@usesigil/kit 0.16.0 → 0.17.0

package/dist/generated/accounts/policyConfig.d.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * @see https://github.com/codama-idl/codama
  */
 import { fetchEncodedAccount, fetchEncodedAccounts, type Account, type Address, type Codec, type Decoder, type EncodedAccount, type Encoder, type FetchAccountConfig, type FetchAccountsConfig, type MaybeAccount, type MaybeEncodedAccount, type ReadonlyUint8Array } from "@solana/kit";
+import { type DestinationGraylistEntry, type DestinationGraylistEntryArgs } from "../types/index.js";
 export declare const POLICY_CONFIG_DISCRIMINATOR: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
 export declare function getPolicyConfigDiscriminatorBytes(): ReadonlyUint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
 export type PolicyConfig = {
@@ -20,10 +21,9 @@ export type PolicyConfig = {
     /** Maximum single transaction size in USD (6 decimals). */
     maxTransactionSizeUsd: bigint;
     /**
-     * Protocol access control mode:
-     * 0 = all allowed (protocols list ignored)
-     * 1 = allowlist (only protocols in list)
-     * 2 = denylist (all except protocols in list)
+     * Protocol allowlist mode. Phase 2 Option A: ONLY value 1 (ALLOWLIST)
+     * permitted. Modes 0 (ALL) and 2 (DENYLIST) deleted under L-1. Handler
+     * rejects any other value with `ErrInvalidProtocolMode`.
      */
     protocolMode: number;
     /**
@@ -37,9 +37,13 @@ export type PolicyConfig = {
      */
     developerFeeRate: number;
     /**
-     * Maximum slippage tolerance for Jupiter swaps in basis points.
-     * 0 = reject all swaps (vault owner must explicitly configure).
-     * Enforced on-chain via instruction introspection of Jupiter data.
+     * Maximum slippage tolerance (basis points) — generic config primitive
+     * preserved per D-5 across Phase 1 Option A demolition. Per L-1 there is
+     * no on-chain Jupiter slippage verifier in V1; this field is consumed by
+     * off-chain SDK simulators and (Phase 6) generic post-execution assertions
+     * (R-1 mint-delta cap). Validated at config time via
+     * `max_slippage_bps <= MAX_SLIPPAGE_BPS` (= 5000 BPS = 50% ceiling).
+     * 0 = no slippage protection configured.
      */
     maxSlippageBps: number;
     /** Timelock duration in seconds for policy changes. 0 = no timelock. */
@@ -49,11 +53,6 @@ export type PolicyConfig = {
      * Empty = any destination allowed. Bounded to MAX_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS.
      */
     allowedDestinations: Array<Address>;
-    /**
-     * Whether instruction constraints PDA exists for this vault.
-     * Set true by create_instruction_constraints, false by apply_close_constraints.
-     */
-    hasConstraints: boolean;
     /**
      * Whether a pending policy update PDA exists for this vault.
      * Set true by queue_policy_update, false by apply/cancel_pending_policy.
@@ -93,14 +92,237 @@ export type PolicyConfig = {
      */
     hasPostAssertions: number;
     /**
-     * Destination access control mode for `agent_transfer`:
-     * 0 = Restricted (DEFAULT) — destination MUST be in `allowed_destinations`.
-     * 1 = OpenWithCap — destination unrestricted; only `daily_spending_cap_usd` throttles drain.
-     * Closes F-4 (third-pass audit): empty `allowed_destinations` no longer
-     * implies default-allow. Owners must explicitly opt into OpenWithCap via
-     * queue_policy_update / apply_pending_policy.
+     * Destination access control mode for `agent_transfer` and spending paths.
+     *
+     * Phase 2 Option A: only value 0 (RESTRICTED) is accepted. Permissive
+     * OPEN_WITH_CAP (1) was deleted. Closes F-4 (third-pass audit) and the
+     * subsequent owner-opt-in window definitively.
      */
     destinationMode: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-19 (Phase 2): SHA-256 digest of the canonical Borsh encoding of the
+     * policy fields the owner approved at queue/init time. Bound at the same
+     * instruction where the owner signs the change, re-asserted at apply, so
+     * a compromised owner-signer or pending-PDA tampering cannot mutate the
+     * applied policy without producing a digest mismatch.
