@usesigil/kit 0.16.0 → 0.17.0

package/dist/seal/intent-digest.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/**
+ * AL3 — `computeSealInputDigest()` per-call intent digest.
+ * Phase 9 Batch I (ISC-69..76, 143, 148, 150, 153, 155).
+ *
+ * SHA-256 over a canonical Borsh-style encoding of the SealInput envelope
+ * (vault, agent identity, mint, amount, target protocol, network, sealed
+ * instructions). Mirrors the discipline of TA-19's `policy_preview_digest`
+ * (`sdk/kit/src/policy/compute-policy-preview-digest.ts`) — same primitive
+ * (SHA-256 via the shared `canonical-encode.ts` helper), same APPEND-ONLY
+ * field ordering, same byte-equal cross-runtime test fixture pattern.
+ *
+ * **What this defends against**
+ * TA-19 binds the POLICY STATE the owner approved (allowlists, caps,
+ * cosign flag, agent set hash). It does NOT bind the specific call the
+ * agent is making — a compromised agent can still propose a transfer to
+ * an attacker-controlled but still-allowlisted recipient, or reorder
+ * instruction account metas to swap a destination, and the policy
+ * checks all pass. AL3 closes that gap: the owner approves a SPECIFIC
+ * intent (recipient, amount, mint, ix shape) in the preview UI, the SDK
+ * hashes that intent into a 32-byte digest, and `executeSeal` rejects
+ * if the bundle assembled at submit time produces a different digest.
+ *
+ * **Canonical encoding (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER)**
+ *
+ *   1. intent_version: u8 = 1                          (1 byte, reserved
+ *                                                       for future format
+ *                                                       evolution per
+ *                                                       Council ISC-155)
+ *   2. network_id: u8                                  (1 byte; 0=devnet,
+ *                                                       1=mainnet — binds
+ *                                                       AL4 isMainnet so
+ *                                                       a mainnet bundle
+ *                                                       can't be replayed
+ *                                                       through a devnet
+ *                                                       preview)
+ *   3. vault: Pubkey                                   (32 bytes)
+ *   4. agent: Pubkey                                   (32 bytes —
+ *                                                       agent IDENTITY,
+ *                                                       not signer)
+ *   5. token_mint: Pubkey                              (32 bytes)
+ *   6. amount: u64 LE                                  (8 bytes)
+ *   7. target_protocol: Pubkey                         (32 bytes; system
+ *                                                       program if the
+ *                                                       caller omitted
+ *                                                       targetProtocol)
+ *   8. instructions: Vec<Ix>                           (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       each ix below)
+ *
+ *   Each ix:
+ *     a. program_address: Pubkey                       (32 bytes)
+ *     b. accounts: Vec<(address: Pubkey, role: u8)>    (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       each 33-byte
+ *                                                       entry)
+ *     c. data: Vec<u8>                                 (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       data bytes)
+ *
+ * **Discipline guardrails**
+ *
+ * - NEVER `JSON.stringify` the input. Object property iteration order is
+ *   not stable across engines and silent reorderings would invalidate
+ *   the digest invariant. The canonical encoder walks fields explicitly.
+ * - 32-byte pubkey comparisons use `Buffer.compare` on raw bytes (NOT
+ *   base58 lexicographic) so the byte ordering matches Solana's
+ *   `Pubkey::cmp` exactly. Council ISC-150 flagged this as a critical
+ *   bug class — base58 lex doesn't preserve the canonical byte ordering
+ *   when leading-zero counts differ.
+ * - Account meta order is preserved as supplied. Reordering metas — even
+ *   identical pubkeys — produces a different digest. This is the load-
+ *   bearing protection against "swap recipient slots" attacks.
+ * - `intent_version: u8 = 1` at position 1 reserves the discriminant
+ *   for future format upgrades. A v2 SealInput format would write
+ *   `intent_version: 2` and the on-chain verifier could route to the
+ *   correct decoder by reading the first byte.
+ *
+ * **Canonical input contract (load-bearing)**
+ *
+ * `seal()` hashes the **pre-rewrite, post-filter** DeFi instructions:
+ *
+ *   1. ComputeBudget program ixs are NOT in the input (wallet adapters
+ *      may prepend their own; the user-approved intent shouldn't pin
+ *      a specific budget). `seal()` filters these out via
+ *      `params.instructions.filter(ix => ix.programAddress !== COMPUTE_BUDGET_PROGRAM)`
+ *      before computing the digest.
