse than no probe, so every terminal state an\n * outbound attempt can reach is named here rather than collapsed into a boolean.\n *\n * The transport verdict and the HTTP status are deliberately SEPARATE axes:\n * `REJECTED` still carries a response status, because \"the endpoint answered 403\"\n * and \"the endpoint never answered\" are different problems with different fixes.\n *\n * Declared in this light schema module (not alongside the operation DTO) so the\n * audit-event vocabulary can name the same enum without pulling the resource-config\n * factory graph into `auditable-events.shared.schema.ts`.\n */\nexport enum WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome {\n  /**\n   * The endpoint answered with 2xx. This is the only outcome that evidences\n   * consumer-side signature verification: the platform cannot observe the\n   * consumer's verification step directly, so a 2xx from an endpoint that\n   * verifies before responding is the available proof.\n   */\n  ACCEPTED = 'accepted',\n  /** The endpoint answered, but not with 2xx. Reachable; it refused or errored. */\n  REJECTED = 'rejected',\n  /** No HTTP response at all — DNS/TLS/connection failure, or the attempt timed out. */\n  UNREACHABLE = 'unreachable',\n  /**\n   * Nothing left the platform. The payload could not be signed, which is an\n   * operator-side key/configuration fault, not a statement about the endpoint.\n   * Reported distinctly so an admin never reads a local misconfiguration as a\n   * broken customer endpoint.\n   */\n  NOT_SENT = 'not_sent',\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SHARED VARIANT DEFINITIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * The 2 M2M webhook scope variants — shared by `WebhookConfig` and\n * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog`. Centralised here so both polymorphic\n * declarations stay in lock-step.\n *\n * Notes:\n * - We deliberately define a domain-local constant (mirroring\n *   `BILLING_SCOPE_VARIANTS` in the billing domain) instead of reusing\n *   `AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS` from `authentications/`. The variant *shape*\n *   is identical — `(ORGANIZATIONS, APPLICATION)` with `isPrimaryScope:\n *   true` — but the auth constant is documented as \"shared across all\n *   AUTH polymorphic resources\" and webhooks are notification resources,\n *   not auth resources. Keeping a domain-local constant prevents the\n *   semantic drift the framework-mindset rule warns about.\n * - Both variants are primary scopes: there is no \"child of an\n *   organization unit\" or \"child of a user\" variant — webhooks are a\n *   tenant-level concern, not an entity-attached one.\n */\nexport const M2M_WEBHOOK_SCOPE_VARIANTS: PolymorphicVariantDefinition[] = [\n  {\n    parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS,\n    parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS],\n    isPrimaryScope: true,\n  },\n  {\n    parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.APPLICATION,\n    parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION],\n    isPrimaryScope: true,\n  },\n];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENDPOINT SUB-SCHEMA\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * A single admin-configured webhook destination.\n *\n * v1 deliberately keeps endpoint config minimal (URL + description +\n * enabled flag) — per user direction: \"as a first implementation, we\n * need just an url and a description, not more.\" Per-endpoint secrets\n * are NOT used: signing happens with a single per-application JWT\n * private key (`JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK`) and consumers\n * verify with the matching public key surfaced via the parent config's\n * derived `applicationPublicKeyPem` field.\n */\nexport const WebhookEndpointSchema = z.object({\n  /** Stable per-endpoint identifier (ULID). Used as the `endpointId` FK on every delivery log row. */\n  id: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Destination URL receiving POST deliveries. */\n  url: z.url(),\n  /** Free-form admin label (visible in the management UI). */\n  description: z.string().max(500).default(''),\n  /** Per-endpoint master switch — disabled endpoints are skipped by the dispatcher. */\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(true),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),\n});\n\nexport type WebhookEndpoint = z.infer<typeof WebhookEndpointSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BASE CONFIG SCHEMA (polymorphism injects the scope FK at variant time)\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const WebhookConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** Master kill-switch — when `false`, the dispatcher short-circuits with no deliveries. */\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** Admin-managed list of destinations. Empty array = no deliveries even when `enabled: true`. */\n  endpoints: z.array(WebhookEndpointSchema).default([]),\n\n  /**\n   * Derived field — populated by `postfixCoreOperations[READ]` from\n   * `appConfig.jwtConfig.config.publicKey[JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK]`.\n   * Excluded from CREATE/UPDATE so clients cannot set it; the value is\n   * regenerated on every read from the canonical app config so key\n   * rotation is reflected immediately. Phase 3 wires the postfix hook\n   * (Step 9 of the plan).\n   */\n  applicationPublicKeyPem: z.string().