@vellumai/assistant 0.6.6 → 0.7.1

package/src/runtime/routes/inbound-stages/acl-enforcement.ts

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import type {
   ContactChannel,
   ContactWithChannels,
 } from "../../../contacts/types.js";
-import * as deliveryCrud from "../../../memory/delivery-crud.js";
-import * as deliveryStatus from "../../../memory/delivery-status.js";
+import { deleteInbound, recordInbound } from "../../../memory/delivery-crud.js";
+import { markProcessed } from "../../../memory/delivery-status.js";
 import {
   findByInviteCodeHash,
   findByInviteCodeHashAnyChannel,
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ import {
   resolveBootstrapToken,
 } from "../../channel-verification-service.js";
 import { deliverChannelReply } from "../../gateway-client.js";
-import { ensureVellumGuardianBinding } from "../../guardian-vellum-migration.js";
 import {
   redeemInvite,
   redeemInviteByCode,
@@ -54,11 +53,13 @@ const log = getLogger("runtime-http");
  * contact, matching the same strategy used by `notifyGuardianOfAccessRequest`.
  * This prevents stale or cross-assistant contacts from leaking a wrong name.
  */
-function resolveGuardianLabel(
-  sourceChannel: ChannelId,
-  canonicalAssistantId: string,
-): string {
-  const anchoredPrincipalId = ensureVellumGuardianBinding(canonicalAssistantId);
+function resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel: ChannelId): string {
+  const vellumGuardian = findGuardianForChannel("vellum");
+  const anchoredPrincipalId = vellumGuardian?.contact.principalId;
+
+  if (!anchoredPrincipalId) {
+    return resolveGuardianName(undefined);
+  }
 
   // Try source-channel guardian, but only accept it when the principal
   // matches the assistant's anchor.
@@ -70,17 +71,7 @@ function resolveGuardianLabel(
     return resolveGuardianName(sourceGuardian.contact.displayName);
   }
 
-  // Fall back to the vellum-channel guardian with the same anchor check.
-  const vellumGuardian = findGuardianForChannel("vellum");
-  if (
-    vellumGuardian &&
-    vellumGuardian.contact.principalId === anchoredPrincipalId
-  ) {
-    return resolveGuardianName(vellumGuardian.contact.displayName);
-  }
-
-  // No anchored guardian found — use generic fallback.
-  return resolveGuardianName(undefined);
+  return resolveGuardianName(vellumGuardian.contact.displayName);
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -99,7 +90,6 @@ export interface AclEnforcementParams {
   actorDisplayName: string | undefined;
   actorUsername: string | undefined;
   replyCallbackUrl: string | undefined;
-  mintBearerToken: () => string;
   assistantId: string;
   externalMessageId: string;
 }
@@ -113,41 +103,7 @@ export type ResolvedMember = {
 export interface AclResult {
   resolvedMember: ResolvedMember | null;
   /** When set, the caller must return this response immediately. */
-  earlyResponse?: Response;
-  /**
-   * Parsed guardian verification code from the message content, if any.
-   * Surfaced here so downstream verification intercept logic can use it
-   * without re-parsing.
-   */
-  guardianVerifyCode: string | undefined;
-}
-
-/**
- * Strip Slack/Telegram mrkdwn formatting wrappers from a raw message.
- * When users copy-paste a verification code from the desktop app with
- * rich-text formatting (e.g. bold), Slack preserves it as `*code*` in
- * the message text, which would otherwise fail the strict bare-code regex.
- */
-function stripMrkdwnFormatting(text: string): string {
-  // Bold (*…*), italic (_…_), strikethrough (~…~), inline code (`…`)
-  return text.replace(/^[*_~`]+/, "").replace(/[*_~`]+$/, "");
-}
-
-/**
- * Parse a guardian verification code from message content.
- * Accepts a bare code as the entire message: 6-digit numeric OR 64-char hex
- * (hex is retained for compatibility with unbound inbound/bootstrap sessions
- * that intentionally use high-entropy secrets).
- *
- * Strips surrounding mrkdwn formatting characters first so that codes
- * pasted with bold/italic/code formatting are still recognized.
- */
-function parseGuardianVerifyCode(content: string): string | undefined {
-  const stripped = stripMrkdwnFormatting(content);
-  const bareMatch = stripped.match(/^([0-9a-fA-F]{64}|\d{6})$/);
-  if (bareMatch) return bareMatch[1];
-
-  return undefined;
+  earlyResponse?: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
 