+ *   2. Top-level System program ixs are NOT in the input (`isProtocolAllowed`
+ *      would reject them anyway; `seal()` strips them in the same filter).
+ *   3. Agent-ATA → vault-ATA rewrites happen AFTER the digest is
+ *      computed. The digest reflects what the USER APPROVED (agent
+ *      ATAs), not what the SDK SUBMITTED (vault ATAs). Any future
+ *      on-chain verifier MUST receive the pre-rewrite projection as
+ *      an explicit argument; re-deriving from the submitted tx bytes
+ *      is impossible.
+ *   4. `outputStablecoinAccount` and `additionalAtaReplacements` from
+ *      `SealParams` are NOT bound by the digest in 0.16.x — they are
+ *      caller-supplied overrides that materially change downstream
+ *      ATA flow. Phase 9 Batch M §RP flagged this as a HIGH gap. A
+ *      preview UI that wants tight intent binding MUST refuse any
+ *      `SealParams` carrying these overrides until 0.16.1 hashes them
+ *      into the canonical encoding.
+ *
+ * Any re-implementation that wants to verify a digest produced by
+ * `seal()` MUST apply the same filter + use the pre-rewrite ix list.
+ */
+import type { Address, Instruction } from "../kit-adapter.js";
+/**
+ * Network discriminant used at canonical position 2. Devnet and mainnet
+ * are the two values bound by the digest; testnet and localnet are
+ * coerced to devnet for digest purposes (the cap/allowlist contract is
+ * the same on all non-mainnet networks).
+ *
+ * @internal The numeric discriminants are an encoding detail of the
+ * canonical digest layout. Callers should pass `network: "devnet" |
+ * "mainnet"` to {@link computeSealInputDigest} and let the encoder map
+ * to the wire value. Consumers wanting a CAIP-2 string for cross-system
+ * binding should use `CAIP2_SOLANA_*` from `../caip2-network.js`.
+ */
+export declare const NETWORK_ID_DEVNET: 0;
+/** @internal See {@link NETWORK_ID_DEVNET}. */
+export declare const NETWORK_ID_MAINNET: 1;
+/**
+ * Inputs to {@link computeSealInputDigest}. A narrower projection of
+ * `SealParams` containing only the binding fields.
+ *
+ * `targetProtocol` is optional; when omitted, the system program ID
+ * (`11111111111111111111111111111111`) is encoded at canonical position
+ * 7. The on-chain verifier MUST mirror this default to keep the digest
+ * stable.
+ */
+export interface SealIntentInput {
+    vault: Address | string;
+    /**
+     * Agent identity pubkey. In V2 (Phase 9) the agent identity IS the
+     * signer address — `params.agent.address` from `seal()`. If a future
+     * V3 multi-sig flow ever separates signer from identity, this field
+     * MUST carry the IDENTITY (the address that was registered in the
+     * vault's agent list), not the signer.
+     */
+    agent: Address | string;
+    tokenMint: Address | string;
+    amount: bigint;
+    targetProtocol?: Address | string;
+    network: "devnet" | "mainnet";
+    instructions: readonly Pick<Instruction, "programAddress" | "accounts" | "data">[];
+}
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical AL3 intent digest over a `SealIntentInput`.
+ *
+ * @returns 32-byte SHA-256 digest. Stable across Node, Bun, and the
+ * browser (Phase 9 Batch L hex fixtures lock this down).
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to exactly 32 bytes, if
+ *   `amount` is negative, or if `network` isn't `"devnet"` or `"mainnet"`.
+ */
+export declare function computeSealInputDigest(input: SealIntentInput): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Inputs to {@link computeScalarIntentDigest} — the on-chain-verifiable
+ * SCALAR subset of {@link SealIntentInput}.
+ *
+ * Drops the `instructions` array because the on-chain verifier does not
+ * (yet) recompute the full ix-bound digest — that requires the ATA-rewrite
+ * mapping table to cross the seal()/validate_and_authorize boundary, which
+ * is v0.17+ work. The scalar subset binds the recipient/amount/mint/protocol
+ * fields the user approves in the preview UI; ix-data tamper is still
+ * gated by R-1..R-4 + TA-12 + TA-14 post-execution invariants.
+ */
+export interface ScalarIntentInput {
+    vault: Address | string;
+    agent: Address | string;
+    tokenMint: Address | string;
+    amount: bigint;
+    targetProtocol?: Address | string;
+    network: "devnet" | "mainnet";
+}
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical scalar AL3 intent digest (D-1 + D-6 close, Bucket
+ * 2 2026-05-21).