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type WebhookConfigBase = z.infer<typeof WebhookConfigBaseSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// POLYMORPHIC DECLARATION\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Yields two `CoreResourceType` variants:\n *   - `organizationWebhookConfig` (FK: `organizationId`)\n *   - `applicationWebhookConfig` (FK: `applicationId`)\n *\n * Both are singletons per scope (cardinality ONE) — wired in\n * `resources-registry.shared.core.definitions.ts` via\n * `createPolymorphicScopeRelationships(...)`.\n */\nexport const webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'webhookConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'webhookConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'WEBHOOK_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: WebhookConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: M2M_WEBHOOK_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}
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Holds:\n *   - a master `enabled` switch\n *   - an array of admin-managed endpoints (URL + description + per-endpoint enabled flag)\n *   - a derived `applicationPublicKeyPem` (READ-only, populated by a\n *     postfix hook from `JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK` so external\n *     consumers can verify our JWT-signed deliveries)\n *\n * Scope FK (`organizationId` / `applicationId`) is injected by the\n * polymorphism engine — NOT declared on the base schema.\n *\n * @see m2m-webhook-organization-delivery.md — Phase 2 / Step 3\n * @see security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.ts\n *   for the dual-scope polymorphic precedent this mirrors.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  CoreResourceType,\n  coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier,\n} from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  declarePolymorphicSchemas,\n  type PolymorphicVariantDefinition,\n} from '../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENDPOINT PROBE VOCABULARY\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Verdict of a single synthetic delivery fired by `webhookConfig.testEndpoint`.\n * A probe that cannot fail is worse than no probe, so every terminal state an\n * outbound attempt can reach is named here rather than collapsed into a boolean.\n *\n * The transport verdict and the HTTP status are deliberately SEPARATE axes:\n * `REJECTED` still carries a response status, because \"the endpoint answered 403\"\n * and \"the endpoint never answered\" are different problems with different fixes.\n *\n * Declared in this light schema module (not alongside the operation DTO) so the\n * audit-event vocabulary can name the same enum without pulling the resource-config\n * factory graph into `auditable-events.shared.schema.ts`.\n */\nexport enum WebhookEndpointProbeOutcome {\n  /**\n   * The endpoint answered with 2xx. This is the only outcome that evidences\n   * consumer-side signature verification: the platform cannot observe the\n   * consumer's verification step directly, so a 2xx from an endpoint that\n   * verifies before responding is the available proof.\n   */\n  ACCEPTED = 'accepted',\n  /** The endpoint answered, but not with 2xx. Reachable; it refused or errored. */\n  REJECTED = 'rejected',\n  /** No HTTP response at all — DNS/TLS/connection failure, or the attempt timed out. */\n  UNREACHABLE = 'unreachable',\n  /**\n   * Nothing left the platform. The payload could not be signed, which is an\n   * operator-side key/configuration fault, not a statement about the endpoint.\n   * Reported distinctly so an admin never reads a local misconfiguration as a\n   * broken customer endpoint.\n   */\n  NOT_SENT = 'not_sent',\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SHARED VARIANT DEFINITIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * The 2 M2M webhook scope variants — shared by `WebhookConfig` and\n * `M2MWebhookDeliveryLog`. Centralised here so both polymorphic\n * declarations stay in lock-step.\n *\n * Notes:\n * - We deliberately define a domain-local constant (mirroring\n *   `BILLING_SCOPE_VARIANTS` in the billing domain) instead of reusing\n *   `AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS` from `authentications/`. The variant *shape*\n *   is identical — `(ORGANIZATIONS, APPLICATION)` with `isPrimaryScope:\n *   true` — but the auth constant is documented as \"shared across all\n *   AUTH polymorphic resources\" and webhooks are notification resources,\n *   not auth resources. Keeping a domain-local constant prevents the\n *   semantic drift the framework-mindset rule warns about.\n * - Both variants are primary scopes: there is no \"child of an\n *   organization unit\" or \"child of a user\" variant — webhooks are a\n *   tenant-level concern, not an entity-attached one.\n */\nexport const M2M_WEBHOOK_SCOPE_VARIANTS: PolymorphicVariantDefinition[] = [\n  {\n    parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS,\n    parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS],\n    isPrimaryScope: true,\n  },\n  {\n    parentResourceType: CoreResourceType.APPLICATION,\n    parentFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.APPLICATION],\n    isPrimaryScope: true,\n  },\n];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENDPOINT SUB-SCHEMA\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * A single admin-configured webhook destination.