 /** Map ChannelStatus to the API-facing member status (excludes "unverified"). */
@@ -178,18 +134,12 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
     actorDisplayName,
     actorUsername,
     replyCallbackUrl,
-    mintBearerToken,
     assistantId,
     externalMessageId,
   } = params;
 
   let resolvedMember: ResolvedMember | null = null;
 
-  // Verification codes must bypass the ACL membership check — users without a
-  // member record need to verify before they can be recognized as members.
-  const guardianVerifyCode = parseGuardianVerifyCode(trimmedContent);
-  const isGuardianVerifyCode = guardianVerifyCode !== undefined;
-
   // /start gv_<token> bootstrap commands must also bypass ACL — the user
   // hasn't been verified yet and needs to complete the bootstrap handshake.
   const rawCommandIntentForAcl = sourceMetadata?.commandIntent;
@@ -239,27 +189,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
     }
 
     if (!resolvedMember) {
-      // Determine whether a verification-code bypass is warranted: only allow
-      // when there is a pending (unconsumed, unexpired) challenge AND no
-      // active guardian binding for this (assistantId, channel).
       let denyNonMember = true;
-      if (isGuardianVerifyCode) {
-        // Allow bypass when there is any consumable challenge or active
-        // outbound session.  The !hasActiveBinding guard is intentionally
-        // omitted: rebind sessions create a consumable challenge while a
-        // binding already exists, and the identity check inside
-        // validateAndConsumeVerification prevents unauthorized takeovers.
-        const hasPendingChallenge = !!getPendingSession(sourceChannel);
-        const hasActiveOutboundSession = !!findActiveSession(sourceChannel);
-        if (hasPendingChallenge || hasActiveOutboundSession) {
-          denyNonMember = false;
-        } else {
-          log.info(
-            { sourceChannel, hasPendingChallenge, hasActiveOutboundSession },
-            "Ingress ACL: guardian verification bypass denied",
-          );
-        }
-      }
 
       // Bootstrap deep-link commands bypass ACL only when the token
       // resolves to a real pending_bootstrap session. Without this check,
@@ -301,7 +231,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           senderName: actorDisplayName,
           senderUsername: actorUsername,
           replyCallbackUrl,
-          bearerToken: mintBearerToken(),
           assistantId,
           canonicalAssistantId,
         });
@@ -309,7 +238,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           return {
             resolvedMember: null,
             earlyResponse: inviteResult,
-            guardianVerifyCode,
           };
       }
 
@@ -327,7 +255,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           senderName: actorDisplayName,
           senderUsername: actorUsername,
           replyCallbackUrl,
-          bearerToken: mintBearerToken(),
           assistantId,
           canonicalAssistantId,
         });
@@ -335,7 +262,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           return {
             resolvedMember: null,
             earlyResponse: codeInterceptResult,
-            guardianVerifyCode,
           };
       }
 
@@ -392,15 +318,11 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
                 // Malformed URL — use as-is
               }
               try {
-                await deliverChannelReply(
-                  dmCallbackUrl,
-                  {
-                    chatId: senderUserId,
-                    text: `I don't recognize you yet! I've let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel, canonicalAssistantId)} know you're trying to reach me. They'll need to share a 6-digit verification code with you — ask them directly if you know them. Once you have the code, reply here with it.`,
-                    assistantId,
-                  },
-                  mintBearerToken(),
-                );
+                await deliverChannelReply(dmCallbackUrl, {
+                  chatId: senderUserId,
+                  text: `I don't recognize you yet! I've let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel)} know you're trying to reach me. They'll need to share a 6-digit verification code with you — ask them directly if you know them. Once you have the code, reply here with it.`,
+                  assistantId,
+                });
               } catch (err) {
                 log.error(
                   { err, senderUserId },
@@ -411,13 +333,12 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
 
             return {
               resolvedMember: null,
-              earlyResponse: Response.json({
+              earlyResponse: ({
                 accepted: true,
                 denied: true,
                 reason: "verification_challenge_sent",
                 verificationSessionId: slackVerifyResult.sessionId,
               }),
-              guardianVerifyCode,
             };
           }
         }
@@ -448,7 +369,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
         }
 
