@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.14 → 1.1.15

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Files changed (94) hide show
  1. package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
  2. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
  4. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +9 -0
  6. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  8. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
  12. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/authority-basis.json +1 -1
  14. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
  15. package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +7 -7
  16. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/method.md +7 -0
  17. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.json +2 -2
  18. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/method.md +27 -10
  19. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.json +1 -1
  20. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/method.md +13 -9
  21. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.json +1 -1
  22. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/method.md +20 -5
  23. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.json +2 -2
  24. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +4 -0
  25. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
  26. package/dist/knowledge/references/build-plan.task-graph.config.md +12 -8
  27. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.autonomous-agent.reviewed-write.md +6 -2
  28. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.chat-assistant.md +13 -2
  29. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.inbound.email-to-todo.md +33 -2
  30. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.module.relationships.discriminator.md +7 -1
  31. package/dist/knowledge/references/external-connectors.frontend-provider-consent-classification.md +2 -0
  32. package/dist/knowledge/references/integration-plan.config.md +78 -8
  33. package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.environment.deployment.md +27 -4
  34. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.domain-module.md +15 -0
  35. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-agent-card.md +43 -11
  36. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-task-surface.md +17 -11
  37. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.function-tool.md +11 -0
  38. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.electronic-signatures.embedded-signing-frame.md +46 -0
  39. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.agent-definition.md +24 -33
  40. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.mcp-server-declaration.md +63 -0
  41. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.outbound-credential.md +61 -0
  42. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.remote-agent-declaration.md +56 -0
  43. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.http-api-binding.md +51 -0
  44. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.provider-capability-disclosure.md +7 -0
  45. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.provider-capabilities.md +11 -0
  46. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.system-of-record-error-codes.md +30 -0
  47. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.rag.retrieval-scores.md +4 -2
  48. package/dist/knowledge/registries/assurance-authority-bases.json +1 -1
  49. package/dist/knowledge/registries/framework-topics.json +45 -1
  50. package/dist/knowledge/registries/playbooks.json +2 -2
  51. package/dist/knowledge/registries/source-tags.json +1080 -1012
  52. package/dist/knowledge/skills/INDEX.md +2 -2
  53. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/SKILL.md +4 -1
  54. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/references/framework-backend-bootstrap-api.md +15 -0
  55. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/SKILL.md +3 -1
  56. package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/document-composition-privacy-notice.md +4 -0
  57. package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-recipient-disclosures.md +7 -0
  58. package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-auditable-event-catalog.md +1 -0
  59. package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-provider-capabilities-api.md +11 -0
  60. package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/SKILL.md +12 -5
  61. package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/references/signing-inside-the-application.md +113 -0
  62. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/SKILL.md +3 -2
  63. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/references/email-artifact-paths.md +8 -4
  64. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-definition-wiring/SKILL.md +1 -1
  65. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/SKILL.md +29 -7
  66. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/references/framework-flows-actors-a2a-contract.md +66 -26
  67. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-autonomous-agents/SKILL.md +6 -2
  68. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/SKILL.md +34 -3
  69. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md +13 -2
  70. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-tool-api.md +11 -0
  71. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-view-api.md +15 -0
  72. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md +139 -0
  73. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md +169 -0
  74. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-llm-agent-invocation/references/framework-llm-agent-definition-api.md +24 -33
  75. package/dist/knowledge/skills/inbound-channels/references/receiving-email.md +33 -2
  76. package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/SKILL.md +31 -9
  77. package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-environment-deployment-api.md +27 -4
  78. package/dist/knowledge/skills/local-environment-bootstrap/references/wildo-cli-bootstrap-commands.md +26 -0
  79. package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-registration/references/framework-domain-modules-api.md +15 -0
  80. package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-relationships/SKILL.md +20 -1
  81. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-backend-package/SKILL.md +13 -2
  82. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-provider-consent-api.md +2 -0
  83. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/SKILL.md +3 -0
  84. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/SKILL.md +8 -2
  85. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/references/module-scaffold-layout.md +17 -0
  86. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-chat-commands/SKILL.md +1 -1
  87. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/framework-http-api-binding-api.md +51 -0
  88. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/incremental-extraction.md +14 -5
  89. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/read-through-writes.md +30 -0
  90. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-mcp-tool-exposure/references/mcp-client-registration-postures.md +5 -0
  91. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-rag-source-fields/references/framework-rag-retrieval-api.md +4 -2
  92. package/dist/knowledge/topic-index.json +231 -84
  93. package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
  94. package/package.json +4 -4
@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ Read this when you need to know:
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8
 
9
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  - exactly what an external agent sees (skills = your agentic actor systems, keyed
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  `skill.id === system.ref`);
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- - how the card advertises auth (`securitySchemes.oauth2.flows` — `authorizationCode`
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- for user-delegated, `clientCredentials` for machine callers);
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+ - how the card advertises auth: two security schemes with one flow each, `oauth2`
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+ (`authorizationCode`, user-delegated) and `oauth2ClientCredentials` (`clientCredentials`,
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+ machine callers), listed as alternatives in `security` and `securityRequirements`;
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14
  - what the card `url` means for audience binding (RFC 8707 / D7).