\n *\n * v1 deliberately keeps endpoint config minimal (URL + description +\n * enabled flag) — per user direction: \"as a first implementation, we\n * need just an url and a description, not more.\" Per-endpoint secrets\n * are NOT used: signing happens with a single per-application JWT\n * private key (`JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK`) and consumers\n * verify with the matching public key surfaced via the parent config's\n * derived `applicationPublicKeyPem` field.\n */\nexport const WebhookEndpointSchema = z.object({\n  /** Stable per-endpoint identifier (ULID). Used as the `endpointId` FK on every delivery log row. */\n  id: z.string().min(1),\n  /**\n   * Destination URL receiving POST deliveries.\n   *\n   * ## `http://` IS ACCEPTED, AND WHAT THAT COSTS YOU (#492, decided 2026-09-08)\n   *\n   * Every delivery carries a **signature JWT in the request**. That JWT is a credential: it is what\n   * proves to your endpoint that the delivery came from this application. Over plaintext it is\n   * readable by anyone on the network path between us and you, and replayable against your endpoint\n   * until it expires — so an observer of one delivery can forge the next one.\n   *\n   * **Use `https://`.** Plaintext is admitted because refusing it would break endpoints already\n   * configured under a framework that accepted them, not because it is safe. That is a commercial\n   * accommodation, deliberately taken, and it is not an assessment that `http://` is fine here.\n   *\n   * The sibling agent push-notification caller requires HTTPS unconditionally, and the same argument\n   * applies to this field; the two differ only in whether anyone has already authored against them.\n   *\n   * Note the URL is also SSRF-guarded at delivery time — a destination resolving to a private or\n   * link-local address is refused regardless of scheme, because a signed POST to an instance-metadata\n   * service is a read primitive rather than a delivery.\n   */\n  url: z.url(),\n  /** Free-form admin label (visible in the management UI). */\n  description: z.string().max(500).default(''),\n  /** Per-endpoint master switch — disabled endpoints are skipped by the dispatcher. */\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(true),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()),\n});\n\nexport type WebhookEndpoint = z.infer<typeof WebhookEndpointSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Whether a destination is reached over PLAINTEXT HTTP, so the signature JWT travels in the clear.\n *\n * ## One definition, because two would eventually disagree (#492)\n *\n * Plaintext is ADMITTED here — a deliberate commercial accommodation recorded on\n * {@link WebhookEndpointSchema.url} — which is exactly why the condition needs a single named home\n * rather than an inline `startsWith('http://')` at each surface that wants to say something about\n * it. A refusal can live in one place because it stops the request; a TOLERATED condition is\n * observed by several, and those several must agree.\n *\n * Read by the write path (which warns and audits) and by the endpoint probe (which reports it to\n * the admin who pressed \"test\"). Both are listed here so the next reader can tell whether adding a\n * third is joining a mechanism or starting a second one.\n *\n * Scheme comparison, not a `startsWith`: `WHATWG` lowercases the scheme during parsing, so\n * `HTTP://example.test` and `http://example.test` are the same destination and a prefix test would\n * disagree with the URL the delivery actually opens. An unparseable value answers `false` — it is\n * not a plaintext destination, it is not a destination at all, and `z.url()` refuses it upstream.\n */\nexport function webhookEndpointTransportIsPlaintext(url: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The host of a webhook destination, for an audit row or a log line — never the full URL.\n *\n * Mirrors `AuditableEvent_Webhook_EndpointTestDispatchedEventDataSchema.destinationHost` and the\n * reasoning recorded there: paths and query strings on customer endpoints routinely embed\n * per-tenant tokens, and these rows are replicated to the organisation's SIEM and to the immutable\n * store. The host answers \"which of my endpoints\" without carrying a credential into a log.\n */\nexport function webhookEndpointDestinationHost(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).host;\n  } catch {\n    return 'unparseable';\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BASE CONFIG SCHEMA (polymorphism injects the scope FK at variant time)\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport const WebhookConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** Master kill-switch — when `false`, the dispatcher short-circuits with no deliveries. */\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  /** Admin-managed list of destinations. Empty array = no deliveries even when `enabled: true`. */\n  endpoints: z.array(WebhookEndpointSchema).default([]),\n\n  /**\n   * Derived field — populated by `postfixCoreOperations[READ]` from\n   * `appConfig.jwtConfig.config.publicKey[JwtPrivateKeys.APPLICATION_WEBHOOK]`.\n   * Excluded from CREATE/UPDATE so clients cannot set it; the value is\n   * regenerated on every read from the canonical app config so key\n   * rotation is reflected immediately. Phase 3 wires the postfix hook\n   * (Step 9 of the plan).