         const replyText = guardianNotified
-          ? `Hmm looks like you don't have access to talk to me. I'll let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel, canonicalAssistantId)} know you tried talking to me and get back to you.`
+          ? `Hmm looks like you don't have access to talk to me. I'll let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel)} know you tried talking to me and get back to you.`
           : "Sorry, you haven't been approved to message this assistant.";
         let replyDelivered = false;
         if (replyCallbackUrl) {
@@ -463,11 +384,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             replyPayload.user = (canonicalSenderId ?? rawSenderId)!;
           }
           try {
-            await deliverChannelReply(
-              replyCallbackUrl,
-              replyPayload,
-              mintBearerToken(),
-            );
+            await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, replyPayload);
             replyDelivered = true;
           } catch (err) {
             log.error(
@@ -479,7 +396,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
 
         return {
           resolvedMember: null,
-          earlyResponse: Response.json({
+          earlyResponse: ({
             accepted: true,
             denied: true,
             reason: "not_a_member",
@@ -487,7 +404,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             // callback delivery failed (e.g. signing-key mismatch → 401).
             ...(!replyDelivered && { replyText }),
           }),
-          guardianVerifyCode,
         };
       }
     }
@@ -495,27 +411,9 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
     if (resolvedMember) {
       if (resolvedMember.channel.status !== "active") {
         const isBlockedMember = resolvedMember.channel.status === "blocked";
-        // Same bypass logic as the no-member branch: verification codes and
-        // bootstrap commands must pass through for re-verifiable states
+        // Bootstrap commands must pass through for re-verifiable states
         // (pending/revoked), but never for blocked members.
         let denyInactiveMember = true;
-        if (!isBlockedMember && isGuardianVerifyCode) {
-          const hasPendingChallenge = !!getPendingSession(sourceChannel);
-          const hasActiveOutboundSession = !!findActiveSession(sourceChannel);
-          if (hasPendingChallenge || hasActiveOutboundSession) {
-            denyInactiveMember = false;
-          } else {
-            log.info(
-              {
-                sourceChannel,
-                channelId: resolvedMember.channel.id,
-                hasPendingChallenge,
-                hasActiveOutboundSession,
-              },
-              "Ingress ACL: inactive member verification bypass denied",
-            );
-          }
-        }
         if (!isBlockedMember && isBootstrapCommand) {
           const bootstrapPayload = (
             rawCommandIntentForAcl as Record<string, unknown>
@@ -557,7 +455,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             senderName: actorDisplayName,
             senderUsername: actorUsername,
             replyCallbackUrl,
-            bearerToken: mintBearerToken(),
             assistantId,
             canonicalAssistantId,
           });
@@ -565,7 +462,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             return {
               resolvedMember: null,
               earlyResponse: inviteResult,
-              guardianVerifyCode,
             };
         }
 
@@ -588,7 +484,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             senderName: actorDisplayName,
             senderUsername: actorUsername,
             replyCallbackUrl,
-            bearerToken: mintBearerToken(),
             assistantId,
             canonicalAssistantId,
           });
@@ -596,7 +491,6 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             return {
               resolvedMember: null,
               earlyResponse: codeInterceptResult,
-              guardianVerifyCode,
             };
         }
 
@@ -659,15 +553,11 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
                   // Malformed URL — use as-is
                 }
                 try {
-                  await deliverChannelReply(
-                    dmCallbackUrl,
-                    {
-                      chatId: senderUserId,
-                      text: `I don't recognize you yet! I've let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel, canonicalAssistantId)} know you're trying to reach me. They'll need to share a 6-digit verification code with you — ask them directly if you know them. Once you have the code, reply here with it.`,
-                      assistantId,
-                    },
-                    mintBearerToken(),
-                  );
+                  await deliverChannelReply(dmCallbackUrl, {
+                    chatId: senderUserId,
+                    text: `I don't recognize you yet! I've let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel)} know you're trying to reach me. They'll need to share a 6-digit verification code with you — ask them directly if you know them. Once you have the code, reply here with it.`,
+                    assistantId,
+                  });
                 } catch (err) {
                   log.error(
                     { err, senderUserId },
@@ -678,13 +568,12 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
 
               return {
                 resolvedMember,
-                earlyResponse: Response.json({
+                earlyResponse: ({
                   accepted: true,
                   denied: true,
                   reason: "verification_challenge_sent",
                   verificationSessionId: slackVerifyResult.sessionId,
                 }),
-                guardianVerifyCode,
               };
             }
           }
@@ -720,7 +609,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           }
 