+ *
+ * SHA-256 over: `b"SIG1" || u8(2) || u8(network_id) || vault || agent ||
+ * token_mint || u64_le(amount) || target_protocol`. Total 142 bytes.
+ *
+ * The on-chain verifier at `programs/sigil/src/utils/intent_digest.rs`
+ * recomputes this same digest from `validate_and_authorize`'s typed
+ * arguments and rejects bundle execution on byte-equal mismatch
+ * (`ErrIntentDigestMismatch` code 6102). Network discriminant is derived
+ * on-chain from the program's build feature; the caller does NOT pin it
+ * — the encoder here just writes the byte the caller's wallet computed,
+ * and Rust verifies the byte matches its own network. Wrong-network
+ * digests fail by construction.
+ *
+ * @returns 32-byte SHA-256 digest, byte-equal to the Rust verifier output.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to 32 bytes, if `amount`
+ *   is negative, or if `network` isn't `"devnet"` or `"mainnet"`.
+ */
+export declare function computeScalarIntentDigest(input: ScalarIntentInput): Uint8Array;
+//# sourceMappingURL=intent-digest.d.ts.map

package/dist/seal/intent-digest.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/seal/intent-digest.js

@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/**
+ * AL3 — `computeSealInputDigest()` per-call intent digest.
+ * Phase 9 Batch I (ISC-69..76, 143, 148, 150, 153, 155).
+ *
+ * SHA-256 over a canonical Borsh-style encoding of the SealInput envelope
+ * (vault, agent identity, mint, amount, target protocol, network, sealed
+ * instructions). Mirrors the discipline of TA-19's `policy_preview_digest`
+ * (`sdk/kit/src/policy/compute-policy-preview-digest.ts`) — same primitive
+ * (SHA-256 via the shared `canonical-encode.ts` helper), same APPEND-ONLY
+ * field ordering, same byte-equal cross-runtime test fixture pattern.
+ *
+ * **What this defends against**
+ * TA-19 binds the POLICY STATE the owner approved (allowlists, caps,
+ * cosign flag, agent set hash). It does NOT bind the specific call the
+ * agent is making — a compromised agent can still propose a transfer to
+ * an attacker-controlled but still-allowlisted recipient, or reorder
+ * instruction account metas to swap a destination, and the policy
+ * checks all pass. AL3 closes that gap: the owner approves a SPECIFIC
+ * intent (recipient, amount, mint, ix shape) in the preview UI, the SDK
+ * hashes that intent into a 32-byte digest, and `executeSeal` rejects
+ * if the bundle assembled at submit time produces a different digest.
+ *
+ * **Canonical encoding (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER)**
+ *
+ *   1. intent_version: u8 = 1                          (1 byte, reserved
+ *                                                       for future format
+ *                                                       evolution per
+ *                                                       Council ISC-155)
+ *   2. network_id: u8                                  (1 byte; 0=devnet,
+ *                                                       1=mainnet — binds
+ *                                                       AL4 isMainnet so
+ *                                                       a mainnet bundle
+ *                                                       can't be replayed
+ *                                                       through a devnet
+ *                                                       preview)
+ *   3. vault: Pubkey                                   (32 bytes)
+ *   4. agent: Pubkey                                   (32 bytes —
+ *                                                       agent IDENTITY,
+ *                                                       not signer)
+ *   5. token_mint: Pubkey                              (32 bytes)
+ *   6. amount: u64 LE                                  (8 bytes)
+ *   7. target_protocol: Pubkey                         (32 bytes; system
+ *                                                       program if the
+ *                                                       caller omitted
+ *                                                       targetProtocol)
+ *   8. instructions: Vec<Ix>                           (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       each ix below)
+ *
+ *   Each ix:
+ *     a. program_address: Pubkey                       (32 bytes)
+ *     b. accounts: Vec<(address: Pubkey, role: u8)>    (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       each 33-byte
+ *                                                       entry)
+ *     c. data: Vec<u8>                                 (u32 LE length ++
+ *                                                       data bytes)
+ *
+ * **Discipline guardrails**
+ *
+ * - NEVER `JSON.stringify` the input. Object property iteration order is
+ *   not stable across engines and silent reorderings would invalidate
+ *   the digest invariant. The canonical encoder walks fields explicitly.
