@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.14 → 1.1.15
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
- package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +9 -0
- package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/authority-basis.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +7 -7
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/method.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/method.md +27 -10
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/method.md +13 -9
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/method.md +20 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +4 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/build-plan.task-graph.config.md +12 -8
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.autonomous-agent.reviewed-write.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.chat-assistant.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.inbound.email-to-todo.md +33 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/references/example.module.relationships.discriminator.md +7 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/references/external-connectors.frontend-provider-consent-classification.md +2 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/integration-plan.config.md +78 -8
- package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.environment.deployment.md +27 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.domain-module.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-agent-card.md +43 -11
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-task-surface.md +17 -11
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.function-tool.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.electronic-signatures.embedded-signing-frame.md +46 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.agent-definition.md +24 -33
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.mcp-server-declaration.md +63 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.outbound-credential.md +61 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.remote-agent-declaration.md +56 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.http-api-binding.md +51 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.provider-capability-disclosure.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.provider-capabilities.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.system-of-record-error-codes.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.rag.retrieval-scores.md +4 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/assurance-authority-bases.json +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/framework-topics.json +45 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/playbooks.json +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/registries/source-tags.json +1080 -1012
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/INDEX.md +2 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/references/framework-backend-bootstrap-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/SKILL.md +3 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/document-composition-privacy-notice.md +4 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-recipient-disclosures.md +7 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-auditable-event-catalog.md +1 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-provider-capabilities-api.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/SKILL.md +12 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/references/signing-inside-the-application.md +113 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/SKILL.md +3 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/references/email-artifact-paths.md +8 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-definition-wiring/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/SKILL.md +29 -7
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/references/framework-flows-actors-a2a-contract.md +66 -26
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-autonomous-agents/SKILL.md +6 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/SKILL.md +34 -3
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-tool-api.md +11 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-view-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md +139 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md +169 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-llm-agent-invocation/references/framework-llm-agent-definition-api.md +24 -33
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/inbound-channels/references/receiving-email.md +33 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/SKILL.md +31 -9
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-environment-deployment-api.md +27 -4
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/local-environment-bootstrap/references/wildo-cli-bootstrap-commands.md +26 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-registration/references/framework-domain-modules-api.md +15 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-relationships/SKILL.md +20 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-backend-package/SKILL.md +13 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-provider-consent-api.md +2 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/SKILL.md +3 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/SKILL.md +8 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/references/module-scaffold-layout.md +17 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-chat-commands/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/framework-http-api-binding-api.md +51 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/incremental-extraction.md +14 -5
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/read-through-writes.md +30 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-mcp-tool-exposure/references/mcp-client-registration-postures.md +5 -0
- package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-rag-source-fields/references/framework-rag-retrieval-api.md +4 -2
- package/dist/knowledge/topic-index.json +231 -84
- package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/package.json +4 -4
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@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ Read this when you need to know:
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- exactly what an external agent sees (skills = your agentic actor systems, keyed
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`skill.id === system.ref`);
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- how the card advertises auth
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- how the card advertises auth: two security schemes with one flow each, `oauth2`
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(`authorizationCode`, user-delegated) and `oauth2ClientCredentials` (`clientCredentials`,
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machine callers), listed as alternatives in `security` and `securityRequirements`;
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- what the card `url` means for audience binding (RFC 8707 / D7).
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## Import Origins
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* agent's canonical audience: BOTH a USER-delegated and a MACHINE (client-credentials)
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* inbound token MUST carry it as `aud` (RFC 8707 / external-access D7) — a token minted for
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* another surface (including the generic API audience, per the 2026-07-29 flip) is rejected.
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*
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* machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app).
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* app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
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* The card advertises BOTH D6 principals as TWO security schemes, one flow each:
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* {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`authorizationCode`, user-delegated → the conversation is
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* owned by the delegating user) and {@link A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`clientCredentials`, org/app
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* machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app). Either satisfies the requirement. Tokens are
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* minted by the app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
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*/
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/**
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*
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* The security scheme a USER-delegated client reads: the `authorizationCode` flow. Kept as `oauth2`, the name the card
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* has always used for it.