           const inactiveReplyText = guardianNotified
-            ? `Hmm looks like you don't have access to talk to me. I'll let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel, canonicalAssistantId)} know you tried talking to me and get back to you.`
+            ? `Hmm looks like you don't have access to talk to me. I'll let ${resolveGuardianLabel(sourceChannel)} know you tried talking to me and get back to you.`
             : "Sorry, you haven't been approved to message this assistant.";
           let inactiveReplyDelivered = false;
           if (replyCallbackUrl) {
@@ -740,11 +629,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
               inactiveReplyPayload.user = (canonicalSenderId ?? rawSenderId)!;
             }
             try {
-              await deliverChannelReply(
-                replyCallbackUrl,
-                inactiveReplyPayload,
-                mintBearerToken(),
-              );
+              await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, inactiveReplyPayload);
               inactiveReplyDelivered = true;
             } catch (err) {
               log.error(
@@ -755,13 +640,12 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
           }
           return {
             resolvedMember,
-            earlyResponse: Response.json({
+            earlyResponse: ({
               accepted: true,
               denied: true,
               reason: `member_${channelStatusToMemberStatus(resolvedMember.channel.status)}`,
               ...(!inactiveReplyDelivered && { replyText: inactiveReplyText }),
             }),
-            guardianVerifyCode,
           };
         }
       }
@@ -785,11 +669,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
             denyPayload.user = (canonicalSenderId ?? rawSenderId)!;
           }
           try {
-            await deliverChannelReply(
-              replyCallbackUrl,
-              denyPayload,
-              mintBearerToken(),
-            );
+            await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, denyPayload);
             denyReplyDelivered = true;
           } catch (err) {
             log.error(
@@ -800,13 +680,12 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
         }
         return {
           resolvedMember,
-          earlyResponse: Response.json({
+          earlyResponse: ({
             accepted: true,
             denied: true,
             reason: "policy_deny",
             ...(!denyReplyDelivered && { replyText: denyReplyText }),
           }),
-          guardianVerifyCode,
         };
       }
 
@@ -819,7 +698,7 @@ export async function enforceIngressAcl(
     }
   }
 
-  return { resolvedMember, guardianVerifyCode };
+  return { resolvedMember };
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -842,10 +721,9 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
   senderName?: string;
   senderUsername?: string;
   replyCallbackUrl?: string;
-  bearerToken?: string;
   assistantId?: string;
   canonicalAssistantId: string;
-}): Promise<Response | null> {
+}): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
   const {
     rawToken,
     sourceChannel,
@@ -855,7 +733,6 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
     senderName,
     senderUsername,
     replyCallbackUrl,
-    bearerToken,
     assistantId,
     canonicalAssistantId,
   } = params;
@@ -865,7 +742,7 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
   // not be tracked: the first delivery redeems the invite and returns early,
   // then the retry finds an active member, passes ACL, and the raw
   // /start iv_<token> message leaks into the agent pipeline.
-  const dedupResult = deliveryCrud.recordInbound(
+  const dedupResult = recordInbound(
     sourceChannel,
     externalChatId,
     externalMessageId,
@@ -873,7 +750,7 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
   );
 
   if (dedupResult.duplicate) {
-    return Response.json({
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       duplicate: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
@@ -909,15 +786,11 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
     const replyText = getInviteRedemptionReply(outcome);
     if (replyCallbackUrl) {
       try {
-        await deliverChannelReply(
-          replyCallbackUrl,
-          {
-            chatId: externalChatId,
-            text: replyText,
-            assistantId,
-          },
-          bearerToken,
-        );
+        await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, {
+          chatId: externalChatId,
+          text: replyText,
+          assistantId,
+        });
       } catch (err) {
         log.error(
           { err, externalChatId },
@@ -925,8 +798,8 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
         );
       }
     }
-    deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-    return Response.json({
+    markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
       inviteRedemption: "already_member",
@@ -937,15 +810,11 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
 
   if (replyCallbackUrl) {
     try {
-      await deliverChannelReply(
-        replyCallbackUrl,
-        {
-          chatId: externalChatId,
-          text: replyText,
-          assistantId,
-        },
-        bearerToken,
-      );
+      await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, {
+        chatId: externalChatId,
+        text: replyText,
+        assistantId,
+      });
     } catch (err) {
       log.error(
         { err, externalChatId },
@@ -955,8 +824,8 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
   }
 
   if (outcome.ok && outcome.type === "redeemed") {
-    deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-    return Response.json({
+    markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
       inviteRedemption: "redeemed",
@@ -965,8 +834,8 @@ async function handleInviteTokenIntercept(params: {
   }
 