+     *
+     * CANONICAL ENCODING (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER):
+     * 1. `daily_spending_cap_usd: u64`
+     * 2. `max_transaction_size_usd: u64`
+     * 3. `max_slippage_bps: u16`
+     * 4. `developer_fee_rate: u16` — PEN-CROSS-6 (Phase 2 close-up)
+     * 5. `protocol_mode: u8`
+     * 6. `protocols: Vec<Pubkey>`
+     * 7. `destination_mode: u8`
+     * 8. `allowed_destinations: Vec<Pubkey>`
+     * 9. `timelock_duration: u64`
+     * 10. `session_expiry_seconds: u64`
+     * 11. `observe_only: bool`
+     * 12. `has_constraints: bool`
+     * 13. `has_post_assertions: u8`
+     * 14. `created_at_slot: u64` — PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up)
+     *
+     * All fields encoded as Borsh: u8/u16/u64 little-endian, `bool` as `[u8; 1]`
+     * (0 or 1), `Vec<Pubkey>` as `u32_le_len ++ pubkey_bytes_concatenated`.
+     * The SDK helper `computePolicyPreviewDigest` mirrors this encoding exactly.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    policyPreviewDigest: ReadonlyUint8Array;
+    /**
+     * PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up): the slot at which `initialize_vault`
+     * minted this PolicyConfig. Bound by TA-19 at position 14 of the
+     * canonical digest encoding.
+     *
+     * Closes the close+reinit replay window: an owner who closes a vault
+     * (via `close_vault`) and later re-inits a fresh PDA at the same
+     * (owner, vault_id) gets a new `created_at_slot`. The signed
+     * `initialize_vault` ix from the old vault encodes the OLD slot in its
+     * preview digest, so replaying that signed tx against the fresh PDA
+     * produces a digest mismatch and `PolicyPreviewMismatch` rejects it.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    createdAtSlot: bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-05 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #2): 24-bit UTC operating-hours
+     * bitmask. Bit `n` (0 ≤ n ≤ 23) set → spending allowed when
+     * `clock.unix_timestamp / 3600 % 24 == n`. Upper 8 bits (24..=31)
+     * MUST be zero; rejected at write-time.
+     *
+     * Default for owners who don't narrow: 0xFFFFFF (all 24 hours enabled
+     * — equivalent to "no operating-hours constraint"). New vaults set
+     * this explicitly via the digest the owner signs; back-compat
+     * consideration removed per L-3 (Phase 2 TA-19 bound the field anyway).
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at position 15 of the canonical digest encoding.
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    operatingHours: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-07 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #4): first-time-destination
+     * 24-hour graylist friction. When a NEW destination is added to
+     * `allowed_destinations` (via queue_policy_update), it enters this
+     * graylist with `unlock_unix = now + 86400` (24h). Until either
+     * (a) the unlock time elapses OR (b) the owner calls
+     * `promote_graylist_destination` to fast-track, spending paths
+     * reject any tx routing value to that destination with
+     * `ErrGraylistFriction` (6077).
+     *
+     * Tuple is `(destination_pubkey, unlock_unix)`. Bounded ≤10 entries
+     * (max_destinations). When full, additional allowlist adds reject
+     * with `ErrGraylistFull` (6087) until an existing entry unlocks or
+     * is promoted.
+     *
+     * DESIGN: graylist entries are derived/ephemeral state — the owner's
+     * signed digest already binds the allowlist (canonical position 8),
+     * and graylist friction only delays an already-authorised destination.
+     * Therefore the graylist itself is NOT in the canonical digest
+     * encoding. Promoting accelerates the unlock but cannot widen the
+     * allowlist beyond what the owner signed.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    destinationGraylist: Array<DestinationGraylistEntry>;
+    /**
+     * TA-07 (Phase 3): if true, new destinations added to the allowlist
+     * skip the 24h graylist entirely (audit trail still recorded via
+     * emitted events). Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 16
+     * so the owner's choice to bypass friction is part of the signed
+     * configuration — not silently flipped.
+     *
+     * Default false. APPENDED at end per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    autoPromoteGrays: boolean;
+    /**
+     * TA-17 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #7): consecutive-failure
+     * threshold after which an agent's capability is auto-revoked.
+     * Owner-configurable in range 3..=20; out-of-range values rejected
+     * at policy-write time with `InvalidPermissions`. Default 5.
+     *
+     * Only on-chain policy-violation codes (6074-6091) count — see
+     * `POLICY_VIOLATION_RANGE` in finalize_session. External codes
+     * (CU exhaustion, nonce desync, auth) do NOT increment.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 17. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    autoRevokeThreshold: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-12 (Phase 5 post-execution invariant #1): hard floor on the
+     * combined USDC + USDT balance held by the vault. After every
+     * `finalize_session` spending path completes (CPI balance audit +
+     * rolling-cap + per-agent + per-protocol bookkeeping), the handler
+     * re-reads the vault's USDC + USDT token-account balances and
+     * asserts their sum is ≥ this value. If not, it rejects with
+     * `ErrStableFloorViolation` (6085).