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* One flow per scheme because A2A 1.0 makes it so: spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message OAuthFlows {
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* oneof flow { AuthorizationCodeOAuthFlow authorization_code = 1; ClientCredentialsOAuthFlow client_credentials = 2; … } }`.
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* Both flows in one scheme made the A2A reference SDK refuse the whole card (#3932).
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*/
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export const A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2';
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/** The security scheme a MACHINE client reads: the `clientCredentials` flow. See {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME}. */
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export const A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2ClientCredentials';
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/**
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* One protocol interface this agent exposes: a URL, the protocol binding spoken there, and the protocol version.
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*
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* spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message AgentInterface { string url = 1 [REQUIRED]; string
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* protocol_binding = 2 [REQUIRED]; string tenant = 3; string protocol_version = 4 [REQUIRED]; }`, serialized camelCase
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* (§5.5). `protocol_binding` is "an open form string … The core ones officially supported are `JSONRPC`, `GRPC` and
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* `HTTP+JSON`."
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*
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* These were named `transport` and `version` until 2026-11-16, names `AgentInterface` does not have, so a 1.0 client
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* parsing the card read every interface with no binding and no version (#3932).
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*/
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export interface A2A_AgentInterface {
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url: string;
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protocolBinding: string;
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protocolVersion: string;
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}
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/**
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* One 1.0 security requirement: the schemes it needs, each with the scopes required. The card lists alternatives, so a
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* client satisfies any one entry.
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*
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* spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message SecurityRequirement { map<string, StringList> schemes = 1; }`
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* and `message StringList { repeated string list = 1; }`.
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*/
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export interface A2A_SecurityRequirement {
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schemes: Record<string, { list: string[] }>;
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}
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export interface A2A_AgentCard {
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defaultOutputModes: string[];
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skills: A2A_Skill[];
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securitySchemes: Record<string, unknown>;
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/** The v0.2.5 requirement list (scheme name → scopes), one entry per alternative. Kept for v0.2.5 clients. */
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security: Record<string, string[]>[];
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/**
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* The same alternatives in the 1.0 shape. spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `AgentCard` —
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* `repeated SecurityRequirement security_requirements = 9`.
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*/
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securityRequirements: A2A_SecurityRequirement[];
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}
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```
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## The A2A task surface (`tasks/get` / `tasks/cancel`)
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Read this when an external agent needs to start work it will come back for. A turn that pauses
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for human approval also becomes a task: it reaches `
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for human approval also becomes a task: it reaches `auth-required` (the protocol's in-task
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authorization, given outside the protocol), carries a status message saying a person decides in the
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application, persists the decision it is waiting on, and leaves that state once its execution moves on. Both paths into a task are live,
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so an integration you build now can encounter either.
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The key thing to understand is **when a task exists at all** — most turns never create
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* - the turn reached an interrupted state (a human-in-the-loop approval pause).
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*
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* All three triggers are live. The interrupted-state arm needs a runtime that can pause a turn; that
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* is the human-in-the-loop approval gate, and a paused turn materialises a task carrying
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* `auth-required` on all three transports (blocking send, non-blocking send, stream), with a status
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* message saying a person decides in the application. The task moves on by itself once they have:
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* poll it, subscribe to it, or register a webhook. A message on the task does not answer the
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* approval, and `tasks/cancel` withdraws it.
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*
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* A blocking turn that answers in one shot, with no webhook, returns an A2A `Message` and writes no task
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* row at all. Both shapes are protocol-conformant: the specification types the
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* projection from `FlowsActors_Status` reads it, the transport emits it, and tests
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* pin it.
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*
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* Not every member is emitted by this transport today — `INPUT_REQUIRED` and
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* `REJECTED` have no `FlowsActors_Status` counterpart and are never produced. They
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* are declared because the vocabulary belongs to the protocol, not to us: a client
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* may legitimately receive them from another A2A server, and omitting them would
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/** Actively being processed. */
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WORKING = 'working',
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/**
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* principals are denied rather than parked because no named person can answer for them.
