@wildo-ai/framework-knowledge 1.1.14 → 1.1.15

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Files changed (94) hide show
  1. package/dist/claude-marketplace/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
  2. package/dist/claude-marketplace/plugins/wildo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  3. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts +1 -1
  4. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js +9 -0
  6. package/dist/esm/framework-knowledge.definitions.js.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  8. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
  9. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.d.ts +1 -1
  11. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js +1 -1
  12. package/dist/esm/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.definition.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/authority-basis.json +1 -1
  14. package/dist/knowledge/assurance-authority-bases/wildo-safe-baseline-v1/external-framework-mapping.json +1 -1
  15. package/dist/knowledge/manifest.json +7 -7
  16. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/method.md +7 -0
  17. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.assemble-verify/playbook.json +2 -2
  18. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/method.md +27 -10
  19. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-decompose/playbook.json +1 -1
  20. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/method.md +13 -9
  21. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.build-dispatch/playbook.json +1 -1
  22. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/method.md +20 -5
  23. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/bottom_up.integration-plan/playbook.json +2 -2
  24. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/method.md +4 -0
  25. package/dist/knowledge/playbooks/refinement.compliance-document-candidate/playbook.json +1 -1
  26. package/dist/knowledge/references/build-plan.task-graph.config.md +12 -8
  27. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.autonomous-agent.reviewed-write.md +6 -2
  28. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.flows-actors.chat-assistant.md +13 -2
  29. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.inbound.email-to-todo.md +33 -2
  30. package/dist/knowledge/references/example.module.relationships.discriminator.md +7 -1
  31. package/dist/knowledge/references/external-connectors.frontend-provider-consent-classification.md +2 -0
  32. package/dist/knowledge/references/integration-plan.config.md +78 -8
  33. package/dist/knowledge/references/platform.config.environment.deployment.md +27 -4
  34. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.domain-module.md +15 -0
  35. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-agent-card.md +43 -11
  36. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.a2a-task-surface.md +17 -11
  37. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.backend.flows-actors.function-tool.md +11 -0
  38. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.frontend.electronic-signatures.embedded-signing-frame.md +46 -0
  39. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.agent-definition.md +24 -33
  40. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.mcp-server-declaration.md +63 -0
  41. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.outbound-credential.md +61 -0
  42. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.flows-actors.remote-agent-declaration.md +56 -0
  43. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.http-api-binding.md +51 -0
  44. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.privacy.provider-capability-disclosure.md +7 -0
  45. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.provider-capabilities.md +11 -0
  46. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.models.system-of-record-error-codes.md +30 -0
  47. package/dist/knowledge/references/saas.rag.retrieval-scores.md +4 -2
  48. package/dist/knowledge/registries/assurance-authority-bases.json +1 -1
  49. package/dist/knowledge/registries/framework-topics.json +45 -1
  50. package/dist/knowledge/registries/playbooks.json +2 -2
  51. package/dist/knowledge/registries/source-tags.json +1080 -1012
  52. package/dist/knowledge/skills/INDEX.md +2 -2
  53. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/SKILL.md +4 -1
  54. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-addon-wiring/references/framework-backend-bootstrap-api.md +15 -0
  55. package/dist/knowledge/skills/backend-custom-operation/SKILL.md +3 -1
  56. package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/document-composition-privacy-notice.md +4 -0
  57. package/dist/knowledge/skills/compliance-document-authoring/references/framework-recipient-disclosures.md +7 -0
  58. package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-auditable-event-catalog.md +1 -0
  59. package/dist/knowledge/skills/config-saas/references/framework-provider-capabilities-api.md +11 -0
  60. package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/SKILL.md +12 -5
  61. package/dist/knowledge/skills/electronic-signature-deliverables/references/signing-inside-the-application.md +113 -0
  62. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/SKILL.md +3 -2
  63. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-add-template/references/email-artifact-paths.md +8 -4
  64. package/dist/knowledge/skills/email-definition-wiring/SKILL.md +1 -1
  65. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/SKILL.md +29 -7
  66. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-a2a-exposure/references/framework-flows-actors-a2a-contract.md +66 -26
  67. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-autonomous-agents/SKILL.md +6 -2
  68. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/SKILL.md +34 -3
  69. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/examples/todo-assistant.example.md +13 -2
  70. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-tool-api.md +11 -0
  71. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-flows-actors-view-api.md +15 -0
  72. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-mcp-server-declaration-api.md +139 -0
  73. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-chat-assistant/references/framework-remote-a2a-agent-declaration-api.md +169 -0
  74. package/dist/knowledge/skills/flows-actors-llm-agent-invocation/references/framework-llm-agent-definition-api.md +24 -33
  75. package/dist/knowledge/skills/inbound-channels/references/receiving-email.md +33 -2
  76. package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/SKILL.md +31 -9
  77. package/dist/knowledge/skills/infra-environment-config/references/framework-environment-deployment-api.md +27 -4
  78. package/dist/knowledge/skills/local-environment-bootstrap/references/wildo-cli-bootstrap-commands.md +26 -0