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15
 
15
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  ## Import Origins
@@ -45,23 +46,49 @@ export interface A2A_Skill {
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  * agent's canonical audience: BOTH a USER-delegated and a MACHINE (client-credentials)
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  * inbound token MUST carry it as `aud` (RFC 8707 / external-access D7) — a token minted for
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  * another surface (including the generic API audience, per the 2026-07-29 flip) is rejected.
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- * `securitySchemes.oauth2.flows`
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- * advertises BOTH D6 principals — `authorizationCode` (user-delegated → the
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- * conversation is owned by the delegating user) and `clientCredentials` (org/app
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- * machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app). Tokens are minted by the
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- * app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
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+ * The card advertises BOTH D6 principals as TWO security schemes, one flow each:
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+ * {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`authorizationCode`, user-delegated → the conversation is
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+ * owned by the delegating user) and {@link A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`clientCredentials`, org/app
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+ * machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app). Either satisfies the requirement. Tokens are
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+ * minted by the app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
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  */
54
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  /**
55
- * One protocol interface this agent exposes — a URL, a transport, and the version it speaks there.
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+ * The security scheme a USER-delegated client reads: the `authorizationCode` flow. Kept as `oauth2`, the name the card
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+ * has always used for it.
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  *
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- * spec-cite: A2A 1.0 proto `AgentInterface` — `url` (REQUIRED), and *"The version of the A2A
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- * protocol this interface exposes. Use the latest supported minor version per major version.
59
- * Examples: `"0.3"`, `"1.0"`"*.
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+ * One flow per scheme because A2A 1.0 makes it so: spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message OAuthFlows {
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+ * oneof flow { AuthorizationCodeOAuthFlow authorization_code = 1; ClientCredentialsOAuthFlow client_credentials = 2; … } }`.
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+ * Both flows in one scheme made the A2A reference SDK refuse the whole card (#3932).
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+ */
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+ export const A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2';
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+ /** The security scheme a MACHINE client reads: the `clientCredentials` flow. See {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME}. */
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+ export const A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2ClientCredentials';
66
+ /**
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+ * One protocol interface this agent exposes: a URL, the protocol binding spoken there, and the protocol version.
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+ *
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+ * spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message AgentInterface { string url = 1 [REQUIRED]; string
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+ * protocol_binding = 2 [REQUIRED]; string tenant = 3; string protocol_version = 4 [REQUIRED]; }`, serialized camelCase
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+ * (§5.5). `protocol_binding` is "an open form string … The core ones officially supported are `JSONRPC`, `GRPC` and
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+ * `HTTP+JSON`."
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+ *
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+ * These were named `transport` and `version` until 2026-11-16, names `AgentInterface` does not have, so a 1.0 client
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+ * parsing the card read every interface with no binding and no version (#3932).
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  */
61
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  export interface A2A_AgentInterface {
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  url: string;
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- transport: string;
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- version: string;
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+ protocolBinding: string;
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+ protocolVersion: string;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * One 1.0 security requirement: the schemes it needs, each with the scopes required. The card lists alternatives, so a
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+ * client satisfies any one entry.