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* Interrupted (non-terminal): the agent needs more input from the client, which a follow-up message
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* on the task gives. NOT emitted by this transport: a turn that answers needs no task, and an
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* Interrupted (non-terminal): an authorization the task waits on, given outside the protocol.
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* Emitted when a user-delegated turn reaches an approval-gated tool: the signed pending decision is
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* persisted, an addressable task is materialised, and its status message says a person decides in
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* the application. Their approval or refusal resumes that same execution, and the task moves on
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* without the client sending anything. Machine principals are denied rather than parked, because
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* no named person can answer for them.
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*/
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/** Terminal: finished successfully. */
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argumentsResource: { resourceType: TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS },
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description:
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'Propose a new due date for one overdue todo. An organization administrator must approve the change before '
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+ 'it is applied. Resolve the todo id with resource.todos.read first.',
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+ 'it is applied. Resolve the todo id with resource.todos.read first, and give the administrator a one-sentence reason.',
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inputSchema: z.object({
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todoId: z.string().min(1).describe('Id of the todo to reschedule. Resolve it with resource.todos.read.'),
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dueDate: z.string().min(1).describe('The proposed due date, as an ISO 8601 date, e.g. "2026-10-04".'),
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// Shown to the administrator who decides, and nowhere else: it is not written to the todo. Defaulted, so a call that
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// leaves it out still runs, and the approval card then shows the default rather than an empty argument (#3295: an
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// approver's edit is parsed, and a parse that fills a default differs from the raw input).
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reason: z.string().max(280).default('No reason given.').describe('One sentence for the approving administrator: why this date.'),
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}),
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// What the todos UPDATE it runs declares (#2526).
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riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
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},
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execute: async (args: { todoId: string; dueDate: string }, ctx: FunctionToolExecutionContext): Promise<RescheduleTodoToolResult> => {
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execute: async (args: { todoId: string; dueDate: string; reason: string }, ctx: FunctionToolExecutionContext): Promise<RescheduleTodoToolResult> => {
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---
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name: flows-actors-chat-assistant
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description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
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description: Add a conversational AI assistant to your app that answers questions grounded in your users' own resource data. Use when the user says "add a chat assistant", "add an AI assistant grounded on <resource>", "let users chat with / ask questions about their <resource>", "wire a resourceReadTool", "add a flows-actors chat agent", "expose an actor system as a chat view", "show the records as cards in the chat", "set a deadline or reminders on an approval", "let my agent delegate to another company's A2A agent", or "cap what the assistant spends per organization / per person" — i.e. when the intent is a conversational, tool-grounded assistant surfaced as a standalone view, NOT a one-shot generation agent or a background flow.
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---
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Nothing refuses a tool that declares nothing, but the application's assurance evidence reports it, because a
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tool is what an agent's authority confinement rests on.
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**Tools from another party's MCP server.** Declare the server on the backend domain module's
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`flowsActors.mcpServers` and list its `ref` in the agent's `mcpRefs` — the full contract is in
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`references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md`. Mind two fields: `credential.secretSlug` is the provider's
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secrets-contract KEY (`accessToken`), never the env-var spelling, or a stored credential is silently missed; and write
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`timeouts` out (`discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000`). Startup refuses an `mcpRefs` entry naming no declared server, a
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plaintext `http://` endpoint, a transport the runtime does not speak and a `ref` declared twice. The server's tools are
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offered at turn start, except on a turn an inbound delivery started and when no credential resolves for the server's
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`credential.subject`; a server that does not answer contributes none rather than failing the turn, and every call is
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on the audit trail. The server's answers are another party's text: declare `contentGuardrails.promptInjection` (Step 4).