  79. package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-registration/references/framework-domain-modules-api.md +15 -0
  80. package/dist/knowledge/skills/module-relationships/SKILL.md +20 -1
  81. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-backend-package/SKILL.md +13 -2
  82. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-file-picker/references/framework-frontend-provider-consent-api.md +2 -0
  83. package/dist/knowledge/skills/provider-frontend-module/SKILL.md +3 -0
  84. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/SKILL.md +8 -2
  85. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-add-module/references/module-scaffold-layout.md +17 -0
  86. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-chat-commands/SKILL.md +1 -1
  87. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/framework-http-api-binding-api.md +51 -0
  88. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/incremental-extraction.md +14 -5
  89. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-external-data/references/read-through-writes.md +30 -0
  90. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-mcp-tool-exposure/references/mcp-client-registration-postures.md +5 -0
  91. package/dist/knowledge/skills/resource-rag-source-fields/references/framework-rag-retrieval-api.md +4 -2
  92. package/dist/knowledge/topic-index.json +231 -84
  93. package/dist/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
  94. package/package.json +4 -4
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
7
7
  /** The template the answer is rendered from — `emails/resources/todos/email-intake.received/`. */
8
8
  export const TODO_EMAIL_RECEIVED_TEMPLATE_REF = 'email.todos.email-intake.received';
9
9
 
10
+ /** The answer to "summary" on a linked thread — `emails/resources/todos/email-intake.summary/`. */
11
+ export const TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_TEMPLATE_REF = 'email.todos.email-intake.summary';
12
+
13
+ /** What a sender writes, alone, on a linked thread to receive the todo's summary PDF. */
14
+ export const TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST = 'summary';
15
+
10
16
  /** The route tag of the screened address, `acme+screened@…`. */
11
17
  export const TODO_EMAIL_SCREENED_ROUTE_TAG = 'screened';
12
18
 
@@ -86,8 +92,32 @@ async function addFollowUpOnce(ctx: InboundChannelHandlerContextBase, todoId: st
86
92
  await ctx.resources.update(TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, todoId, { checklist: [...checklist, { label: `${label} ${marker}`, done: false }] });
87
93
  }
88
94
 
95
+ /** A follow-up whose whole text is the word {@link TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST}, in any case. */
96
+ function asksForSummary(message: InboundMessage<InboundChannelKind.EMAIL>): boolean {
97
+ return (message.strippedReply ?? message.text).trim().toLowerCase() === TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_REQUEST;
98
+ }
99
+
100
+ /**
101
+ * Answers "summary" with the todo's generated summary PDF attached (#1856). The handler names the file; the engine
102
+ * checks it with the handler's own read (the file belongs to the organization, is servable, and the todo still holds
103
+ * it) before the reply is queued. A todo with no summary yet gets the same template, saying so.
104
+ */
105
+ async function replyWithSummary(ctx: InboundChannelHandlerContext<InboundReplyMode.THREAD>, todoId: string): Promise<void> {
106
+ const todo = await ctx.resources.read<Todos>(TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS, todoId);
107
+ if (!todo) throw Object.assign(new Error('The todo this thread is about no longer exists'), { name: 'TodoNotFound' });
108
+ // A `z_file` value is typed as either shape (one file, or `fileIds` for a multi-file field); this field holds one.
109
+ const summary = todo.generatedSummaryPdf;
110
+ const summaryFileId = summary && 'fileId' in summary ? summary.fileId : undefined;
111
+ await ctx.reply({
112
+ templateRef: TODO_EMAIL_SUMMARY_TEMPLATE_REF,
113
+ variables: { todoTitle: todo.title, hasSummary: Boolean(summaryFileId) },
114
+ ...(summaryFileId ? { attachmentFileIds: [summaryFileId] } : {}),
115
+ });
116
+ }
117
+
89
118
  /**
90
- * What both answering handlers do: a message on a thread already linked to a todo is a follow-up; any other
119
+ * What both answering handlers do: a message on a thread already linked to a todo is a follow-up (or, when it
120
+ * reads only "summary", a request for the todo's summary PDF); any other
91
121
  * becomes a new todo, the thread is linked to it, and the sender is answered.
92
122
  */
93
123
  async function intake(
@@ -96,7 +126,8 @@ async function intake(
96
126
  ): Promise<void> {
97
127
  const linked = message.thread.linkedResource;
98
128
  if (linked?.resourceType === TasksManager_ResourceType.TODOS) {
99
- await addFollowUpOnce(ctx, linked.resourceId, message);
129
+ if (asksForSummary(message)) await replyWithSummary(ctx, linked.resourceId);
130
+ else await addFollowUpOnce(ctx, linked.resourceId, message);
100
131
  return;
101
132
  }
102
133
  const list = await resolveTargetList(ctx, message.payload.routeTag);
@@ -12,7 +12,13 @@
12
12
  foreignKeyField: 'todoId',
13
13
  // Static discriminator: only applies when parent todo is RECURRING
14
14
  discriminator: { discriminatorField: todosRecurringTypeField, values: [Todos_RecurrenceType.RECURRING] },
15
- childOperations: { lifecycle: { onParentDelete: { enabled: true, mode: ChildLifecycleMode.IMMEDIATE, maxDepth: 1 } } },
15
+ // LAZY: a recurring todo gains an occurrence every time it comes due, so a daily todo's set only grows, and deleting
16
+ // it should not delete years of rows inside the request. The delete enqueues the teardown; the child-teardown job
17
+ // removes the occurrences once the delete has committed, and re-checks later if it runs first (#2586). Until then
18
+ // an occurrence may outlive its todo briefly. It is the application's one
19
+ // LAZY edge, so the boot report lists it under [dependent-lifecycle-deferred]. No subject erasure reaches it: no
20
+ // user edge composes a todo or a todo list, and a tenant purge RETAINS todos (the ORGANIZATIONS edge above).
21
+ childOperations: { lifecycle: { onParentDelete: { enabled: true, mode: ChildLifecycleMode.LAZY, maxDepth: 1 } } },
16
22
  // Only applies to RECURRING todos (Edge Case #2 handled in backend). LIST context is open so the
17
23
  // todo page can list a recurring todo's occurrences (#1787); occurrences declare no SEARCH.
18
24
  contextPolicy: {
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ export const PROVIDER_CAPABILITY_FRONTEND_CONSENT_CLASSIFICATION = Object.freeze
43
43
  SMS: SERVER_ONLY,
44
44
  // #2293: a deliverable is sent for signature from the backend; the vendor's signing page is its own, not a browser SDK.