   // Failed redemption — inform the user and deny
-  deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-  return Response.json({
+  markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+  return ({
     accepted: true,
     eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
     denied: true,
@@ -995,10 +864,9 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
   senderName?: string;
   senderUsername?: string;
   replyCallbackUrl?: string;
-  bearerToken?: string;
   assistantId?: string;
   canonicalAssistantId: string;
-}): Promise<Response | null> {
+}): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
   const {
     code,
     sourceChannel,
@@ -1008,7 +876,6 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
     senderName,
     senderUsername,
     replyCallbackUrl,
-    bearerToken,
     assistantId,
     canonicalAssistantId,
   } = params;
@@ -1031,7 +898,7 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
     if (crossChannelInvite) {
       // Record inbound for dedup tracking — without this, duplicate webhook
       // deliveries would re-enter ACL and send the mismatch reply again.
-      const dedupResult = deliveryCrud.recordInbound(
+      const dedupResult = recordInbound(
         sourceChannel,
         externalChatId,
         externalMessageId,
@@ -1039,7 +906,7 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
       );
 
       if (dedupResult.duplicate) {
-        return Response.json({
+        return ({
           accepted: true,
           duplicate: true,
           eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
@@ -1049,15 +916,11 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
       const mismatchReply = "This invite is not valid for this channel.";
       if (replyCallbackUrl) {
         try {
-          await deliverChannelReply(
-            replyCallbackUrl,
-            {
-              chatId: externalChatId,
-              text: mismatchReply,
-              assistantId,
-            },
-            bearerToken,
-          );
+          await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, {
+            chatId: externalChatId,
+            text: mismatchReply,
+            assistantId,
+          });
         } catch (err) {
           log.error(
             { err, externalChatId },
@@ -1065,8 +928,8 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
           );
         }
       }
-      deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-      return Response.json({
+      markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+      return ({
         accepted: true,
         eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
         denied: true,
@@ -1081,7 +944,7 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
   // deliveries could slip through: the first delivery redeems the invite and
   // activates membership, then a retry finds an active member, passes ACL,
   // and the raw 6-digit message leaks into the agent pipeline.
-  const dedupResult = deliveryCrud.recordInbound(
+  const dedupResult = recordInbound(
     sourceChannel,
     externalChatId,
     externalMessageId,
@@ -1089,7 +952,7 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
   );
 
   if (dedupResult.duplicate) {
-    return Response.json({
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       duplicate: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
@@ -1114,7 +977,7 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
       { err, sourceChannel, externalChatId },
       "Invite code intercept: redemption threw, rolling back dedup record",
     );
-    deliveryCrud.deleteInbound(dedupResult.eventId);
+    deleteInbound(dedupResult.eventId);
     throw err;
   }
 
@@ -1134,15 +997,11 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
     const replyText = getInviteRedemptionReply(outcome);
     if (replyCallbackUrl) {
       try {
-        await deliverChannelReply(
-          replyCallbackUrl,
-          {
-            chatId: externalChatId,
-            text: replyText,
-            assistantId,
-          },
-          bearerToken,
-        );
+        await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, {
+          chatId: externalChatId,
+          text: replyText,
+          assistantId,
+        });
       } catch (err) {
         log.error(
           { err, externalChatId },
@@ -1150,8 +1009,8 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
         );
       }
     }
-    deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-    return Response.json({
+    markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
       inviteRedemption: "already_member",
@@ -1162,15 +1021,11 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
 
   if (replyCallbackUrl) {
     try {
-      await deliverChannelReply(
-        replyCallbackUrl,
-        {
-          chatId: externalChatId,
-          text: replyText,
-          assistantId,
-        },
-        bearerToken,
-      );
+      await deliverChannelReply(replyCallbackUrl, {
+        chatId: externalChatId,
+        text: replyText,
+        assistantId,
+      });
     } catch (err) {
       log.error(
         { err, externalChatId },
@@ -1180,8 +1035,8 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
   }
 
   if (outcome.ok && outcome.type === "redeemed") {
-    deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-    return Response.json({
+    markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+    return ({
       accepted: true,
       eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
       inviteRedemption: "redeemed",
@@ -1190,8 +1045,8 @@ async function handleInviteCodeIntercept(params: {
   }
 
   // Failed redemption (expired, revoked, etc.) — inform and deny
-  deliveryStatus.markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
-  return Response.json({
+  markProcessed(dedupResult.eventId);
+  return ({
     accepted: true,
     eventId: dedupResult.eventId,
     denied: true,