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**Another party's A2A agent.** Declare it on the backend domain module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents` and list its `ref`
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in the agent's `remoteAgentRefs`; the agent is offered one tool, `a2a_<ref>`, that sends a message and returns the
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remote agent's answer, or the remote task still running with its ids. The contract is in
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`references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md`. The tool's description is your `description`, never the
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card's; the credential goes only to the `endpointUrl` you named or, without one, to the card's own host; the model
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cannot continue or cancel a remote task, and one still running at `callMs` comes back with its state and ids. The same credential, inbound-delivery and audit rules as an MCP server
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apply, and so does `promptInjection`.
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### Step 4: Declare the use, the guardrails and the approval gates
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Every agent you author — a chat assistant, a one-shot call from your code, a background agent, the agent
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step of a flow — carries three declarations. They are not options for a sensitive agent: they are what an
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functionRefs: [
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TODOS_READ_TOOL_REF,
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TODO_LISTS_READ_TOOL_REF,
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// A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
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// tool cannot address. See `./todo-occurrences-tool.ts`.
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TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
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TODOS_CREATE_TOOL_REF,
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TODOS_UPDATE_TOOL_REF,
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// RETRIEVAL grounding — a different KIND of source from the three above. Those return ROWS
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agents: FlowsActors_Agent[];
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functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
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autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
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chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
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} = {
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flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
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[TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
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@@ -480,6 +502,11 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
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},
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agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
|
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autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
|
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// Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
|
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506
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+
// (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
|
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// The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
|
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|
+
// organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
|
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|
+
chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
|
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|
// Generic engine factories instantiated per resource — every tool runs AS THE
|
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// CALLER (the engine rebuilds a scoped ExecutionContext from the caller's verified
|
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// auth; identity is never LLM-supplied) and each op's own ACL is enforced by the
|
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@@ -571,8 +598,10 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
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// The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
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|
// is answers it, in the conversation or from their decision inbox.
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askPersonTool(),
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// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same
|
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-
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|
+
// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
|
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|
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// it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
|
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|
+
presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
|
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|
+
todoOccurrencesTool,
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|
// The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
|
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rescheduleTodoTool,
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|
// The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
|
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@@ -583,6 +612,8 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
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612
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|
## References
|
|
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|
|
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|
+
- `references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent` declaration an agent's `remoteAgentRefs` names: the `a2a_<ref>` tool it becomes, where the credential may go, what each call does and records
|
|
616
|
+
- `references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md` — the `FlowsActors_McpServer` declaration (transport, credential, timeouts) an agent's `mcpRefs` names
|
|
586
617
|
- `references/framework-model-spend-limits-api.md` — the organization budget and the per-person ceiling every in-app turn is refused against, fail-closed, and the three unit ceilings on embeddings, document extraction and content screening: how to grant them on plans, what the person is told, what each refused call does, the `MODEL_SPEND_LIMIT_REFUSED` audit row each refusal writes, and where each one's usage is shown
|
|
587
618
|
- `references/framework-tool-dispatch-obligations-api.md` — grounding an agent on resource operations, and the two controller-tier gates a HAND-WRITTEN tool must call itself
|
|
588
619
|
- `references/framework-present-records-tool-api.md` — `presentRecordsTool()`: the agent shows its person records as summary cards in the conversation, kept as a reference and fetched with the viewer's session
|
package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ const todoAssistantChatAgent: FlowsActors_Agent = {
|
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functionRefs: [
|
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TODOS_READ_TOOL_REF,
|
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TODO_LISTS_READ_TOOL_REF,
|
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|
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// A recurring todo's occurrences, by the todo's id: they are listed under their todo, which the generic read
|
|
134
|
+
// tool cannot address. See `./todo-occurrences-tool.ts`.