45
45
  ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE: SERVER_ONLY,
46
+ // The frame is the application's own engine component, not a browser module the provider loads.
47
+ EMBEDDED_ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE: SERVER_ONLY,
46
48
  SSO_SAML: SERVER_ONLY,
47
49
  LLM_CHAT: SERVER_ONLY,
48
50
  LLM_EMBEDDINGS: SERVER_ONLY,
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@
11
11
  ```typescript
12
12
  *
13
13
  * WHAT RUNS BESIDE THE BACKEND, and what the application reaches out to (#1495) — its workers, its
14
- * minions, the providers it binds, and the channels work arrives on (#1630).
14
+ * minions, the providers it binds, the channels work arrives on (#1630), and the needs no existing
15
+ * provider fills, each with why (#3992): the only door to authoring a new provider.
15
16
  *
16
17
  * ## Why this family exists
17
18
  *
@@ -84,16 +85,12 @@ export const INTEGRATION_PROVIDER_BINDING_SKILL_REF: Readonly<Record<ProviderBin
84
85
  */
85
86
  export const INTEGRATION_INBOUND_CHANNEL_SKILL_REF = 'inbound-channels';
86
87
 
87
- /** Stable prefixes the trusted runtime stamps; a provider supplies only the slug. */
88
- export const INTEGRATION_WORKER_REF_PREFIX = 'worker-';
89
- export const INTEGRATION_MINION_REF_PREFIX = 'minion-';
90
-
91
88
  const SlugSchema = z.string().regex(/^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/);
92
89
  const NonEmptyStringSchema = z.string().trim().min(1);
93
90
 
94
91
  /** One worker: an HTTP-only subprocess the backend delegates to. */
95
92
  export const IntegrationWorkerPlanSchema = z.strictObject({
96
- workerRef: z.string().regex(new RegExp(`^${INTEGRATION_WORKER_REF_PREFIX}[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$`)),
93
+ workerRef: IntegrationWorkerRefSchema,
97
94
  runtime: z.enum(BuildPlanWorkerRuntime).systemEnum('BuildPlanWorkerRuntime'),
98
95
  /** What the backend delegates to it, and why that cannot happen inside a request. */
99
96
  purpose: NonEmptyStringSchema,
@@ -109,7 +106,7 @@ export type IntegrationWorkerPlan = z.infer<typeof IntegrationWorkerPlanSchema>;
109
106
 
110
107
  /** One minion: a cron unit that wakes itself. */
111
108
  export const IntegrationMinionPlanSchema = z.strictObject({
112
- minionRef: z.string().regex(new RegExp(`^${INTEGRATION_MINION_REF_PREFIX}[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$`)),
109
+ minionRef: IntegrationMinionRefSchema,
113
110
  /** What happens because time passed, and why it is not a request. */
114
111
  purpose: NonEmptyStringSchema,
115
112
  /** The named behaviours its tick performs. At least one: a minion that does nothing is a schedule with no work. */
@@ -151,6 +148,63 @@ export const IntegrationProviderBindingPlanSchema = z.strictObject({
151
148
  });
152
149
  export type IntegrationProviderBindingPlan = z.infer<typeof IntegrationProviderBindingPlanSchema>;
153
150
 
151
+ /**
152
+ * The ref of a planned WORKER or MINION (`worker-<slug>`, `minion-<slug>`): the surface that wires an unprovided need for
153
+ * itself (#3995 item 6). The prefix says which collection it names, so a worker and a minion sharing a slug stay distinct.
154
+ */
155
+ const IntegrationExecutionSurfaceRefSchema = z.string().regex(
156
+ new RegExp(`^(?:${INTEGRATION_WORKER_REF_PREFIX}|${INTEGRATION_MINION_REF_PREFIX})[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$`),
157
+ );
158
+
159
+ /**
160
+ * A need NO provider the framework already has fills (#3992), recorded so that a provider is authored only for a reason
161
+ * someone wrote down. App creation USES the engine's providers and the registry's modules; authoring a new one is the last
162
+ * resort (Paul, 2026-11-16), and only an entry here may become a build task that authors a provider package. A binding may
163
+ * name a provider that does not exist yet only when an entry here names it.
164
+ *
165
+ * ## Who wires it: a provider binding, or the worker or minion named by `wiredByRef` (#3995 item 6)
166
+ *
167
+ * A need reaches the build in one of two ways. Either a {@link IntegrationProviderBindingPlanSchema binding} names its
168
+ * `providerRef` on the runtime owner that needs it (backend, companion, application frontend, website), and that binding's
169
+ * task authors the provider; or {@link wiredByRef} names the planned worker or minion that alone uses it, and THAT
170
+ * surface's task authors the provider and declares it in the surface's own scope
171
+ * (`providers.scopes.workers.<key>` / `providers.scopes.minions.<key>`, which the worker and minion tasks already write).
172
+ *
173
+ * Decided by what the framework already does: a worker's or minion's provider is declared on that surface's own
174
+ * `providers` block and belongs to the task that builds it (see {@link ProviderBindingScope}), so the plan names the
175
+ * surface rather than inventing a scope for it. Rejected: adding `WORKER` and `MINION` members to `ProviderBindingScope`.
176
+ * The scope is a closed set of SINGLE owners, each with one declaration file a landing probe reads and one skill; a
177
+ * worker or minion scope is keyed per surface (`scopes.workers.<key>`), so a bare `WORKER` member would name no file and
178
+ * no surface, and carrying the key would turn every binding into a second worker-or-minion reference beside the one
179
+ * this field already is. It would also give a minion's provider a task of its own, apart from the minion that holds its
180
+ * whitelist and its schedule, which the scope's own contract forbids.