\n   */\n  applicationPublicKeyPem: z.string().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type WebhookConfigBase = z.infer<typeof WebhookConfigBaseSchema>;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// POLYMORPHIC DECLARATION\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Yields two `CoreResourceType` variants:\n *   - `organizationWebhookConfig` (FK: `organizationId`)\n *   - `applicationWebhookConfig` (FK: `applicationId`)\n *\n * Both are singletons per scope (cardinality ONE) — wired in\n * `resources-registry.shared.core.definitions.ts` via\n * `createPolymorphicScopeRelationships(...)`.\n */\nexport const webhookConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'webhookConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'webhookConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'WEBHOOK_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: WebhookConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: M2M_WEBHOOK_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.d.ts

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ import { NotificationBadgeDefinition } from "./notification-badges.schemas";
  * Canonical (framework-shipped) notification badge definitions.
  *
  * Intentionally empty: the two aspirational placeholders (`new messages` /
- * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them and the launcher
- * surfacing was retracted (see `.claude/plans/badge-launcher-retract.md`). Real
- * definitions return with their producer per the Reintroduction Contract (R1),
- * carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.
+ * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them.
+ *
+ * This is a statement about FRAMEWORK-shipped definitions only. Badge surfacing itself works: a
+ * navigation item carries `notificationBadgeRef` and the sidebar renders the badge, and applications
+ * declare their own definitions. A framework definition returns here only once the framework also
+ * ships its producer, carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.
  */
 export declare const coreNotificationBadgeDefinitions: NotificationBadgeDefinition[];
 //# sourceMappingURL=notification-badges.core.definitions.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"notification-badges.core.definitions.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAE5E;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAO,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.js

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
  * Canonical (framework-shipped) notification badge definitions.
  *
  * Intentionally empty: the two aspirational placeholders (`new messages` /
- * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them and the launcher
- * surfacing was retracted (see `.claude/plans/badge-launcher-retract.md`). Real
- * definitions return with their producer per the Reintroduction Contract (R1),
- * carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.
+ * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them.
+ *
+ * This is a statement about FRAMEWORK-shipped definitions only. Badge surfacing itself works: a
+ * navigation item carries `notificationBadgeRef` and the sidebar renders the badge, and applications
+ * declare their own definitions. A framework definition returns here only once the framework also
+ * ships its producer, carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.
  */
 export const coreNotificationBadgeDefinitions = [];
 //# sourceMappingURL=notification-badges.core.definitions.js.map

package/dist/esm/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"notification-badges.core.definitions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAkC,EAAE,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { NotificationBadgeDefinition } from \"./notification-badges.schemas\";\n\n/**\n * Canonical (framework-shipped) notification badge definitions.\n *\n * Intentionally empty: the two aspirational placeholders (`new messages` /\n * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them and the launcher\n * surfacing was retracted (see `.claude/plans/badge-launcher-retract.md`). Real\n * definitions return with their producer per the Reintroduction Contract (R1),\n * carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.\n */\nexport const coreNotificationBadgeDefinitions: NotificationBadgeDefinition[] = [];\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"notification-badges.core.definitions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/notifications/notification-badges.core.definitions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAkC,EAAE,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { NotificationBadgeDefinition } from \"./notification-badges.schemas\";\n\n/**\n * Canonical (framework-shipped) notification badge definitions.\n *\n * Intentionally empty: the two aspirational placeholders (`new messages` /\n * `unpaid invoices`) were removed because nothing produced them.\n *\n * This is a statement about FRAMEWORK-shipped definitions only. Badge surfacing itself works: a\n * navigation item carries `notificationBadgeRef` and the sidebar renders the badge, and applications\n * declare their own definitions. A framework definition returns here only once the framework also\n * ships its producer, carrying a typed `source` (EVENT_COUNTER | DERIVED_QUERY) + `display`.\n */\nexport const coreNotificationBadgeDefinitions: NotificationBadgeDefinition[] = [];\n"]}