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+ *
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+ * spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message SecurityRequirement { map<string, StringList> schemes = 1; }`
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+ * and `message StringList { repeated string list = 1; }`.
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+ */
90
+ export interface A2A_SecurityRequirement {
91
+ schemes: Record<string, { list: string[] }>;
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92
  }
66
93
 
67
94
  export interface A2A_AgentCard {
@@ -96,15 +123,22 @@ export interface A2A_AgentCard {
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123
  defaultOutputModes: string[];
97
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  skills: A2A_Skill[];
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  securitySchemes: Record<string, unknown>;
126
+ /** The v0.2.5 requirement list (scheme name → scopes), one entry per alternative. Kept for v0.2.5 clients. */
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  security: Record<string, string[]>[];
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+ /**
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+ * The same alternatives in the 1.0 shape. spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `AgentCard` —
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+ * `repeated SecurityRequirement security_requirements = 9`.
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+ */
132
+ securityRequirements: A2A_SecurityRequirement[];
100
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  }
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  ```
102
135
 
103
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  ## The A2A task surface (`tasks/get` / `tasks/cancel`)
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137
 
105
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  Read this when an external agent needs to start work it will come back for. A turn that pauses
106
- for human approval also becomes a task: it reaches `input-required`, persists the decision it is
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- waiting on, and leaves that state once its execution moves on. Both paths into a task are live,
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+ for human approval also becomes a task: it reaches `auth-required` (the protocol's in-task
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+ authorization, given outside the protocol), carries a status message saying a person decides in the
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+ application, persists the decision it is waiting on, and leaves that state once its execution moves on. Both paths into a task are live,
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  so an integration you build now can encounter either.
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110
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  The key thing to understand is **when a task exists at all** — most turns never create
@@ -133,11 +167,11 @@ one, and that is deliberate rather than a gap.
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  * - the turn reached an interrupted state (a human-in-the-loop approval pause).
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  *
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  * All three triggers are live. The interrupted-state arm needs a runtime that can pause a turn; that
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- * is the human-in-the-loop approval gate, and a paused turn now materialises a task carrying
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- * `input-required` on all three transports (blocking send, non-blocking send, stream). An earlier
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- * revision of this note warned that the arm was inert and `input-required` never emitted — true
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- * when written, and left here in corrected form because a reader who remembers the old claim would
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- * otherwise conclude the state is decorative and safe to drop.
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+ * is the human-in-the-loop approval gate, and a paused turn materialises a task carrying
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+ * `auth-required` on all three transports (blocking send, non-blocking send, stream), with a status
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+ * message saying a person decides in the application. The task moves on by itself once they have:
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+ * poll it, subscribe to it, or register a webhook. A message on the task does not answer the
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+ * approval, and `tasks/cancel` withdraws it.
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  *
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  * A blocking turn that answers in one shot, with no webhook, returns an A2A `Message` and writes no task
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  * row at all. Both shapes are protocol-conformant: the specification types the
@@ -201,7 +235,7 @@ export interface A2A_TaskSurfaceContract {
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  * projection from `FlowsActors_Status` reads it, the transport emits it, and tests
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  * pin it.
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  *
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- * Not every member is emitted by this transport today — `AUTH_REQUIRED` and
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+ * Not every member is emitted by this transport today — `INPUT_REQUIRED` and
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  * `REJECTED` have no `FlowsActors_Status` counterpart and are never produced. They
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  * are declared because the vocabulary belongs to the protocol, not to us: a client
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  * may legitimately receive them from another A2A server, and omitting them would
@@ -213,13 +247,19 @@ export enum A2A_TaskState {
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  /** Actively being processed. */
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  WORKING = 'working',
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  /**
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- * Interrupted (non-terminal): the agent needs input. The current transport emits this when a
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- * user-delegated turn reaches an approval-gated tool, persists the signed pending decision and
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- * materialises an addressable task. Approval or refusal resumes that same execution; machine
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- * principals are denied rather than parked because no named person can answer for them.