181
+ */
182
+ export const IntegrationUnprovidedNeedSchema = z.strictObject({
183
+ /**
184
+ * The ref the provider to author will have: what the binding that wires it names as its `providerRef`. The entry's
185
+ * business key, on its OWN schema instance: the workbench takes an entry's own key out of its reading, and a key sharing
186
+ * an instance with another aspect's headline (a binding is headed by its `providerRef`) would either stay printed or
187
+ * blank that headline.
188
+ */
189
+ providerRef: z.string().regex(/^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/),
190
+ /** What the application needs from outside, in its own words — "send invoices through the client's Fortnox ledger". */
191
+ need: NonEmptyStringSchema,
192
+ /**
193
+ * Why no engine provider and no registry module fills it: a vendor none of them offers, a behaviour they lack, or a
194
+ * business obligation that names a vendor. Checked against the lists the planner was shown; "it seemed simpler" is not one.
195
+ */
196
+ whyNoExistingProvider: NonEmptyStringSchema,
197
+ /**
198
+ * The planned worker or minion that wires this provider for itself (`worker-<slug>`, `minion-<slug>`), when no other
199
+ * runtime owner uses it. Its build task then authors the provider and declares it in that surface's own scope. Absent
200
+ * when a provider binding wires it; both may be present when the surface and a runtime owner both use it.
201
+ */
202
+ wiredByRef: IntegrationExecutionSurfaceRefSchema.optional(),
203
+ /** The requirements it is accountable to. */
204
+ servesRefs: z.array(NonEmptyStringSchema).default([]),
205
+ });
206
+ export type IntegrationUnprovidedNeed = z.infer<typeof IntegrationUnprovidedNeedSchema>;
207
+
154
208
  /**
155
209
  * One channel work ARRIVES on (#1630, #3394): the application declares that messages on this channel are
156
210
  * work it acts on, which is what makes the foundation enable the channel's engine capability
@@ -172,7 +226,9 @@ export type IntegrationInboundChannelPlan = z.infer<typeof IntegrationInboundCha
172
226
  * THE integration-plan payload.
173
227
  *
174
228
  * **Artifact-family id: `integration-plan`.** Produced by `bottom_up.integration-plan`, consumed by
175
- * `bottom_up.build-decompose`, which emits one task per worker, minion, provider binding and inbound channel.
229
+ * `bottom_up.build-decompose`, which emits one task per worker, minion, provider binding and inbound channel. A binding
230
+ * whose provider is an {@link IntegrationUnprovidedNeedSchema unprovided need}, or the worker or minion such a need names
231
+ * as `wiredByRef`, is the one task that AUTHORS the provider; every other binding wires a provider that exists.
176
232
  *
177
233
  * Every collection may be EMPTY and the whole plan is still meaningful: most applications need no
178
234
  * worker and no minion, and saying so is an answer. There is no `min(1)` anywhere here, and that is
@@ -189,7 +245,16 @@ export const IntegrationPlanSchema = z.object({
189
245
  providerBindings: z.array(IntegrationProviderBindingPlanSchema).default([]),
190
246
  /** Channels work arrives on. Empty for an application no message ever reaches, which is most of them. */
191
247
  inboundChannels: z.array(IntegrationInboundChannelPlanSchema).default([]),
248
+ /** Needs no existing provider fills, each with why (#3992). Empty for nearly every application, and that is the point. */
249
+ unprovidedNeeds: z.array(IntegrationUnprovidedNeedSchema).default([]),
192
250
  }).superRefine((plan, context) => {
251
+ const unprovided = new Set<string>();
252
+ plan.unprovidedNeeds.forEach((need, index) => {
253
+ if (unprovided.has(need.providerRef)) {
254
+ context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: `the unprovided need ${need.providerRef} is recorded twice; one entry says why it is authored`, path: ['unprovidedNeeds', index, 'providerRef'] });
255
+ }
256
+ unprovided.add(need.providerRef);
257
+ });
193
258
  const workerRefs = new Set<string>();
194
259
  plan.workers.forEach((worker, index) => {
195
260
  if (workerRefs.has(worker.workerRef)) {
@@ -204,6 +269,11 @@ export const IntegrationPlanSchema = z.object({
204
269
  }
205
270
  minionRefs.add(minion.minionRef);
206
271
  });
272
+ // A need wired by a surface the plan does not run would be authored for nothing (#3995 item 6).
273
+ plan.unprovidedNeeds.forEach((need, index) => {
274
+ if (need.wiredByRef === undefined || workerRefs.has(need.wiredByRef) || minionRefs.has(need.wiredByRef)) return;
275
+ context.addIssue({ code: 'custom', message: `the unprovided need ${need.providerRef} is wired by ${need.wiredByRef}, which this plan neither runs as a worker nor as a minion`, path: ['unprovidedNeeds', index, 'wiredByRef'] });
276
+ });
207
277
  /*
208
278
  * One provider bound TWICE on one scope is one declaration written twice — the config carries a
209
279
  * single entry per ref per scope, so the second is either a duplicate or a disagreement, and
@@ -159,10 +159,12 @@ export function resolveDefaultLocalDataStorage(locationType: WildoLocationType):
159
159
  * HTTP rather than onto a broker. A minion is confined to its own queues there by a PostgreSQL row-level security policy;
160
160
  * MongoDB has none, so a MongoDB application's minions are refused under `SMALL` (`describeMinionsRefusedByEnvironmentServiceProfile`).
161
161
  *
162
- * ## What it does not change yet
162
+ * ## No broker
163
163
  *
164
- * The broker's provisioning: under every profile the environment still runs RabbitMQ and apps-manager still mints the
165
- * application's vhost and credentials, though a `SMALL` application's processes no longer use them. Tracked by #2303.