+     *
+     * This is the LAST defensive line — no combination of attacks (CPI
+     * drain, per-protocol cap bypass via async fulfillment, fee
+     * inflation, slippage manipulation) may drain the vault below this
+     * line. Default 0 (no reserve — preserves all existing vault
+     * behavior). Owner-configurable via `initialize_vault` and
+     * `queue_policy_update`.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 18. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    stableBalanceFloor: bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-14 (Phase 5 post-execution invariant #2): rolling 24h
+     * per-recipient outflow cap, in 6-decimal USDC face value. When
+     * non-zero, every `finalize_session` spending path validates that
+     * the recipient's rolling 24h spend (tracked on
+     * `SpendTracker.per_recipient`) PLUS this transaction's outflow
+     * to that recipient stays ≤ this value. Otherwise rejects with
+     * `ErrRecipientCapExceeded` (6096).
+     *
+     * Default 0 (no per-recipient cap) preserves existing vault
+     * behavior. Owner-configurable via `initialize_vault` and
+     * `queue_policy_update`.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 19. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    perRecipientDailyCapUsd: bigint;
+    /**
+     * G6 (audit 2026-05-18): owner-controlled opt-in flag for TA-09
+     * cosign enforcement on elevated policy mutations.
+     *
+     * When `false` (default): elevated mutations (raising caps,
+     * expanding allowlists, weakening floors / per-recipient caps /
+     * protocol caps) require only the owner's signature — no cosign
+     * session is required. Low-friction default, suitable for solo
+     * founders, AI-agent automation, dev/test vaults, and any vault
+     * whose owner is a Squads V4 multisig PDA (multisig at the Solana
+     * layer already enforces multi-signer authorization).
+     *
+     * When `true`: TA-09 elevation checks fire. The seven elevation
+     * triggers in `queue_policy_update` (raises_daily_cap,
+     * raises_max_tx, expands_destinations, expands_protocols,
+     * lowers_floor, weakens_per_recipient_cap, weakens_protocol_caps)
+     * require a non-default `cosign_session` pubkey + a corresponding
+     * signer in `remaining_accounts` with `is_signer == true`.
+     *
+     * Toggle semantics:
+     * - **Enabling (false → true)** is NON-ELEVATED. It is a safety
+     * improvement — owner is voluntarily tightening the policy.
+     * Cosign is not required to enable cosign.
+     * - **Disabling (true → false)** IS ELEVATED. One-way-ratchet
+     * semantics: if cosign is currently ON, the owner cannot turn
+     * it OFF without producing a valid cosign signature — exactly
+     * the protection cosign was meant to provide. A phishing-
+     * compromised owner key cannot silently disable cosign and
+     * then drain via subsequent non-elevated mutations.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 20. APPENDED at end
+     * of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    cosignRequired: boolean;
+    /**
+     * D-5 close (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): the cosign-session pubkey
+     * gating elevated capability grants on the `reactivate_vault` path.
+     *
+     * THREAT: a phished/leaked owner key can chain
+     * `freeze_vault → reactivate_vault(new_agent=ATTACKER, FULL_CAPABILITY)`
+     * in a single transaction. The vault's `cosign_required` flag gates
+     * elevated MUTATIONS via `queue_policy_update`, but the reactivate
+     * path grafts a new agent at FULL_CAPABILITY directly — no timelock,
+     * no cosign — yielding an instant operator-class grant.
+     *
+     * DEFENSE: when `cosign_session_pubkey != Pubkey::default()` AND the
+     * reactivate ix passes `capability == FULL_CAPABILITY` for the new
+     * agent, the handler REQUIRES a matching signer in
+     * `ctx.remaining_accounts` whose key equals this pubkey AND
+     * `is_signer == true`. Otherwise rejects with
+     * `ErrReactivateCosignRequiredForFullCapability` (6114).
+     *
+     * Default `Pubkey::default()` at `initialize_vault` time means
+     * existing vaults retain today's behavior (no cosign gate on
+     * reactivate). Owners opt in by setting a non-default value via
+     * `queue_policy_update`. Setting a non-default value here is
+     * orthogonal to `cosign_required` — the two gate different ix paths
+     * (queue/apply vs reactivate) and use different pubkey sources
+     * (`pending.cosign_session` vs this field).