|
|
135
|
+
TODO_OCCURRENCES_TOOL_REF,
|
|
133
136
|
TODOS_CREATE_TOOL_REF,
|
|
134
137
|
TODOS_UPDATE_TOOL_REF,
|
|
135
138
|
// RETRIEVAL grounding — a different KIND of source from the three above. Those return ROWS
|
|
@@ -189,6 +192,7 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
|
|
189
192
|
agents: FlowsActors_Agent[];
|
|
190
193
|
functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
|
|
191
194
|
autonomousAgents?: FlowsActors_AutonomousAgentDeclaration[];
|
|
195
|
+
chatAgents?: FlowsActors_ChatAgentDeclaration[];
|
|
192
196
|
} = {
|
|
193
197
|
flowActorSystemsFactoryMap: {
|
|
194
198
|
[TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF]: () => todoAssistantActorSystem,
|
|
@@ -200,6 +204,11 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
|
|
200
204
|
},
|
|
201
205
|
agents: [todoAssistantChatAgent, todoTriageAgent, todoDeadlineDrillAgent, todoAutoResolveAgent],
|
|
202
206
|
autonomousAgents: [todosOverdueTriage, todosDeadlineDrill],
|
|
207
|
+
// Who answers a person who writes to the Teams bot (#2665). The Teams messages handler already converses
|
|
208
|
+
// (`../../inbound/teams-bot.inbound-handler.ts`), and with no chat agent declared every such message was refused.
|
|
209
|
+
// The todo assistant answers, as the linked member who wrote and with that member's authority, in every
|
|
210
|
+
// organization that chose no other agent for the connection (Settings > Chat agents).
|
|
211
|
+
chatAgents: [{ ref: 'todos.assistant', systemRef: TODO_ASSISTANT_SYSTEM_REF, isDefault: true }],
|
|
203
212
|
// Generic engine factories instantiated per resource — every tool runs AS THE
|
|
204
213
|
// CALLER (the engine rebuilds a scoped ExecutionContext from the caller's verified
|
|
205
214
|
// auth; identity is never LLM-supplied) and each op's own ACL is enforced by the
|
|
@@ -291,8 +300,10 @@ export const moduleBackend_FlowsActorsRegistry: {
|
|
|
291
300
|
// The engine's question tool (#2720): gated on the OWNER route by construction, so only the person whose turn it
|
|
292
301
|
// is answers it, in the conversation or from their decision inbox.
|
|
293
302
|
askPersonTool(),
|
|
294
|
-
// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same
|
|
295
|
-
|
|
303
|
+
// The records the assistant may show as cards: the same three it reads. An occurrence has no page, so its card opens
|
|
304
|
+
// it in an overlay over the conversation (#2776).
|
|
305
|
+
presentRecordsTool({ resourceTypes: [TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODO_LISTS, TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS_RECURRING_OCCURRENCES] }),
|
|
306
|
+
todoOccurrencesTool,
|
|
296
307
|
// The overdue-triage agent's one write, ROLE-gated to administrators (#1611). See `./reschedule-todo-tool.ts`.
|
|
297
308
|
rescheduleTodoTool,
|
|
298
309
|
// The deadline drill's four-minute reviewer-routed delete (#1866). See `./deadline-drill-agent.ts`.
|
|
@@ -1157,10 +1157,17 @@ export function functionToolDeliverableDeclarationProblems(
|
|
|
1157
1157
|
* #2914), one sentence per problem with its remedy; empty when they are sound or absent. `declaredFieldsOf` answers the
|
|
1158
1158
|
* fields the resource's main schema declares, or undefined when the resource is not registered (its fields are then not
|
|
1159
1159
|
* checked here: a field the row does not hold is shown and sealed as absent).
|
|
1160
|
+
*
|
|
1161
|
+
* `systemReadAllowedOf` answers whether the resource grants the system READ (`systemAccessPolicy.read`), or undefined when
|
|
1162
|
+
* the resource is not registered. The card, the seal and the currency check all read the row through `readAsSystem`, which
|
|
1163
|
+
* refuses a resource that does not grant it, and that refusal is swallowed into "no record values": every approval then
|
|
1164
|
+
* seals no field and no currency check can compare anything. Measured on Wonder Ledger's live sign-off, where the declared
|
|
1165
|
+
* field set was sealed on none of the seals, so a declaration nothing can read stops the application here instead.