164
+ * Since #2303 slice D a `SMALL` environment runs no RabbitMQ at all (`environmentServiceProfileRunsMessageBroker`): neither
165
+ * lane renders it, no env file carries `RABBITMQ_*`, no runtime joins its network segment, and apps-manager (told through
166
+ * `PLATFORM_ENVIRONMENT_SERVICE_PROFILE`) initializes no admin client and mints, revokes or restores no vhost or credential.
167
+ * A `backingServices.rabbitmq` declaration beside it is refused.
166
168
  */
167
169
  export enum EnvironmentServiceProfile {
168
170
  /** Every service the environment's declarations ask for. The default when nothing is authored. */
@@ -170,7 +172,7 @@ export enum EnvironmentServiceProfile {
170
172
  /**
171
173
  * The footprint for a small deployment: no ClamAV, no immudb, no mongot
172
174
  * ({@link servicesOmittedByEnvironmentServiceProfile}), one database family, and background work on the application's
173
- * own database instead of RabbitMQ (minions only on PostgreSQL). Vector search remains available on PostgreSQL
175
+ * own database instead of RabbitMQ, which it does not run (minions only on PostgreSQL). Vector search remains available on PostgreSQL
174
176
  * (pgvector is part of the PostgreSQL image, not a separate service).
175
177
  */
176
178
  SMALL = 'small',
@@ -247,6 +249,27 @@ export function queueAdapterTypeOfEnvironmentServiceProfile(profile: Environment
247
249
  }
248
250
  }
249
251
 
252
+ /**
253
+ * Whether an environment under `profile` runs a message broker at all (#2303 slice D). Derived from
254
+ * {@link queueAdapterTypeOfEnvironmentServiceProfile}, never authored: the broker exists to carry the RabbitMQ queue, and
255
+ * under the DATABASE queue nothing in the environment uses one (the platform scheduler delivers over HTTP). Absent profile
256
+ * ⇒ {@link DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT_SERVICE_PROFILE}.
257
+ *
258
+ * The ONE answer every broker decision reads: whether a deployment lane renders RabbitMQ, whether an env file carries
259
+ * `RABBITMQ_*`, whether apps-manager initializes its RabbitMQ admin client and mints a vhost and credentials, and whether
260
+ * a `backingServices.rabbitmq` declaration contradicts the profile. Total over the queue vocabulary through the switch
261
+ * below, so a third queue adapter must decide here whether it needs a broker.
262
+ */
263
+ export function environmentServiceProfileRunsMessageBroker(profile: EnvironmentServiceProfile | undefined): boolean {
264
+ switch (queueAdapterTypeOfEnvironmentServiceProfile(profile ?? DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT_SERVICE_PROFILE)) {
265
+ case QueueAdapterType.RABBITMQ:
266
+ return true;
267
+ case QueueAdapterType.DATABASE:
268
+ case QueueAdapterType.MEMORY:
269
+ return false;
270
+ }
271
+ }
272
+
250
273
  /**
251
274
  * Why an application that declares minions cannot run under `profile` on `applicationDatabaseEngine`, or undefined when it
252
275
  * can (#2303).
@@ -27,6 +27,19 @@ export interface BackendDomainModule extends SharedDomainModule {
27
27
  * `capabilities.tools.functionRefs`.
28
28
  */
29
29
  functionTools?: FunctionTool[];
30
+ /**
31
+ * Another party's MCP servers this module's agents may call (#3958): each one's endpoint and the stored provider
32
+ * connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's `capabilities.tools.mcpRefs`. Registration
33
+ * refuses a plaintext `http://` endpoint, and every call goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_McpServer`.
34
+ */
35
+ mcpServers?: FlowsActors_McpServer[];
36
+ /**
37
+ * Another party's A2A agents this module's agents may delegate a task to (#3930): each one's card URL and the stored
38
+ * provider connection whose credential reaches it. Reference them from an agent's
39
+ * `capabilities.tools.remoteAgentRefs`. Registration refuses a plaintext `http://` card or endpoint, and every call
40
+ * goes through the outbound guard. See `FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`.
41
+ */
42
+ remoteAgents?: FlowsActors_RemoteAgent[];
30
43
  /**
31
44
  * Agents that may run with nobody on a socket — on a schedule or on an inbound delivery (#1611).
32
45
  * Declaring one grants nothing: a turn runs in an organization only while one of its OAuth clients
@@ -435,6 +448,8 @@ function mergeFlowsActors(
435
448
  ) as FlowActorSystem_InitializationFactoryMap,
436
449
  agents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.agents ?? []),
437
450
  functionTools: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.functionTools ?? []),
451
+ mcpServers: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.mcpServers ?? []),
452
+ remoteAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.remoteAgents ?? []),
438
453
  autonomousAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.autonomousAgents ?? []),
439
454
  chatAgents: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.chatAgents ?? []),
440
455
  actorExecutionContinuations: modules.flatMap(m => m.flowsActors?.actorExecutionContinuations ?? []),
@@ -33,23 +33,49 @@ export interface A2A_Skill {
33
33
  * agent's canonical audience: BOTH a USER-delegated and a MACHINE (client-credentials)
34
34
  * inbound token MUST carry it as `aud` (RFC 8707 / external-access D7) — a token minted for
35
35
  * another surface (including the generic API audience, per the 2026-07-29 flip) is rejected.