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+ * Interrupted (non-terminal): the agent needs more input from the client, which a follow-up message
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+ * on the task gives. NOT emitted by this transport: a turn that answers needs no task, and an
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+ * approval pause is {@link AUTH_REQUIRED}, because a message does not answer it.
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  */
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  INPUT_REQUIRED = 'input-required',
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- /** Interrupted (non-terminal): authentication needed. NOT emitted by this transport. */
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+ /**
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+ * Interrupted (non-terminal): an authorization the task waits on, given outside the protocol.
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+ * Emitted when a user-delegated turn reaches an approval-gated tool: the signed pending decision is
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+ * persisted, an addressable task is materialised, and its status message says a person decides in
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+ * the application. Their approval or refusal resumes that same execution, and the task moves on
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+ * without the client sending anything. Machine principals are denied rather than parked, because
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+ * no named person can answer for them.
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+ */
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  AUTH_REQUIRED = 'auth-required',
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  /** Terminal: finished successfully. */
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  COMPLETED = 'completed',
@@ -204,10 +204,14 @@ export const rescheduleTodoTool: FunctionTool = {
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  argumentsResource: { resourceType: TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS },
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  description:
206
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  'Propose a new due date for one overdue todo. An organization administrator must approve the change before '
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- + 'it is applied. Resolve the todo id with resource.todos.read first.',
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+ + 'it is applied. Resolve the todo id with resource.todos.read first, and give the administrator a one-sentence reason.',
208
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  inputSchema: z.object({
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  todoId: z.string().min(1).describe('Id of the todo to reschedule. Resolve it with resource.todos.read.'),
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  dueDate: z.string().min(1).describe('The proposed due date, as an ISO 8601 date, e.g. "2026-10-04".'),
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+ // Shown to the administrator who decides, and nowhere else: it is not written to the todo. Defaulted, so a call that
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+ // leaves it out still runs, and the approval card then shows the default rather than an empty argument (#3295: an
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+ // approver's edit is parsed, and a parse that fills a default differs from the raw input).
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+ reason: z.string().max(280).default('No reason given.').describe('One sentence for the approving administrator: why this date.'),
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215
  }),
212
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  humanApproval: {
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  route: HumanDecision_RouteKind.ROLE,
@@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ export const rescheduleTodoTool: FunctionTool = {
215
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  // What the todos UPDATE it runs declares (#2526).
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  riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
217
221
  },
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- execute: async (args: { todoId: string; dueDate: string }, ctx: FunctionToolExecutionContext): Promise<RescheduleTodoToolResult> => {
222
+ execute: async (args: { todoId: string; dueDate: string; reason: string }, ctx: FunctionToolExecutionContext): Promise<RescheduleTodoToolResult> => {
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223
  const dueDate = new Date(args.dueDate);
220
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  if (Number.isNaN(dueDate.getTime())) throw new Error(`"${args.dueDate}" is not a date.`);
221
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  await dispatchResourceOperationAsTool({
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  ---
2
2
  name: flows-actors-chat-assistant
3
- description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
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+ description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", "let my agent delegate to another company's A2A agent", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
4
4
  user-invocable: false
5
5
  ---
6
6
 
@@ -187,6 +187,24 @@ A tool you **write by hand** declares how it reaches the application's data, as
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  Nothing refuses a tool that declares nothing, but the application's assurance evidence reports it, because a
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  tool is what an agent's authority confinement rests on.
189
189
 
190
+ **Tools from another party's MCP server.** Declare the server on the backend domain module's
191
+ `flowsActors.mcpServers` and list its `ref` in the agent's `mcpRefs` — the full contract is in
192
+ `references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md`. Mind two fields: `credential.secretSlug` is the provider's
193
+ secrets-contract KEY (`accessToken`), never the env-var spelling, or a stored credential is silently missed; and write
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+ `timeouts` out (`discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000`). Startup refuses an `mcpRefs` entry naming no declared server, a
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+ plaintext `http://` endpoint, a transport the runtime does not speak and a `ref` declared twice. The server's tools are
196
+ offered at turn start, except on a turn an inbound delivery started and when no credential resolves for the server's
197
+ `credential.subject`; a server that does not answer contributes none rather than failing the turn, and every call is
198
+ on the audit trail. The server's answers are another party's text: declare `contentGuardrails.promptInjection` (Step 4).