|
|
1160
1166
|
*/
|
|
1161
1167
|
export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
|
|
1162
1168
|
tool: Pick<FunctionTool, 'functionRef' | 'sealedRecordFields' | 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow' | 'argumentsResource' | 'requiresHumanApproval' | 'humanApproval' | 'asksThePerson'>,
|
|
1163
1169
|
declaredFieldsOf?: (resourceType: string) => readonly string[] | undefined,
|
|
1170
|
+
systemReadAllowedOf?: (resourceType: string) => boolean | undefined,
|
|
1164
1171
|
): string[] {
|
|
1165
1172
|
const fields = tool.sealedRecordFields;
|
|
1166
1173
|
const replaces = tool.approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow === true;
|
|
@@ -1184,6 +1191,10 @@ export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
|
|
|
1184
1191
|
const unknown = declared ? fields.filter((field) => !declared.includes(field)) : [];
|
|
1185
1192
|
if (unknown.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, naming ${unknown.join(', ')}, which ${tool.argumentsResource!.resourceType} does not declare.`);
|
|
1186
1193
|
}
|
|
1194
|
+
if (tool.argumentsResource && systemReadAllowedOf?.(tool.argumentsResource.resourceType) === false) {
|
|
1195
|
+
problems.push(`${named}, but ${tool.argumentsResource.resourceType} does not grant the system read the approval card, the seal and the currency check `
|
|
1196
|
+
+ `read the row through: declare systemAccessPolicy.read = ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED on it.`);
|
|
1197
|
+
}
|
|
1187
1198
|
}
|
|
1188
1199
|
return problems;
|
|
1189
1200
|
}
|
|
@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ export interface BackendDomainModule extends SharedDomainModule {
|
|
|
93
93
|
* `capabilities.tools.functionRefs`.
|
|
94
94
|
*/
|
|
95
95
|
functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
|
|
96
|
+
/**
|
|
97
|
+
* Another party's MCP servers this module's agents may call (#3958): each one's endpoint and the stored provider
|
|
98
|
+
* connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`. Registration
|
|
99
|
+
* refuses a plaintext `http://` endpoint, and every call goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_McpServer`.
|
|
100
|
+
*/
|
|
101
|
+
mcpServers?: FlowsActors_McpServer[];
|
|
102
|
+
/**
|
|
103
|
+
* Another party's A2A agents this module's agents may delegate a task to (#3930): each one's card URL and the stored
|
|
104
|
+
* provider connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's
|
|
105
|
+
* `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs`. Registration refuses a plaintext `http://` card or endpoint, and every call
|
|
106
|
+
* goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`.
|
|
107
|
+
*/
|
|
108
|
+
remoteAgents?: FlowsActors_RemoteAgent[];
|
|
96
109
|
/**
|
|
97
110
|
* Agents that may run with nobody on a socket — on a schedule or on an inbound delivery (#1611).
|
|
98
111
|
* Declaring one grants nothing: a turn runs in an organization only while one of its OAuth clients
|
|
@@ -501,6 +514,8 @@ function mergeFlowsActors(
|
|
|
501
514
|
) as FlowActorSystem_InitializationFactoryMap,
|
|
502
515
|
agents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.agents ?? []),
|
|
503
516
|
functionTools: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.functionTools ?? []),
|
|
517
|
+
mcpServers: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.mcpServers ?? []),
|
|
518
|
+
remoteAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.remoteAgents ?? []),
|
|
504
519
|
autonomousAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.autonomousAgents ?? []),
|
|
505
520
|
chatAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.chatAgents ?? []),
|
|
506
521
|
actorExecutionContinuations: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.actorExecutionContinuations ?? []),
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Another party's MCP server — the declaration contract
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Read this when an agent should call tools from an MCP server someone else runs. It surfaces the
|
|
4
|
+
`FlowsActors_McpServer` you put on a backend domain module's `flowsActors.mcpServers`, and whose `ref`
|
|
5
|
+
an agent lists in `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`:
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
- `transport` — `HTTP_STREAM` (Streamable HTTP) is the one the runtime speaks.