+ * - 32-byte pubkey comparisons use `Buffer.compare` on raw bytes (NOT
+ *   base58 lexicographic) so the byte ordering matches Solana's
+ *   `Pubkey::cmp` exactly. Council ISC-150 flagged this as a critical
+ *   bug class — base58 lex doesn't preserve the canonical byte ordering
+ *   when leading-zero counts differ.
+ * - Account meta order is preserved as supplied. Reordering metas — even
+ *   identical pubkeys — produces a different digest. This is the load-
+ *   bearing protection against "swap recipient slots" attacks.
+ * - `intent_version: u8 = 1` at position 1 reserves the discriminant
+ *   for future format upgrades. A v2 SealInput format would write
+ *   `intent_version: 2` and the on-chain verifier could route to the
+ *   correct decoder by reading the first byte.
+ *
+ * **Canonical input contract (load-bearing)**
+ *
+ * `seal()` hashes the **pre-rewrite, post-filter** DeFi instructions:
+ *
+ *   1. ComputeBudget program ixs are NOT in the input (wallet adapters
+ *      may prepend their own; the user-approved intent shouldn't pin
+ *      a specific budget). `seal()` filters these out via
+ *      `params.instructions.filter(ix => ix.programAddress !== COMPUTE_BUDGET_PROGRAM)`
+ *      before computing the digest.
+ *   2. Top-level System program ixs are NOT in the input (`isProtocolAllowed`
+ *      would reject them anyway; `seal()` strips them in the same filter).
+ *   3. Agent-ATA → vault-ATA rewrites happen AFTER the digest is
+ *      computed. The digest reflects what the USER APPROVED (agent
+ *      ATAs), not what the SDK SUBMITTED (vault ATAs). Any future
+ *      on-chain verifier MUST receive the pre-rewrite projection as
+ *      an explicit argument; re-deriving from the submitted tx bytes
+ *      is impossible.
+ *   4. `outputStablecoinAccount` and `additionalAtaReplacements` from
+ *      `SealParams` are NOT bound by the digest in 0.16.x — they are
+ *      caller-supplied overrides that materially change downstream
+ *      ATA flow. Phase 9 Batch M §RP flagged this as a HIGH gap. A
+ *      preview UI that wants tight intent binding MUST refuse any
+ *      `SealParams` carrying these overrides until 0.16.1 hashes them
+ *      into the canonical encoding.
+ *
+ * Any re-implementation that wants to verify a digest produced by
+ * `seal()` MUST apply the same filter + use the pre-rewrite ix list.
+ */
+import { base58Decode32, sha256, writeU32Le, writeU64Le, writeU8, } from "../canonical-encode.js";
+import { SigilSdkDomainError } from "../errors/sdk.js";
+import { SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_AMOUNT, SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_NETWORK, SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, } from "../errors/codes.js";
+/**
+ * Network discriminant used at canonical position 2. Devnet and mainnet
+ * are the two values bound by the digest; testnet and localnet are
+ * coerced to devnet for digest purposes (the cap/allowlist contract is
+ * the same on all non-mainnet networks).
+ *
+ * @internal The numeric discriminants are an encoding detail of the
+ * canonical digest layout. Callers should pass `network: "devnet" |
+ * "mainnet"` to {@link computeSealInputDigest} and let the encoder map
+ * to the wire value. Consumers wanting a CAIP-2 string for cross-system
+ * binding should use `CAIP2_SOLANA_*` from `../caip2-network.js`.
+ */
+export const NETWORK_ID_DEVNET = 0;
+/** @internal See {@link NETWORK_ID_DEVNET}. */
+export const NETWORK_ID_MAINNET = 1;
+/** Canonical default for an omitted `targetProtocol` — the system program ID. */
+const SYSTEM_PROGRAM_ZEROS = new Uint8Array(32);
+/**
+ * Magic prefix prepended to the canonical encoding (D-6 close, Bucket 2
+ * 2026-05-21). Protects against cross-format digest collisions if Sigil ever
+ * introduces a different SHA-256-based digest with the same field shape.
+ * Mirror of `INTENT_DIGEST_MAGIC` in `programs/sigil/src/utils/intent_digest.rs:33`.
+ */
+const INTENT_DIGEST_MAGIC = new Uint8Array([0x53, 0x49, 0x47, 0x31]); // "SIG1"
+/**
+ * Intent format version. Bucket 2 bumped from v1 → v2 to discriminate the
+ * magic-prefix addition and the on-chain scalar verifier ABI. v1 was the
+ * prior client-only digest without prefix; any old v1 fixture is now
+ * unverifiable on-chain by construction.