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+
200
+ **Another party's A2A agent.** Declare it on the backend domain module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents` and list its `ref`
201
+ in the agent's `remoteAgentRefs`; the agent is offered one tool, `a2a_<ref>`, that sends a message and returns the
202
+ remote agent's answer, or the remote task still running with its ids. The contract is in
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+ `references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md`. The tool's description is your `description`, never the
204
+ card's; the credential goes only to the `endpointUrl` you named or, without one, to the card's own host; the model
205
+ cannot continue or cancel a remote task, and one still running at `callMs` comes back with its state and ids. The same credential, inbound-delivery and audit rules as an MCP server
206
+ apply, and so does `promptInjection`.
207
+
190
208
  ### Step 4: Declare the use, the guardrails and the approval gates
191
209
  Every agent you author — a chat assistant, a one-shot call from your code, a background agent, the agent
192
210
  step of a flow — carries three declarations. They are not options for a sensitive agent: they are what an
@@ -410,6 +428,9 @@ const todoAssistantChatAgent: FlowsActors_Agent = {
410
428
  functionRefs: [
411
429
  TODOS_READ_TOOL_REF,
412
430
  TODO_LISTS_READ_TOOL_REF,
431
+ // A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
432
+ // tool cannot address. See `./todo-occurrences-tool.ts`.
433
+ TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
413
434
  TODOS_CREATE_TOOL_REF,
414
435
  TODOS_UPDATE_TOOL_REF,
415
436
  // RETRIEVAL grounding — a different KIND of source from the three above. Those return ROWS
@@ -469,6 +490,7 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
469
490
  agents: FlowsActors_Agent[];
470
491
  functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
471
492
  autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
493
+ chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
472
494
  } = {
473
495
  flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
474
496
  [TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
@@ -480,6 +502,11 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
480
502
  },
481
503
  agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
482
504
  autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
505
+ // Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
506
+ // (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
507
+ // The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
508
+ // organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
509
+ chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
483
510
  // Generic engine factories instantiated per resource — every tool runs AS THE
484
511
  // CALLER (the engine rebuilds a scoped ExecutionContext from the caller's verified
485
512
  // auth; identity is never LLM-supplied) and each op's own ACL is enforced by the
@@ -571,8 +598,10 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
571
598
  // The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
572
599
  // is answers it, in the conversation or from their decision inbox.
573
600
  askPersonTool(),
574
- // The records the assistant may show as cards: the same two it reads.
575
- presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS] }),
601
+ // The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
602
+ // it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
603
+ presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
604
+ todoOccurrencesTool,
576
605
  // The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
577
606
  rescheduleTodoTool,
578
607
  // The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
@@ -583,6 +612,8 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
583
612
 
584
613
  ## References
585
614
 
615
+ - `references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent` declaration an agent's `remoteAgentRefs` names: the `a2a_<ref>` tool it becomes, where the credential may go, what each call does and records
616
+ - `references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_McpServer` declaration (transport, credential, timeouts) an agent's `mcpRefs` names
586
617
  - `references/framework-model-spend-limits-api.md` — the organization budget and the per-person ceiling every in-app turn is refused against, fail-closed, and the three unit ceilings on embeddings, document extraction and content screening: how to grant them on plans, what the person is told, what each refused call does, the `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT_REFUSED` audit row each refusal writes, and where each one's usage is shown
587
618
  - `references/framework-tool-dispatch-obligations-api.md` — grounding an agent on resource operations, and the two controller-tier gates a HAND-WRITTEN tool must call itself
588
619
  - `references/framework-present-records-tool-api.md` — `presentRecordsTool()`: the agent shows its person records as summary cards in the conversation, kept as a reference and fetched with the viewer's session
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ const todoAssistantChatAgent: FlowsActors_Agent = {
130
130
  functionRefs: [
131
131
  TODOS_READ_TOOL_REF,
132
132
  TODO_LISTS_READ_TOOL_REF,
133
+ // A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
134
+ // tool cannot address. See `./todo-occurrences-tool.ts`.