|
|
8
|
+
- `url` — the server's `https://` endpoint; startup refuses `http://`.
|
|
9
|
+
- `credential` — a `FlowsActors_OutboundCredential`, the stored provider connection whose token reaches the server:
|
|
10
|
+
`providerRef`, `secretSlug` (the provider's secrets-contract KEY, e.g. `accessToken`, never the
|
|
11
|
+
env-var spelling such as `VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`: a wrong spelling misses a stored credential
|
|
12
|
+
silently), and `subject` (`USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION`, `ORGANIZATION` or `USER`).
|
|
13
|
+
- `timeouts` — `discoveryMs` (opening a session and listing tools, default 5 000) and `callMs` (one
|
|
14
|
+
tool call, default 30 000). Write them out: the type an application authors against is the parsed
|
|
15
|
+
one, so the defaults do not make them optional there.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
## Import Origins
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
## Source Excerpts
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
```typescript
|
|
26
|
+
*
|
|
27
|
+
* How the runtime reaches the server.
|
|
28
|
+
*
|
|
29
|
+
* A closed vocabulary rather than a free string: the transport decides the whole connection
|
|
30
|
+
* lifecycle — how a session opens, whether the server can push, how a stream ends — so a value
|
|
31
|
+
* nobody implemented must be unrepresentable rather than discovered at the first call.
|
|
32
|
+
*
|
|
33
|
+
* STDIO is deliberately ABSENT. It launches a local subprocess, which is the coding-agent lane's
|
|
34
|
+
* shape and not an application's: a generated application runs in a container it does not control,
|
|
35
|
+
* and "the agent may spawn a process" is a different security decision from "the agent may call an
|
|
36
|
+
* endpoint". Adding it later is a decision, not an omission.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
38
|
+
export enum FlowsActors_McpTransport {
|
|
39
|
+
/** Streamable HTTP — the current MCP transport for remote servers. */
|
|
40
|
+
HTTP_STREAM = 'http_stream',
|
|
41
|
+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* Server-sent events — the earlier remote transport, still widely deployed. The client speaks Streamable HTTP only,
|
|
43
|
+
* so startup REFUSES a server declared with it (#3958) rather than failing every turn as a protocol error.
|
|
44
|
+
*/
|
|
45
|
+
SSE = 'sse',
|
|
46
|
+
}
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
/**
|
|
50
|
+
* Bounds on a call that leaves the trust boundary.
|
|
51
|
+
*
|
|
52
|
+
* Present with defaults rather than optional-and-unbounded, because an MCP call is a REMOTE call and
|
|
53
|
+
* the mistake this whole issue warns against is modelling it as a second kind of local function. A
|
|
54
|
+
* local function cannot hang; this can, and an unbounded tool call holds a model turn open for as
|
|
55
|
+
* long as somebody else's server feels like it.
|
|
56
|
+
*/
|
|
57
|
+
export const FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema = z.object({
|
|
58
|
+
/** How long tool DISCOVERY may take before the server contributes no tools to the turn. */
|
|
59
|
+
discoveryMs: z.number().int().positive().default(5_000),
|
|
60
|
+
/** How long one tool CALL may take before it returns a typed timeout to the agent. */
|
|
61
|
+
callMs: z.number().int().positive().default(30_000),
|
|
62
|
+
});
|
|
63
|
+
export type FlowsActors_McpServerTimeouts = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema>;
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
export const FlowsActors_McpServerSchema = z.object({
|
|
66
|
+
/** The value an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs` names. Unique within an application. */
|
|
67
|
+
ref: z.string().min(1),
|
|
68
|
+
displayName: z.string().min(1),
|
|
69
|
+
transport: z.enum(FlowsActors_McpTransport),
|
|
70
|
+
/** The server's endpoint. `https` in every deployed environment; the runtime refuses plaintext. */
|
|
71
|
+
url: z.string().url(),
|
|
72
|
+
/** Which stored provider credential authorizes the calls (`FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema`). */
|
|
73
|
+
credential: FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema,
|
|
74
|
+
timeouts: FlowsActors_McpServerTimeoutsSchema.default({ discoveryMs: 5_000, callMs: 30_000 }),
|
|
75
|
+
});
|
|
76
|
+
export type FlowsActors_McpServer = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_McpServerSchema>;
|
|
77
|
+
```
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
The credential's own contract, shared with remote A2A agents:
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
## Import Origins
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
- `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
## Source Excerpts
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-models`
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
```typescript
|
|
90
|
+
/**
|
|
91
|
+
* WHOSE credential the call carries.