+ */
+const INTENT_VERSION_V2 = 2;
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical AL3 intent digest over a `SealIntentInput`.
+ *
+ * @returns 32-byte SHA-256 digest. Stable across Node, Bun, and the
+ * browser (Phase 9 Batch L hex fixtures lock this down).
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to exactly 32 bytes, if
+ *   `amount` is negative, or if `network` isn't `"devnet"` or `"mainnet"`.
+ */
+export function computeSealInputDigest(input) {
+    if (input.amount < 0n) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_AMOUNT, `computeSealInputDigest: amount must be non-negative, got ${input.amount}`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                field: "amount",
+                received: input.amount.toString(),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    const networkId = input.network === "mainnet"
+        ? NETWORK_ID_MAINNET
+        : input.network === "devnet"
+            ? NETWORK_ID_DEVNET
+            : -1;
+    if (networkId < 0) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_NETWORK, `computeSealInputDigest: network must be 'devnet' or 'mainnet', got ${String(input.network)}`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                received: String(input.network),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    // Decode all pubkeys up front so any malformed input fails before we
+    // start the hash walk (clear error messages > corrupt digests).
+    const vaultBytes = base58Decode32(input.vault);
+    const agentBytes = base58Decode32(input.agent);
+    const tokenMintBytes = base58Decode32(input.tokenMint);
+    const targetProtocolBytes = input.targetProtocol === undefined
+        ? SYSTEM_PROGRAM_ZEROS
+        : base58Decode32(input.targetProtocol);
+    const decodedIxs = input.instructions.map((ix, idx) => {
+        if (!ix.programAddress) {
+            throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeSealInputDigest: ix[${idx}].programAddress is required`, {
+                context: {
+                    operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                    field: `ix[${idx}].programAddress`,
+                    ixIndex: idx,
+                },
+            });
+        }
+        const programAddress = base58Decode32(ix.programAddress);
+        const accounts = (ix.accounts ?? []).map((acc, accIdx) => {
+            if (!acc.address) {
+                throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeSealInputDigest: ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].address is required`, {
+                    context: {
+                        operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                        field: `ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].address`,
+                        ixIndex: idx,
+                        accountIndex: accIdx,
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            const role = acc.role;
+            if (role === undefined || role === null) {
+                throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeSealInputDigest: ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].role is required`, {
+                    context: {
+                        operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                        field: `ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].role`,
+                        ixIndex: idx,
+                        accountIndex: accIdx,
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            // §RP Batch I L-1: AccountRole enum values are 0..3 (READONLY,
+            // WRITABLE, READONLY_SIGNER, WRITABLE_SIGNER). Reject anything
+            // outside that range — a caller bypassing the enum to pass
+            // role=257 would silently truncate to 1 in the digest while the
+            // submitted tx encodes role=1 too (no exec divergence), but the
+            // digest then masks bit-pattern information that a future
+            // verifier might rely on.
+            if (typeof role !== "number" || role < 0 || role > 3) {
+                throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeSealInputDigest: ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].role must be an AccountRole (0..3), got ${String(role)}`, {
+                    context: {
+                        operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                        field: `ix[${idx}].accounts[${accIdx}].role`,
+                        ixIndex: idx,
+                        accountIndex: accIdx,
+                        received: String(role),
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            return {
+                address: base58Decode32(acc.address),
+                role,
+            };
+        });
+        const data = ix.data ? new Uint8Array(ix.data) : new Uint8Array(0);
+        return { programAddress, accounts, data };
+    });
+    // Compute exact buffer size:
+    //   4 (magic "SIG1") + 1 (intent_version) + 1 (network_id) + 32 (vault) +
+    //   32 (agent) + 32 (token_mint) + 8 (amount) + 32 (target_protocol) +
+    //   4 (ix count) + sum over ixs of [32 (programAddress) + 4 (accounts
+    //   count) + sum (33 per account) + 4 (data length) + data.length]
+    //
+    // D-6 close (Bucket 2 2026-05-21): the leading `INTENT_DIGEST_MAGIC`
+    // bytes ("SIG1") bring fixed header to 146 (was 142). v2 encoder.