36
- * `securitySchemes.oauth2.flows`
37
- * advertises BOTH D6 principals — `authorizationCode` (user-delegated → the
38
- * conversation is owned by the delegating user) and `clientCredentials` (org/app
39
- * machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app). Tokens are minted by the
40
- * app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
36
+ * The card advertises BOTH D6 principals as TWO security schemes, one flow each:
37
+ * {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`authorizationCode`, user-delegated → the conversation is
38
+ * owned by the delegating user) and {@link A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME} (`clientCredentials`, org/app
39
+ * machine → the conversation is owned by the org/app). Either satisfies the requirement. Tokens are
40
+ * minted by the app's own OIDC provider (`/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`).
41
41
  */
42
42
  /**
43
- * One protocol interface this agent exposes — a URL, a transport, and the version it speaks there.
43
+ * The security scheme a USER-delegated client reads: the `authorizationCode` flow. Kept as `oauth2`, the name the card
44
+ * has always used for it.
44
45
  *
45
- * spec-cite: A2A 1.0 proto `AgentInterface` — `url` (REQUIRED), and *"The version of the A2A
46
- * protocol this interface exposes. Use the latest supported minor version per major version.
47
- * Examples: `"0.3"`, `"1.0"`"*.
46
+ * One flow per scheme because A2A 1.0 makes it so: spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message OAuthFlows {
47
+ * oneof flow { AuthorizationCodeOAuthFlow authorization_code = 1; ClientCredentialsOAuthFlow client_credentials = 2; … } }`.
48
+ * Both flows in one scheme made the A2A reference SDK refuse the whole card (#3932).
49
+ */
50
+ export const A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2';
51
+ /** The security scheme a MACHINE client reads: the `clientCredentials` flow. See {@link A2A_DELEGATED_SECURITY_SCHEME}. */
52
+ export const A2A_MACHINE_SECURITY_SCHEME = 'oauth2ClientCredentials';
53
+ /**
54
+ * One protocol interface this agent exposes: a URL, the protocol binding spoken there, and the protocol version.
55
+ *
56
+ * spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message AgentInterface { string url = 1 [REQUIRED]; string
57
+ * protocol_binding = 2 [REQUIRED]; string tenant = 3; string protocol_version = 4 [REQUIRED]; }`, serialized camelCase
58
+ * (§5.5). `protocol_binding` is "an open form string … The core ones officially supported are `JSONRPC`, `GRPC` and
59
+ * `HTTP+JSON`."
60
+ *
61
+ * These were named `transport` and `version` until 2026-11-16, names `AgentInterface` does not have, so a 1.0 client
62
+ * parsing the card read every interface with no binding and no version (#3932).
48
63
  */
49
64
  export interface A2A_AgentInterface {
50
65
  url: string;
51
- transport: string;
52
- version: string;
66
+ protocolBinding: string;
67
+ protocolVersion: string;
68
+ }
69
+
70
+ /**
71
+ * One 1.0 security requirement: the schemes it needs, each with the scopes required. The card lists alternatives, so a
72
+ * client satisfies any one entry.
73
+ *
74
+ * spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `message SecurityRequirement { map<string, StringList> schemes = 1; }`
75
+ * and `message StringList { repeated string list = 1; }`.
76
+ */
77
+ export interface A2A_SecurityRequirement {
78
+ schemes: Record<string, { list: string[] }>;
53
79
  }
54
80
 
55
81
  export interface A2A_AgentCard {
@@ -84,6 +110,12 @@ export interface A2A_AgentCard {
84
110
  defaultOutputModes: string[];
85
111
  skills: A2A_Skill[];
86
112
  securitySchemes: Record<string, unknown>;
113
+ /** The v0.2.5 requirement list (scheme name → scopes), one entry per alternative. Kept for v0.2.5 clients. */
87
114
  security: Record<string, string[]>[];
115
+ /**
116
+ * The same alternatives in the 1.0 shape. spec-cite: A2A v1.0.0 specification/a2a.proto, `AgentCard` —
117
+ * `repeated SecurityRequirement security_requirements = 9`.
118
+ */
119
+ securityRequirements: A2A_SecurityRequirement[];
88
120
  }
89
121
  ```
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
23
23
  * - the turn reached an interrupted state (a human-in-the-loop approval pause).
24
24
  *
25
25
  * All three triggers are live. The interrupted-state arm needs a runtime that can pause a turn; that
26
- * is the human-in-the-loop approval gate, and a paused turn now materialises a task carrying
27
- * `input-required` on all three transports (blocking send, non-blocking send, stream). An earlier
28
- * revision of this note warned that the arm was inert and `input-required` never emitted — true
29
- * when written, and left here in corrected form because a reader who remembers the old claim would
30
- * otherwise conclude the state is decorative and safe to drop.
26
+ * is the human-in-the-loop approval gate, and a paused turn materialises a task carrying
27
+ * `auth-required` on all three transports (blocking send, non-blocking send, stream), with a status
28
+ * message saying a person decides in the application. The task moves on by itself once they have:
29
+ * poll it, subscribe to it, or register a webhook. A message on the task does not answer the
30
+ * approval, and `tasks/cancel` withdraws it.
31
31
  *
32
32
  * A blocking turn that answers in one shot, with no webhook, returns an A2A `Message` and writes no task
33
33
  * row at all. Both shapes are protocol-conformant: the specification types the
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ export interface A2A_TaskSurfaceContract {
91
91
  * projection from `FlowsActors_Status` reads it, the transport emits it, and tests
92
92
  * pin it.
93
93
  *
94
- * Not every member is emitted by this transport today — `AUTH_REQUIRED` and
94
+ * Not every member is emitted by this transport today — `INPUT_REQUIRED` and
95
95
  * `REJECTED` have no `FlowsActors_Status` counterpart and are never produced. They
96
96
  * are declared because the vocabulary belongs to the protocol, not to us: a client
97
97
  * may legitimately receive them from another A2A server, and omitting them would
@@ -103,13 +103,19 @@ export enum A2A_TaskState {
103
103
  /** Actively being processed. */
104
104
  WORKING = 'working',
105
105
  /**
106
- * Interrupted (non-terminal): the agent needs input. The current transport emits this when a
107
- * user-delegated turn reaches an approval-gated tool, persists the signed pending decision and
108
- * materialises an addressable task. Approval or refusal resumes that same execution; machine
109
- * principals are denied rather than parked because no named person can answer for them.