|
|
92
|
+
*
|
|
93
|
+
* The distinction is not a preference. A tool call that reaches a third party on a user's behalf
|
|
94
|
+
* should be attributable to that user AT THE FAR END — that is what makes it revocable there and
|
|
95
|
+
* auditable by the party being called. An application-wide service identity loses that: every
|
|
96
|
+
* user's call looks identical to the server, and one leaked credential exposes every tenant.
|
|
97
|
+
*/
|
|
98
|
+
export enum FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject {
|
|
99
|
+
/**
|
|
100
|
+
* The acting user's own delegated credential, falling back to the organization's connection when
|
|
101
|
+
* the user has none. The default, and the reason a fallback exists at all: an agent acting for a
|
|
102
|
+
* user who has never connected the server would otherwise have no path, which would make every
|
|
103
|
+
* unattended and batch turn impossible.
|
|
104
|
+
*/
|
|
105
|
+
USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION = 'user_then_organization',
|
|
106
|
+
/** The organization's connection only — for a server the tenant connects once on everyone's behalf. */
|
|
107
|
+
ORGANIZATION = 'organization',
|
|
108
|
+
/** The acting user's own credential only. No fallback: a user who has not connected cannot call. */
|
|
109
|
+
USER = 'user',
|
|
110
|
+
}
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
/**
|
|
113
|
+
* Which stored credential authorizes the call.
|
|
114
|
+
*
|
|
115
|
+
* `providerRef` names a provider the application has already connected, so the credential comes from
|
|
116
|
+
* `organizationProviderCredentials` / `userProviderCredentials` rather than from a store invented
|
|
117
|
+
* for one kind of call. Those exist, carry per-tenant isolation by construction, and already have the connect and
|
|
118
|
+
* consent flow in front of them — a second credential store for this one call shape would be a
|
|
119
|
+
* second thing to rotate, audit and leak.
|
|
120
|
+
*/
|
|
121
|
+
export const FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema = z.object({
|
|
122
|
+
providerRef: z.string().min(1),
|
|
123
|
+
/**
|
|
124
|
+
* The provider's `secretsContract` KEY (`accessToken`) — the one both credential resolver ports
|
|
125
|
+
* require, and NOT the slot's env-var spelling (`VENDOR_ACCESS_TOKEN`) the env projection names.
|
|
126
|
+
* Stored credentials are keyed on the key (#624), and this value reaches the stores verbatim, so a
|
|
127
|
+
* spelling here misses a credential that exists.
|
|
128
|
+
*
|
|
129
|
+
* DECLARED rather than derived, because it is not derivable: a provider's contract may carry
|
|
130
|
+
* several secrets, and which of them authorizes the endpoint is a fact about that vendor's
|
|
131
|
+
* deployment rather than anything the framework can compute. Guessing a conventional name would
|
|
132
|
+
* resolve the wrong secret silently — the resolver would find a credential, spend it, and be
|
|
133
|
+
* refused by the far server for a reason no log here would explain.
|
|
134
|
+
*/
|
|
135
|
+
secretSlug: z.string().min(1),
|
|
136
|
+
subject: z.enum(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject).default(FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSubject.USER_THEN_ORGANIZATION),
|
|
137
|
+
});
|
|
138
|
+
export type FlowsActors_OutboundCredential = z.infer<typeof FlowsActors_OutboundCredentialSchema>;
|
|
139
|
+
```
|