+    const FIXED = 4 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 32 + 4;
+    let ixsBytes = 0;
+    for (const ix of decodedIxs) {
+        ixsBytes += 32 + 4 + ix.accounts.length * 33 + 4 + ix.data.length;
+    }
+    const buf = new Uint8Array(FIXED + ixsBytes);
+    const view = new DataView(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, buf.byteLength);
+    let off = 0;
+    buf.set(INTENT_DIGEST_MAGIC, off);
+    off += 4;
+    off = writeU8(view, off, INTENT_VERSION_V2);
+    off = writeU8(view, off, networkId);
+    buf.set(vaultBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    buf.set(agentBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    buf.set(tokenMintBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, input.amount);
+    buf.set(targetProtocolBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    off = writeU32Le(view, off, decodedIxs.length);
+    for (const ix of decodedIxs) {
+        buf.set(ix.programAddress, off);
+        off += 32;
+        off = writeU32Le(view, off, ix.accounts.length);
+        for (const acc of ix.accounts) {
+            buf.set(acc.address, off);
+            off += 32;
+            off = writeU8(view, off, acc.role);
+        }
+        off = writeU32Le(view, off, ix.data.length);
+        buf.set(ix.data, off);
+        off += ix.data.length;
+    }
+    if (off !== buf.length) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeSealInputDigest: encoded ${off} bytes, expected ${buf.length}. ` +
+            `If you added a field to SealIntentInput, update the FIXED/ixsBytes ` +
+            `sizing AND the encoder body in the SAME commit.`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeSealInputDigest",
+                field: "encoder_size_invariant",
+                encoded: off,
+                expected: buf.length,
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    return sha256(buf);
+}
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical scalar AL3 intent digest (D-1 + D-6 close, Bucket
+ * 2 2026-05-21).
+ *
+ * SHA-256 over: `b"SIG1" || u8(2) || u8(network_id) || vault || agent ||
+ * token_mint || u64_le(amount) || target_protocol`. Total 142 bytes.
+ *
+ * The on-chain verifier at `programs/sigil/src/utils/intent_digest.rs`
+ * recomputes this same digest from `validate_and_authorize`'s typed
+ * arguments and rejects bundle execution on byte-equal mismatch
+ * (`ErrIntentDigestMismatch` code 6102). Network discriminant is derived
+ * on-chain from the program's build feature; the caller does NOT pin it
+ * — the encoder here just writes the byte the caller's wallet computed,
+ * and Rust verifies the byte matches its own network. Wrong-network
+ * digests fail by construction.
+ *
+ * @returns 32-byte SHA-256 digest, byte-equal to the Rust verifier output.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to 32 bytes, if `amount`
+ *   is negative, or if `network` isn't `"devnet"` or `"mainnet"`.
+ */
+export function computeScalarIntentDigest(input) {
+    if (input.amount < 0n) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_AMOUNT, `computeScalarIntentDigest: amount must be non-negative, got ${input.amount}`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeScalarIntentDigest",
+                field: "amount",
+                received: input.amount.toString(),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    const networkId = input.network === "mainnet"
+        ? NETWORK_ID_MAINNET
+        : input.network === "devnet"
+            ? NETWORK_ID_DEVNET
+            : -1;
+    if (networkId < 0) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_NETWORK, `computeScalarIntentDigest: network must be 'devnet' or 'mainnet', got ${String(input.network)}`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeScalarIntentDigest",
+                received: String(input.network),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    const vaultBytes = base58Decode32(input.vault);
+    const agentBytes = base58Decode32(input.agent);
+    const tokenMintBytes = base58Decode32(input.tokenMint);
+    const targetProtocolBytes = input.targetProtocol === undefined
+        ? SYSTEM_PROGRAM_ZEROS
+        : base58Decode32(input.targetProtocol);
+    // 4 magic + 1 version + 1 network_id + 32 + 32 + 32 + 8 + 32 = 142 bytes.
+    const buf = new Uint8Array(142);
+    const view = new DataView(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, buf.byteLength);
+    let off = 0;
+    buf.set(INTENT_DIGEST_MAGIC, off);
+    off += 4;
+    off = writeU8(view, off, INTENT_VERSION_V2);
+    off = writeU8(view, off, networkId);
+    buf.set(vaultBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    buf.set(agentBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    buf.set(tokenMintBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, input.amount);
+    buf.set(targetProtocolBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    if (off !== 142) {
+        throw new SigilSdkDomainError(SIGIL_ERROR__SDK__INVALID_PARAMS, `computeScalarIntentDigest: encoded ${off} bytes, expected 142.`, {
+            context: {
+                operation: "computeScalarIntentDigest",
+                field: "encoder_size_invariant",
+                encoded: off,
+                expected: 142,
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    return sha256(buf);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=intent-digest.js.map

package/dist/seal/intent-digest.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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