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 22. APPENDED at end
+     * of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    cosignSessionPubkey: Address;
+    /**
+     * F-Q6 (2026-06-02): owner-configured delay (in seconds) before an
+     * OPERATOR capability grant takes effect. Default 0. An owner-set
+     * security control gating OPERATOR seating — bound by TA-19 at canonical
+     * digest position 22 so a tampered SDK or pending-PDA mutation cannot
+     * silently lower it between owner approval and on-chain landing.
+     * Changeable only via the timelocked `queue_policy_update` path (so
+     * lowering it is itself delayed). The single-key forced floor
+     * (`max(field, 600)`) and per-tier grant logic live in `register_agent`
+     * / `queue_agent_grant`.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    operatorGrantDelaySeconds: bigint;
 };
 export type PolicyConfigArgs = {
     /** Associated vault pubkey */
@@ -113,10 +335,9 @@ export type PolicyConfigArgs = {
     /** Maximum single transaction size in USD (6 decimals). */
     maxTransactionSizeUsd: number | bigint;
     /**
-     * Protocol access control mode:
-     * 0 = all allowed (protocols list ignored)
-     * 1 = allowlist (only protocols in list)
-     * 2 = denylist (all except protocols in list)
+     * Protocol allowlist mode. Phase 2 Option A: ONLY value 1 (ALLOWLIST)
+     * permitted. Modes 0 (ALL) and 2 (DENYLIST) deleted under L-1. Handler
+     * rejects any other value with `ErrInvalidProtocolMode`.
      */
     protocolMode: number;
     /**
@@ -130,9 +351,13 @@ export type PolicyConfigArgs = {
      */
     developerFeeRate: number;
     /**
-     * Maximum slippage tolerance for Jupiter swaps in basis points.
-     * 0 = reject all swaps (vault owner must explicitly configure).
-     * Enforced on-chain via instruction introspection of Jupiter data.
+     * Maximum slippage tolerance (basis points) — generic config primitive
+     * preserved per D-5 across Phase 1 Option A demolition. Per L-1 there is
+     * no on-chain Jupiter slippage verifier in V1; this field is consumed by
+     * off-chain SDK simulators and (Phase 6) generic post-execution assertions
+     * (R-1 mint-delta cap). Validated at config time via
+     * `max_slippage_bps <= MAX_SLIPPAGE_BPS` (= 5000 BPS = 50% ceiling).
+     * 0 = no slippage protection configured.
      */
     maxSlippageBps: number;
     /** Timelock duration in seconds for policy changes. 0 = no timelock. */
@@ -142,11 +367,6 @@ export type PolicyConfigArgs = {
      * Empty = any destination allowed. Bounded to MAX_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS.
      */
     allowedDestinations: Array<Address>;
-    /**
-     * Whether instruction constraints PDA exists for this vault.
-     * Set true by create_instruction_constraints, false by apply_close_constraints.
-     */
-    hasConstraints: boolean;
     /**
      * Whether a pending policy update PDA exists for this vault.
      * Set true by queue_policy_update, false by apply/cancel_pending_policy.
@@ -186,14 +406,237 @@ export type PolicyConfigArgs = {
      */
     hasPostAssertions: number;
     /**
-     * Destination access control mode for `agent_transfer`:
-     * 0 = Restricted (DEFAULT) — destination MUST be in `allowed_destinations`.
-     * 1 = OpenWithCap — destination unrestricted; only `daily_spending_cap_usd` throttles drain.
-     * Closes F-4 (third-pass audit): empty `allowed_destinations` no longer
-     * implies default-allow. Owners must explicitly opt into OpenWithCap via
-     * queue_policy_update / apply_pending_policy.
+     * Destination access control mode for `agent_transfer` and spending paths.
+     *
+     * Phase 2 Option A: only value 0 (RESTRICTED) is accepted. Permissive
+     * OPEN_WITH_CAP (1) was deleted. Closes F-4 (third-pass audit) and the
+     * subsequent owner-opt-in window definitively.
      */
     destinationMode: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-19 (Phase 2): SHA-256 digest of the canonical Borsh encoding of the
+     * policy fields the owner approved at queue/init time. Bound at the same
+     * instruction where the owner signs the change, re-asserted at apply, so
+     * a compromised owner-signer or pending-PDA tampering cannot mutate the
+     * applied policy without producing a digest mismatch.