135
+ TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
133
136
  TODOS_CREATE_TOOL_REF,
134
137
  TODOS_UPDATE_TOOL_REF,
135
138
  // RETRIEVAL grounding — a different KIND of source from the three above. Those return ROWS
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
189
192
  agents: FlowsActors_Agent[];
190
193
  functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
191
194
  autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
195
+ chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
192
196
  } = {
193
197
  flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
194
198
  [TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
@@ -200,6 +204,11 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
200
204
  },
201
205
  agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
202
206
  autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
207
+ // Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
208
+ // (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
209
+ // The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
210
+ // organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
211
+ chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
203
212
  // Generic engine factories instantiated per resource — every tool runs AS THE
204
213
  // CALLER (the engine rebuilds a scoped ExecutionContext from the caller's verified
205
214
  // auth; identity is never LLM-supplied) and each op's own ACL is enforced by the
@@ -291,8 +300,10 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
291
300
  // The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
292
301
  // is answers it, in the conversation or from their decision inbox.
293
302
  askPersonTool(),
294
- // The records the assistant may show as cards: the same two it reads.
295
- presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS] }),
303
+ // The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
304
+ // it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
305
+ presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
306
+ todoOccurrencesTool,
296
307
  // The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
297
308
  rescheduleTodoTool,
298
309
  // The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
@@ -1157,10 +1157,17 @@ export function functionToolDeliverableDeclarationProblems(
1157
1157
  * #2914), one sentence per problem with its remedy; empty when they are sound or absent. `declaredFieldsOf` answers the
1158
1158
  * fields the resource's main schema declares, or undefined when the resource is not registered (its fields are then not
1159
1159
  * checked here: a field the row does not hold is shown and sealed as absent).
1160
+ *
1161
+ * `systemReadAllowedOf` answers whether the resource grants the system READ (`systemAccessPolicy.read`), or undefined when
1162
+ * the resource is not registered. The card, the seal and the currency check all read the row through `readAsSystem`, which
1163
+ * refuses a resource that does not grant it, and that refusal is swallowed into "no record values": every approval then
1164
+ * seals no field and no currency check can compare anything. Measured on Wonder Ledger's live sign-off, where the declared
1165
+ * field set was sealed on none of the seals, so a declaration nothing can read stops the application here instead.
1160
1166
  */
1161
1167
  export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
1162
1168
  tool: Pick<FunctionTool, 'functionRef' | 'sealedRecordFields' | 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow' | 'argumentsResource' | 'requiresHumanApproval' | 'humanApproval' | 'asksThePerson'>,
1163
1169
  declaredFieldsOf?: (resourceType: string) => readonly string[] | undefined,
1170
+ systemReadAllowedOf?: (resourceType: string) => boolean | undefined,
1164
1171
  ): string[] {
1165
1172
  const fields = tool.sealedRecordFields;
1166
1173
  const replaces = tool.approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow === true;
@@ -1184,6 +1191,10 @@ export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
1184
1191
  const unknown = declared ? fields.filter((field) => !declared.includes(field)) : [];
1185
1192
  if (unknown.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, naming ${unknown.join(', ')}, which ${tool.argumentsResource!.resourceType} does not declare.`);
1186
1193
  }
1194
+ if (tool.argumentsResource && systemReadAllowedOf?.(tool.argumentsResource.resourceType) === false) {
1195
+ problems.push(`${named}, but ${tool.argumentsResource.resourceType} does not grant the system read the approval card, the seal and the currency check `
1196
+ + `read the row through: declare systemAccessPolicy.read = ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED on it.`);
1197
+ }
1187
1198
  }
1188
1199
  return problems;
1189
1200
  }
@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ export interface BackendDomainModule extends SharedDomainModule {
93
93
  * `capabilities.tools.functionRefs`.
94
94
  */
95
95
  functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
96
+ /**
97
+ * Another party's MCP servers this module's agents may call (#3958): each one's endpoint and the stored provider
98
+ * connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`. Registration
99
+ * refuses a plaintext `http://` endpoint, and every call goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_McpServer`.