106
+ * Interrupted (non-terminal): the agent needs more input from the client, which a follow-up message
107
+ * on the task gives. NOT emitted by this transport: a turn that answers needs no task, and an
108
+ * approval pause is {@link AUTH_REQUIRED}, because a message does not answer it.
110
109
  */
111
110
  INPUT_REQUIRED = 'input-required',
112
- /** Interrupted (non-terminal): authentication needed. NOT emitted by this transport. */
111
+ /**
112
+ * Interrupted (non-terminal): an authorization the task waits on, given outside the protocol.
113
+ * Emitted when a user-delegated turn reaches an approval-gated tool: the signed pending decision is
114
+ * persisted, an addressable task is materialised, and its status message says a person decides in
115
+ * the application. Their approval or refusal resumes that same execution, and the task moves on
116
+ * without the client sending anything. Machine principals are denied rather than parked, because
117
+ * no named person can answer for them.
118
+ */
113
119
  AUTH_REQUIRED = 'auth-required',
114
120
  /** Terminal: finished successfully. */
115
121
  COMPLETED = 'completed',
@@ -972,10 +972,17 @@ export function functionToolDeliverableDeclarationProblems(
972
972
  * #2914), one sentence per problem with its remedy; empty when they are sound or absent. `declaredFieldsOf` answers the
973
973
  * fields the resource's main schema declares, or undefined when the resource is not registered (its fields are then not
974
974
  * checked here: a field the row does not hold is shown and sealed as absent).
975
+ *
976
+ * `systemReadAllowedOf` answers whether the resource grants the system READ (`systemAccessPolicy.read`), or undefined when
977
+ * the resource is not registered. The card, the seal and the currency check all read the row through `readAsSystem`, which
978
+ * refuses a resource that does not grant it, and that refusal is swallowed into "no record values": every approval then
979
+ * seals no field and no currency check can compare anything. Measured on Wonder Ledger's live sign-off, where the declared
980
+ * field set was sealed on none of the seals, so a declaration nothing can read stops the application here instead.
975
981
  */
976
982
  export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
977
983
  tool: Pick<FunctionTool, 'functionRef' | 'sealedRecordFields' | 'approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow' | 'argumentsResource' | 'requiresHumanApproval' | 'humanApproval' | 'asksThePerson'>,
978
984
  declaredFieldsOf?: (resourceType: string) => readonly string[] | undefined,
985
+ systemReadAllowedOf?: (resourceType: string) => boolean | undefined,
979
986
  ): string[] {
980
987
  const fields = tool.sealedRecordFields;
981
988
  const replaces = tool.approvalReplacesEarlierApprovalOfRow === true;
@@ -999,6 +1006,10 @@ export function functionToolRecordApprovalDeclarationProblems(
999
1006
  const unknown = declared ? fields.filter((field) => !declared.includes(field)) : [];
1000
1007
  if (unknown.length > 0) problems.push(`${named}, naming ${unknown.join(', ')}, which ${tool.argumentsResource!.resourceType} does not declare.`);
1001
1008
  }
1009
+ if (tool.argumentsResource && systemReadAllowedOf?.(tool.argumentsResource.resourceType) === false) {
1010
+ problems.push(`${named}, but ${tool.argumentsResource.resourceType} does not grant the system read the approval card, the seal and the currency check `
1011
+ + `read the row through: declare systemAccessPolicy.read = ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED on it.`);
1012
+ }
1002
1013
  }
1003
1014
  return problems;
1004
1015
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
1
+ # saas.frontend.electronic-signatures.embedded-signing-frame
2
+
3
+ ## Import Origins
4
+
5
+ - `@wildo-ai/saas-frontend-lib`
6
+
7
+ ## Source Excerpts
8
+
9
+ ### Origin Package: `@wildo-ai/saas-frontend-lib`
10
+
11
+ ```tsx
12
+ /**
13
+ * Embedded signing: the signed-in person signs a record's deliverable at the signature vendor, inside a frame of the
14
+ * application, instead of following the vendor's e-mail. Import from `@wildo-ai/saas-frontend-lib`.
15
+ *
16
+ * Place it where the person meets the record (an engagement letter's page, say). On mount it asks the backend for the
17
+ * vendor's signing page (`signatureRequestSigners.openSigningSession`). The answer is given only to a signer an open
18
+ * request on that record names and the vendor says has not signed yet, so for anybody else, once the person has signed,
19
+ * and when the request's provider signs from its e-mail only, the component renders NOTHING. The page is valid for
20
+ * minutes and is never stored, which is why it is asked for here, when the person is in front of it. A signer whose turn
21
+ * has not come (signers who sign in turn) is shown nothing either, until it does.
22
+ *
23
+ * When the person is done, a vendor that redirects sends the frame to the application's own {@link SIGNING_RETURN_PAGE_PATH};
24
+ * the frame sees it arrive (it is now same-origin), closes, and calls `onSigningReturned`. A vendor that does not redirect
25
+ * (or redirects to another of the application's origins) keeps showing its own end page. Either way nothing here says the
26
+ * document is signed: every vendor's own guidance is that the end of the frame is not the outcome, and the request becomes
27
+ * SIGNED only once the engine has validated the signed document, at its next re-read (poll or vendor notification).