+     *
+     * CANONICAL ENCODING (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER):
+     * 1. `daily_spending_cap_usd: u64`
+     * 2. `max_transaction_size_usd: u64`
+     * 3. `max_slippage_bps: u16`
+     * 4. `developer_fee_rate: u16` — PEN-CROSS-6 (Phase 2 close-up)
+     * 5. `protocol_mode: u8`
+     * 6. `protocols: Vec<Pubkey>`
+     * 7. `destination_mode: u8`
+     * 8. `allowed_destinations: Vec<Pubkey>`
+     * 9. `timelock_duration: u64`
+     * 10. `session_expiry_seconds: u64`
+     * 11. `observe_only: bool`
+     * 12. `has_constraints: bool`
+     * 13. `has_post_assertions: u8`
+     * 14. `created_at_slot: u64` — PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up)
+     *
+     * All fields encoded as Borsh: u8/u16/u64 little-endian, `bool` as `[u8; 1]`
+     * (0 or 1), `Vec<Pubkey>` as `u32_le_len ++ pubkey_bytes_concatenated`.
+     * The SDK helper `computePolicyPreviewDigest` mirrors this encoding exactly.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    policyPreviewDigest: ReadonlyUint8Array;
+    /**
+     * PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up): the slot at which `initialize_vault`
+     * minted this PolicyConfig. Bound by TA-19 at position 14 of the
+     * canonical digest encoding.
+     *
+     * Closes the close+reinit replay window: an owner who closes a vault
+     * (via `close_vault`) and later re-inits a fresh PDA at the same
+     * (owner, vault_id) gets a new `created_at_slot`. The signed
+     * `initialize_vault` ix from the old vault encodes the OLD slot in its
+     * preview digest, so replaying that signed tx against the fresh PDA
+     * produces a digest mismatch and `PolicyPreviewMismatch` rejects it.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    createdAtSlot: number | bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-05 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #2): 24-bit UTC operating-hours
+     * bitmask. Bit `n` (0 ≤ n ≤ 23) set → spending allowed when
+     * `clock.unix_timestamp / 3600 % 24 == n`. Upper 8 bits (24..=31)
+     * MUST be zero; rejected at write-time.
+     *
+     * Default for owners who don't narrow: 0xFFFFFF (all 24 hours enabled
+     * — equivalent to "no operating-hours constraint"). New vaults set
+     * this explicitly via the digest the owner signs; back-compat
+     * consideration removed per L-3 (Phase 2 TA-19 bound the field anyway).
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at position 15 of the canonical digest encoding.
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    operatingHours: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-07 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #4): first-time-destination
+     * 24-hour graylist friction. When a NEW destination is added to
+     * `allowed_destinations` (via queue_policy_update), it enters this
+     * graylist with `unlock_unix = now + 86400` (24h). Until either
+     * (a) the unlock time elapses OR (b) the owner calls
+     * `promote_graylist_destination` to fast-track, spending paths
+     * reject any tx routing value to that destination with
+     * `ErrGraylistFriction` (6077).
+     *
+     * Tuple is `(destination_pubkey, unlock_unix)`. Bounded ≤10 entries
+     * (max_destinations). When full, additional allowlist adds reject
+     * with `ErrGraylistFull` (6087) until an existing entry unlocks or
+     * is promoted.
+     *
+     * DESIGN: graylist entries are derived/ephemeral state — the owner's
+     * signed digest already binds the allowlist (canonical position 8),
+     * and graylist friction only delays an already-authorised destination.
+     * Therefore the graylist itself is NOT in the canonical digest
+     * encoding. Promoting accelerates the unlock but cannot widen the
+     * allowlist beyond what the owner signed.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    destinationGraylist: Array<DestinationGraylistEntryArgs>;
+    /**
+     * TA-07 (Phase 3): if true, new destinations added to the allowlist
+     * skip the 24h graylist entirely (audit trail still recorded via
+     * emitted events). Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 16
+     * so the owner's choice to bypass friction is part of the signed
+     * configuration — not silently flipped.
+     *
+     * Default false. APPENDED at end per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    autoPromoteGrays: boolean;
+    /**
+     * TA-17 (Phase 3 pre-execution guard #7): consecutive-failure
+     * threshold after which an agent's capability is auto-revoked.
+     * Owner-configurable in range 3..=20; out-of-range values rejected
+     * at policy-write time with `InvalidPermissions`. Default 5.
+     *
+     * Only on-chain policy-violation codes (6074-6091) count — see
+     * `POLICY_VIOLATION_RANGE` in finalize_session. External codes
+     * (CU exhaustion, nonce desync, auth) do NOT increment.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 17. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule.
+     */
+    autoRevokeThreshold: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-12 (Phase 5 post-execution invariant #1): hard floor on the
+     * combined USDC + USDT balance held by the vault. After every
+     * `finalize_session` spending path completes (CPI balance audit +
+     * rolling-cap + per-agent + per-protocol bookkeeping), the handler
+     * re-reads the vault's USDC + USDT token-account balances and
+     * asserts their sum is ≥ this value. If not, it rejects with
+     * `ErrStableFloorViolation` (6085).