100
+ */
101
+ mcpServers?: FlowsActors_McpServer[];
102
+ /**
103
+ * Another party's A2A agents this module's agents may delegate a task to (#3930): each one's card URL and the stored
104
+ * provider connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's
105
+ * `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs`. Registration refuses a plaintext `http://` card or endpoint, and every call
106
+ * goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`.
107
+ */
108
+ remoteAgents?: FlowsActors_RemoteAgent[];
96
109
  /**
97
110
  * Agents that may run with nobody on a socket — on a schedule or on an inbound delivery (#1611).
98
111
  * Declaring one grants nothing: a turn runs in an organization only while one of its OAuth clients
@@ -501,6 +514,8 @@ function mergeFlowsActors(
501
514
  ) as FlowActorSystem_InitializationFactoryMap,
502
515
  agents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.agents ?? []),
503
516
  functionTools: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.functionTools ?? []),
517
+ mcpServers: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.mcpServers ?? []),
518
+ remoteAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.remoteAgents ?? []),
504
519
  autonomousAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.autonomousAgents ?? []),
505
520
  chatAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.chatAgents ?? []),
506
521
  actorExecutionContinuations: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.actorExecutionContinuations ?? []),
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
1
+ # Another party's MCP server — the declaration contract
2
+
3
+ Read this when an agent should call tools from an MCP server someone else runs. It surfaces the
4
+ `FlowsActors_McpServer` you put on a backend domain module's `flowsActors.mcpServers`, and whose `ref`
5
+ an agent lists in `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`:
6
+
7
+ - `transport` — `HTTP_STREAM` (Streamable HTTP) is the one the runtime speaks.
8
+ - `url` — the server's `https://` endpoint; startup refuses `http://`.
9
+ - `credential` — a `FlowsActors_OutboundCredential`, the stored provider connection whose token reaches the server:
10
+ `providerRef`, `secretSlug` (the provider's secrets-contract KEY, e.g. `accessToken`, never the
11
+ env-var spelling such as `VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`: a wrong spelling misses a stored credential
12
+ silently), and `subject` (`USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION`, `ORGANIZATION` or `USER`).
13
+ - `timeouts` — `discoveryMs` (opening a session and listing tools, default 5 000) and `callMs` (one
14
+ tool call, default 30 000). Write them out: the type an application authors against is the parsed
15
+ one, so the defaults do not make them optional there.
16
+
17
+ ## Import Origins
18
+
19
+ - `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
20
+
21
+ ## Source Excerpts
22
+
23
+ ### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
24
+
25
+ ```typescript
26
+ *
27
+ * How the runtime reaches the server.
28
+ *
29
+ * A closed vocabulary rather than a free string: the transport decides the whole connection
30
+ * lifecycle — how a session opens, whether the server can push, how a stream ends — so a value
31
+ * nobody implemented must be unrepresentable rather than discovered at the first call.
32
+ *
33
+ * STDIO is deliberately ABSENT. It launches a local subprocess, which is the coding-agent lane's
34
+ * shape and not an application's: a generated application runs in a container it does not control,
35
+ * and "the agent may spawn a process" is a different security decision from "the agent may call an
36
+ * endpoint". Adding it later is a decision, not an omission.
37
+ */
38
+ export enum FlowsActors_McpTransport {
39
+ /** Streamable HTTP — the current MCP transport for remote servers. */
40
+ HTTP_STREAM = 'http_stream',
41
+ /**
42
+ * Server-sent events — the earlier remote transport, still widely deployed. The client speaks Streamable HTTP only,
43
+ * so startup REFUSES a server declared with it (#3958) rather than failing every turn as a protocol error.
44
+ */
45
+ SSE = 'sse',
46
+ }
47
+
48
+
49
+ /**
50
+ * Bounds on a call that leaves the trust boundary.
51
+ *
52
+ * Present with defaults rather than optional-and-unbounded, because an MCP call is a REMOTE call and
53
+ * the mistake this whole issue warns against is modelling it as a second kind of local function. A
54
+ * local function cannot hang; this can, and an unbounded tool call holds a model turn open for as
55
+ * long as somebody else's server feels like it.