28
+ *
29
+ * What it needs elsewhere: a provider that claims `EMBEDDED_ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE` and declares `embeddedSigning`, and a
30
+ * `wildo config sync` then `wildo dev sync-csp` since it was added, which put the vendor's signing origins in the SaaS
31
+ * frontend's CSP `frame-src` from the provider's own declaration; without them the browser refuses to load the frame.
32
+ *
33
+ * It renders no words of its own: the application passes the frame's accessible `title`.
34
+ */
35
+ export interface EmbeddedSigningFrameProps {
36
+ /** The record the deliverable belongs to: the signature request's `linkedResourceType`. */
37
+ readonly linkedResourceType: string;
38
+ /** The record the deliverable belongs to: the signature request's `linkedResourceId`. */
39
+ readonly linkedResourceId: string;
40
+ /** The frame's accessible name (WCAG 4.1.2), in the person's language, e.g. "Sign the engagement letter". */
41
+ readonly title: string;
42
+ /** Called once the person left the vendor's page. Re-read the record if you show its signature state. */
43
+ readonly onSigningReturned?: () => void;
44
+ readonly className?: string;
45
+ }
46
+ ```
@@ -106,45 +106,36 @@ export type FlowsActors_Agent = {
106
106
  /**
107
107
  * References to MCP servers the agent may reach.
108
108
  *
109
- * ## CHECKED, NOT YET CALLABLE (#491)
109
+ * ## Checked at startup, called at turn start (#491, #3958)
110
110
  *
111
- * Each ref must name an MCP server the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_McpServer`), and
112
- * `FlowsActorsRegistryService` REFUSES at initialization an agent whose refs name none. That
113
- * closes the shape this field was in: it used to resolve against nothing, so a shipped catalog
114
- * carried seven refs (`filesystem-mcp`, `git-mcp`, `browser-mcp`, `mongodb-mcp`, …) that named
115
- * no server anywhere while the agent card rendered them as capabilities — a claim shown to a
116
- * user about a reach the agent did not have. The catalog is gone and the card no longer
117
- * renders these.
111
+ * Each ref must name an MCP server the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_McpServer`, on a backend domain
112
+ * module's `flowsActors.mcpServers`), and startup REFUSES an agent whose refs name none. That closes the shape
113
+ * this field was in: it used to resolve against nothing, so a shipped
114
+ * catalog carried seven refs that named no server anywhere — a claim about a reach the agent did not have.
118
115
  *
119
- * The check is deliberately stricter than `functionRefs`, which skip an unknown ref with a
120
- * debug line: an unknown `functionRef` costs an agent one tool, whereas these were presented
121
- * as a capability, and a refusal makes the old state unreachable rather than fixed once.
116
+ * The check is deliberately stricter than `functionRefs`, which skip an unknown ref with a debug line: an unknown
117
+ * `functionRef` costs an agent one tool, whereas these name another party's server.
122
118
  *
123
- * ## What is still missing before a ref becomes a CALLABLE tool
124
- *
125
- * The declaration is checkable; the call is not yet made. `AgentsBackendService` resolves
126
- * `functionRefs` and nothing else, so an agent carrying `mcpRefs` still has exactly the reach
127
- * its `functionRefs` give it.
128
- *
129
- * 1. **An MCP client.** `saas-backend-lib/src/mcp/` is the SERVER Wildo exposes to external MCP
130
- * clients. There is no client, and no MCP client SDK in any manifest.
131
- * 2. ~~A server registry~~ — BUILT. `registry.mcpServers`, declared per application.
132
- * 3. **Credential resolution at call time.** Decided 2026-09-09: the call carries the acting
133
- * user's own delegated provider credential where present and the organization's connection
134
- * otherwise, from `userProviderCredentials` / `organizationProviderCredentials` rather than
135
- * a store invented for MCP. `FlowsActors_McpCredentialSubject` records that choice per
136
- * server; nothing reads it yet.
119
+ * At turn start the agent opens a session with each named server, using the credential the server's declared
120
+ * `credential.subject` selects, and is offered the server's tools. They are withheld on a turn an inbound
121
+ * delivery started and when no credential resolves; a server that does not answer contributes no tools rather
122
+ * than failing the turn. Every tool call, and a target the outbound guard refuses, is recorded on the audit
123
+ * trail; an unreachable or slow server is logged.
124
+ */
125
+ mcpRefs: string[],
126
+ /**
127
+ * References to remote A2A agents the agent may delegate a task to (#3930).
137
128
  *
138
- * Also decided, and not yet implemented: an unreachable server contributes NO tools to a turn
139
- * rather than failing it — tools are discovered at turn start — and a call that fails mid-turn
140
- * returns a typed error the agent can reason about. Both emit an audit event, because a server
141
- * quietly unreachable for a week must be visible as that rather than as an agent that became
142
- * less capable for no stated reason.
129
+ * Each ref must name a remote agent the APPLICATION declared (`FlowsActors_RemoteAgent`, on a backend domain
130
+ * module's `flowsActors.remoteAgents`); startup REFUSES an agent whose refs name none, as for `mcpRefs`.
143
131
  *
144
- * Restoring these to any surface that presents them as a capability belongs in the same change
145
- * that makes them callable.
132
+ * At turn start the agent is offered one tool per named remote agent, described by the declaration (never by the
133
+ * remote card). A call sends the agent's message to the remote agent over A2A 1.0 with the credential the
134
+ * declaration's `credential.subject` selects, and returns the remote reply, or the remote task's state and ids
135
+ * when it is still running or waits for input. Withheld on a turn an inbound delivery started and when no
136
+ * credential resolves. Every call is recorded on the audit trail.
146
137
  */
147
- mcpRefs: string[],
138
+ remoteAgentRefs?: string[],
148
139
  },
149
140
  },
150
141