+     *
+     * This is the LAST defensive line — no combination of attacks (CPI
+     * drain, per-protocol cap bypass via async fulfillment, fee
+     * inflation, slippage manipulation) may drain the vault below this
+     * line. Default 0 (no reserve — preserves all existing vault
+     * behavior). Owner-configurable via `initialize_vault` and
+     * `queue_policy_update`.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 18. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    stableBalanceFloor: number | bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-14 (Phase 5 post-execution invariant #2): rolling 24h
+     * per-recipient outflow cap, in 6-decimal USDC face value. When
+     * non-zero, every `finalize_session` spending path validates that
+     * the recipient's rolling 24h spend (tracked on
+     * `SpendTracker.per_recipient`) PLUS this transaction's outflow
+     * to that recipient stays ≤ this value. Otherwise rejects with
+     * `ErrRecipientCapExceeded` (6096).
+     *
+     * Default 0 (no per-recipient cap) preserves existing vault
+     * behavior. Owner-configurable via `initialize_vault` and
+     * `queue_policy_update`.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 19. APPENDED per
+     * F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    perRecipientDailyCapUsd: number | bigint;
+    /**
+     * G6 (audit 2026-05-18): owner-controlled opt-in flag for TA-09
+     * cosign enforcement on elevated policy mutations.
+     *
+     * When `false` (default): elevated mutations (raising caps,
+     * expanding allowlists, weakening floors / per-recipient caps /
+     * protocol caps) require only the owner's signature — no cosign
+     * session is required. Low-friction default, suitable for solo
+     * founders, AI-agent automation, dev/test vaults, and any vault
+     * whose owner is a Squads V4 multisig PDA (multisig at the Solana
+     * layer already enforces multi-signer authorization).
+     *
+     * When `true`: TA-09 elevation checks fire. The seven elevation
+     * triggers in `queue_policy_update` (raises_daily_cap,
+     * raises_max_tx, expands_destinations, expands_protocols,
+     * lowers_floor, weakens_per_recipient_cap, weakens_protocol_caps)
+     * require a non-default `cosign_session` pubkey + a corresponding
+     * signer in `remaining_accounts` with `is_signer == true`.
+     *
+     * Toggle semantics:
+     * - **Enabling (false → true)** is NON-ELEVATED. It is a safety
+     * improvement — owner is voluntarily tightening the policy.
+     * Cosign is not required to enable cosign.
+     * - **Disabling (true → false)** IS ELEVATED. One-way-ratchet
+     * semantics: if cosign is currently ON, the owner cannot turn
+     * it OFF without producing a valid cosign signature — exactly
+     * the protection cosign was meant to provide. A phishing-
+     * compromised owner key cannot silently disable cosign and
+     * then drain via subsequent non-elevated mutations.
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 20. APPENDED at end
+     * of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    cosignRequired: boolean;
+    /**
+     * D-5 close (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): the cosign-session pubkey
+     * gating elevated capability grants on the `reactivate_vault` path.
+     *
+     * THREAT: a phished/leaked owner key can chain
+     * `freeze_vault → reactivate_vault(new_agent=ATTACKER, FULL_CAPABILITY)`
+     * in a single transaction. The vault's `cosign_required` flag gates
+     * elevated MUTATIONS via `queue_policy_update`, but the reactivate
+     * path grafts a new agent at FULL_CAPABILITY directly — no timelock,
+     * no cosign — yielding an instant operator-class grant.
+     *
+     * DEFENSE: when `cosign_session_pubkey != Pubkey::default()` AND the
+     * reactivate ix passes `capability == FULL_CAPABILITY` for the new
+     * agent, the handler REQUIRES a matching signer in
+     * `ctx.remaining_accounts` whose key equals this pubkey AND
+     * `is_signer == true`. Otherwise rejects with
+     * `ErrReactivateCosignRequiredForFullCapability` (6114).
+     *
+     * Default `Pubkey::default()` at `initialize_vault` time means
+     * existing vaults retain today's behavior (no cosign gate on
+     * reactivate). Owners opt in by setting a non-default value via
+     * `queue_policy_update`. Setting a non-default value here is
+     * orthogonal to `cosign_required` — the two gate different ix paths
+     * (queue/apply vs reactivate) and use different pubkey sources
+     * (`pending.cosign_session` vs this field).