56
+ */
57
+ export const FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema = z.object({
58
+ /** How long tool DISCOVERY may take before the server contributes no tools to the turn. */
59
+ discoveryMs: z.number().int().positive().default(5_000),
60
+ /** How long one tool CALL may take before it returns a typed timeout to the agent. */
61
+ callMs: z.number().int().positive().default(30_000),
62
+ });
63
+ export type FlowsActors_McpServerTimeouts = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema>;
64
+
65
+ export const FlowsActors_McpServerSchema = z.object({
66
+ /** The value an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs` names. Unique within an application. */
67
+ ref: z.string().min(1),
68
+ displayName: z.string().min(1),
69
+ transport: z.enum(FlowsActors_McpTransport),
70
+ /** The server's endpoint. `https` in every deployed environment; the runtime refuses plaintext. */
71
+ url: z.string().url(),
72
+ /** Which stored provider credential authorizes the calls (`FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema`). */
73
+ credential: FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema,
74
+ timeouts: FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema.default({ discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000 }),
75
+ });
76
+ export type FlowsActors_McpServer = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerSchema>;
77
+ ```
78
+
79
+ The credential's own contract, shared with remote A2A agents:
80
+
81
+ ## Import Origins
82
+
83
+ - `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
84
+
85
+ ## Source Excerpts
86
+
87
+ ### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
88
+
89
+ ```typescript
90
+ /**
91
+ * WHOSE credential the call carries.
92
+ *
93
+ * The distinction is not a preference. A tool call that reaches a third party on a user's behalf
94
+ * should be attributable to that user AT THE FAR END — that is what makes it revocable there and
95
+ * auditable by the party being called. An application-wide service identity loses that: every
96
+ * user's call looks identical to the server, and one leaked credential exposes every tenant.
97
+ */
98
+ export enum FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject {
99
+ /**
100
+ * The acting user's own delegated credential, falling back to the organization's connection when
101
+ * the user has none. The default, and the reason a fallback exists at all: an agent acting for a
102
+ * user who has never connected the server would otherwise have no path, which would make every
103
+ * unattended and batch turn impossible.
104
+ */
105
+ USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION = 'user_then_organization',
106
+ /** The organization's connection only — for a server the tenant connects once on everyone's behalf. */
107
+ ORGANIZATION = 'organization',
108
+ /** The acting user's own credential only. No fallback: a user who has not connected cannot call. */
109
+ USER = 'user',
110
+ }
111
+
112
+ /**
113
+ * Which stored credential authorizes the call.
114
+ *
115
+ * `providerRef` names a provider the application has already connected, so the credential comes from
116
+ * `organizationProviderCredentials` / `userProviderCredentials` rather than from a store invented
117
+ * for one kind of call. Those exist, carry per-tenant isolation by construction, and already have the connect and
118
+ * consent flow in front of them — a second credential store for this one call shape would be a
119
+ * second thing to rotate, audit and leak.
120
+ */
121
+ export const FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema = z.object({
122
+ providerRef: z.string().min(1),
123
+ /**
124
+ * The provider's `secretsContract` KEY (`accessToken`) — the one both credential resolver ports
125
+ * require, and NOT the slot's env-var spelling (`VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`) the env projection names.
126
+ * Stored credentials are keyed on the key (#624), and this value reaches the stores verbatim, so a
127
+ * spelling here misses a credential that exists.
128
+ *
129
+ * DECLARED rather than derived, because it is not derivable: a provider's contract may carry
130
+ * several secrets, and which of them authorizes the endpoint is a fact about that vendor's
131
+ * deployment rather than anything the framework can compute. Guessing a conventional name would
132
+ * resolve the wrong secret silently — the resolver would find a credential, spend it, and be
133
+ * refused by the far server for a reason no log here would explain.
134
+ */
135
+ secretSlug: z.string().min(1),
136
+ subject: z.enum(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject).default(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject.USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION),
137
+ });
138
+ export type FlowsActors_OutboundCredential = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema>;
139
+ ```