+     *
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical digest position 22. APPENDED at end
+     * of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    cosignSessionPubkey: Address;
+    /**
+     * F-Q6 (2026-06-02): owner-configured delay (in seconds) before an
+     * OPERATOR capability grant takes effect. Default 0. An owner-set
+     * security control gating OPERATOR seating — bound by TA-19 at canonical
+     * digest position 22 so a tampered SDK or pending-PDA mutation cannot
+     * silently lower it between owner approval and on-chain landing.
+     * Changeable only via the timelocked `queue_policy_update` path (so
+     * lowering it is itself delayed). The single-key forced floor
+     * (`max(field, 600)`) and per-tier grant logic live in `register_agent`
+     * / `queue_agent_grant`.
+     *
+     * APPENDED at end of struct per F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule for Borsh stability.
+     */
+    operatorGrantDelaySeconds: number | bigint;
 };
 /** Gets the encoder for {@link PolicyConfigArgs} account data. */
 export declare function getPolicyConfigEncoder(): Encoder<PolicyConfigArgs>;

package/dist/generated/accounts/policyConfig.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"policyConfig.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/generated/accounts/policyConfig.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAKL,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EAoBpB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,KAAK,EACV,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,cAAc,EACnB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EACxB,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EACxB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACxB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,yBAEtC,CAAC;AAEH,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,oCAIhD;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG;IACzB,aAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAClC,8BAA8B;IAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,wEAAwE;IACxE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpC;;;OAGG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7B,wBAAwB;IACxB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb;;;;;OAKG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB;;;;OAIG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACzB,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;IAC7B,8BAA8B;IAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACrC,2DAA2D;IAC3D,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACvC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,wEAAwE;IACxE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAClC;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpC;;;OAGG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACtC,wBAAwB;IACxB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb;;;;;OAKG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;OAIG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACzB,CAAC;AAEF,kEAAkE;AAClE,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAyBlE;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAsB9D;AAED,4DAA4D;AAC5D,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAE5E;AAED,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACjE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GACvC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AACnC,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACjE,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAC5C,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAUxC,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACtE,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAI1C;AAED,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EAC3E,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAG/C;AAED,wBAAsB,oBAAoB,CACxC,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC/C,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EACzB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAIlC;AAED,wBAAsB,yBAAyB,CAC7C,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC/C,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EACzB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAGvC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"policyConfig.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/generated/accounts/policyConfig.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAKL,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EAsBpB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,KAAK,EACV,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,cAAc,EACnB,KAAK,OAAO,EACZ,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACvB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EACxB,KAAK,YAAY,EACjB,KAAK,mBAAmB,EACxB,KAAK,kBAAkB,EACxB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACrB,OAAO,EAGL,KAAK,wBAAwB,EAC7B,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAClC,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,yBAEtC,CAAC;AAEH,wBAAgB,iCAAiC,oCAIhD;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG;IACzB,aAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAClC,8BAA8B;IAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,wEAAwE;IACxE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpC;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7B,wBAAwB;IACxB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb;;;;;OAKG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB;;;;OAIG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OA4BG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IACxC;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAuBG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC;IACrD;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAkBG;IACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAeG;IACH,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgCG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OA4BG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnC,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;IAC7B,8BAA8B;IAC9B,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACrC,2DAA2D;IAC3D,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACvC;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,wEAAwE;IACxE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAClC;;;OAGG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpC;;;OAGG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACtC,wBAAwB;IACxB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb;;;;;OAKG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;OAIG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OA4BG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IACxC;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAuBG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC;IACzD;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAkBG;IACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACpC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAeG;IACH,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACzC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgCG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACxB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OA4BG;IACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC7B;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACH,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;CAC5C,CAAC;AAEF,kEAAkE;AAClE,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAsClE;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAmC9D;AAED,4DAA4D;AAC5D,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAE5E;AAED,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACjE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GACvC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AACnC,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACjE,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAC5C,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;AAUxC,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EACtE,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAI1C;AAED,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,EAC3E,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAC1B,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAG/C;AAED,wBAAsB,oBAAoB,CACxC,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC/C,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EACzB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAIlC;AAED,wBAAsB,yBAAyB,CAC7C,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,oBAAoB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAC/C,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EACzB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,GAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAGvC"}

package/dist/generated/accounts/policyConfig.js

@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
  *
  * @see https://github.com/codama-idl/codama
  */
-import { assertAccountExists, assertAccountsExist, combineCodec, decodeAccount, fetchEncodedAccount, fetchEncodedAccounts, fixDecoderSize, fixEncoderSize, getAddressDecoder, getAddressEncoder, getArrayDecoder, getArrayEncoder, getBooleanDecoder, getBooleanEncoder, getBytesDecoder, getBytesEncoder, getStructDecoder, getStructEncoder, getU16Decoder, getU16Encoder, getU64Decoder, getU64Encoder, getU8Decoder, getU8Encoder, transformEncoder, } from "@solana/kit";
+import { assertAccountExists, assertAccountsExist, combineCodec, decodeAccount, fetchEncodedAccount, fetchEncodedAccounts, fixDecoderSize, fixEncoderSize, getAddressDecoder, getAddressEncoder, getArrayDecoder, getArrayEncoder, getBooleanDecoder, getBooleanEncoder, getBytesDecoder, getBytesEncoder, getStructDecoder, getStructEncoder, getU16Decoder, getU16Encoder, getU32Decoder, getU32Encoder, getU64Decoder, getU64Encoder, getU8Decoder, getU8Encoder, transformEncoder, } from "@solana/kit";
+import { getDestinationGraylistEntryDecoder, getDestinationGraylistEntryEncoder, } from "../types/index.js";
 export const POLICY_CONFIG_DISCRIMINATOR = new Uint8Array([
     219, 7, 79, 84, 175, 51, 148, 146,
 ]);
@@ -25,7 +26,6 @@ export function getPolicyConfigEncoder() {
         ["maxSlippageBps", getU16Encoder()],
         ["timelockDuration", getU64Encoder()],
         ["allowedDestinations", getArrayEncoder(getAddressEncoder())],
-        ["hasConstraints", getBooleanEncoder()],
         ["hasPendingPolicy", getBooleanEncoder()],
         ["hasProtocolCaps", getBooleanEncoder()],
         ["protocolCaps", getArrayEncoder(getU64Encoder())],
@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ export function getPolicyConfigEncoder() {
         ["policyVersion", getU64Encoder()],
         ["hasPostAssertions", getU8Encoder()],
         ["destinationMode", getU8Encoder()],
+        ["policyPreviewDigest", fixEncoderSize(getBytesEncoder(), 32)],
+        ["createdAtSlot", getU64Encoder()],
+        ["operatingHours", getU32Encoder()],
+        [
+            "destinationGraylist",
+            getArrayEncoder(getDestinationGraylistEntryEncoder()),
+        ],
+        ["autoPromoteGrays", getBooleanEncoder()],
+        ["autoRevokeThreshold", getU8Encoder()],
+        ["stableBalanceFloor", getU64Encoder()],
+        ["perRecipientDailyCapUsd", getU64Encoder()],
+        ["cosignRequired", getBooleanEncoder()],
+        ["cosignSessionPubkey", getAddressEncoder()],
+        ["operatorGrantDelaySeconds", getU64Encoder()],
     ]), (value) => ({ ...value, discriminator: POLICY_CONFIG_DISCRIMINATOR }));
 }
 /** Gets the decoder for {@link PolicyConfig} account data. */
@@ -49,7 +63,6 @@ export function getPolicyConfigDecoder() {
         ["maxSlippageBps", getU16Decoder()],
         ["timelockDuration", getU64Decoder()],
         ["allowedDestinations", getArrayDecoder(getAddressDecoder())],
-        ["hasConstraints", getBooleanDecoder()],
         ["hasPendingPolicy", getBooleanDecoder()],
         ["hasProtocolCaps", getBooleanDecoder()],
         ["protocolCaps", getArrayDecoder(getU64Decoder())],
@@ -58,6 +71,20 @@ export function getPolicyConfigDecoder() {
         ["policyVersion", getU64Decoder()],
         ["hasPostAssertions", getU8Decoder()],
         ["destinationMode", getU8Decoder()],
+        ["policyPreviewDigest", fixDecoderSize(getBytesDecoder(), 32)],
+        ["createdAtSlot", getU64Decoder()],
+        ["operatingHours", getU32Decoder()],
+        [
+            "destinationGraylist",
+            getArrayDecoder(getDestinationGraylistEntryDecoder()),
+        ],
+        ["autoPromoteGrays", getBooleanDecoder()],
+        ["autoRevokeThreshold", getU8Decoder()],
+        ["stableBalanceFloor", getU64Decoder()],
+        ["perRecipientDailyCapUsd", getU64Decoder()],
+        ["cosignRequired", getBooleanDecoder()],
+        ["cosignSessionPubkey", getAddressDecoder()],
+        ["operatorGrantDelaySeconds", getU64Decoder()],
     ]);
 }
 /** Gets the codec for {@link PolicyConfig} account data. */